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2ABSTRACT
The revolution in the financial sen/ices sector is dramatically changing the way in 
which the securities industry conducts its activities. With existing current differences 
between nations in the regulation of financial institutions acting as barriers to the 
efficient operation of markets, cooperation among governments is needed to ensure 
that the new international setting is both stable and competitive. In North America, 
fresh initiatives are gradually leading towards the harmonization of regulation, 
particularly in the securities sector. As a result, the industry must adjust itself to this 
newly evolving reality.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the principles regulating the Canadian securities 
industry in its newest configuration under a North American free trade area.
To begin the study, a picture is drawn of the Canadian securities industry itself and of 
the events leading to the arrival of what is hoped to be an eventual hemispheric free 
trade area. With the internationalization of Canada’s financial markets, Canadian 
policymakers (both at the federal and provincial levels) have had to make efforts to 
harmonize and coordinate financial regulation affecting the securities industry. These 
efforts were accompanied by a series of undertakings leading towards an indisputable 
"Americanization" of Canadian securities policies.
On another level, an assessment is made of the two most recent developments 
leading to a lowering of barriers to trade in financial services and to the establishment 
of foreign financial institutions in North American domestic markets. These are the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Finally, the work examines the impact of North American free trade on the way the 
players Canadian securities industry now operate at home, in the U.S. as well as in 
Mexico. In the end, the conclusions help to put in perspective the level of progress 
attained by Canadians in view of global and regional competition.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of the present work is to measure the impact of the North American free 
trade agreements on the Canadian securities industry and to determine the desirability 
and the efficiency of North American norms and treaties (in the context of the 
liberalization of trade in services) governing multinational securities-related activities of 
Canadian financial institutions, in this paper, we focus on the principles for regulating 
the North American securities-related1 services offered by Canadian institutions not 
only because of their particular character, but also, because despite the increasing 
internationalization of financial services and markets, the national regulatory systems 
affecting the securities industry in Canada and the United States still differ 
substantially.
This study could not have been written even a few decades ago because its subject 
matter did not exist. In recent years, financial markets have grown very rapidly, mainly 
due to the massive explosion of changes, either domestically or internationally. 
Globalization of securities markets is a recent phenomenon. Fast growing Euroequity 
and Eurobond markets, trading in so-called "world class" equities, linked commodity 
markets, equity markets and clearing agencies, international distributions of 
privatization issues and domestic mutual funds based on foreign portfolios are the 
daily facts of the capital markets. Over the past decades, securities legislation has 
become international in scope and decisions relating to securities regulation and 
services have increasingly been linked to numerous economic and trade policies.
The search for principles to govern the provision of financial services by foreign firms, 
whether located inside or outside the respective national market of customers, has 
taken place in a number of contexts. In view of the fact that internationalization has 
provided better access to new markets and expanded trade opportunities for the
Generally, securities-related services are comprised of a variety of subjects serving to 
provide direct access to capital markets. These include advice, underwriting, 
investment and portfolio management, dealing and brokerage services. Furthermore, 
investment banking involves the provision, with merger and acquisition activities, of 
foreign exchange trading, operations in the Euromarkets and the development of new 
financial instruments. As for the word "securities", it is a catch-all term for stocks, 
bonds, and money market instruments. C.R. GIPSON, The McGraw-Hill Dictionary of 
International Trade and Finance (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1994) at 462.
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securities industry, the role of regulation is ever growing. Although they have 
developed into highly sophisticated international markets, securities markets continue 
to be regulated by national or regional authorities. However, transnational distribution 
of securities have presented serious challenges to all regulators. The world of finance 
has been fundamentally and irrevocably transformed by market forces and economic 
as well as technological factors that have acted as catalysts for these developments. 
Consequently, sustained and increased cooperation among regulators needs to occur 
to ensure that the fairly new international setting is both stable and competitive.
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (hereinafter GATT) included discussions on liberalization of trade in 
services in addition to trade in goods. The inclusion of services for the first time in 
GATT (now run by its successor, the World Trade Organization, hereinafter WTO) 
reflects their increasing importance in international trade, especially over the last 
decade. Financial services, and banking (including securities-related) services in 
particular, are now a significant component of international trade in services, in part 
because of the growing interdependence of national financial markets. Trade in 
services is conventionally defined on a balance of payments basis to comprise certain 
non-merchandise transactions between residents and non-residents of a country2. 
Due to the intangibility of services, trade data can generally be derived only from 
central bank information on flows of foreign exchange or from periodic surveys or 
censuses of service industries. Exceptional care must therefore be taken in 
interpreting statistics on trade in services.
In addition to the GATT, there exist unilateral national policies towards foreign 
providers of financial services, as well as treaties such as the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (hereinafter FTA)3 and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(hereinafter NAFTA)4, the supranational rules adopted by the European Union 
(hereinafter EU), and the multilateral codes of the Organisation for Economic Co-
R. COtF, Liberalisation des echanges de services informatiques: enjeux et marge de 
manoeuvre pour I’lztat canadien, (1991) 25 R.J.T. 499 at 504.
Canada - United States: Free-Trade Agreement; (1988) 27 I.L.M. 281.
Canada - Mexico - United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, (1993) 32 
I.L.M. 605.
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operation and Development (hereinafter OECD). In the banking sector, policy makers 
and regulators must ensure that no institution can escape supervision by moving its 
activities from one jurisdiction to another and that international movements of funds 
are properly tracked. Here, cooperation is most advanced in the supervision and 
regulation of commercial banks, thanks to the efforts of the Bank of International 
Settlements (hereinafter BIS)5.
A very successful international attempt at coordinating financial market regulation is 
the Basle Concordat, drafted by the BIS. The Basle Concordat deals with prudential 
supervision and solvency6. The Concordat incorporates the principle of consolidated 
supervision which assumes that banking supervisory authorities can only be satisfied 
with the strength of individual banks when they are able to examine the entirety of 
each bank’s worldwide business. While several difficulties remain in the coordination 
of the prudential supervision of commercial banks, the Basle Concordat constitutes a 
first achievement of this kind in international financial markets. Still, other financial 
institutions (such as securities firms) are active in certain spheres where banks 
operate but are not subject to the same capital requirements. In the context of relative 
decline in traditional banking activities and the increase in securities transactions, any 
divergent treatment can only limit the scope for competition between the various 
categories of institutions.
Despite the dramatic growth of securities instruments and markets in recent years, 
progress in the supervision of securities-related activities of financial institutions has 
been much slower than in the supervision of banking. Because a failure by a series of 
major securities houses could have serious implications for the stability of the financial 
industry as a whole, the securities industry ought to have an international body 
playing a role similar to that of the BIS. Memorandums of Understanding (hereinafter 
MOUs) have been negotiated between several securities commissions to cover 
prudential restrictions (such as fraud and disclosure of information). However, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereinafter IOSCO) is still in its 
infancy and has yet to forge any agreement of a critical nature. However, lOSCO’s
OECD, Banks Under Stress (Paris: OECD, 1992) at 35. 
GIPSON, supra, note 1 at 35.
19
working groups have made significant progress especially with respect to the need to 
coordinate capital requirements with those of the BIS7. There also exists a growing 
desire within the organization to adapt itself to the changing world8. Nevertheless, 
based on the fact that it took more than a decade of consultation and cooperation to 
arrive at the Basle Concordat, rapid breakthroughs in international coordination of 
prudential supervision in the securities industry cannot be expected, for it is at the 
same stage of development that coordination in the banking sector was in the 1970s. 
Although short-term miracles cannot be achieved in this area, a true sense of urgency 
does exist. This sense of urgency, however, should not serve as an excuse for weak 
standards. The international coordination of prudential supervision should rely on 
minimum standards that provide meaningful safeguards. However, current differences 
between national governments in the regulation of financial institutions continue to act 
as barriers to the efficient operation of several markets. It would appear that unless 
there is increased harmonization of regulation, the pace of progress could well slow 
down over the next few years in part because of the remaining barriers to 
internationalization9.
On a broad front, the number of restrictions to market forces, representing obstacles 
to free competition in financial services, have been reduced during the 1980s through 
financial deregulation and liberalization. These growing movements have favoured the 
concept of harmonization of the laws, regulations and other measures. The 
harmonization of various bodies of laws seems indispensable in the development of 
agreements establishing free trade such as the FTA and NAFTA. It involves balancing 
the mere compatibility of judicial systems on the one hand with the unification of
Cooperation between the IOSCO and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
resulted in May 1995, of a joint report entitled "Framework for Supervisory Information 
about the Derivative Activities of Banks and Securities Firms" is reproduced in (1995) 
18 O.S.C.B. 2005. See Also News Release — Final Communique of the XXth Annual 
Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
(1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 3356 at 3359. Remarks of Edward J. Waitzer, Chairman, IOSCO 
Technical Committee — Cooperation Between Banking & Market Regulators — Some 
Thoughts on the Role of IOSCO, (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 3258.
"Valeurs mobilieres: la mondialisation appelle des changements fondamentaux" Le 
Devoir [of Montreal] (5 July 1995) B3.
For a reference to recent discussions on the establishment of regional financial areas 
and perspectives on regulatory harmonization, see News Release, supra, note 7 at 
3361.
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various rules of law on the other. The process of harmonization requires the 
determination of common directions and orientations and establishing common basic 
ground rules. Thus, harmonized laws are convergent laws. Still, due to the rapid 
growth of the world’s financial marketplace, economic laws (and particularly securities 
laws and services) must be voluntarily and specifically harmonized. This objective, 
however, can be difficult to achieve because of the various existing legal structures.
There exist various mechanisms designed to minimize interjurisdictional differences. 
Harmonization may be spontaneous10, induced11, bureaucratic12 or institutional13. 
The need for interjurisdictional harmonization of law in the context of regulation of the 
securities industry is highly complex. Generally, the goals of financial regulation are to 
prevent fraud and theft and, if possible, correct market failures. Nevertheless, 
harmonization may create a series of problems in achieving satisfactory regulatory 
framework. For instance, (i) regulation may restrict trade or bring higher "production 
costs" for financial services; (ii) regulatory restrictions in one regime may lead to 
innovation in another; (iii) given the fact that regulation generally adopts simple 
solutions to a series of given problems, it tends to be more remote from the 
practitioners’ expertise; (iv) regulation is less well adapted to individual markets and 
institutions, and it cannot easily accommodate the differences in the various systems; 
and (v) since the regulatory process is very political in nature, conclusions or changes 
in harmonization agreements often require long periods of time and can be difficult to 
reach14.
Spontaneous harmonization is the result of the decision made by legislators "[...] to 
adopt as models aspects of the laws of other jurisdictions". R.C.C. CUMMING, 
"Harmonization of Law in Canada: An Overview" in Royal Commission on the 
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Perspectives on the 
Harmonization of Law in Canada (Research Studies, Vol. 55) (Toronto, Ont.: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985) (R.C.C. CUMMING, Research Coordinator) 1 at 24. 
Induced harmonization is a technique used in Canada whereby the federal 
government uses its constitutional spending power to induce the provinces to accept 
uniformity. Ibid. at 25.
Bureaucratic harmonization results from a joint action on the part of bureaucracies to 
administer regulatory structures. Ibid. at 28.
Institutional harmonization results from the creation of organization that have a 
mandate to develop proposals which could form the basis for harmonized law. Ibid. at 
31.
S.M. SCHAEFER, "Financial Regulation: The Contribution of the Theory of Finance" in 
J. FINGLETON, ed., The Internationalisation of Capital Markets and the Regulatory 
Response (London: Graham & Trotman, 1992) 149 at 152-154.
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In Canada’s case, the search for a uniform system of financial law has been marked 
by a series of internal discords created by the constitutional distribution of legislative 
powers15. For many years, the Canadian securities industry lagged somewhat behind 
its competitors in other countries. One cause for this has been attributed to the 
difficulty of the federal and the provincial governments to modernize the regulatory 
system. Canada’s largest financial institutions (its chartered banks) are federally 
regulated while securities dealers and underwriters, investment advisors and portfolio 
managers have been subject to provincial regulation. Because foreign countries and 
issuers would much rather deal with a unique set of regulation instead of ten different 
ones, the lack of adequate level of coordination between the various Canadian 
supervisory authorities has been a hurdle for a country that could aspire to rapidly 
move towards an integrated financial market. In their quest to achieve a Canadian 
"common market" in the distribution of and trading in securities, a very different form 
of cooperation has been needed among Canadian securities commissions for the 
system to compete effectively.
Even today, the uniformity of all internal rules has been too difficult to achieve. 
Instead, the focus has been towards harmonization. The requirements for prospectus 
clearance serves as an example of a barrier to a fully integrated market16. However, 
some of these restrictions have been tempered by special agreements negotiated 
with, for example, the U.S. Nevertheless, basic harmonization of broad policies by the 
federal and provincial governments is still needed to prevent unnecessary duplication 
and to strengthen the coordination of Canada’s financial services sector. Some have 
suggested that the federal government become responsible for securities regulation. 
Their argument is that until then, Canada may not be in a position to play as effective 
a role as is desirable on an international level and make what kind of decisions for its 
entire market. However, it is not clear that this is an essential approach to be taken. 
The political reality reaffirms the provincial legislatures’ desire to ensure that the 
federal government does not acquire jurisdiction over securities matters. Whatever
See, e.g., K. NORRIE, R. SIMEON & M. KRASNICK, Federalism and the Economic 
Union in Canada (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 2.
"Instruction generate n°. C-1 - Approbation de documents a I’echelle canadienne" (as 
modified) in M. THERIAULT & P. FORTIN, Droit des valeurs mobilieres au Quebec, 
Vol. 1 (Montreal, Que.: Wilson & Lafleur, Martel, 1992) (loose-leaf) at E-421.
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solution is retained by Canadians, the federal/provincial jurisdictional problems would 
need to be solved to strengthen the coordination and harmonization of Canada’s 
securities policies.
Harmonization of the rules affecting Canadian securities-related services also comes 
about from the two major North American free trade agreements entered into by 
Canada in recent years. Trade in financial services, which is related to, but not 
identical to, cross-border capital flows, has increased significantly. It most definitely 
holds an important place in the FTA and NAFTA. A precise definition of "trade in 
financial services" raises some difficulties. International trade in financial services 
takes place not only through the provision of these services by an institution or factors 
of production in one country (i.e. cross-border trade), such as borrowing and 
depositing across national boundaries, but also through the establishment of 
subsidiaries, branches or agencies by a financial institution in a country other than its 
home country (i.e. establishment-related trade)17. Overall, discussions between 
nations have focused on specific aspects of trade liberalization. These aspects 
include: (i) international capital movements (or cross-border capital flows); (ii) cross- 
border financial services; and (iii) the right of establishment of the financial services 
industry18. In the context of this work, the main restrictions on the activities of the 
securities industry concern: (i) the entry and establishment of new foreign securities 
firms; (ii) the purchase of domestic securities firms, in whole or in part, by foreign 
securities firms; (iii) restrictions on the operating procedures of foreign-owned 
securities firms in the domestic market; and (iv) cross-border international operations.
Hence, "[sjome services, such as underwriting of securities for large corporations and 
governments, requires a presence in neither the country of the issuer nor the country 
of the buyers. U.S. securities firms, for example, have been active suppliers of 
underwriting services to Canadian issuers. Other securities industry services, retail 
brokerage in particular, require a presence near the customers." J. CHANT, Free 
Trade in the Financial Sector: Expectations and Experience, Studies on the Economic 
Future of North America (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 1991) at 2.
Using this notion, the OECD Committee on Financial Markets adopted a definition of 
trade in financial services in three points: (i) the selling of financial products to the 
residents of another country from one’s home base (which, in fact,reflects a pure trade 
approach and replicates the definition of trade in goods); (ii) the selling, by a firm or 
individual established in a foreign country, of financial products to the residents of third 
country; and (iii) the selling, by a firm or individual established in a foreign country, of 
financial products to the residents of that country. OECD, International Trade in 
Financial Services (Paris: OECD, 1984) at 22.
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Having said so, the globalization of the securities industry and markets requires that 
governments develop a coordinated system for the management and regulation of the 
international financial system. Against the background of the changing nature of the 
financial services industry and a series of conflicting interests, governments are 
confronted with far reaching implications of policy issues they must reconcile. Thus, 
they may have to measure the consequences of granting national treatment19 to 
foreign securities firms as well as the impact of an exterior presence on the domestic 
system. This is of particular concern to smaller nations faced with allowing access to 
securities firms from other countries with a much larger securities sector and 
consequently much larger securities firms.
Essentially, free trade in the financial (including the securities) industry refers to the 
elimination of governmental restrictions with respect to: (i) transactions/transfer of 
funds (such as exchange control restrictions) involved in international financial 
operations; or (ii) legal or administrative regulations. The different reasons which 
motivate domestic governments to impose restrictions on foreign securities firms in 
each country derive from individual historical factors, the degree of development and 
sophistication of the domestic securities market and general policy and regulatory 
attitudes regarding the value, and need for, competition in the domestic securities 
industry. Nevertheless, there are circumstances when restrictions can exist, if judged 
to be necessary to meet national and/or international concerns20. In other words, 
liberalization does not absolutely require an obligation to abandon national regulation, 
nor to harmonize on a regional or multinational standard. Instead, it feeds on a 
reasonable level of mutual recognition of regulatory standards.
In the context of multinational activities of securities firms and banking affiliates, 
national treatment means that host states should grant to foreign-controlled 
enterprises "treatment under their laws, regulations and administrative practices, 
consistent with international law and no less favourable than that accorded in like 
situations to domestic enterprises". OECD, Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises by the Governments of OECD Member Countries (Paris: 
OECD, 1976) at Section 11:1 reprinted in OECD, The OECD Declaration and Decisions 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises — 1991 Review (Paris: 
OECD, 1992) at 101.
Special restrictions can be necessary to decrease and eliminate the abuses and, to 
protect essential security interests or maintain public order by preventing illegal 
activities (such as tax evasion, fraud or money-laundering). OECD, Liberalization of 
Capital Movements and Financial Services in the OECD Area (Paris: OECD, 1990) at 
13-14.
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The issue of liberalizing trade in services through the development of a mutually 
agreed international conventions has recently come to the forefront in the international 
trade arena. For example, the Uruguay Round, under the auspices of the GATT, 
concluded negotiations on trade in services as part of the multilateral trade 
negotiations. In the trade discussions between Canada and the U.S. as well as 
between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, trade and investment in services (including 
financial services) were integral and important issues in reaching the trade 
accords21. Thus, the developments in the internationalization of financial services 
over the past few decades suggest that the supervision of financial institutions can no 
longer be confined to domestic operations. There still remain a number of 
philosophical, legal and jurisdictional differences in the process for controlling 
international financial operations among countries. These regulatory differences pose 
not only problems for the integration and liberalization of international trade in financial 
services but also affect the nature and degree of competition in national financial 
service markets. In spite of the process of domestic financial deregulation which has 
gradually become self-reinforcing, there are still a number of restrictions which can 
constitute significant barriers for financial institutions from entering others territories. 
Existing regulatory and structural asymmetries are particularly obvious when 
comparing the dual with the universal banking model.
In several countries, different types of financial institutions have traditionally been 
subject to specific and separate regulation imposing on financial institutions a certain 
degree of specialization and separation of functions. A particular feature of the 
segmented financial system of the U.S. is the range of permissible activities. Under 
the American dual banking model, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (hereinafter 
GSA)22 established a significant separation between commercial and investment 
banking in the U.S. Under this law, banks are generally prohibited from underwriting 
or dealing in securities by applying the restrictions. Foreign institutions are also 
concerned by the fact that some securities activities of banks are regulated by the
For one of the first works of scholarship suggesting that there should be international 
regulation for financial services using a method similar to that provided by the GATT. 
See B. GAVIN, A GATT for International Banking?, (1985) 19:2 J.W.T.L. 121.
12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 377, 378 and 78.
25
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter Exchange Act)23 and the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 (hereinafter BHCA)24. In spite of the historical reasons which 
led to the segmented financial system, the recent crumbling of the so-called "four 
financial pillars" in Canada demonstrates that the trend towards greater participation in 
securities underwriting is very likely to flow over to the U.S. as well. Thus, in spite of 
country-specific differences, the universal or "one-stop" banking model (which implies 
all types of commercial and investment banking activities offered by one entity) should 
one day become the norm in an integrated North American financial market.
In the meantime, however, the application of broad trade in services principles to the 
specific requirements of North American trade in financial services agreements has 
been difficult. The development of trade in financial services accords needed to take 
into account and satisfy a series of different and competing concerns including: (i) the 
problem that the conceptual understanding of any of the principles necessary to a 
trade agreement differs among nations; (ii) the jurisdictional prerogatives of national 
and sub-national governments differ significantly in both substance and form; (ii) the 
regulatory powers governing domestic and international operations of financial 
institutions are shifting in scope and the degree of development of the domestic 
industry differs in a number of countries; (v) the structure of financial systems and 
institutions vary from country to country; (vi) the degree of importance of financial 
institutions and international trade in financial sen/ices is stronger in some countries 
more than others; (vii) the willingness of domestic governments to allow foreign 
financial institutions to compete in the domestic industry ranges from country to 
country; and (viii) the degree to which regulatory, solvency and supervisory controls 
are greater in some nations than in others. Moreover, the FTA and NAFTA had to 
take into account the constantly changing nature of the industry on an international 
basis. Therefore, they had to deal with functional basis. Finally, for the trade in 
financial services agreements to be politically acceptable they had to provide for 
signatories to periodically opt out. Having said all this, can we say that harmonization 
occurs through the FTA and NAFTA? The short answer is that it does, but only 
partially.
48 Stat. 881.
12 U.S.C. § 1841.
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This study seeks to demonstrate that since the signing of the FTA and NAFTA, there 
has been clear and measurable progress towards the goal of harmonizing the laws 
regulating international securities-related activities of North American financial 
institutions. However, apart from the free trade agreements, some harmonization has 
been achieved through deliberate cooperation on the part of financial regulators and 
administrative agencies (such as the various securities commissions). Although the 
traditional and rigid distinctions between different financial service categories are 
actually breaking down, the products typically considered to be part of financial 
services may be classified into three categories: (i) commercial banking services; (ii) 
securities-related services (or investment banking); and (iii) insurance services25. The 
bulk of this work centres on the Canadian securities industry and the securities-related 
services it provides rather than a wider spectrum of financial sen/ices. However, the 
Canadian application of the universal banking model requires that we refer to banks. 
To date, only a few trust, insurance and other financial services companies have 
entered the Canadian securities business. However, with the introduction of the most 
recent federal initiative to clarify permitted business activities, more such securities 
entrants may be expected. Still, we have chosen to avoid discussing the trust26, 
insurance and other related financial sectors in this work, unless for special 
circumstances. Moreover, though technically very different, the words "investment 
banker"27, "broker"28, "dealer"29 or "securities firm" have been used in a context to 
allow them to be interchangeable. Finally, the study does not endeavour to address 
the global dimension of the liberalization of trade in financial services through the
For a similar classification, see GATT Doc., MTN.GNS/W/68 of 4 September 1989 at 
3-5.
The trust companies, like their counterparts the "thrifts" of the U.S., have not been 
significantly involved in international business.
"The middleman between the corporation issuing new securities and the public". J.M. 
ROSENBERG, Dictionary of Banking and Financial Services, 2nd ed. (New York, N.Y.: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1985) at 374.
"An agent who arranges sales for a commission or fees". GIPSON, supra, note 1 at 
47.
"Traders who buy and sell for their personal accounts. Unlike brokers, who are 
commission agents, a dealer buys as a principal and attempts to profit from the 
spread between the selling price and the purchase price in a given transaction". Ibid., 
at 104.
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WTO, this matter being the subject of an on-going debate30. Instead, the focus is put 
solely on the North American norms and treaties (in the context of the liberalization of 
trade in services) governing multinational activities of the Canadian securities industry.
In the process of undertaking the research for this thesis, a massive amount of 
material discussing the Canadian financial system, securities regulation and free trade 
has been examined. It included substantial literature on various aspects of these fields 
in the legal and financial periodicals. All this is apart from the numerous administrative 
circulars (containing policies and practice) published by the two most important 
Canadian jurisdictions, i.e. the Ontario Securities Commission (hereinafter OSC), the 
Quebec Securities Commission (hereinafter QSC) as well as the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC). Then, in regards to the implementation of 
the free trade agreements, it was necessary to examine the many legislative hearings 
and reports to the U.S. Congress and the Parliament of Canada, as well as the 
special reports they have produced from time to time. Finally, one important source 
helping to keep pace with the many changes occurring to the Canadian securities 
industry and its conduct of the business itself has been the financial press. This work 
speaks as of the end of December 1995.
The study is organized into three parts. The first one covering the Canadian securities 
industry in the context of free trade, the second one covering the agreements 
liberalizing North American trade of financial services, and the third one measuring 
the impact of liberalized trade on the Canadian securities businesses. Within Part I, 
the composition of the Canadian securities industry and an overview of the North 
American free trade era are considered successively. Developments leading towards 
the emergence of a new Canadian regulatory structure surrounding the securities 
industry as well as the "Americanization" of Canadian securities policies are treated in 
a separate title. Part II of this work examines the financial services chapters of the 
FTA and NAFTA. It assesses the advantages and disadvantages of these accords
See, e.g., "U.S. Against Them" The Economist (29 July 1995) 53. "Banking on Sir 
Leon" The Economist (15 July 1995) 58. P. LEWIS, "U.S. Trade Pullback" The New 
York Times (4 July 1995) 47. P. LEWIS, "U.S. Rejects Accord to Free Trade in 
Financial Services" The New York Times (30 June 1995) D1. For a general analysis, 
see, e.g., E. McGOVERN, International Trade Regulation (London: Globefield, 1995).
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from the perspective of the Canadian securities industry. Also, it serves to provide a 
better understanding of the various domestic changes which occur (now and then) in 
view of the North American liberalization of trade in financial sen/ices. Moreover, it 
serves to determine if the FTA and NAFTA provoked by themselves the 
harmonization of laws. Both treaties examined under separate titles, are analyzed so 
as to reflect the prevalent situation before the negotiations, the negotiation objectives 
of all signatory countries and, in the end, the negotiation results. Finally, Part III 
reviews the effects of North American free trade on the way the Canadian securities 
industry conducts its business. The first title examines the existing competition 
between Canadian and American securities-related financial institutions both in 
Canada and in the U.S. The second title looks at the means of adaptation by 
Canadian dealers in the newly opened Mexican market.
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PART I: THE CANADIAN SECURITIES INDUSTRY IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
The latter part of this century will be remembered as a decade that brought various 
parts of the world closer together through such developments as the easing of East- 
West tensions, the building of the single European market, the emergence of stronger 
economic ties between the countries of the Pacific Rim, and the two major North 
American trade agreements. Nowhere Is the movement towards closer ties among the 
world’s economies more evident than in the globalization of the financial sector. The 
integration of financial markets around the world and associated financial innovation 
have brought fundamental changes in the way funds are raised, and in the types of 
financial instruments that are used.
Our study of the Canadian securities industry in the context of the liberalization of 
trade in financial services begins with a general description of the leading elements 
under examination. First, an overview of the nature of trade in relation to the 
securities helps understand how the recent trends in the international financial 
marketplace and changes affecting capital market have influenced the ways of doing 
business in North America and throughout the world.
TITLE I: SETTING THE STAGE
In the past few years, the North American securities industry has been affected by 
two significant developments: (i) the globalization of the financial marketplace, and (ii) 
the signing of accords leading towards the regional liberalization of trade in financial 
services.
CHAPTER I: The Nature of Trade In Services in Relation to the 
Securities Industry
international operations of financial institutions demand the establishment of a new set 
of rules to help harmonize recognized standards. However, prior to examining this 
aspect, it is important to understand how fairly recent developments suggest that 
multinational banking and securities firms can no longer be supervised solely through
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domestic regulation.
1. Preliminary Observations: Trends in the International Financial 
Marketplace and Changes Affecting Capital Markets
The financial markets permit our modem economies to function and with the 
increased diversity of economic activity, the financial industry has become increasingly 
complex31. Internationalization is reflected in the increased flows of people, goods, 
services and knowledge across national borders32. In the financial domain, this 
integration is featured in cross-border capital flows33. Providers of capital for the 
needs of governments, business and individuals make transaction worldwide — the 
markets have evolved towards a global approach34. The financial industry’s activities 
have experienced massive growth due to dramatic changes in the traditional ways of 
doing business35. As a result, the international financial landscape has been 
completely reformed. Now, almost all international intermediation is carried out in the 
securities markets or through instruments providing some form of negotiability36.
On the role of a financial system see, e.g., OECD, The New Financial Landscape 
(Paris: OECD, 1995). C.N. HENNING, W. PIGOTT & H. SCOTT, Financial Markets 
and the Economy, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988) at 5ff.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement and numerous regulatory changes 
have been some of the most important factors leading to the globalization of financial 
markets. B. BECKER, Global Securities Markets, (1988) 6 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law 242. 
M. GRUSON, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, [1987] Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 303 at 306.
Essentially cross-border capital flows relate to movement of funds crossing national 
boundaries (independently of the nationality or residence of the parties involved in the 
transaction). OECD, Liberalization of Capital Movements and Financial Services in the 
OECD Area (Paris: OECD, 1990) at 75.
On the global evolution of financial markets, see, e.g., R. O’BRIEN, Global Financial 
Integration: The End of Geography (London: Pinter, 1992). K. KAUFMAN, Financial 
Integration — A Regional or Global Phenomenon?, Presentation made at the XVIIth 
Annual Conference of the International Organization of Securities Commissions on 
October 27, 1992, reproduced in (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 5198. G. CAPOGLU, The 
Internationalization of Financial Markets and Competitiveness in the World Economy, 
(1990) 24:2 J.W.T. 111. T.M. RYBCZYKSKI, The Internationalization of Finance and 
Business, (1988) 33:3 Business Economics 14.
Generally, this growth is, partly, evidenced in the greater importance of market 
intermediation of funds (which involves the issuance of and trading in, securities such 
as stocks or bonds). G. SMITH, Money, Banking and Financial Intermediation 
(Lexington, Ma.: D.C. Heath, 1991) at 527.
OECD, Trends in Banking in OECD Countries, (Paris: OECD, 1985) at 19.
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The securities markets37 of both the advanced industrial and developing market 
economies have undergone dramatic changes in recent years30. These changes 
have taken the forms of both globalization39 and integration40 of these markets 
creating "internationalized markets"41 out of formerly purely national ones. Recent 
developments in international financial trade, illustrate their expansion.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the rate of growth of international financial trade accelerated 
tremendously. The largest single factor influencing the growth of the global capital 
markets in that period has been the appearance of large trade imbalances in the 
industrial countries. The resulting balance of payments deficits required massive 
international financing42. Corresponding to the massive imbalances in trade, the
A "securities market" is a medium of exchange in which businesses raise capital by 
issuing stocks and bonds rather than by borrowing from banks. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Internationalization of Securities Market Report, Staff of 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Commission on Energy and Commerce 
(Washington, D.C.: Government of the United States, 1987).
On the recent changes affecting the securities markets, see generally, OECD, 
Securities Markets in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1995). FINGLETON, ed., supra, 
note 14. O. AYAYI, International Securities Regulation, (1992) 5 J. Int’l Banking L. 
191. J.A. GRUNDFEST, Internationalization of the World’s Securities Markets: 
Economic Causes and Regulatory Consequences, (1990) 4 J. of Rn. Serv. Res. 349.
A. PETERS, The Changing Structure of the Financial Services Industry and the 
Implications for International Securities Regulation, (1989) 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
525. R.P. AUSTIN, Regulatory Principles and the Internationalization of Securities 
Markets, (1988) 50 L. & Cont. Prob. 219.
"Globalization" refers to the "rapid growth of formerly insignificant securities markets, 
as well as the emergence of small dynamic securities markets in nations where none 
had previously existed". M. A. GERSTENZANG, Insider Trading and the 
Internationalization of the Securities Market, (1989) 27 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 409 at 
415.
In this context, "integration" is defined as the "rapid interlocking of national securities 
markets". Ibid. at 411-415.
"Internationalization" of securities markets may be thought of as the result of two 
distinct, yet interrelated, developments of "integration and globalization". Ibid. at 411. 
However, not all scholars have endorsed the theory that securities markets are 
becoming "global" or "internationalized". D.E. VAN ZANDT, The Regulatory and 
Institutional Conditions for an International Securities Market, (1991) 32 Va. J. Int’l L. 
47 at 48, 81.
At that time, the post-war position of the U.S. as a generator of surpluses was 
dramatically reversed to that of a major borrower. At the same time, Germany and 
Japan became the major creditor nations of the world. IMF, World Economic Outlook 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, October 1987) Tables A30 and A31.
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international capital markets experienced a major restructuring and expansion43. 
Accompanying these developments has been the emergence of transnational entities 
which, not satisfied merely with trading goods and services internationally, conducted 
their own operations in many different countries44. These multinational corporations 
(hereinafter MNCs) utilized local organizational-legal structures that are tied together 
by a shared capital structure45. As many MNCs conducted financing activities, they 
followed in the footsteps of sovereign countries and utilized international securities 
markets for raising capital from suppliers of many different nationalities46. As a result, 
the past few decades have witnessed the sustained growth of international debt and 
equity issues through unregulated markets47. For instance, in Canada, corporate and 
government issuers extensively used international capital markets as a source of debt
According to GATT statistics, net international bank lending exhibited an average 
yearly growth of 15% between 1978 and 1988. This rate far exceeded the 8.5% 
observed for the volume of world trade. GATT Doc., MTN.GNS/W/68 of 4 September 
1989 at 2. B. HOEKMAN & M. LEIDY, "Contingent Commercial Policies and the 
Credibility of Financial Market Liberalization" in S. HEWIN & R. O’BRIEN, eds, 
Finance and the International Economy:4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 
Introduction. More detailed data about the impressive growth of the financial service 
sector in general and the different sub-sectors are provided by G. BROKER, "Trends 
in Banking Structure and Regulation" in OECD, OECD Countries Competition in 
Banking (Paris: OECD, 1989) at 122-124.
On trade and transnational entities during that period, see, e.g., J.A. PUTTERMAN, 
Transnational Production in Sen/ices as a Form of International Trade, (1992) 16:2 
World Competition 123.
The motives for international investment are varied and complex and depend to a 
large extent upon the type of industry involved. For example, by becoming MNCs, 
securities firms have wanted to protect their present or potential markets by following 
competitors or customers abroad.
One reason for the popularity of international securities offerings is because it provides 
access to more capital at lower costs. M. ATKIN & J. GLEN, Comparing Corporate 
Capital Structures Around the Globe, (1992) 34 Int’l Exec. 369 at 373.
The first stage of internationalization centred around the Euromarket. A Release of the 
SEC published in 1964 (SEC Release N° 33-4708 (9 July 1964) was an important 
event in the genesis and development of the Euromarket. E.F. GREENE [etal.], U.S. 
Regulation of the International Securities Markets, Vol. 1 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1992) at 187-188. The late 1960s, saw first the growth 
of the Eurocurrency markets for short term transactions followed by the Eurobond 
market for the issuance of debt securities and ultimately, in the 1980s, the Euroequity 
markets, all essentially unregulated markets. See, e.g., H.S. BLOOMENTHAL & S. 
WOLFF, International Capital Markets and Securities Regulation, Vol. 10 (Deerfield, 
III.: Clark Boardman, 1992) at 1-8. Corporations seeking financing on foreign markets 
have permitted the steady growth of international transactions in all geographic areas. 
OECD, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 52 (Paris: OECD, 1992) at 56.
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and equity capital48. With this trend, the internationalization of securities trading has 
become apparent in a number of ways49.
The development and application of technology communications50 and computers51 
to the securities industry dramatically improved the conduct of international 
investment52. In numerous countries, listing of foreign securities on stock exchanges 
has facilitated the enlargement of business activities53. The ability to trade the same
"Two Canadian issuers were among the first to make multinational offerings of equity 
securities in Canada, the U.S. and Europe". Submission of the Staff of the Ontario
Securities Commission to the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning the 
Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, (1985) 8 O.S.C.B. 3972 at 3978.
P.E. MILLSPAUGH, Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog, (1992) 
26 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L & Econ. 355. Comment, International Financial Markets and 
Regulatbn of Trading of International Equities, (1988) 19 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 327 at 328. 
See, e.g., L.D. SOLOMAN & L. CORSO, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of 
Securities: the Emerging Gbbal Market and the Implications for Regulation, (1991) 24 
J. Marshall L. Rev. 199. P. SHRIVASTAVA, Strategies for Coping with
Telecommunications Technology in the Financial Services Industry, (1983) 18:1 
Colum. J. of World Bus. 19.
Widespread use of computers now allows a series of very fast calculations to be 
made: daily interest, foreign currency exchange rate comparisons, arbitrage 
opportunities, etc. Computers, too, have already replaced substantial trading volume 
that once was done between floor traders at many stock and futures exchanges. P. 
DURIVAGE, "La technologie au service des courtiers" La Presse [of Montreal] (26 
August 1994) C1. OECD, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 54 (Paris: OECD, 1993) at 10. 
"Changes in technology have been responsible for changes in securities markets, and 
they make it easier to provide pertinent information to investors. These advancements 
in technology provide the key to regulatory change". J.M. AALBREGTSE, 
Internationalization of the Securities Markets - Moving Away from Section 5, (1988) 10 
U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 225 at 232. In fact, the new source of competitive advantage in 
the markets derives from the knowledge of superior and scarce information and the 
control of this information. See, e.g., J.P. LITTLECHILD, "In the beginning there was 
the talking computer ... A silent revolution is underway in the banking industry" 
Canadian Banker (August 1990) 31. A. GART, An Analysis of the New Financial 
Institutions: Changing Technologies, Financial Structures, Distribution System, and 
Deregulation (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989). T. COURCHENE, "Trade in Banking 
Services" in D. CONKLIN, ed., Trade in Services: Case Studies and Empirical Issues 
(Halifax, N.S.: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988) 116 at 119-125. G.R. 
FAULHABER, Financial Services: Markets in Transition, Discussion Paper #27 
(Washington, D.C.: Fishman Davidson Centre, 1987) at 10-21.
See, e.g., A.L. PETERS & A.E. FELDMAN, The Changing Structure of the Securities 
Markets and the Securities Industry: Implications for International Securities 
Regulatbn, (1988) 9 Mich. Y.B. Int’l Legal Studies 19 at 50-51. In Canada, the two 
main exchanges (i.e. The Toronto Stock Exchange and Montreal Exchange) have 
developed mechanisms to facilitate the entry of foreign issuers to the Canadian capital 
markets. See, e.g., H.J.F. BLOOMFIELD, "Recent Trends in Securities Regulations 
Related to International Transactions" in SERVICE DE LA FORMATION 
PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC, ed., Devebppements recents en droit
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securities in sequence on Asian, European and North American exchanges has 
essentially created a twenty-four hour trading day54. Competition between different 
markets is accentuated with the ability to obtain price quotes and execute trades in 
securities on different exchanges. Such inter-market competition has been recognized 
and formalized by inter-market linkages that transmit pricing between exchanges and 
execute trades at the most competitive prices available55. These developments
des valeurs mobilieres (1992) (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1992) 77 at 78-79. 
Twenty-four hour trading is also referred to as "globalization of trading". F. K0BLER, 
Regulatory Problems in Internationalization Trading Markets, (1987) 9 U. Pa. Int’l Bus. 
L. 107 at 108. On twenty-four hour trading, see, e.g., VAN ZANDT, supra, note 41 at
55. SEC STAFF REPORT, DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, The October 1987 Market Break, Federal Securities 
Law Reports, Number 1271 (extra edition) (Chicago, III.: Commerce Clearing House, 
1988) at 11-2. S. B. SHOPKORN, Global Trading: The Current and Future Impact on 
United States Markets and United States Portfolio Managers, (1986) 4 B.U. Int’l L.J. 
25 at 26. S.E. HUNTER, The Status and Evolution of Twenty-Four Hour Trading: A 
Trader’s View of International Transactions, Clearance, and Settlement, (1986) 4 B.U. 
Int’l L.J. 15.
The globalization of securities markets has led to the establishment of market links 
between certain stock exchanges operating in different countries. B.S. RITTER & W.R. 
DAUBER, The Present and Future Role of Electronic Trading Linkage in the 
Developing International Securities Markets, (1989) 22 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 
639. "From Foreign Desk to Foreign Exchange" The Economist (23 July 1988) 63. R. 
P. BERNARD, International Linkages Between Securities Markets: A Ring of 
Dinosaurs Joining Hands and Dancing Together?, [1987] Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 321. In 
the U.S., the SEC "generally views agreements between U.S. and foreign securities 
exchanges as positive developments". SEC Release N° 34-27080 cited in GREENE 
[etal.J, Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 380. A linkage program between stock exchanges in 
Canada and the U.S. was set up to provide greater liquidity and better prices for North 
American investors. In 1984, the first formal linkage was established between the 
Montreal Exchange and the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE). SEC Release N° 34- 
21925 (8 April 1985); SEC Release N° 34-26029 (25 August 1988); SEC Release N° 
34-26578 (28 February 1989). Using electronic connections, transactions may be 
executed on the floor of the different exchanges by traders of either exchanges. This 
successful linkage has lead to implementation of other similar plans. For instance, in
1985, a linkage between the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) was approved. SEC Release N° 34-22442 (20 September 1985). In
1986, the TSE linked with the Midwest Stock Exchange. SEC Release N° 34-23075 
(28 March 1986). Further, linkages were also established with exchanges in other 
countries, bringing even closer to reality the idea of a world-wide twenty-four hour 
market linkage system. The first transatlantic exchange link was established between 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD). SEC Release N° 34-29812 (11 October 1991). However, trade linkages and 
interlisting of stocks cause regulatory headaches by making it possible to avoid 
domestic law. P. ANISMAN & P. HOGG, "Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities 
Legislation", in P. ANISMAN [et a!.], Proposals for a Securities Market Law for 
Canada, Vol. 3, Background Papers (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 
1979) 135 at 148-149. One solution to this difficulty might be for various exchanges to 
adopt a series of unified trading rules combined with supervision, surveillance and
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created fundamental problems for the national regulators of securities markets on how 
to apply purely national securities laws and regulations to international securities 
transactions that may involve foreign investors, foreign national issuers, and foreign 
national markets as well as those of the regulator’s own country56. The trend towards 
the internationalization of securities markets was accelerated with the removal of 
restrictions on foreign participation in many of the major securities markets57. A 
dramatic increase in the share of financial services provided by non-residents and by 
the penetration of domestic markets by institutions from other countries58 took the 
form of a rapid increase in the cross-border activities of financial institutions in other 
countries. These new market conditions created new types of rivalries between the 
markets themselves. The development of new financial instruments and practices 
opened up many opportunities for participants in financial markets59. In this context,
enforcement regulations. These could be developed by groups like the International 
Federation of Stock Exchanges or the International Councils of Securities Dealers and 
Self-Regulatory Organizations. *International Links Proposed to Stem Future Market 
Crisis", 2 Int’l Sec. Reg. Rep. (Buriff) 1 (21 June 1989). BLOOMENTHAL, supra, note 
47 at 1-196, 1-198.
H.M. WILLIAMS & L.B. SPENCER, Jr., Regulation of International Securities Markets: 
Towards a Greater Cooperation, (1982) 4 J. Comp. Corp. L. Sec. Reg. 55.
The removal of competitive barriers (referred to loosely as "deregulation") has been 
both a driving force and a political response to internationalization. See generally S.J. 
KHOURY, The Deregulation of the World Financial Markets: Myths, Realities, and 
Impact (Westport, CT.: Greenwood, 1990). "Deregulation" differs from the term 
"reregulation" which describes various kinds of legislative activity undertaken to 
address the perceived shortcomings of regulatory systems in the aftermath of 
deregulation. E.L. RUBIN, Deregulation, Reregulation and the Myth of the Market, 
(1988) 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1249. J.R. MACEY, The Myth of "ReregulationThe 
Interest Group Dynamics of Regulatory Change in the Financial Services Industry, 
(1988) 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1275. Significant deregulation of financial institutions 
has occurred in the U.K. — the so-called Big Bang, aimed at removing the barriers to 
entry both to the U.K. market by foreign firms and across financial sectors previously 
defined by commercial banking, investment banking, brokers, or insurers. See, e.g., D. 
WALKER, Some Reflections on Big Bangs in Financial Systems, (1987-88) 13 C.B.L.J. 
388.
D.L. GOELZER, A. SULLIVAN & R. MILLS, Securities Regulation in the international 
Marketplace: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements, (1988) 9 Mich. Y.B. Int’l Legal 
Studies 53. PETERS & FELDMAN, supra, note 53 at 19.
Over the years, several imaginative financing techniques and financial instruments 
have been developed from interest rate and currency swaps, to floating rate notes 
(FRNs), options and futures, stock and bond indexes as well as futures and options, to 
name just a few. See, e.g., OECD, Banks under Stress, supra, note 5 at 123. The 
spread of many of these instruments and practices contributed significantly to the 
growing use of securities and security-like instruments, which are created through the 
process of securitization. Securitization has come to mean a bypass of banks. L. 
BOOTH, The Regulation of Canada’s Financial Markets: A Primer on the Economic
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certain securities regulatory authorities have developed systems60 to facilitate 
multinational offerings61.
CHAPTER II: The Free Trade Era
In recent years, the globalization of the financial marketplace has led to the 
liberalization of trade in financial services. In North America, the coming about of a 
regional free trade era is the result of: (i) economic integration; and (ii) the signing of 
two major free trade agreements.
1. North American Economic Integration
The past few decades have been marked by significant expansion of global trade. For 
the industrial countries, the consequence of this growth has been an increasing
Issues, (1990) 3 B.F.L.R. 147 at 164-166. On the increased used of securitized 
instruments see, e.g., OECD, Securitisation: An International Perspective (Paris: 
OECD, 1995). OECD, Financial Market Trends, various issues. O. SHIJURO, R. 
COOPER & H. SCHULMAN, International Financial Integration: The Policy Challenges 
(Paris: OECD, 1989) at 17-18. The primary sources of innovation have been the 
securities subsidiaries of U.K. and French banks as well as large American and 
Japanese non-bank securities houses. OECD, Systemic Risks in Securities Markets 
(Paris: OECD, 1991) at 9.
With the growing interdependence of North American markets, the CSA embarked (in
1990) on the development of an electronic filing for all required securities filings. The 
system (called the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval or SEDAR) 
should be implemented by early 1996. This new technology will facilitate the 
harmonization of securities regulation on an international scale. Hence, in view of the 
fact that the SEC already uses a similar system (called the Electronic Data Gathering 
and Retrieval System or EDGAR), discussions have been under way to create an 
electronic link with all participants in the North American markets. CSA Notice — 
SEDAR, (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 1892. CSA Notice —An Electronic System for Securities 
Filings, (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 2857. Avis des autorites canadiennes en valeurs 
mobilieres — SEDAR, (1995) 26:15 B.C.V.M.Q. 1. Avis des autorites canadiennes en 
valeurs mobilieres-systeme eiectronique de donnees, d’analyse et de recherche, 
(1994) 25:24 B.C.V.M.Q. 1. On SEDAR, see Notice — Remarks of Edward J. Waitzer 
— A Year in the Life of a Regulator, (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 5075 at 5076. On EDGAR, 
see EDGAR, (1993) 26 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 173. J.L. ARNOLD & M.A. 
DIAMOND, EDGAR: The SEC’s Program and its Impact (Morristown, N.J.: Financial 
Executives Research Foundation, 1986). EDGAR: The SEC’s Disclosure System, 
(1986) 19 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 161.
See generally, T.R. GIRA, Toward a Global Capital Market: The Emergence of 
Simultaneous Multinational Securities Offerings, (1987) 11 Md J. Int’l L. & Trade 157.
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dependence on international commerce62. Moreover the world is now increasingly 
characterized by large regional groupings, with competition shifting rapidly from 
national to regional and global planes63. Undoubtedly, these are new challenges to 
developing countries at a time when tough economic conditions prevail on many parts 
of the globe64.
This distribution of international economic power has had an impact on the ways 
many MNCs do business65. As we examine the Canadian securities industry in the 
context of North American regionalization, it is important to briefly bring back into 
focus some of the external factors that free trade must take into consideration. These 
factors are the legal ramifications of economic integration and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT) rules on free trade areas66.
R. BOUZAS & J. ROSS, eds, Economic Integration in the Western Hemisphere 
(Notre-Dame, IN: University of Notre-Dame, 1994). J.S. FINLAYSON, "Canadian 
International Economic Policy: Context, Issues and a Review of Some Recent 
Literature" in Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Prospects for Canada, 
Canada and the International Political/Economic Environment, (Research Studies, Vol. 
28) (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1985) (D. STAIRS & G.R. WINHAM, 
eds) 9 at 12ff.
See, e.g., OECD, Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System: Synergy 
and Divergence (Paris: OECD, 1995). K. ANDERSON & R. BLACKHURST, eds, 
Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993). A.O. KRUEGER, "The Effects of Regional Trading Blocs on World 
Trade" in R. CUSHING [et al], eds, The Challenge of NAFTA: North American, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the World Trade Regime (Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson 
School of Public Affairs, 1993) 21. K. ANDERSON, "NAFTA, Excluded Pacific Rim 
Countries, and the Multilateral Trading System", Ibid., 33. H.J. JOHNSON, Dispelling 
the Myth of Globalization: The Case for Regionalization, (New York, N.Y.: Praeger,
1991).
A key concern for developing countries is whether the grouping of some of the world’s 
most advanced economies will impact on new inflows of FDIs. See, e.g., U. HIEMENZ 
& R.J. LANGHAMMER, Regional Integration Among Developing Countries: 
Opportunities, Obstacles and Option (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990) at 14.
See generally, I.A. RONKAINEN, "Trading Blocks: Opportunity or Demise for Trade?" 
Multinational Business Review (Spring 1993) 1. UNCTC, Regional Economic 
Integration and Transnational Corporations in the 1990s: Europe 1992, North 
American, and Developing Countries, Current Studies, series A, N° 15 (New York, 
N.Y.: UNCTC, 1990).
See generally, J.P. BYRLEY, Regional Arrangements, the GATT and the Quest for 
Free Trade, (1991) 6 Fla. J. Int’l L. 323.
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Essentially, there are two aspects to the process of international economic 
integration67: (i) liberalization68; (ii) harmonization of policy in areas that bear on the 
economy in general69. Often, economic integration has been classified at different 
levels of coordination — the free trade area, the custom union, the common market 
and the economic union70.
The requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT (to which Canada, the U.S. and Mexico 
are members) have also been Important to the creation of a continental accord71 for 
they relate exclusively to trade liberalization72. In essence, this provision allows the
For an excellent discussion on economic integration, see, e.g., A.E. SAFARIAN, 
Canadian Federalism and Economic Integration (Ottawa, Ont.: Information Canada, 
1974). B. BALASSA, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1973).
Liberalization entails the abolition of national measures that prevent the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. H. HUTCHESON, Vocabulary of 
Free Trade, Terminology Bulletin 204 (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1991) at 135. Insofar as financial services are concerned, "[...] it is useful to 
distinguish among approaches [...] [r]anging from the most liberal to the less liberal 
[i.e. (i) common regulation; (ii) mutual recognition; (iii) non-discrimination; (iv) national 
treatment; (v) cross border trade with limited entry; (vi) cross border trade area without 
entry]. The distinguishing features of these arrangements are summarized in CHANT, 
supra, note 17 at 3-6.
G. HANSSON, Harmonisation and International Trade (London: Routledge, 1992) at 
25. In Canada, "[t]here is a strong concern that the high standards of securities laws 
that have been built over the recent years in North America will be subject to 
compromises in order to achieve a certain degree of international harmonization and 
integration." S.M. BECK, "Recent Trends in Securities Regulation" in L.S.U.C. Special 
Lectures, Securities Law in the Modern Financial Marketplace (Toronto, Ont.: Richard 
De Boo, 1989) 1 at 3.
See, e.g., M.N. JOVANOVIC, International Economic Integration (London: Routledge,
1992) at 9ff. D. CARREAU, P. JUILLARD & T. FLORY, Droit international economique 
(Paris: L.G.D.J., 1978) at 122ff. SAFARIAN, supra, note 67 at 2. BALASSA, supra, 
note 67 at 1. Free trade areas entail the removal of discriminatory internal measures 
insofar as they apply to imported goods or services from the parties to an agreement. 
Custom unions are, essentially, free trade areas with discriminatory external measures 
common to all partners; common markets are custom unions with unrestrained labour 
and capital mobility between participating nations; and economic unions are common 
markets with coordinated fiscal, monetary, regulatory and social policies.
Both the FTA and NAFTA establish "free-trade areas" consistent with Article XXIV of 
the GATT. FTA, Article 101. NAFTA, Article 101. I. BERNIER & S. DUFOUR, GATT, 
Uruguay Round and NAFTA, (1994) 4:2 FTU 13.
In 1995, the number of Free Trade Areas was said to be continuously growing. "The 
Right Direction?" The Economist (16 September 1995) 23. Among the Free Trade 
Areas created under the authority of GATT Article XXIV, the reader is referred to the 
following: Free Trade Area Between Israel and the United States. Report of the 
Working Party adopted on May 14, 1989; GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents, 34th Supp. (1988), at 58; reprinted in (1985) 24 I.L.M. 653. Australia/New
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establishment of free trade zones and the elimination of the Most-Favoured-Nation 
(hereinafter MFN) principle with respect to third parties73.
In whatever form, integration is, essentially, evaluated in a practical setting. There 
exists no theoretical predictability about the economic consequence of integration. 
Different integration levels entail different national sovereignty sacrifices. Therefore, it 
is useful to consider policy coordination issues carefully and be able to recognize 
where national policies diverge, as we will later note with respect to securities 
regulation and laws affecting the securities industry.
2. Structure of the Three Economies
Economic integration of the three North American countries (Canada, the United 
States and Mexico) is not an entirely new idea74. Particularly in Canada, there has
Zealand Closer Economic Relations - Trade Agreement (ANZCERT). Report of the 
Working Party adopted on October 2, 1984; GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents 31st Supp. (1985), p. 170; reprinted in (1983) 22 I.L.M. 945. Agreement 
Between the European Communities and Israel. Report of the Working Party adopted 
on July 15, 1976; GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 23rd Supp. 
(1977), p. 55. Caribbean Free Trade Area. Report of the Working Party adopted on 
November 9, 1971; GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 18th Supp. 
(1972), p. 129. Latin American Free Trade Area. Examination of Montevideo Treaty. 
Report of the Working Party adopted on November 18, 1960; GATT, Basic 
Instruments and Selected Documents 9th Supp. (1961), p. 87. European Free Trace 
Association. Examination of Stockholm Convention. Report of the Working Party 
adopted on June 4, 1960; GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 9th 
Supp. (1961), p. 70. The Treaties Establishing the European Economic Community 
and the European Atomic Energy Community. Report of the Working Party adopted on 
November 29, 1957; GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 6th Supp. 
(1961), p. 68.
For a recent assessment of Article XXIV of the GATT, see, e.g., J.H. JACKSON & 
R.H. SNAPE, "History and Economics of GATT’s Article XXIV" in ANDERSON & 
BLACKHUST, eds, supra, note 63 at 273. For a Canadian perspective, see S.M. 
RIERSTEAD, An International Bind: Article XXIV of GATT and Canada, (1993) Ottawa 
L. Rev. 315.
See generally J.W. WILKIE & O.M. LAZIN, "Mexico As Linchpin for Free Trade in the 
Americas" in J.W. WILKIE, ed., Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol. 31, Part 2 
(Los Angeles, CA: UCLA Latin American Centre, 1995) 1175 at 1177 n. 1. T.L. 
GORDON, Economic Integration in North America: An Agreement of Limited 
Dimensions but Unlimited Expectations, (1993) 56 The Modern L. Rev. 157 at 159. W. 
McGAUGHEY, Jr., A U.S.-Mexico-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Do We Just Say 
No? (Minneapolis, MN.: Thistlerose, 1992) at 45ff; S.J. RANDALL, H. KONRAD & S. 
SILVERMAN, North American Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States 
and Mexico (Calgary, Alta: University of Calgary Press, 1992) at 12ff.
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been a long interest in (and controversy about) closer economic ties with the U.S. 
This is not surprising given the fact that each of the two countries is the most 
important trading partner of the other75. Adding Mexico to the equation is, however, 
a more recent idea76.
The North American countries vary in degree of development and in foreign trade 
objectives. Although the continent is a natural geographic unit and, perhaps, an 
appropriate economic unit, the U.S., Canada and Mexico are plainly quite different77. 
First, Canada and the U.S. are fully industrialized nations while Mexico is semi­
industrialized. In the past, integration in other parts of the world usually occurred 
among countries which were smaller and more equal in size and economic 
development than is the case in North America. Second, Canada and Mexico are 
resource rich while the U.S. faces energy problems. Third, the U.S. economy 
dominates the region to a degree not found in other regional groupings, being roughly 
ten times the size of Canada and twenty times that of Mexico. Historically, the 
superpower status of the U.S. has forced Canada and Mexico to fear its
However, prior to its decision to become a full member of the Organization of 
American States (effective January 1990), "Canada was geopolitically considered as 
being more part of Western Europe than of the Americas due to its British tradition, its 
links with France and its membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)". L. 
PERRET, "Canada, NAFTA and Beyond" in N. LACASSE & L. PERRET, eds, Free 
Trade in the Americas (An Hemispheric Approach) (Montreal, Que.: Collection Bleue, 
Wilson & Lafleur, 1994) 3 at 3.
M. HART, A North American Free Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Ont: Centre for Trade 
Policy and Law, 1990) at 11ff. Note that in the late 1960s, there were talks to create a 
trilateral free trade association including Canada, the U.S. and ... Great Britain. Hence, 
in view of France’s reluctance towards a British admittance in the EC, Ottawa, 
Washington and London discussed the possibility of creating the "North Atlantic Free 
Trade Association" or NAFTA. B. LANDRY, Commerce sans frontieres: le sens du 
libre-echange (Montreal, Que.: Quebec/Amerique, 1987) at 108. With the stalling of 
GATT in 1993 and the Maastricht Treaty facing an uncertain future, a similar idea (this 
time linking the U.S. and the EC, to form a common European American market) was 
proposed by former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Again, however, this 
"North Atlantic Free Trade Area" did not materialize. J.M. ROSENBERG, Encyclopedia 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the New American Community, and 
Latin-American Trade (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995) at 321.
For a discussion, see generally J.A. ERFANI, The Paradox of the Mexican State: 
Rereading Sovereignty from Independence to NAFTA (Boulder, Co: Rienner, 1995). R. 
GRINSPUN & M.A. CAMERON, eds, The Political Economy of North American Free 
Trade (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).
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domination78.
These features are likely to present difficulties in the integration process79. The 
extent of the countries’ socio-economic disparity is illustrated in Table 1. The GNP 
and per capita GNP as well as other social factors such as literacy and life 
expectancy show Mexican development to be far behind its neighbours to the 
north80.
In both cases, there is a rational or irrational fear of the economic giant across the 
border. H.W. KONRAD, "North American Continental Relationships: Historical Trends 
and Antecedents" in S.J. RANDALL [et al.], supra, note 74 at 83. Mexico’s 
contemporary history is characterized by its high degree of nationalism and of 
suspicion towards foreign investment and ownership in its territory. Political, economic 
and emotional animosities in Mexico towards the U.S. are well-known. "[0]ne must 
consider Mexico’s nationalistic sensitivity in dealing with a country to which it lost half 
of its territory in 1848 [...]" F. De ANDREA, "Protecting Strategic and Economic 
Sectors: Petroleum and Energy in Mexico" in N. LACASSE & L. PERRET, eds, Doing 
Business in Mexico: The Free Trade Challenge (Montreal, Que.: Collection Bleue, 
Wilson & Lafleur, 1993) 59 at 63. They, like many other Latin-American countries, 
have viewed U.S. policies as designed to further U.S. citizens’ business concerns as 
well as international strategic concerns. See, e.g., J. GRUNWALD, Foreign Private 
Investment: The Challenge of Latin American Nationalism, (1971) 11 Va. J. Int’l L. 228 
at 232. In Canada, there has been a traditional widespread fear that with integration 
“Canadians will become hewers of wood and drawers of water". R. WONNACOTT & 
P. WONNACOTT, Free Trade Between the United States and Canada: the Potential 
Economic Effects (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) at iv. Not too long 
ago, the former Premier of Ontario mentioned that free trade was a contract leading 
toward a "piece by piece" annexation with the U.S. M. VASTEL, "Pour I’aider a sauver 
le Canada d’une annexion aux £tats-Unis, Bob Rae lance un pressant appel a Robert 
Bourassa." Le Soleil [of Quebec] (9 October 1991) A4.
B.W POULSON & M. PENUBARTI, "North-American Trade in the Post-Debt-Crisis 
Era" in K. FATEMI, ed., North American Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities and 
Challenges (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 84 at 84.
See generally, R.S. BELOUS & J. LEMCO, eds, NAFTA as a Model of Development: 
The Benefits and Costs of Merging High and Low Wage Areas (Washington, D.C.: 
National Planning Association, 1993).
42
TABLE 1
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE ECONOMIES
1994 U.S. CANADA MEXICO
Area (square kilometres) 9,533 9,976 1,973
Populations (millions) 255.4 27.3 86.2
World rank (by population) 4 32 11
GDP (billions of U.S. dollars) 6,738 548 377
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars) 25,788 18,782 4,108
Adult literacy 99.5% 98% 87.6%
Life expectancy, years 76 77 70
Inflation rate (%) 2.2% 0.9% 7%
Source: World Development Report ’94, the World Bank; World Competitiveness Report, ’94.
Table 2 highlights the structure of the three economies. It shows that each of the 
three countries experienced a decline between 1960 and 1994, in the share of the 
labour force and of output devoted to the agricultural sector. While the compensating 
increase in the U.S. and Canada was in services, in Mexico it was mainly in industry. 
In 1994, two-thirds of the economic activity in the U.S. and Canada was in sen/ices 
compared to only one third in Mexico. It is a reflection of the differential productivity 
and stage of development that a full third of the Mexican labour force is still employed 
in agriculture, compared to 2.9 percent in the U.S.81
TABLE 2
STRUCTURE OF THE THREE ECONOMIES
U.S. CANADA MEXICO
Distribution of the Labour Force (%) 1960 1994 1960 1994 1960 1994
Agriculture 7% 2.9% 13% 4.5% 55% 33.1%
Industry 36 25.3 35 23.2 20 35.5
Sen/ices 57 71.8 52 72.3 25 31.8
Sources: EIU; Statistics Canada; World Competitiveness Report, ’94.
A recent study assessed Mexico’s productivity. The research found that in most cases 
(including in the banking industry), Mexican (as well as some other Latin American) 
firms were less productive than those of Canada and the U.S. The weakness came 
from ineffective organization (i.e. too many workers, hierarchical structures, bad 
communications and unnecessary tasks). "Death of an Oxymoron: Latin American 
Productivity" The Economist (25 June 1994) 67.
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Table 3 presents the total trade of the three North American countries, as well as their 
trade with each other. In 1972 and 1994, a quarter of the total U.S. trade was with 
Canada and Mexico. In the case of Canada, two-thirds of the 1994 imports and 
exports are with the U.S., and an insignificant proportion with Mexico. Similarly, two- 
thirds of Mexican trade was with the U.S., and an insignificant proportion was with 
Canada. This pattern reflects the immense size of the U.S. economy and the 
geographic proximity of the U.S. between the two other countries. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement may somewhat stimulate Canada-Mexico trade. Yet, 
given the existing trade patterns, it is reasonable to consider separately the Canada- 
U.S., Canada-Mexico and U.S.-Mexico trade flows82.
TABLE 3
INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN TRADE ($U.S. Billion)
1972 1994
U.S. Exports Imports Exports Imports
Total trade 50.0 59.0 512.4 689.3
Trade with Canada 12.4 15.8 114.3 132.0
Trade with Mexico 2.0 2.0 50.8 50.4
CANADA
Total trade 21.1 19.4 161.3 151.5
Trade with U.S. 14.1 13.1 133.1 99.6
Trade with Mexico 0.1 0.1 715.0 3.4
MEXICO
Total trade 1.7 2.7 57.0 72.0
Trade with U.S. 1.1 1.6 45.7 50.8
Trade with Canada 0.0 0.1 3.1 0.7
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1994.
Despite their differences, increased political and economic pressures around the globe 
have driven the three countries closer together. As a result, the emerging North 
American regional market has become a focal point in many firms’ strategic outlook83
For other statistics, see generally, WILKIE, ed., supra, note 74.
A recent study has found that this North American focus has two dimensions: (i) the 
integration of Canadian, U.S. and (somewhat more slowly) Mexican business 
operations into continental operations; and (ii) the rationalization of production
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(including those operating in the securities industry).
3. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: The Rise of 
a Phoenix
With a gradual economic integration on the way, the first step towards the 
formalization of a "renewed" trading relationship between Canada and the U.S. has 
been the signing of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.
3.1 Background and Rationale for a FTA
As we have seen the Canada-U.S. trading relationship is characterized by remarkably 
high level of economic interdependence with Canada’s reliance on the U.S. being 
considerably larger than vice verse?4. Still, Canada’s importance to the U.S. is 
unquestionable85.
From time to time in the course of Canadian history, some form of economic 
integration has been proposed. The issue of free trade with the U.S. is one of
capacity. S. KRAJEWSKI, S. BLANK & H.S. YU, "North American Business 
Integration" Business Quarterly (Spring 1994) 55.
For an historical account of past events leading up to the FTA, see, e.g., H. BELLO & 
G.R. WINDHAM, "The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Issues of Process" in L. 
WAVERMAN, ed., Negotiating and Implementing a North American Free Trade 
Agreement (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 1992) 29. G.V. DOERN & B.W. 
TOMLIN, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story Review Essay: The Great Canada - 
United States Free Trade Debate, (1992) 21:2 Am. Rev. of Can. Studies 337. E. 
THEROUX, Du traite de reciprocity a YAccord du iibre-4change, (1991) 25 R.J.T. 227. 
E.H. FRY, "An Historical Overview of Canada - U.S. Trade Relations" in P.P. 
PROULX, ed., Canada-United States Trade Liberalization and Socio-Economic 
Integration: U.S. Perspectives (Halifax, N.S.: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 
1990) 51. R. WHITE, Fur Trade to Free Trade: Putting the U.S.-Canada Trade 
Agreement in Historical Perspective (Toronto, Ont.: Dundorn, 1988).
For instance, apart from supplying the U.S. with large quantities of important raw 
materials, Canada represents a major market for manufactured goods and the largest 
proportion of American FDI is located in Canada. Moreover, Canadians are invested 
largely in the U.S. D. STEGER, "The Impact of U.S. Trade Laws on Canadian 
Economic Policies" in C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE, Policy Harmonization: The Effects of a 
Canadian-American Free Trade Area (Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1990) 73 at 
74.
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Canada’s oldest debates and has been called "the Issue that will not die"86. The 
pervasiveness of the free trade question is also demonstrated by the absence of any 
exclusive links with the principles and ideas of the different political parties. The first 
idea of economic integration between Canada and the U.S. can be traced back to the 
1840s, when Great Britain ended the Imperial Preferences for its colonies. The British 
North American colonies turned to trade with the U.S87. Since then, many attempts 
were made to obtain a durable bilateral arrangement on this issue. Twice in Canadian 
history, free trade with the U.S. was proposed and defeated in federal elections88. 
Nevertheless, trade between the two countries continued to grow.
In 1965, one bilateral trade accord was signed: the Canada-U.S. Automotive Products 
Trade Agreement (Auto Pact)89. Canada’s high degree of interdependence and 
sensitivity to external economic developments became evident in the early 1970s 
when the U.S. encountered severe economic problems. In addition to Washington 
refusing to take into account Canada’s special position vis-a-vis the U.S.90 These 
developments led Ottawa to re-examine the Canada-U.S. trade relationship. The 
impact of these external events was reinforced by a resurgence of Canadian 
nationalism91. However, on the whole, the federal government’s attempt to decrease
P. WONNACOTT, The United States and Canada: The Quest for Free Trade-An
Examination of Selected Issues, Policy Analysis in International Economic N° 16 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1987) at 1. W. NEIL, Canada- 
U.S. Trade Policy Issues: Free Trade Discussions (Ottawa, Ont.: Library of Parliament, 
1985) 1. J.L. GRANATSTEIN, "Free Trade Between Canada and the United States: 
The Issue That Will Not Go Away" in Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Prospects for Canada, The Politics of Canada’s Economic Relationship with the United 
States (Research Studies, Vol. 29) (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 
(D. STAIRS & G.R. WINHAM, eds) 11 at 11. B. MACDONALD, The issue That Will 
Not Die (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1967).
CANADA, Royal Commission of the Economic Union and Development Prospects for 
Canada, Report, Vol. 1 (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) 
at 218-219.
C.F. DORAN, Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today (Baltimore, MD: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1984) at 15. GRANATSTEIN, supra, note 86 at 17-21. 
K.M. CURTIS & J.E. CARROLL, Canadian-American Relations (Lexington, MA: D.C. 
Heath, 1983) at 19.
In 1972, President Nixon essentially ended the special relationship in his address to 
the Canadian Parliament by pointing out that mature partners should have 
autonomous and independent policies. DORAN, supra, note 88 at 21-23.
In the Autumn of 1972, Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Secretary of State of External 
Affairs, presented three possible options for Canadian-American relations: "[(i)] 
maintain the present relationship with the United States with a minimum of policy
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Canada’s high degree of dependence did not prove to be very fruitful92. Under 
difficult economic circumstances, considerations of economic self interest began to 
prevail in Canada, and more attention was subsequently given to the Canada-U.S. 
trade relationship93.
In the 1980s, the Canadian government recognized the growing interdependence 
between states as "a fact of life"94. Despite the fact the Canadian economy was 
exposed to all kinds of international developments (for example, its capital markets, 
for all intents and purposes, being completely integrated with the global market), 
Canada was one of the few OECD members that did not belong to a free trade area 
or to a common-market association95. In March 1985, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
and President Ronald Reagan met in Quebec City to explore possibilities for
adjustments; [(ii)] move deliberately towards closer integration with the United States; 
or [(iii)] pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the 
Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life and in the process to reduce 
the present Canadian vulnerability." M. SHARP, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for 
the Future" International Perspectives (September/October 1972) 1 at 1. The last 
option (the so-called "Third Option") became the strategy of the Canadian government 
in the 1970s and the early 1980s. Many initiatives were taken in the wake of the Third 
Option, including the creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency [hereinafter 
FIRA] (created to screen new investments and to review large foreign acquisitions of 
existing assets. In 1985, FIRA was abolished and replaced with Investment Canada 
and screening of foreign investment became less demanding) and the National Energy 
Program [hereinafter NEP] (introduced in 1980 with the prime objectives of achieving 
at least 50% Canadian ownership of oil and gas production and self-sufficiency of oil 
supply by 1990 — in 1984, it was abolished). P. MORICI, A.J.R. SMITH & S. LEA, 
Canadian Industrial Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1981) c. 
3.
On U.S. responses to Canadian nationalism, see, e.g., D. LEYTON-BROWN, 
Weathering the Storm: Canadian-U.S. Relations, 1980-83 (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian- 
American Committee, 1985) Chapter 3.
P. MORICI, Meeting the Competitive Challenge: Canadian and the United States in 
the Global Economy (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian-American Committee, 1988) at 33-36. 
P. MORICI, The Global Competitive Struggle: Challenges to the United States and 
Canada (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian-American Committee, 1984) at 87-89.
The Third Option policy was openly abandoned when the government of Pierre Elliott 
Trudeau released a discussion paper acknowledging that decisions and actions of one 
country increasingly affect others. CANADA, Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s: A 
Discussion Paper (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1983) at 40- 
45.
ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, Venturing Forth: An Assessment of the Canada- 
U.S. Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988) 
at 3.
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increased trade between the two nations. Free trade talks began on May 21, 198696.
Negotiations were difficult97. Canada indicated that it would not accept an 
arrangement which would weaken the Auto Pact, agriculture, regional development 
and foreign investment rules. In addition, a binding system to settle disputes would 
have to be included. On the last point, opinions diverged widely. From the outset, 
Canada wanted a bilateral tribunal with binding powers to deal with American 
protectionist trade rules. This induced Ottawa to suspend the trade talks on 
September 23, 1987.
Pointing to the unacceptable concessions Canada would have to make, the opposition 
parties (the Liberals and the New Democrats) urged the Mulroney government to 
abandon the free trade idea altogether98. At the same time, the powerful province of 
Ontario reiterated its strong reservations vis-a-vis free trade. Despite this pressure99, 
bilateral governmental consultations were held in order to resume the negotiations. 
Both parties realized that time was running out very rapidly: the deadline set by the 
U.S. Congress for the "fast track" procedure would expire on October 4, 1987100. On
On the decision to negotiate the FTA, see G.R. WINHAM, "Why Canada Acted" in W. 
DIEBOLD, Jr., ed., Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Canada in U.S. Trade Policy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988) 37.
For a good insider account, see M. HART, Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada- 
U.S. Free Trade Negotiations (Vancouver, B.C.: UBC Press, 1994).
Commenting over the situation of financial institutions, the government of Canada 
announced that the FTA would "[...] allow our large world-class financial institutions to 
tap global financial markets and enhance their financial strength." CANADA, 
Department of External Affairs, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Brief 
(Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988) at 7. In contrast, the official 
opposition in Parliament (i.e. the Liberal Party of Canada) opposed the deal saying 
"[...] it gives complete access to American companies [...]." LIBERAL PARTY OF 
CANADA, Reaching Out: A Liberal Alternative to the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement 
(Ottawa, Ont.: Liberal Party of Canada, 1987) at 33. For its part, the New Democratic 
Party for many years has tried (and failed) to cancel the FTA by introducing motions in 
the Canadian House of Commons. See, e.g., K. PUTHON & R. SCHWARTZ, NDP 
Attempt to Abrogate FTA Fails, (1992) 5:6 Canada-U.S. Trade 39.
Other reasons given for Canada to abandon the FTA are cited in R.D. ROBINSON, 
Canada Should Opt Out of the Free Trade Association with the United States, (1992) 
34 Int’l Exec. 363. CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, Paying the 
Price (Ottawa, Ont.: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1991).
In essence the fast track process obliges Congress to review trade agreements within 
a specified period of time, then either assent to or reject them in their entirety without 
amendment.
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October 1st, the talks were re-opened and a compromise was reached before the 
deadline with Canada acquiring its bilateral panel. In the end however, both sides 
appeared to have made major concessions. Prime Minister Mulroney and President 
Reagan signed the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on January 2, 1988.
The passage of the Agreement required implementing legislation by the U.S. 
Congress which was achieved relatively smoothly101. The FTA was fully ratified by 
the time Congress adjourned in October 1988 for national elections. In Canada, 
however, the situation was very different. The opposition parties opposed the FTA. 
Nevertheless, the government secured the passage of the implementing legislation by 
the House of Commons in September 1988. However, when it became clear that the 
Canadian Senate (controlled by the opposition) would not pass the legislation before 
a federal election took place, the Prime Minister called one for November 21, 
1988102. The government was re-elected with a majority and given a mandate103 
to proceed with the FTA which came into effect on January 1, 1989104. The FTA 
provided for an indefinite term but it could be terminated by either country upon giving 
six months notice105.
At the time of its signing, the FTA was the single most important trade agreement 
ever concluded between two countries in that it attacked protectionism and provided 
for liberalization in all sectors of the economy including commitments on trade in 
financial services106. However, as we shall see, the FTA extends beyond trade in
United States - Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988). For the U.S. viewpoint on the implementation of the 
FTA, see House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, H.R. Doc. 102- 
36, January 30, 1991, Congressional Information Service 91H780-5, 47p.
R. JOHNSTON, "Free Trade and the Dynamics of the 1988 Canadian Election" in J. 
WEARING, ed., Voting in Canada (Toronto, Ont.: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991) 35 at 37. 
"Opponents of the FTA still maintain that although the Conservative Government that 
advocated the FTA was reelected in the general election called on the issue of free 
trade, the majority of Canadians voted against the adoption of the FTA." C. JORDAN,
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, (1989) 5 Rev. Banking and Fin. 
Sew. 33 at 34 n. 7.
FTA, Article 2105. On the entry into force of the FTA, see U.S. Senate Report N° 100- 
509, 15 September 1988. (1988) 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2395-2468 at 9-10, 43-44.
FTA, Article 2106.
FTA, Chapter One. For a general assessment of the FTA, see, e.g., N. LACASSE, 
"Bilan interimaire de I’Accord de libre-echange Canada-lztats-Unis" in LACASSE & 
PERRET, supra, note 75 at 149. When the FTA negotiations began, there were
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financial services to include long-term securities investment. The FTA has a preamble 
and is divided into eight parts comprising twenty-one chapters in total107. It 
recognizes the special relationship and mutual interdependence existing between the 
two countries and supplements (rather than replaces) international and bilateral 
agreements108. However, the U.S. and Canada both had different reasons to join in 
this accord.
3.1.1 United States* Rationale
Over the years, Americans have seen their relationship with Canadians as non­
problematic. For this reason, in the U.S., public attention to the creation of a free 
trade area with Canada was negligible. While the benefits of free trade would, of 
course, be of great importance to the comparatively small Canadian economy, they 
would be less essential to the U.S. economy. The Reagan Administration was 
determined nevertheless, to pursue a free trade arrangement with Canada. Because 
of the political sensitivities that could be raised in Canada by an American initiative, 
U.S. officials were inclined to let Canada take the first step109.
The Reagan Administration firmly opposed the rising protectionism in the global 
economy and considered free trade a lever against protectionist countries110. At the
suggestions that trade in financial services should be the subject of a separate 
agreement to be negotiated by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Canadian 
Ministry of Finance. However, in the end, it was decided that its mere existence would 
help for bilateral negotiations. P. MANSON, Impact of the Free Trade Agreement on 
Financial Services, (1988-1989) 3 B.F.L.R. 329 at 331.
On the general contents and impacts of the FTA, see, e.g., F. SIDDIQUI, ed., The 
Economic Impact and Implications of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(Lewinston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1991). R.A. SANFORD, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement: Its Aspects, Highlights, and Probable Impact on Future Bilateral Trade and 
Trading Agreements (1989) 7 Dickinson J. Int’l L. 371. D. STEVENS, The Canada- 
United States Free Trade Agreement: An Analyses of its Main Provisions, (1989) Int’l 
Bus. L.J. 918.
For an understanding of the objectives listed in Article 102 of the FTA, see, e.g., 
CANADA, Department of External Affairs, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
Synopsis (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987) at 14.
P. MORICI, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions: What Are the Issues?, (1985) 15:3 
Am. Rev. of Can. Stud. 311 at 317.
P. LOW, Trading Free: The GATT and US Trade Policy (New York, N.Y.: Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1993) at 9. P. MORICI, A New Special Relationship: Free Trade and 
U.S.-Canada Economic Relations in the 1990s (Ottawa, Ont.: Centre for Trade Policy
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same time, the Administration wanted to liberalize trade with other countries that were 
interested in freer trade as well111. The emphasis by the U.S. was focused on the 
concept of "fair trade", whereby it requested foreign countries to eliminate their trade 
restrictions. If such access was not forthcoming, reciprocal or comparable U.S. 
legislation would be enacted. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 provided the explicit 
mandate for the Administration to negotiate separate, bilateral arrangements on either 
a sectoral or comprehensive basis. In March 1985, the first bilateral free trade 
agreement, although limited in scope, was signed with Israel112. Although the 
economic effects of free trade with Canada would be small for the U.S.113, an 
arrangement could ease persistent frictions, increase the chance of future 
cooperation, and launch a new initiative to get North America "moving again"114.
The trade policy of the Reagan Administration evoked, however, considerable criticism 
in the U.S. Congress115. In order to save the free trade talks, key members of the 
Administration lobbied intensively. Eventually, the "fast track" procedure was 
endorsed, which led to the beginning of the negotiations with Canada. In its pursuit of 
free trade, President Reagan succeeded in keeping Canada-U.S. trade out of the 
partisan political debate in Congress. Moreover, the sizeable trade flows with Canada 
did not become an issue in Congress with respect to the introduction of the Omnibus
and Law, 1991) at 19ff. J.J. SCHOTT, More Free Trade Areas? (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for International Economics, 1989) at 11-13.
E. NEF, “Looking at Washington" in D. CAMERON, ed., The Free Trade Papers 
(Toronto, Ont.: James Lorimer, 1986) 63 at 65.
For an assessment of the U.S.-lsrael FTA, see, e.g., A. AMINOFF, The United States 
- Israel Free Trade Area: In Theory and Practice, (1991) 25:1 J.W.T. 5. H.F. ROSEN, 
"The U.S.-lsrael Free Trade Area Agreement: How Well Is It Working and What Have 
We Learned?" in J.J. SCHOTT, ed., Free Trade Areas and U.S. Trade Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1989) 97.
For some thoughts on the economic benefits for the U.S., see, e.g., F.C. MENZ & S.A. 
STEVENS, eds, Economic Opportunities in Freer U.S. Trade with Canada (Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991).
R.J. WONNACOTT, Canada/United States Free Trade: Problems and Opportunities 
(Toronto, Ont.: Ontario Economic Council, 1985) at 7-10. G.C. HUFBAUER & A.J. 
SAMET, "A U.S. View of Freer Trade" International Perspectives (March/April 1984) 
27.
See, e.g., CANADA, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada, Report, Vol. 1 (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1985) 319.
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Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (hereinafter OTCA)116.
3.1.2 Canada’s Rationale
Canada always has been a strong supporter of multilateralism on the premise that 
greater gains can be realized for a relatively small economic entity in a multilateral 
forum, rather than on a bilateral basis where bargaining strengths are unequal117. 
Nevertheless, there has been a growing feeling in Canada that in a changing world 
characterized by increasing protectionism and the strengthening of regional trade 
blocs, a continued adherence to a purely multilateral trade strategy could be harmful 
for the Canadian economy118.
This first major advocate of bilateral free trade with the U.S. was the Senate’s 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs which concluded that Canada’s interests were 
unlikely to be served by what had become a "Club of Three" (the U.S., the EC and 
Japan)119. A Canada-U.S. arrangement, on the other hand, would certainly 
strengthen Canada both politically and economically120. In 1985, the new 
Conservative government presented a discussion paper which singled out 
protectionist pressures in the U.S. and recognized that the multilateral rules were no
A Pub. L. N° 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. This comprehensive trade legislation, which 
came into force in August 1988, concentrates on reciprocity and market access. From 
the Canadian point of view, "[sjeveral observers, [...] have recommended that Canada 
should consider the FTA at an end if a U.S. trade bill is enacted containing seriously 
protectionist measures affecting Canada." D.P. STEGER, A Concise Guide to the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (Toronto, Ont.: Carswell, 1988) at 96.
R. WONNACOTT, "Bilateral Trade Liberalization with the United States and 
Multilateral Liberalization in the GATT: Selected Observations" in D.W. CONKLIN & 
T.J. COURCHENE, eds, Canadian Trade at a Crossroads: Options for New 
International Agreements (Toronto Ont.: Ontario Economic Council, 1985) 335 at 335. 
K.A.J. HAY, "Canadian Trade Policy in the 1980s" International Perspectives 
(July/August 1982) 16 at 18.
S. REISMAN, "The Issue of Free Trade" in CAMERON, ed., supra, note 111, 33 at 37. 
CANADA, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada-United States 
Relations, Volume III: Canada’s Trade with the United States (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1982) at 111-115.
For a detailed explanation of Canada’s objectives in the negotiation with the U.S., see, 
e.g., ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra, note 95 at 5-6.
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longer a sufficient means of managing Canada’s most important relationship121. At 
the same time, the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada (commonly known as the "Macdonald Commission") 
recommended bilateral free trade as well122.
Because the linkages between Canada and the U.S. are very comprehensive and 
complex, this inter-dependence between the two nations must be considered truly 
unique in the international system. For Canada, the FTA provided many benefits in its 
relationship with the U.S123. It Incorporated Into a bilateral agreement the rights and 
protection afforded each country by the GATT and it defined those commitments124. 
Without doubt, free trade with the U.S. has been seen to provide viable opportunities 
to increase the overall efficiency and productivity of Canadian industry125.
From a policy-making perspective, the FTA generally did not require Canada to carry
CANADA, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Competitiveness and Security: 
Directions for Canada’s International Relations (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada, 1985) at 30-33.
Established in 1983 by the Liberal government, the Commission released a 
voluminous study on long-term economic prospects and challenges for Canada. See 
CANADA, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for 
Canada (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985). In 1985, the 
newly elected Mulroney government accepted the report which offered a "vision of a 
future agreement [that] was simultaneously bolder and more conservative than the 
1988 FTA, depending on the provisions at issue". G.B. DOERN & B.W. TOMLIN, The 
Free Trade Story: Faith & Fear (Toronto, Ont.: Stoddart, 1991) at 56. Apart from the 
Macdonald Commission, several other private groups endorsed the concept of free 
trade. MORICI, supra, note 110 at 54.
Having been one of Canada’s biggest supporter of the FTA, the Province of Quebec 
has largely benefited from free trade. "Free-Trade Agreement Helped Quebec Most, 
Study Suggests: Province’s Exports to U.S. Have Surged Since 1989" The [Toronto] 
Globe and Mail (26 July 1994) A4. At the outset, it was predicted that the eastern and 
western provinces would perhaps gain more than Ontario and Quebec. ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra, note 95 at 24.
For a complete summary of the FTA, see, e.g., P. MORICI, The Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement, (1989) 3:4 Int’l Trade J. 25.
See, e.g., CANADA, Department of Finance, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement: An Economic Assessment (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1988) at 3. Amongst other things, the FTA provides more secure access to 
the U.S. as "Canadians wanted to be sure that when they invested to serve the North 
American market they would not be subject to the whims of American courts and 
regulators." S. REISMAN, "The Nature of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement" in 
M.G. SMITH & F. STONE, eds, Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement 
(Toronto, Ont.: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987) 41 at 44.
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out major modifications in its traditional regulatory instruments. Particularly in an area 
such as financial services, it was established that most existing practices in both 
Canada and the U.S. should remain in force126. However, future changes in laws 
and regulations have been subject to the national treatment principle. As we will see, 
this has led to increased substantial harmonization of Canadian and U.S. policies in 
numerous areas including the ones affecting the securities industry.
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Challenge from 
the South
NAFTA is not just a simple trade agreement127. Besides being designed to increase 
trade and investment, it aims to create economic opportunities in various sectors 
including the financial services industry128. Overall, NAFTA helps make a more 
efficient use of North American resources while favouring competitive market 
forces129. However, it also helps bring in a new player to the trade game — Mexico.
4.1 Background and Rationale for a NAFTA
The FTA has played an indirect role in the creation of NAFTA130. Though a 
provision of the FTA stipulates the right of either Party to enter into other free trade 
agreements131, the Canada-U.S. deal was designed as a bilateral agreement. As
MORICI, supra, note 110 at 78 n. 13.
"NAFTA is neither a piece of domestic legislation design to create jobs nor a mere 
agreement designed to foster trade among three nations. NAFTA is carefully 
conceived foreign policy product [...]". J. SIMSER, Financial Services Under NAFTA: A 
Starting Point, (1995) 10 B.F.L.R. 187 at 188. Also, see generally M. DELAL BAER & 
S. WEINTRAUB, eds, The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade 
Issues (Boulder, Co: Rienner, 1994). J. BEAUJEU-GARNIER, Le continent nord- 
americain a I’heure de I’ALIzNA, 2nd ed. (Paris: SEDES, 1994).
R.W. FOLSOM & W.D. FOLSOM, Understanding NAFTA and its International 
Business Implicatbns (New York, N.Y.: Matthew Bender Irwin, 1995) at 32.
D.C. ALEXANDER, The North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview, (1993) 
11 Tax & Bus. Law. 48 at 48.
B.W. TOMLIN, The Stages of Prenegotiation: The Decision to Negotiate North 
American Free Trade, (1989) 44 Int’l J. 254 at 254.
FTA, Article 104 para. 1. Thus, either country could negotiate its own FTAs with third 
countries. R.G. LIPSEY & M.G. SMITH, "The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: 
Special Case or Wave of the Future?" in SCHOTT, ed., supra, note 112, 317 at 325- 
328.
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opposed to NAFTA, the extension of the FTA to other Parties was not included in the 
Agreement132. Its aim was limited specifically to trade measures of Canada and the 
U.S. A decade ago, FTA with Mexico was not even foreseeable133. However, the 
successful negotiation of the FTA by Canada and the U.S. provided inspiration for 
Mexico to pursue the same in light of its own new liberalized policies134.
At first, when the idea emerged in Mexico, the agreement sought was of a bilateral 
nature with the U.S.135. Preliminary studies136 led to the official endorsement of "a
NAFTA, Article 2205. The existence of this clause has led some authors to say that 
NAFTA is like a living tree "planted in North America but capable of growing into 
Central and South America." R.G. DEARDEN, D. PALMETEER, "The "Living Tree" of 
NAFTA" CCH NAFTA WATCH (19 January 1994) 1 at 1.
As recently as 1984, American businessmen in Mexico anticipated that in the future, 
the country would be integrated with Central America. A partnership with the U.S. did 
not even appear to be a possibility. I. TRIGUEROS, "A Free Trade Agreement 
Between Mexico and the United States" in SCHOTT, ed., supra, note 112, 255 at 258. 
G.B. BLAKE, "Mexico in the Year 2000" in J.H. CHRISTIAN, ed., Business Mexico, 
(Mexico City: American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, 1984) at 207. C.H. LEE, 
"Mexico and Regional Economic Integration" in CHRISTIAN, ed., Ibid., at 213.
For an overview of NAFTA’s negotiations, see generally L. WAVERMAN, Negotiating 
and Implementing a North American Free Trade Agreement (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser 
Institute, 1992). T.H. WILSON & R.R. MEARS, Let the Games Begin: the Tough Road 
Ahead of the North American Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, (1992) 27 Texas 
Int’l L.J. 865. The North American Free Trade Agreement: In Whose Best Interest?, 
(1992) 12 Nw. L. & Bus. 536.
Canada has been aware of this possibility since the beginning, as it participated as an 
observer to meetings between the Mexicans and the Americans. Canada did not show 
at first, great interest in the Mexico-U.S. FTA. On the question of a possible free trade 
agreement between the U.S. and Mexico, and its potential impact on Canada, as 
debated in the Parliament of Canada, see CANADA, House of Commons, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
International Trade, Issue N° 76, (12 and 13 December 1990) (sixth report of the 
Committee to the House); Issue N° 71, (7 November 1990); Issue N° 69, (5 November 
1990); Issue N° 68, (1 November 1990); Issue N° 66, 23 October 1990); Issue N° 63, 
(19 October 1990); Issue N° 61, (9 October 1990); Issue N° 59, (28 September 1990); 
Issue N° 58, (27 September 1990); Issue N° 56, (18 June 1990) at 4-18, 23-25. 
CANADA, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Issue N° 33, (23 October 1990); Issue N° 31, (12 June 1990); Issue N° 26, (28 May 
1990).
On the prospects for and potential of a U.S.-Mexico FTA, as debated in the U.S., see 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Hearings before the Committee of Ways and 
Means (Subcommittee on Trade), 14 & 28 June 1990, Congressional Information 
Service 91H781-10, 438p. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION, The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade Agreement 
with Mexico. Report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives and to the Senate Finance Committee, Publication 2353 (Washington,
D.C.: United States International Trade Commission, 1991). In addition, see T. WU & 
N. LONGLEY, A U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: U.S. Perspectives, (1991) 25:3
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comprehensive bilateral FTA as the best vehicle to strengthen bilateral economic 
relations and meet the challenge of international competition" in Washington, D.C. in 
the Summer of 1990 by then Presidents Bush and Salinas137. This Agreement, 
following the previous example of the FTA, would include the gradual elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, clear and binding protection of intellectual property 
rights, the means to expand investment trade and services and the establishment of a 
dispute resolution mechanism. At that time, Canada showed its interest and joined in 
the negotiations. These discussions set the stage for a possible NAFTA. The 
American Congress allowed the NAFTA to be negotiated through the "fast track 
procedure"138. This was in order to guarantee the other Parties to the negotiations 
that a vote on the Agreement would be held within a fixed period of time without 
amendments.
After numerous high level encounters and negotiating sessions, each party proposed 
a NAFTA text in 1991. The aim was to reach an agreement before May 1992, since 
that would be the deadline for Congress to start the "fast track" adoption of the 
NAFTA139. After that time, the U.S. Presidential election process would hamper all 
other activities. None of the negotiating teams were willing however to let the May 
1992 deadline impinge upon the need to achieve a balanced and beneficial 
agreement. Parallel to these talks, it was agreed that discussions would be held on 
labour and environmental issues140. In the end, NAFTA was signed by the Canadian
J.W.T. 5.
Text of a letter from the President to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Finance and the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means dated 25 
September 1990 as reprinted in R.G. DEARDEN & D. PALMETEER, eds, Free Trade 
Law Reporter (Don Mills, Ont.: CCH Canadian, 1989) at 70,1001 para. 95-101 (loose- 
leaf). Letter from President Salinas de Gortari to President Bush, Ibid. at 70,105 para. 
95-105.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. N° 100-418,102 Stat. 1107 
(Est. Supp. 1989), §§ 2902, 2903, May 24, 1991. H. BELLO & A.F. HOLMER, "The 
Fast Track" Debate: a Prescription for Pragmatism, (1992) 26 Int’l Law. 183.
G.N. HORLICK & M.A. MEYER, Fast Track Authority — The Key to Successful Trade 
Negotiations, (1991) 4:3 Canada-U.S. Trade 25 at 25.
See, e.g., J. LEMCO & W.B.P. ROBSON, eds, Ties Beyond Trade: Labour and 
Environmental Issues under NAFTA (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian-American Committee, 
1993). K.J. READY, "NAFTA: Labour, Industry, and Government Perspectives" in M.F. 
BOGNANNO & K.J. READY, eds, The North American Free Trade Agreement- 
Labour, Industry, and Government Perspectives (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993) 3.
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Prime Minister and the Presidents of the U.S. and Mexico on December 17, 
1992141. However, the Agreement’s approval process was not easy142. The fact 
that the negotiations were trilateral rendered consensus that much more difficult to 
achieve. In the negotiations leading to the FTA, the bargaining was done face to face 
between the U.S. and Canada. Concessions to the other Party were made on the 
basis of what the first could offer in return. NAFTA changed the picture by bringing 
Mexico into the negotiating room. In this context, each Party was either an ally or an 
adversary. The gains of one did not necessarily correspond to the concessions of the 
other. This rendered the balancing of interests among the three countries much more 
difficult.
These trilateral regional negotiations were taking place concurrently with the 
multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The evolution of 
these world negotiations (which lasted seven years) directly affected the nature of 
both the FTA and NAFTA and vice versa143. The FTA was partially constructed on 
the basis of the GATT as it integrated the GATT’s principles in its provisions144. A 
similar inter-connection existed between GATT and NAFTA145.
"The NAFTA Signing in Three Capitals" The Free Trade Observer (January 1993) 662. 
Also, see generally, C. O’NEAL TAYLOR, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade 
Agreements: Why NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, (1994) 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & 
Econ. 1. P. HAYDEN, NAFTA in Effect as of January 1, 1994, (1994) 12:11 Legal 
Alert 97.
The U.S. Congress narrowly approved NAFTA. See, e.g., "NAFTA Approved by 
Congress" CCH NAFTA WATCH (January 1994) 1. For his part, the newly elected 
Prime Minister proceeded with implementing NAn"A after having secured a series of 
improvements requested by the Liberal Party of Canada during the 1993 federal 
election campaign. "Canada to Proceed With Proclamation of NAFTA" The Free Trade 
Observer (December 1993) 854. On the prospects following a NAFTA failure, see, 
e.g., CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, North American Outlook: 1993-1994, 
Report Number 1046 (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 1994) at 25-30. 
According to the Counsellor on Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Canada, "[i]t 
is [...] noteworthy to recognize the role of the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement and 
NAFTA in the successful completion of the Uruguay Round." M.L. CASSE, Assessing 
the Uruguay Round— The U.S. Perspective, (1994) 7:2 Int’l Econ. L. Soc. Bulletin 8 at 
8.
S. HACKETT, United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: An Introduction to the 
Free Trade Agreement and the Investment Provisions of Chapter 16, (1989) 27 U. 
Det. L. Rev. 283 at 285. See also I. BERNIER, L’Accord du libre-echange annote, 
(Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1990). This monograph establishes a cross reference 
of the provisions of the FTA and NAFTA to those of the GATT and the relevant 
jurisprudence.
See FTA, Articles 407, 501, 602 and 807.
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The aim of NAFTA has been to build an agreement similar in form and scope to the 
FTA which is suitable for North America. Except for certain residual elements (like 
some contained in the financial sen/ices Chapter), the FTA was integrated into 
NAFTA and thus, for all intents and purposes, repealed146. Maintaining two separate 
agreements would have led to severe legal difficulties in the field of dispute resolution 
to name only one potential problem area. For this reason, the main elements of the 
FTA such as national treatment, investment, financial services, dispute resolution 
mechanism, etc. were liberalized further or integrated into NAFTA. As with the 
FTA147, the Parties agreed that such an Agreement had to respect the principles of 
Article XXIV of the GATT relating to the establishment of free trade zones148.
4.1.1 Mexico’s Rationale
The NAFTA negotiations were the direct result of Mexico’s change of policy towards 
the international trade regime and its subsequent results149. This new policy led to
Since January 1st, 1994, the FTA has been suspended and will remain so, as long as 
Canada and the U.S. are Parties to NAFTA. Still, rather than being replaced, many 
provisions contained in the FTA have been incorporated by reference in NAFTA. 
These FTA provisions remain therefore in force, notwithstanding the coming into force 
of NAFTA. In the Financial Services Chapter, Annex 1401.4 mentions that Article 1702 
paras. 1 and 2 of the FTA is incorporated and made a part of NAFTA. B. APPLETON, 
Navigating NAFTA: A Concise Guide to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1994) at 21. I. BERNIER & S. DUFOUR, NAFTA's 
Impact on the FTA, (1994) 4:1 FTU 1 at 1-2. M. SMITH, "The North-American Free 
Trade Agreement: Global impacts" in ANDERSON & BLACKHURST, eds, supra, note 
63, 83 at 85.
FTA, Article 101. On the relation between the FTA and GATT, see J.-G. CASTEL, 
"Consistency of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement with Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" in M. GOLD & D. LEYTON-BROWN, eds, 
Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada - U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Toronto, Ont.: 
Carswell, 1988) 47. M.M. HART, GATT Article XXIV and Canada-United States 
Negotiations, (1987) 1 R.I.B.L. 317. Note that prior to the signing of NAFTA, the FTA 
was assessed by the GATT in view of Article XXIV. I. BERNIER, Le GATT et les 
arrangements economiques regionaux: le rapport du groupe de travail sur TAccord du 
libre-echange entre le Canada et les Iztats-Unis, (1992) 33 C. de D. 313.
NAFTA, Article 101. L. PERRET, "Canada, NAFTA and Beyond" in LACASSE & 
PERRET, eds, supra, note 75, 3 at 7.
C.A. HEREDIA, NAFTA and Democratization in Mexico, (1994) 48 J. Int’l Aff. 13 at 15. 
R.G. CLARK, "The State of the NAFTA Negotiations" in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, 
supra, note 75, 105 at 114. C.A. VEGA, "A Mexican Assessment of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Issues and Prospects" in R.E. GREEN, 
ed., The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: Issues and Prospects for a Free Trade 
Agreement in the Western Hemisphere (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993) 67 at 67. J.A.
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an immediate increase in trade between Mexico and the U.S. through the booming 
maquiladora industries150 and increased U.S. investments151. Since 1982, the 
importance of oil as a percentage of Mexico’s export income decreased 
dramatically152. With a proportional increase of the export of non-oil products, a 
higher dependence was created on access to the U.S. market. For Mexico, 
guaranteed access to its main export market through a free trade agreement was the 
next logical step for its new policy153. Thus NAFTA has been a means of continuing 
Mexico’s economic transformation.
An important element which favoured the ratification of NAFTA was the successful 
framework trade agreement between Mexico and the U.S. that was signed in 
November 1987154. The framework agreement implemented a bilateral permanent 
consultation procedure on various issues such as trade investment and other issues 
of concern to both countries. Along with the increasing two-way trade, the bilateral 
commission was successful in strengthening the Mexico-U.S. relationship. As a result 
of these consultations, bilateral agreements followed in the subsequent years on the
McKINNEY, "Mexico in a North American Free Trade Area" in K. FATEMI, ed., North 
American Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges (New York, N.Y.: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993) 134 at 135. L. RUBIO, "The Rationale for NAFTA: Mexico’s New 
"Outward-Looking" Strategy" Business Economics (April 1993) 12 at 13.
The maquiladoras are manufacturing plants that assemble components imported tax- 
free for re-export. The chief lure is cheap labour. See, e.g., R. CRANE, "Trade 
Liberalization and the Lessons of the Mexican Maquiladora Program" in GREEN, ed., 
supra, note 149 at 83.
For an account of the unilateral Mexican trade liberalization and the subsequent 
relations which developed with the U.S. see, e.g., S. WEINTRAUB [et al.], U.S.- 
Mexico Industrial Integration — The Road to Free Trade, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1990). The possibility for a free trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico had 
been rarely addressed before given the Mexican economic policy. See, e.g., S. 
WEINTRAUB, A Free Trade Agreement Between the U.S.A. and Mexico? 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1985).
S.J. RANDALL, Oil Industry Development and Trade Liberalization in the Western 
Hemisphere, (1993) 14 Energy Journal 101 at 103. "A Sacred Limping Cow" The 
Economist (15 May 1993) 50.
"For Mexico, the main rationale of the NAFTA lies in the investment dimension 
perhaps more than on trade liberalization. A relatively stable access to the U.S. 
market will encourage long-term investment and will help to attract foreign capital into 
Mexico." S. LOIZIDES & G. RH^AUME, The North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Implications for Canada, Report 99-93 (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 
1993) at 17.
Framework Trade and Investment Agreement, reprinted in (1988) 28 I.L.M. 438. M.G. 
SMITH, The U.S.- Mexico Framework Agreement: Implications for Bilateral Trade, 
(1988-89) 20 L. & Pol. Int’l Bus. 655.
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aforementioned issues155.
Mexico accepted Canada as part of the deal since President Salinas, with a long term 
perspective, was of the opinion that it was in the interest of both countries to be part 
of a same agreement with the U.S. and not two different agreements. That possibility 
could have led to a series of bilateral FTA’s between the U.S. and other Latin 
American countries to the detriment of third Parties to such agreements. Also, a 
foreign investor might have found that by locating in the U.S. he could reap the 
benefits of serving three markets rather than two156.
Overall, Mexico has a series of short term, medium term and long term 
expectations157. In the long term, NAFTA constitutes leverage for Mexico’s social 
development (not in terms of aid) but rather by virtue of increased trade. In the 
medium term, Mexico seeks to participate to a greater extent in world commerce. 
Finally, its short term aspirations are to build a new kind of relationship with the U.S. 
(and simultaneously, with Canada). In this context, NAFTA may have been 
responsible for the fact that Mexico recently joined the OECD158.
4.1.2 United States’ Rationale
For the U.S., the desire to secure investments in Mexico was perceived as attainable 
under NAFTA159. Most Americans found in Mexico’s trade proposal great optimism
See, e.g., Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks, reprinted in (1990) 29 I.L.M. 36. 
Joint Committee for Investment and Trade, (1990) 29 I.L.M. 40. See also R. 
SANDOVAL, Mexico’s Path Towards the Free Trade Agreement with the U.S., (1991) 
23 U. of Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 133. J. SILVA & R.K. DUNN, A Free Trade 
Agreement Between the United States and Mexico: The Right Choice?, (1990) 27 San 
Diego L. Rev. 937.
P. MORICI, "Facing Up to Mexico" in K. FATEMI, ed., North American Free Trade 
Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1993)
145 at 147.
P.G. OLIVERA, "What Do Mexicans Expect From NAFTA?" CCH NAFTA WATCH (26 
May 1994) 7.
"Mexico Finalizes OECD Membership" CCH NAFTA WATCH (14 July 1994) 8.
See generally, E.H. FRY & L.H. RADEBAUGH, eds, Investment in the North American 
Free Trade Area: Opportunities and Challenges (Provo, Utah: David M. Kennedy 
Centre for International Studies, Brigham Young University, 1992). J.H. BELLO & A.F. 
HOLMER, Reflections on the NAFTA as a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy, 
(1994) 28 Int’l Law. 425.
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for their economic and political futures160. Economic growth in the U.S. has been 
predicted by many current studies, as a result of trade liberalization with Mexico161. 
The growing significance of American exports to Mexico has created an opening for a 
comprehensive trade and investment agreement162. Under NAFTA, the U.S. has 
enlarged its market opportunities in a country where American goods and services are 
fashionable and has secured access for investment in a rapidly growing 
economy163. In the long run, a prosperous Mexico could indirectly support American 
economic growth164. Moreover, extending the U.S. foreign policy through economic 
ties with Mexico might serve U.S. political interests165. A NAFTA seemed to be only 
the beginning of a southward expansion of the trade agreement to other Latin 
American countries for the U.S. By including Canada at the beginning of the process, 
the door was open to ongoing expansion of the Agreement in pursuit of greater 
markets166. Closer continental economic cooperation would provide the Americans
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, 
North American Free Trade Agreement-Generating Jobs for Americans (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Dept. Commerce, May 1991) at 3ff. See also P. TOWNLEY, "The Business 
Outlook and the Realities of the North American Free Trade Agreement" Executive 
Speeches (Oct/Nov 1992) 27. C. BEIGIE, The Anticipated Economic Effect of a North 
American Free Trade Area on Business in the North American Context, (1987) 12 
Can.-U.S. L.J. 83.
For a list of studies see, J.A. McKINNEY, "Potential Effects of NAFTA on U.S. 
Economy" Baylor Business Review (Spring 1993) 29.
Opponents of NAFTA have maintained that the Agreement was designed to protect 
American investors. J. FAUX, "The NAFTA Illusion" Challenge (July/August 1993) 4. 
For a list of other arguments against NAFTA, see, e.g., "Eat Your NAFTA" The 
Economist (13 November 1993) 15.
See generally, "Happily Ever NAFTA?" World Trade (April 1994) 64. R.A. PASTOR, 
Integration with Mexico: Options for U.S. Policy (New York, N.Y.: Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1993). J.R. ESPANA, "Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) on U.S.-Mexican Trade and Investment Flows" Business Economics (July
1993)41.
See, e.g., "After NAFTA" The Economist (20 March 1993) 71. USITC, The Likely 
Impact on the United States of a Free Trade Agreement With Mexico, Publication N° 
2353, (Washington, D.C.: USITC, 1991) at 2-2ff.
J.G. CASTANEDA, "Can NAFTA Change Mexico?" Foreign Affairs (Sept./Oct. 1993)
66 at 69. B. HAMEL, Le nouvel ordre international et la politique commerciale des
Iztat'Unis: quelques developpements recents, Cahier de recherche 91-3, Groupe de
recherche sur la continental isation des economies canadiennes et mexicaines
(Montreal, Que.: UQAM, 1991) at 2. S. WEINTRAUB, A Marriage of Convenience —
Relations Between Mexico and the United States, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University
Press, 1990) at 206.
On the greater intentions of the U.S., see generally, M. FRECHETTE, Hemispheric
Free Trade: Building on the NAFTA-A U.S. Perspective, Studies on the Economic
Future of North America (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 1993). PROULX, ed.,
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with an opportunity to develop their own trading bloc167.
4.1.3 Canada’s Rationale
Historically, the lack of trade with Mexico was due in part to the lack of knowledge 
and awareness of Canadians about Mexico for purposes other than tourism168. This 
misperception has changed rapidly with the signing of NAFTA. Mexico’s opening of its 
economy has increased its economic ties with Canada169. At the same time that free 
trade talks between the U.S. and Mexico began, bilateral trade agreements were 
concluded in the early 1990s between Canada and Mexico170. These agreements 
provided a legal framework for the increasing ties and also established the basis for 
closer cooperation.
Canada was more cautious in its approach to NAFTA, announcing on September 24, 
1990171 that it would participate in preliminary discussions with Mexico and the U.S.
supra, note 84.
"Except for Brazil and Mexico, most Latin American countries stand to gain less from 
free trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S. than the U.S. stands to gain from FTA’s 
with them. The main incentive for the Latin American countries to form FTAs with the 
United States may be to attract investment or to halt the spread of new trade 
restrictions. Latin American countries do probably stand to benefit long-term export 
benefits from reduced trade barriers among themselves". R. ERZAN & A. YEATES, 
Free Trade Agreements with the United States-What’s is it for Latin America?, 
Working Paper WPS 827 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992) 12.
R.R. BARACIO, "Mexico’s Economic Reform and Business Perspectives with Canada" 
in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 78 at 140-141. Note that during the 1970s, 
some studies gave significant consideration to Canadian relations with Mexico and the 
rest of Latin America. CANADA, Foreign Policy for Canadian: Latin America (Ottawa, 
Ont.: Queen’s Printer, 1970). C.l. BRADFORD, Jr. & C. PESTIEAU, Canada and Latin 
America: The Potential for Partnership (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Economic Policy 
Committee of the Private Planning Association of Canada, 1970). However, no 
sustained efforts were made to facilitate these trade relations.
On Canadian economic ties with Mexico, see generally, J. SINCLAIR, ed., Crossing 
the Line: Canada and Free Trade with Mexico (Vancouver, B.C.: New Star Books,
1992).
"Canada and Mexico Conclude Bilateral Agreements” (16 March 1990) as reprinted in 
DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 70,811 para. 96-021. 
International Trade Minister Crosbie Announces Canada to Participate in Free Trade 
Talks with Mexico and the United States (24 September 1990) as reprinted in 
DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 70,125 para. 95-121. Statement 
to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International 
Trade, by Honourable John Crosbie, Minister for International Trade Regarding 
Canada’s Participation in North American Free Trade Talks with Mexico and the
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to establish the basis for subsequent negotiations on a trilateral FTA172. Canada’s 
approach was seen at first as an element of delay by both the Mexicans and the 
Americans173. Mexican negotiators felt unsure of the role Canada would play in the 
negotiations174. Canada and Mexico have common interests, in the field of energy 
for example, but also compete for the same export market. Mexicans believed that 
Canada’s pursuit of its interests and its desire to presen/e the FTA would not make 
for a strong ally in the negotiation process175. With some effort, Canada 
nevertheless managed to gain its place at the negotiating table176.
Canada decided to officially join the negotiations February 5, 1991177 to participate
United States, Ibid. at 70,131 para. 95-131.
On the reasons behind Canada’s decision to join the free trade preliminary 
discussions, see, e.g., B.C. SWICK-MARTIN, Canada-U.S.-Mexico Free Trade, (1990) 
3:10 Canada-U.S. Trade 73. Apprehensions by Canadians concerned the extent to 
which the trade regimes of the three countries involved would have to be adjusted in 
order to reach a trilateral accord. See generally, M. HART, A North American Free 
Trade Agreement: The Strategic Complications for Canada (Halifax, N.S.: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 1990).
M.W. GORDON, Economic Integration in North America—An Agreement of Limited 
Dimensions But Unlimited Expectations, (1993) 56 Modern L. Rev. 157 at 164. R. 
WONNACOTT, Canada’s Role in the U.S.- Mexico Free Trade Negotiations, (1992) 
World Economy 79 at 81. MORICI, supra, note 110 at 151.
M.A. CAMERON, L. EDEN & M. APPEL MOLOT, "North American Free Trade: Co­
operation and Conflict in Canada - Mexico Relations" in O. HAMPSON & C. MAULE, 
eds, Canada Among Nations 1992-93, A New World Order? (Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton 
University Press, 1992) 174 at 176.
After the signing of NAFTA, President Salinas admitted that "Canada’s advice on how 
to negotiate with the [U.S.] was invaluable in closing deal". J. RIVERA DE LOS 
REYES, "Mexico and Free Trade Agreements With Latin American Countries" in 
LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 75, 107 at 113.
On Canada’s perception of the coming negotiations at the time, see generally, T. 
THOMAS, Free Trade Negotiations between Mexico, Canada and the United States, 
Research Document LP-234E (Ottawa, Ont.: Library of Parliament, Economics Division
1990). The participation of Canada in the negotiations was not easily granted. Further 
the role to be played by Canada at the negotiating table was seriously questioned. 
See, e.g., R.G. LIPSEY, Canada and the U.S. at the U.S. - Mexico Free Trade Dance: 
Wallflower or Partner?, Commentary N° 20, (Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1990). 
"Joint Communique — President Bush, President Salinas and Prime Minister Mulroney" 
(5 February 1991) as reprinted in DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 
70,155 para. 95-151. More specifically, see "Statement by the Minister for International 
Trade, John C. Crosbie on Canada-U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Negotiations" (5 February
1991) Ibid. at 70,165 para. 95-171.
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fully in the foundation of NAFTA178. This decision was not taken wholeheartedly by 
Canada179. The dominant impression is that it was a choice between the lesser of 
two evils180. Again, the decision by the Canadian federal government to negotiate 
NAFTA led to another emotionally charged national debate181. At the federal level, 
the Liberal Party of Canada (the then official opposition) said that, if elected, it would 
renegotiate the FTA as well as certain aspects of NAFTA182. For its part, the New 
Democratic Party vowed to fight the Agreement183. Provincially, Quebec was fully in 
favour of NAFTA184. However, Ontario was opposed to the deal185.
Canada’s main objectives at the NAFTA negotiations were to secure better access to
The three main reasons why Canada became a full-fledged participant in the 
negotiations were: (i) to build on the gains achieved in the FTA; (ii) improve access to 
the Mexican market; and (iii) enjoy the gains from a more liberalized trade regime. 
Canada Will Join United States and Mexico in Negotiations for Free Trade Agreement, 
8 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) (6 February 1992) 184.
The basis for this decision can be found in CANADA, Canada and a Mexico — United 
States Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Ont.: Working Paper prepared by the International 
Trade and Finance Branch at the Department of Finance, July 1990).
Repeatedly in studies, one of the stated factors justifying Canada’s decision to 
participate in the trade negotiations was that Canada did not have much choice. See, 
e.g., HART, supra, note 76 at 77ff. Some studies supported the assertion that the 
NAFTA was a much less compelling policy issue for Canadians than was the FTA. 
See, e.g., G. RITCHIE, Beyond the Volcano: Canadian Perspective on Trilateral Free
Trade, (1991) Coium. J. of World Bus. 84. Finally, it was said that Canada’s principal 
aim in joining the negotiations was to prevent any dilution of the gains made in the 
FTA. See, e.g., R. CUERVO-LORENS, Canada-U.S.-Mexico Free Trade, (1991) 4:4 
Canada-U.S. Trade 26 at 27.
The federal government furiously battled the opposition to NAFTA. See, e.g., P. 
MORTON, "Tory “Slang" Takes Aim at NAFTA Foes" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(15 September 1992) 3.
"Liberal Party Says it will Renegotiate NAFTA if Elected" The Free Trade Observer 
(September 1993) 806. "Canada’s Liberal Party Vows to Renegotiate FTA and NAFTA 
if Elected" The Free Trade Observer (January 1993) 664. "Chretien Vows to 
Renegotiate FTA" The Free Trade Observer (February 1992) 455.
"Parliament Starts Debate on NAFTA — NDP Vows to Fight" The Free Trade Observer 
(November 1992) 632.
"Quebec Finds NAFTA Efforts Fruitful" The Free Trade Observer (March 1993) 702. 
"Quebec Plans to Support NAFTA" The Free Trade Observer (February 1993) 678. 
ONTARIO, Report of the Ministerial Committee Examining North American Free Trade 
(Toronto, Ont.: Queen’s Printer, 1993). See also, "Ontario Cabinet Opposes NAFTA" 
The Free Trade Observer {June 1993) 745. Note that less than three months before it 
would come into effect, Ontario’s NDP government announced it would challenge 
NAFTA in courts on grounds that it intrudes on provincial jurisdiction over such areas 
as financial services, investment services and social services. R. MACKIE, "Ontario to 
Challenge NAFTA in Courts" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (13 October 1993) B8. 
However, this idea did not materialize. *
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the Mexican market, safeguard and improve the gains made in the FTA and maintain 
Canada as attractive investment location in North America186. For the Canadian 
government, all of the objectives were "fully achieved" and more as the NAFTA deal 
was said to be the FTA-plus187. Surely, Canada was better off as part of the 
negotiations than as a by-stander188. NAFTA gave a chance to Canada to improve 
its access to the U.S. market in the area of financial services189. Moreover, if 
Canadians had decided not to participate in the Agreement it would probably have 
lost in terms of investment since establishing an enterprise in the U.S. would have led 
to preferential market access for the U.S.-based enterprise in the two countries190. 
Further, this precedent could have isolated Canada from the southern expansion of
A. NYMARK & E. VERDUN, "Canadian Investment and NAFTA" in A.M. RUGMAN, 
ed., Foreign Investment and NAFTA (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1994) 124 at 131. R.J. WONNACOTT, "Canada’s Role in NAFTA: To What 
Degree Has It Been Defensive?" in V. BULMER-THOMAS, N. CRASKE & M. 
SERRANO, eds, Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who Will 
Benefit? (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 163 at 165.
"Canadian Objectives Met in NAFTA, Wilson Said" The Free Trade Observer (August
1992) 568.
On efficiency gains for Canadian industry under NAFTA, see, e.g., G.R. WINHAM, 
NAFTA and the Trade Policy Revolution of the 1980s: A Canadian Perspective, (1994) 
49 Int’l J. 472. S. GLOBERMAN, Canada’s Interests in North American Economic 
Integration, (1993) 36 Can. Public Adm. 90 at 93ff. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement: Implications for Canada, Report 99-93 (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of 
Canada, 1993). L. WAVERMAN, " A Canadian Vision of North American Economic 
Integration" in S. GLOBERMAN, ed., Continental Accord, (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser 
Institute, 1991) 31 at 31 ff.
R.G. CLARK, "The State of the NAFTA Negotiations", LACASSE & PERRET, eds, 
supra, note 75 at 112.
This approach qualified as "hub-and-spoke", would have led to the U.S. entering into 
a series of bilateral Free Trade Agreement with Latin American countries to the 
continents overall trade. It was first called the "hub-and-spoke" problem by LIPSEY, 
supra, note 176. On hub-and-spoke, see also R.J. WONNACOTT, NAFTA: A View 
From Canada, North American Forum Policy Paper 94-3 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University, 1994). R.J. WONNACOTT, "Liberalizing Trade in the Western Hemisphere: 
Where Do We Want to Go, and How Do We Get There?" in GREEN, ed., supra, note 
149, 15. C. KOWALCZYK & R. WONNACOTT, Hub and Spokes, and Free Trade in 
the Americas, Research Report /  Department of Economics (London, Ont.: University 
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Committee, 1991) at 22ff. R. LIPSEY, "The Case of Trilateral ism" in GLOBERMAN, 
ed., supra, note 188, 89. R.J. WONNACOTT, Canada and the U.S.-Mexico Free 
Trade Negotiations, Commentary N° 21, (Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1990). 
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the Agreement to the tip of Argentina, should this ever happen191. It was in 
Canada’s best interest to be full Party to NAFTA, face the challenge of Mexico and 
ensure that its interests were defended192. In short, for Canada and Mexico, NAFTA 
opened up an opportunity to create a relationship that was virtually non-existent193.
5. A Hemispheric Integration: The Rhythm of the Future
Historically, U.S. policy with respect to some type of special relationship with Latin 
America has been rather mixed. On the one hand, as a member of GATT, the U.S. 
has generally favoured a multilateral approach in its trade relations. On the other 
hand, the Americans feared the establishment of a single Latin American integrated 
area without U.S. participation194. With the signing of several Latin American trading 
arrangements195 and, in view of the evolution of the European market and the
M.V.M. BRADFORD, "Canada, NAFTA and Its "Domino Effect" in the Americas" in 
LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 75, 97 at 105. R. CUERVO-LORENS, NAFTA 
— A Canadian Perspective, (1992) 5:3 Canada-U.S. Trade 10 at 11. A. BERRY, L. 
WAVERMAN & A. WESTON, "Canada and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: 
A Case of Reluctant Regionalism" Business Economics (April 1992) 31 at 32.
See, e.g., R. YORK, "NAFTA’s Implications for Canadian Trade Policy: A Comment" in 
CUSHING [et al.], eds, supra, note 73, 159 at 166. On Canada’s broad objectives 
during NAFTA’s negotiations, see generally E.R. BRUNING, "The North American
Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective" in K. FATEMI, ed., North American 
Free Trade Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993) 117 at 130.
R.G. CLARK, "Canada, NAFTA and the Americas" in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, 
supra, note 126, 87 at 90. On January 1, 1994, the Canadian government described 
its general approach to trade policy and the role of NAFTA in a Statement entitled 
North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Statement on Implementation, 
Canada Gazette Part I, Vol. 128, N° 1 (1 January 1994) 68. See "Canadian Statement 
Explains NAFTA’s Role in Trade Policy" CCH NAFTA WATCH (2 February 1994) 2. 
See, e.g., J. RIVERA DE LOS REYES, "Mexico and Free Trade Agreements With 
Latin American Countries" in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 75, 107. 
S. EDWARDS, "Latin American Economic Integration: A New Perspective on an Old 
Dream" World Economy (March 1993) 317. Also see J.W. CLARK, Economic 
Regionalism and the Americas, (New Orleans, LA: Houser, 1966) at 20ff discussing 
the proposals for the creation of a Latin American Common Market. V.L. URQUIDI, 
Free Trade and Economic Integration in Latin American: Toward a Common Market 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964). Eventually, the proposal was not 
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With the rejection of the proposal for the creation of a free trade area to include all 
Latin American economies (see discussion in the preceding footnote), many treaties 
were signed leading to the birth of the Central Latin American Common Market 
(CACM), The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) superseded by the 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), the Andean Group, MERCOSUR, the 
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), the Latin American Economic System
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discussions hinting to the formation of an East Asian economic grouping, the U.S. 
chose to stand firmly in favour of a continental economic integration, thus setting the 
stage for an American Common Market196.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (hereinafter EAI) was announced by then- 
U.S. President George Bush in June 1990 as a new partnership for trade, investment 
and growth197. It was not merely a trade policy initiative, but a comprehensive
(SELA) and other Latin American economic integration associations. In view of NAFTA 
there is a new enthusiasm about open trade among Latin American countries. See, 
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(Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 1992) at 15. J.M. ROSENBERG, The 
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Challenge (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1992). A. FISHLOW & S. HAGGARD, The 
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ed., Reshaping the North American Partnership for the 1990’s: A United Europe and 
Competitive Pacific Rim Necessitate New Strategic Policies (New York, N.Y.: Americas 
Society/Canadian Affairs, 1991). In addition, see D. KUJAWA, S.H. KIM & H.-J. KIM, 
"A North American Free-Trade Agreement: The First Step Toward One America" 
Multinational Business Review (Fall 1993) 12. T.A. STEWART, "The New Face of 
American Power" Fortune (26 July 1993) 70. "The Business of the American 
Hemisphere" The Economist (24 August 1991) 37.
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249. E. GITLI & G. RYD, Latin American Integration and the Enterprise for the 
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economic market-oriented reform and economic growth approach towards Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Because trade between the U.S. and Mexico was already 
considerably advanced when the EAI was proposed, the measure was not intended to 
extend to Mexico, but was proposed with the rest of Latin America in mind, thus 
favouring a hemispheric integration198.
The EAI was based on three core objectives: (i) trade; (ii) investment reforms; and (iii) 
debt reduction. First, the trade proposal set as a long-term goal the establishment of 
a comprehensive free trade zone for North, Central and South America. As an 
intermediate step, the proposal encouraged bilateral framework agreements199.
Western Hemisphere Free Trade Zone, (1992) 5 C.U.B.L.R. 199. C.F. BARNUM, 
Enterprise for the Americas: A New Partnership for Trade, Investment, and Growth, 
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(1991) 9 Brookings Rev. 22. R.B. PORTER, The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: 
A New Approach to Economic Growth, (1990) 32 J. Interamerican Studies & World 
Aff. 2. S. WEINTRAUB, The New US. Economic Initiative Toward Latin America, 
(1991) 33 J. interamerican Studies & World Aff. 1. "The Enterprise for Americas 
Initiative - A White House Progress Report", Business America (15 July 1991) 10. C.B. 
CLARK, "The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative: Supporting a "Silent Revolution in 
Latin America" Business America (23 September 1991) 6.
L. PERRET, "Canada, NAFTA and Beyond" in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 
75, 3 at 10.
Since the announcement of the EAI, several Latin American countries have entered 
into trade and investment framework agreements with the U.S. The framework 
agreements provide for bilateral discussions leading to trade liberalization. Ironically, 
Canada joined the NAFTA talks mainly to avoid a "hub-and-spoke" relationship with 
the U.S. See supra, note 190. Hence, despite the presence of a MFN clause, NAFTA 
offers the possibility of three "hub-and-spoke" arrangements. C. JOLIVET, Apergu de 
la position canadienne dans les negociations de I’ALlzNA sur les services, (1992) 5:3 
C.U.B.L.J. 321 at 323. L. EDEN & N. PATTERSON, "The View from the Spokes: 
Canada and Mexico Face the United States" in S.J. RANDALL, H. CONRAD & S. 
SILVERMAN, eds, North America Without Borders?: Integrating Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico (Calgary, Alta.: University of Calgary Press, 1992) 67 at 73. Article 
2205 of NAFTA provides that other countries may join NAFTA only on terms and 
conditions agreed by all three current members. Hence, any of the three countries 
could choose to begin free trade negotiations with a fourth country. Right now, Mexico 
has deals signed or in negotiations with many Latin American countries. "Mexico 
Explores Closer Ties with Latin America" CCH NAFTA WATCH (25 February 1994) 3. 
"Mexican Free Trade Expands to Latin America" CCH NAFTA WATCH (19 January 
1994) 5. Moreover, NAFTA’s accession clause is not geographically limited. Thus, a 
technical possibility exists for the treaty to extend to countries in the western or 
eastern hemisphere. V. LOUNGNARATH, Quelques reflexions d’ordre juridique sur la 
clause d’adhesion de I’ALlzNA, (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 1 at 2. M.G. SMITH, "Integration 
of Mexico into the North American Economies: Immediate Challenges and Longer 
Term Opportunities" in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 78, 1 at 9. Canada 
has briefly examined these prospects but this perspective really appears too far away. 
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Second, the investment proposal sought to unlock the potential for domestic and 
foreign investment in Latin America and encourage capital flows. Third, the 
govemment-to-government debt reduction plan was an extension, on a smaller scale, 
of the Brady Plan, the Bush Administration’s strategy to help heavily indebted 
countries reduce their obligations to commercial banks200.
President Bush’s general commitment to worldwide trade liberalization such as 
NAFTA and the EAl’s trade components, appeared to be in line with previous Reagan 
administration policies201. For his part, his successor, President Clinton, had several 
options. The U.S. could either carry on a two-legged policy of going both with NAFTA 
and the GATT actively or settle on leaving NAFTA with Mexico and concentrating on 
multilateralism with the GATT. The former option divided into two strategies: (i) make 
NAFTA into a Western Hemispheric FTA; or (ii) open up NAFTA to countries 
anywhere202. President Clinton chose to make Latin America an important 
component of its trade policy203.
Post [of Toronto] (29 July 1993) 3. Taiwan was the first Asian country to publicly 
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March 1993) 19. More recently, the Japan Institute of International Affairs has 
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avenue, see, e.g., Japan, the United States, and Latin America: Toward a Trilateral 
Relationship in the Western Hemisphere (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1993). This option is also being considered by other Asia-Pacific countries. 
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In 1994, hoping to move beyond any framework agreements providing for bilateral 
discussions, the government of Chile requested to join NAFTA204. Formal 
discussions began in May 1995205. At that time, the U.S., Canada and Mexico 
started by assessing Chile’s progress toward greater trade liberalization and market 
opening consistent with NAFTA standards. Often cited as Latin America’s star 
economic performer, Chile has made the most progress in implementing trade and 
market-oriented reforms206. Its steady growth and low inflation rates in recent years 
are rare on the Latin American continent. It attracts a substantial amount of foreign 
investment, however, it has had an under-developed domestic capital market207. 
Nevertheless, Chile has been one of the first countries since the debt crisis to return 
to the "voluntary" international capital markets208. Private Chilean companies have 
also gone to the world capital markets. Thus, Chile stands to gain a great deal from 
NAFTA. Its addition would be an important step towards a hemispheric 
integration209. Apart from Chile, other Latin American countries may join NAFTA in
"Chile: A Step Closer to NAFTA Accession?" CCH NAFTA WATCH (15 April 1994) 8. 
“Chile: Another NAFTA Party in 1994?" CCH NAFTA WATCH (19 January 1994) 3. 
M.D. ROWAT, "Future Accession to NAFTA: The Cases of Chile and the 
MERCOSUR" in A.R. RIGGS & T. VELK, eds, Beyond NAFTA: An Economic, Political 
and Sociological Perspective (Vancouver, B.C.: Simon Fraser Institute, 1993) 196. In 
1994, Chile was singled out by the Clinton Administration as the only country the U.S. 
will seek a FTA in the near future. "U.S. Identifies Chile for Next Free Trade 
Agreement" CCH NAFTA WATCH (14 July 1994) 1. M. YOPPO, "The Chilean 
Perception of the Americas Initiative" in GREEN, ed., supra, note 149, 175 at 178. 
However, note that as of the end of 1995, Chile was still waiting for President Bill 
Clinton to get fast-track authority from the U.S. Congress to "seriously" negotiate. In 
this context, Canadian federal officials are carefully considering a Canada-Chile FTA. 
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Globe and Mail (28 December 1995) B2. "Sleeping Giant" The Economist (9 
December 1995) 46. D. FAGAN, "Rubin Sees No NAFTA Expansion Until 1997" The 
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(18 November 1995) 48.
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Gamblers Win for Now" The Economist (13 February 1993) 19 at 19.
On a further expansion of the hemispheric economic zone, see, e.g., R. BOUZAS, 
"Argentina, the Southern Common, and the Prospects for Success of the EAI" in 
GREEN, ed., supra, note 149 at 162.
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a not so distant future210. In the meantime, however, these countries prepare 
themselves by constructing bilateral and sub-regional agreements211.
Overall, although Latin American countries have taken giant strides towards 
institutionalizing democracy, market economics and hemispheric community, many 
problems remain to be solved212. For that reason, President Clinton needed to 
persuade the American people of their strong self-interest in the region213. At the 
Summit of the Americas, its intentions were unequivocal when he led an initiative 
(endorsed by all 34 Western Hemisphere nations) to conclude negotiations for a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (hereinafter FTAA) by the year 2005214 in view of 
creating a New American Community (hereinafter NAC)215.
For its part, Canada was fully behind this initiative. The Liberal government in Ottawa, 
indicated during the course of the 1993 election campaign that it would "play an active 
and independent role in defining [the free trade] bloc instead of merely reacting to
See, e.g., "Columbia Second in Line for NAFTA Accession" CCH NAFTA WATCH (13 
June 1994) 8. "Argentina Optimistic of NAFTA Accession ... But Ex-president Warns: 
Argentina Economy Not Ready" CCH NAFTA WATCH (15 April 1994) 8.
G.C. HUFBAUER & J.J. SCHOTT, Western Hemisphere Economic Integration 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994) at 97ff. P. MELLER, "A 
Latin American Perspective of NAFTA" in LACASSE & PERRET, eds, supra, note 75, 
119 at 140-141. Still, some raise doubts that NAFTA is a suitable model for many of 
the developing countries in the region. A. WESTON "From FTA to NAFTA — Whither 
Canadian Trade Policy Towards the South?, Ibid., 195 at 198.
For example, there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the unequal benefits of 
economic reform, growing poverty, corruption, drug trafficking and powerful militaries. 
"Latin America’s Challenge" The [ Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 December 1994) A20.
A.F. LOWENTHAL, "Latin America: Ready for Partnership?" Foreign Affairs (January
1993) 74.
"Congress Considers Bill to Create Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area" CCH 
NAFTA WATCH (15 April 1994) 3.
The negotiation process for the FTAA began with a meeting in January 1995 hosted 
by the OAS. In the end, this new trade zone will result in a merger of the area’s five 
subregional trading arrangements: NAFTA, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, the Central 
American Common Market, and the Andean Pact. D. SMITH, "Trade Ministers Discuss 
FTAA" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 July 1995) B17. "The Americas Drift Towards 
Free Trade" The Economist (8 July 1995) 35. "Hemispheric Leaders Unveil Americas 
Free Trade Zone" CCH NAFTA WATCH (15 December 1994) 1. "Summit of the 
Americas: U.S. Wants Focus on Trade" CCH NAFTA WATCH (28 October 1994) 1. 
ROSENBERG, supra, note 27 at 307-308.
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Washington’s hub-and-spoke approach to trade in [the Western Hemisphere]"216. 
Consequently, since it gained power, Canada’s Prime Minister Jean Chretien has 
been aggressively pushing his policy of trying to expand its country’s trade relations 
beyond the U.S. by widening the territorial scope of free trade and urging NAFTA 
partners to admit other countries217. As for Mexico, the election of Ernesto Zedillo as 
President was seen as an endorsement of NAFTA218. Nevertheless, there has been 
caution with regard to foreign investment in Mexico following the 1994 armed uprising 
in Chiapas, the assassination of a presidential candidate and the 1995 peso crisis. 
These events may also be signs of the future for the Americas.
TITLE II: TOWARDS THE EMERGENCE OF A "NORTH AMERICAN”
SECURITIES BUSINESS
The Canadian financial services system has undergone a series of changes in the 
past few years which have served to enhance domestic competition and efficiency 
and to increase foreign participation. Three significant developments have been: (i) 
the comprehensive reform of federal and provincial services legislation (the crumbling 
of the four pillars); (ii) the implementation of the FTA; and (iii) the even more recent 
implementation of NAFTA.
"Canada should be working with other countries to minimize dominance by the 
strongest partner. A Liberal government will work to build common Western 
Hemisphere institutions to provide political, demographic, and economic 
counterweights to the United States." LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, Creating 
Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada (Ottawa, Ont.: Liberal Party of Canada,
1993) at 25.
In recent months, the Canadian Prime Minister expressed his opinion at the Asia- 
Pacific Economic Conference [hereinafter APEC], the Summit of the Americas, during 
a trip to Latin America and even in Europe (where he called for a possible association 
of the EU and NAFTA countries). D. FAGAN, "Free Trade with U.S. Hailed by New 
Study" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 December 1995) B2. "Canada Explores Free 
Trade With EU" CCH NAFTA WATCH (29 December 1994) 8. J. SALLOT, "Forging 
Links to Global Economies: Chretien Has Moved a Long Way Toward His Trade 
Minister’s Ideas About Open Markets" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 December
1994) A7. M. DROHAM, "Free-trade Talk Baffles Experts: Europeans Wonder Why 
Chretien is Pushing NAFTA" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (3 December 1994) A12. 
P. MARTIN, "Canada, Israel Talking Free Trade" The [ Toronto]  Globe and Mail (25 
November 1994) A1. "A Dream of Trade" The Economist (19 November 1994) 35. 
"Canada Calls for Fast Expansion of NAFTA" CCH NAFTA WATCH (13 October 1994) 
1.
"Zedillo Victory Strengthens NAFTA’s Future" CCH NAFTA WATCH (15 September
1994) 1.
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CHAPTER I: The Changing Face of the Canadian Securities 
Industry — Impact of the Liberalization of Financial 
Services on the Canadian Regulatory Provisions 
Governing the Industry
The existing framework of securities regulation in Canada consists of various federal 
and provincial statutes219. Moreover, administrative agencies, along with a variety of 
national and self-regulatory organizations, possess some powers over members and 
issuers. The provincial legislative authority possesses the power to regulate trading in 
securities220. Each of the provinces has a securities statute221. Those regulatory 
regimes set-up securities regulatory authorities empowered to license and require full 
disclosure of information on issuers offering securities so as to protect the public222. 
In addition to regulations under the statute, each provincial jurisdiction has issued 
policy statements. Faced with the disparities between each of the governing 
legislation, such policy statements are the result of efforts to harmonize 
regulation223. Other sources of securities regulation include blanket orders and
On the Canadian securities regulatory structure, see generally, INSIGHT 
CONFERENCE, Securities Regulation, Policy and Practice (Toronto, Ont.: Insight,
1995). E.H. NEAVE, Canada and the World Financial System: The Role of Securities 
Regulation, Working Paper 89-09 (Kingston, Ont.: Queen’s University School of 
Business Research Program, 1989).
A.S. ABEL & J.l. LASKIN, Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto, Ont.: 
Carswell 1975) at 359.
in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec and 
Saskatchewan, the acts are administered by a securities commission. In the other 
provinces, there is not a separate commission but securities administration is handled 
by specific government officials.
The general principle underlying Canadian securities legislation is that of full, true and 
plain disclosure of all pertinent facts by those offering the securities for sale to the 
public. However, the broad discretionary powers possessed by Canadian securities 
regulators create a great deal of uncertainty for market participants planning 
transactions that may or may not be found to breach the “public interest". In view of 
this uncertainty, it has been proposed that the regulators consider the adoption of a 
"no action letter" procedure similar to that used in the U.S. J.G. MaclNTOSH, An 
Agenda for the Securities Regulators: Part I, (1994) ll:2 Corporate Financing 73 at 73. 
J.G. MaclNTOSH, Securities Regulation and the Public Interest: Of Politics, 
Procedures, and Policy Statements-Part I, (1994) 24 C.B.L.J. 77 at 107 
The policy statements set out in detail the procedures to be followed in complying with 
the legislation, and provide guidance as to how administrators (or tribunals) will 
exercise their discretion. The statements are divided into three groups: national, 
uniform and local. National policy statements are issued jointly by all ten provincial 
jurisdictions. Uniform statements were joint policy statements initially passed in 1966 
by five jurisdictions (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario). 
Although they are gradually being replaced by National Policy Statements, a few
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notices, decision and ruling issued by the respective securities commissions224. For 
its part, the federal legislative authority can punish fraudulent dealing in securities 
under the federal Criminal Code225. Finally, topics like take-over bids and insider 
trading are also regulated by the federal and provincial legislatures.
On another level, the Canadian system of securities regulation is highly harmonized 
with international regulation and Canadian capital markets are very receptive to 
foreign financing226.
For the past few years, the Ontario Securities Commission (hereinafter OSC) and the 
Quebec Securities Commission (hereinafter QSC) have been conducting their 
activities in view of the many changes on the international (and North American) 
scene. Both Commissions have adopted the view that regarding regulation and 
supervision of financial systems, competition requires more international coordination. 
Thus, they pursue the various initiatives undertaken within task forces of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereinafter IOSCO). The OSC 
has kept pace with the fast-changing international developments by creating an 
International Markets policy-making branch227. It developed its market
Uniform Policy Statements still remain in force. Local statements are issued by one 
provincial jurisdiction for application within that province only. M.R. GILLEN, Securities 
Regulation in Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 74-75.
GILLEN, Ibid. at 75-76. "Provincial securities commissions meet regularly to discuss 
policy matters through an association [named the Canadian Securities Administrators 
or CSA] that embraces all the provinces. In practical terms, though, the setting of 
policy for the financial institutions is largely an exercise involving Ontario, Quebec, the 
federal government and, to a lesser extent, British Columbia." ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Foreign Financing Operations (Canada) (London: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1995) at 13.
However, the courts have given a wide scope to the provincial power on certain 
related matters. P.W. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Ont.: 
Carswell, 1985) at 474 n. 119-123.
See generally, INSIGHT CONFERENCE, Canada’s Role in the International Securities 
Market (Toronto, Ont.: Insight, 1994). INSIGHT CONFERENCE, Financial Services 
Forum (Toronto, Ont.: Insight, 1994). Notice — Remarks by Joseph J. Oliver - 
Executive Director of the Ontario Securities Commission in London, England - May 19, 
1992: *!Access by Foreign Issuers to the Canadian Capital Markets", (1992) 15 
O.S.C.B. 2369.
On the international strategy of the OSC, see, Notice — Remarks of Edward J. 
Waitzer, Chairman of the OSC - April 8, 1994: "International Securities Regulation - 
Coping with the "Rashomon Effect"", (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 1719.
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technology228 and established close working relationships with many securities 
commissions throughout the world including the SEC, the Securities Investment Board 
in the U.K. and the securities commissions of Italy, France and Australia229. A few 
years ago, it was made public that the international strategy of the QSC is comprised 
of three axis230. Firstly, it recognizes and encourages the deregulation of financial 
institutions; the creation of new financial products; the exchange of information 
between different securities commissions; and the use of technology advancements 
for the acceleration as well as the harmonization of international capital markets. 
Secondly, the QSC analyzes all questions deriving from bilateral and multilateral talks 
on uniform standards with a view to ensure the efficiency of capital markets231.
See, e.g., Notice — Remarks of Edward J. Waitzer, Chairman of the OSC: June 29, 
1994— "Non-traditional Trading Systems: Striving for Competitive Excellence", (1994) 
17 O.S.C.B. 3113. Notice— Electronic Trading Systems in Ontario, (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 
2512.
Notice — Remarks of Robert J. Wright to the Eglinton Rotary Club — May 19, 1993: 
"The Work of the Ontario Securities Commission", (1993) 16 O.S.C.B 2429 at 2430. 
See also News Release-Memorandum of Understanding With the Australian 
Securities Commission, (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 3118.
Avis - Allocution prononcee par Me Paul Fortugno, president de la Commission des 
valeurs mobilieres du Quebec, lors d’un dejeuner-causerie devant les membres de la 
Chambre de commerce de Rimouski, le mardi 17 novembre 1992 — 
L’internationalisation des marches financiers: une opportunity incontournable pour le 
Quebec, (1992) 23:47 B.C.V.M.Q. 1 also reprinted in (1993) 27 R.J.T. 541 [hereinafter 
Avis du 17 novembre 1992\. For some comments see, S. ROUSSEAU, La C.V.M.Q. 
dans un marche en mutation: les effets de I’internationalisation du marche des valeurs 
mobilieres sur le role de la Commission des valeurs mobilises du Quebec en matiere 
d’appel public a I’epargne, (1993) 51 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 359.
For instance, the QSC examined the FTA, NAFTA, the GATT and the OECD Codes of 
Liberalization. Avis du 17 novembre 1992, supra, note 230 at 3; M[N]otre integration 
continentale, acceleree par I’existence du Traite de libre-echange americano-canadien, 
nous suggere une regie ou I’harmonisation doit prevaloir". See also COMMISSION 
DES VALEURS MOBILIERES DU QUEBEC, "Les actives internationales", in Rapport 
annuel 1992 - 1993 (Quebec, Que.: Publications du Quebec, 1993) 22. Moreover, the 
QSC assists certain international organizations like IOSCO. Engagement d'assistance 
aux autres membres de I’Organisation internationale des commissions de valeurs 
(OICV), Decision n° 8096, (1987) 18:15 B.C.V.M.Q. A1. COMMISSION DES 
VALEURS MOBILIERES DU QUEBEC, Rapport d’activitis 1987-1988 (Quebec, Que.: 
Publications du Quebec, 1988) 31. About the evolution of Quebec’s markets, it has 
been noted that the "trend towards the "North Americanization" of securities legislation 
in Quebec is in keeping with the primary responsibility of the Commission, and by 
extension the objective of the legislator, to ensure the efficiency of capital markets". J. 
MAVRIDIS, "Materiality: In Search of a Standard for Disclosure in Quebec" in 
SERVICE DE LA FORMATION PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC, ed., 
supra, note 53, 1 at 55-56.
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Finally, it provides technical assistance to some emerging markets232.
At the same time as NAFTA was being negotiated, the Commissions (as well as the 
SEC and the Mexican authorities) signed an agreement concerning the creation of the 
Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas (hereinafter COSRA). This occurred 
during a meeting of the Inter-American Authorities of Securities Regulators, in which 
delegations of seventeen authorities from sixteen countries of the Americas took 
part233. In its preamble, the Agreement reminds the reader of the fundamental role 
of securities markets within each country’s economy and declares that the 
internationalization and interconnection of securities markets will contribute to the 
growth of economies on national and regional levels234. This new organization aims 
at promoting cooperation between the securities regulating authorities of member 
states. Among the subjects upon which this cooperation is meant to focus, the 
Agreement mentions the elaboration of reform that would widen participation in 
securities markets; the protection of investors through the application of strict 
disclosure requirements and rules of ethics; the definition of incentive measures for 
securities investment, the abolition of international investment barriers; the 
development of negotiation systems aimed at increasing the transparency and 
efficiency of markets; and finally, the establishment of links between markets235.
The QSC’s presence on emerging markets by its will "to extend the zone of 
international financial stability and contribute to the institution and implementation of 
harmonized legislative and regulatory frameworks." QUEBEC, Ministry of Finance, 
Quinquennial Report on the Implementation of the Securities Act (Quebec, Que.: 
Ministry of Finance, 1993) at 74. For example, see Avis — Signature par la 
Commission des valeurs mobilieres du Quebec d’un accord d’echange d’information 
avec lAgence des valeurs mobilieres de Roumanie, (1993) 24:40 B.C.V.M.Q. 1. Avis 
— Assistance technique canadienne sur le marchS des capitaux roumains, (1993) 24:1
B.C.V.M.Q. 1. Avis — Signature par la Commission des valeurs mobilieres du Quebec 
d’un accord d’echange d’information avec I’agence de supervision des valeurs 
mobilieres de Hongrie, (1992) 23:10 B.C.V.M.Q. 1; (1992) 124 G.O. II 4569 
(D. 929-92, 23 June 1992); and, Avis — Entente de cooperation entre la Commission 
des valeurs mobilieres et I’Agence de supervision des valeurs mobilieres de Hongrie, 
(1991)22:40 B.C.V.M.Q. 1.
OECD, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 53 (Paris: OECD, February 1993) at 10.
The Charter of COSRA is reprinted in SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
The SEC Speaks in 1993, Vol. 2 (New York, N.Y.: Practising Law Institute, 1993) at 
379-381.
COMMISSION DES VALEURS MOBILIERES DU QUEBEC, "Les activites 
internationales" in Rapport annuel 1992-1993, supra, note 231 at 22.
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For many years the harmonization of securities legislation and regulations has been 
vigorously pursued in Canada. Because of this fact it is important to underline that the 
negotiation of the financial services Chapters of the FTA and NAFTA took place at a 
time of significant legislative and regulatory change. The reform occurring in the 
Canadian financial service sector has significantly eroded the barriers between 
different kinds of financial institutions and has given rise to a blend of services offered 
by securities dealers as well as banks, trust and loan companies and insurance 
companies. In view of the efforts towards regulatory consistency and of the presence 
of so-called "universal" banks (which combine banking activities with securities 
underwriting and market intermediation activities in a single corporate entity)236, 
changes in the nature of the traditional activities of Canadian financial institutions 
require that we briefly examine the activities of some of the main ones comprising the 
Canadian securities industry, i.e. the banks and the investment dealers.
1. The Canadian Composition of the Securities Industry
Until recently, the Canadian financial system was organized according to the so-called 
"pillar" system, in which the major financial functions were performed by separate 
categories of institutions. The original pillar system (based on separate regulation and 
separate ownership of four broad categories of financial institutions — i.e. banks, 
securities firms, trust and insurance companies) was put into place in the wake of the 
Great Depression. In recent years, Canadian financial regulation has undergone 
significant changes and introduced the concept of universal banking237. As a result, 
the financial services industry increased its number of mergers and acquisitions from 
within238. Canada’s securities industry now consists of investment dealers but also 
of the largest group of financial institutions — the banks.
OECD, supra, note 5 at 50. Here it is essentially for the bank to decide if its securities 
business could be conducted more efficiently through a holding company or through a 
separately capitalized subsidiary. R. DALE, "Regulating Bank’s Securities Activities: A 
Global Assessment", in FINGLETON, ed., supra, note 14, 109 at 111-112.
For a recent assessment, see, e.g., M. BABAD & C. MULRONEY, Pillars: The Coming 
Crisis in Canada's Financial Industry (Toronto, Ont.: Stoddart, 1993).
For an overview of the key issues that are considered by the Canadian Minister of 
Finance and the Bureau of Competition Policy when reviewing a financial sector 
merger, see Size, Competition and Concentration in Canadian Financial Services, 
Report 102-93 (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 1993).
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1.1 The Investment Dealers239
Investment dealers (i.e. members of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada 
(hereinafter IDA240)) and brokers (i.e. members of one or more Canadian stock 
exchanges241) perform two basic but complementary services242. First, the 
securities firms bring together those who have a surplus capital to invest in 
governments and companies who need investment capital. This function is performed 
on the primary market and it is achieved through the underwriting and distribution to 
investors of new issues of securities. A second function is providing active and liquid 
secondary markets for the transfer of existing or already outstanding securities from 
one owner to another.
The vast majority of Canadian securities houses belong to one or more of the self- 
regulatory organizations (hereinafter SROs)243. Most firms hold multiple
Information about the investment dealers is scarce. A recent survey denounces that 
fact. E. ROSEMAN, "More Info Sought from Investment Dealers: Trustworthiness Most
Important" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (17 September 1994) B18.
The role of the IDA is to establish and enforce, through self-regulation, high standards 
of business procedure and to promote through study, public statements and 
representations, a framework of policies for savings and investment. IDA’s continuing 
discussions with Canadian securities commissions and stock exchanges are aimed at 
maintaining uniform and standardized approaches to business conduct in the industry. 
On the IDA, see generally, CCH, ed., Canadian Stock Exchanges Manual, Vol. 1 
(North York, Ont.: CCH Canadian Limited, 1994 (loose-leaf)) at 75,001ff.
In Canada, five organized stock exchanges (located in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, 
Calgary and Winnipeg) ail compete for listings although inter-listing on more than one 
exchange is possible. They promulgate their own by-laws, rules and policies. 
However, these must conform to the provincial securities acts as administered by the 
provincial securities commissions. Based on the value of business, Toronto (with 
nearly 75%) is the largest Canadian exchange. On the Toronto stock exchange, see 
G. SAWIAK, The Toronto Stock Exchange (Toronto, Ont.: Butterworths, 1986). 
Toronto is followed by Montreal with nearly 20%. The Vancouver exchange is primarily 
a market for resources exploration and development company stocks. The Calgary 
(known as the Alberta Stock Exchange) and Winnipeg exchanges are regional in 
nature and are very small with few listed companies and little trading volume. 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 224 at 28. 
ONTARIO, Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Report of the Securities 
Industry Ownership Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission (Toronto, Ont.: 
Government of Ontario, 1972) at 5.
The most important Canadian SROs are the IDA and the Canadian stock exchanges. 
On Canadian SROs, see, e.g., R. SORELL, "Supervision of Self-Regulatory 
Organizations in Ontario’s Securities Market" in QUEEN’S SYMPOSIUM, Securities 
Regulation: Issues and Perspectives-Papers Presented at the Queen’s Annual 
Business Law Symposium 1994 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1995) 165. D.L.
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memberships. As at October 1995, there were 158 firms who were subject to the 
authority of the SROs244. Employment in the industry stood at 24,284245 and 
capital employed in the business246 was Cdn $ 4,779 million dollars in mid- 
1995247. Still, the industry is small compared to other segments of the financial 
services sector or even to some companies, operating within competing segments. 
Canada’s largest bank, the Royal, for instance, employed over 60,000 people in June 
1995, had shareholders’ equity of Cdn $ 8.5 billion and total assets of over Cdn $ 173 
billion248. The entire Canadian securities industry is likewise eclipsed in size by 
several individual U.S. securities houses249.
In spite of its comparatively small size, the industry has provided Canada with a quite 
large and sophisticated capital market. These qualities are measured in terms of the 
variety and size of new issues brought to the market and the depth and liquidity of 
secondary trading markets. Today, the industry is highly competitive and becoming 
increasingly so.
There is a great variety in the type of securities firms in Canada250. To satisfy the 
diverse needs of numerous types of investors, firms in the securities industry exhibit a 
considerable variety in structure. On the one hand, "fully integrated houses" 
comprised, in the main, of large firms that offer a broad range of services251. On the
RATNER, Self-Regulatory Organizations, (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 368. 
INVESTMENT DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Securities Industry Statistics, 1995.
Ibid.
The major components of industry regulatory capital includes capital, retained 
earnings, subordinated debt and stand-by subordinated debt.
INVESTMENT DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Securities Industry Statistics, 1995.
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, Semestrial Financial Report, June 1995.
Recent data shows the top three U.S. securities firms to be gigantic. Ranked first is 
Merrill Lynch, with a capital of US $ 20.60 billion and over 43,800 employees. Second 
is Salomon Inc. with a capital of US $ 16.10 billion and 8,600 employees. And third is 
Lehman Brothers with US $ 14.72 billion in capital and 8,512 employees. "Tomorrow, 
the World" in "A Survey of Wall Street" The Economist (15 April 1995) 3. See also P.J. 
SPAIN & J.R. TALBOT, eds, Hoover’s Handbook of World Business 1995-96 (Austin, 
Tx: The Reference Press, Inc., 1995) at 51. G. HOOVER, A. CAMPBELL & P.J. 
SPAIN, eds, Hoover’s Handbook of American Business 1995 (Austin, Tx: The 
Reference Press, Inc., 1995) at 107.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 224 at 17.
They usually maintain underwriting, sales, trading, portfolio management, statistical, 
research, accounting and delivery departments.
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other hand, "specialty houses" may restrict themselves to one or more aspects of the 
investment business252. Thus, as is evident from the preceding, it is not possible to 
list under definite headings ail classifications of firms as there is always some 
overlapping and variation in the business transacted by each type. Firms range 
greatly in size from the largest employing about 3,700 persons in some 85 branches 
across Canada and in major financial centres abroad down to very small 
businesses253.
In terms of revenue ranking, Canadian financial services investments dealers do quite 
well, as illustrated in Table 4254.
For example, brokerage houses range from those which sell all types of stock to those 
which specialize in one type of stock (such as mining and oil stock, etc.). There are 
also discount brokerage firms, which offer trading facilities only. Other areas include, 
among others, such operations as selling mutual funds or exclusive trading with 
institutional clients. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 
224 at 17.
For a complete list of securities firms in Canada, see, e.g., Canadian Almanac & 
Directory 1995 (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Almanac & Directory, 1995) at 1-5 to 1-9. 
Standard & Poor’s Security Dealers of North America (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 
Summer 1995 Edition) at 1280-1281.
The rarity of information makes it hard to have a precise picture of the situation. In its 
most recent survey, the Financial Post 500 explained that "[t]he reason you won’t find 
ranking of the country’s top investment dealers is that there are no public reporting 
standards by which investment dealers are measured. The FP 500 research team did 
conduct a survey, but so few investment dealers responded that reporting results 
would be misleading." M. ANDERSON, "Who’s Minding the Store?" The Financial Post 
500 Magazine 1995 (July 1995) 175 at 178.
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TABLE 4
INVESTMENT DEALERS REVENUE RANKING
COMPANY REVENUE PROFIT
. RETURN'ON
§ | §  . .
ASSETS
AND YEAR END 4000 $000 % CHT3E t-Y R K . $000 % CH*GE
RBC Dominion 
Securities (Se94)
1.020,180 133,300 31 5.89 18.375,2© 30
Midland Walwyn 
(De94)
480.040 29,077 •54 3.30 : . ; ; " ^ 6 7 3.087,907 64
Bums Fry 
Holdings (Se93)
416.877 IS 25,650 50 ] 4.617,120 24
Nesbitt Thomson 
Group (Se93)
. :r \s3jtei' 50,016 114 pm : na 18.078,179 302
Fahnestock Viner 
Holdings (De94)’
167 ,2© l l l t l l l 11,780 •34 8.40 19.12 510,636 26
First Marathon 
(Dec94)
f  160,532 i 25,196 •66 . v: .aAo ii /'• 8 0 4 " 2.572,048 80
Marleau, Lemire 
(De94)J
38,465 : : ' -1 4 ,2 © •35 5.56 ' m 224,916 94
Ondaatje Corp. 
(Mr94)
' • 23,047  ^• 0 4 1 9,335 172 • 11.17 < y  y 4 $ i  • 141,443 120
Average 20 22 6 36 IB  Wi 86
1 Figures are reported in U.S. dollars.
2 Figures have been annualized in previous 3 through 5 years, na -  
meaningful
n o t  available. n m  «  n o t
Source: Report on Business Magazine, July 1995 at 145.
Like other businesses, securities firms are financed by capital originally subscribed by 
their owner-shareholders, by year-to-year net earnings retained in the business and 
by loans. Securities firms organized as sole proprietorships or partnerships were once 
common, but the need for more capital, greater job specialization and more 
employees and branches has seen few survive. Instead, most firms today are 
incorporated as private companies with ownership shares limited to officers, directors 
and employees. The competitive need for a larger capital base has, since 1983, led 
several securities firms to seek additional shareholder capital by "going public" 
through the issuance of new shares to the public255. Control of such firms was often 
retained by senior officers and employees by issuing a limited number of voting
B. MAROTTE, "Shake-up in Brokerage World" The [Montreal] Gazette (14 October
1995) C4.
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shares to the public. Non-industry and non-Canadian ownership restrictions prevented 
firms from being controlled by outsiders or non-residents, with the exception of five 
U.S. firms long established in Canada who were given "grandfather" exemptions when 
an ownership moratorium was imposed in 1971. However, as will be discussed later, 
ownership of the industry has undergone radical change during the past two decades.
The securities industry is highly leveraged. Firms depend on borrowed money to a 
significant extent to finance their securities inventories, underwriting (including bought 
deals256), trading commitments and client margin accounts. Commissions generated 
from agency transactions are the main source of revenue for most houses257. 
Earnings arising from capital trading activities and from underwriting are also 
significant for many firms, with various types of fee revenues making up most of the 
balance258. Employee compensation is normally the largest single expense.
Returns in the securities business tend to be high in bull markets259. However, with 
their heavy exposure to losses in trading and underwriting and their costly and 
extensive staff and communication networks, securities firms are especially vulnerable 
to cyclical business swings, not only in Canada but throughout the world. The best 
recent illustration of this was the October 1987 market crash. However, note that even
A "bought deal" is one where a dealer (sometimes with a partner) buys the entire 
issue for resale to its clients. The dealer risks his own capital in the bought deal. See,
e.g., J.-P. BRFARD, Les contrats de souscription a forfait de valeurs mobilieres 
(Montreal, Que.: Wilson & Lafleur Sorej, 1984) at 8-9.
E.H. NEAVE, Canada’s Financial System (Toronto, Ont.: John Wiley & Sons, 1981) at 
298-299. During the first quarter of 1994, commissions earned on trades in Canada 
climbed to an unprecedented Cdn $ 806 million. The increase in mutual funds sales 
had a noticeable impact on the rise of commissions earned. Gross mutual funds sales 
increased by 50% in the first quarter of 1995 over the whole sales for 1994, totalling 
Cdn $35 billion. Commissions earned on mutual funds sales reached the record 
proportion of 31% of total brokerage commissions against a 16% average over the 
past three years. INVESTMENT DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Securities Industry 
Statistics, 1995.
Trades on all Canadian exchanges reached Cdn $72 billion in the first quarter of 
1995, more than a third of the whole of last year’s total volume. Underwriting fees 
remained roughly the same as last year at Cdn $382 million during that same quarter. 
Total new corporate stock issues was in the order of Cdn $8.5 billion also in the 
quarter. INVESTMENT DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Securities Industry Statistics, 1995. 
Total securities industry operating profits reached a record high of Cdn $564 million for 
the first quarter of 1995, whereas net profits soared to Cdn $238 million thereby 
beating last year’s quarterly average of Cdn $182 million. INVESTMENT DEALERS 
ASSOCIATION, Securities Industry Statistics, 1995.
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recently, the Canadian securities industry profits plunged to Cdn $ 421 million from 
Cdn $ 722 million in 1994260. They totalled only Cdn $ 8 million in the last quarter of 
1994, reflecting a dramatic drop in corporate finance work and equity issues. As far as 
the large, established dealers in the securities business are concerned, the tumbling 
of their profits might have been greater if not for the fact that many of those dealers 
have extensive retail networks and are now subsidiaries of major domestic chartered 
banks with strong financial backing.
1.2 The Canadian Chartered Banks
In Canada, chartered banks operate under the Bank Act (which is regularly updated). 
The Act sets out specifically what a bank may do and provides operating rules 
enabling it to function within the regulatory framework. Canadian-owned banks are 
designated as Schedule I banks and foreign-owned banks are called Schedule II 
banks.
1.2.1 Schedule I (or Domestic) Chartered Banks
These banks are the giants of Canada’s capital markets. There are eight of them261 
with six far out-distancing the asset size of other Canadian-owned banks and non­
bank financial institutions. Together, the "Big Six" controlled Cdn $ 760 billion in 
assets262. In terms of total assets, Canadian banks are big by North American 
standards but not those of Japan or Europe. Accordingly, they are well represented in 
the North American top 20 by size. By contrast, not even the largest Canadian bank is 
anywhere near the size of any of Japan’s top 10. The major banks have achieved 
their present asset size largely by establishing a network of over 7,000 retail branches
INVESTMENT DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Securities Industry Statistics, 1995.
The domestic chartered banks of Canada are, in order of incorporation: (i) Bank of 
Montreal; (ii) Scotiabank /  The Bank of Nova Scotia; (iii) Laurentian Bank of Canada; 
(iv) Toronto Dominion Bank; (v) Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; (vi) Royal 
Bank of Canada; (vii) National Bank of Canada; and (viii) Canadian Western Bank. 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 224 at 13. B. LAW, 
ed., 1995 Corpus Almanac & Canadian Sourcebook (Don Mills, Ont.: Southam Inc.
1994) at 13-8.
Ibid. at 15.
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and an extensive network of automated teller machines throughout Canada263. 
Banks have also become major participants on the international banking scene.
Where at one time all the banks moved together and followed each other into new 
lines of business, they are now starting to develop distinct identities and personalities. 
Since the 1987 big bang in the Canadian securities industry, major changes have 
taken place and more are still to come. As illustrated in Table 5, the most significant 
change is that the six largest Canadian-owned Schedule I banks are all now solidly in 
the securities business264. One of them (the Toronto-Dominion or TD Bank) has 
largely chosen to develop its own securities company subsidiaries. The other five 
(Royal Bank of Canada or RBC, Scotiabank or Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal 
or B of M, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce or CIBC and National Bank of 
Canada) have each bought control of large national investment firms. These links 
have created a Canadian investment structure that is significantly larger in its capital 
base and international exposure265. Also, Canadian banks have gained considerable 
expertise in the securities business. These changes have provided the opportunity to 
a number of investment dealers to attract large clients and investors in them.
Ibid
"Les 50 premieres financieres" Commerce (June 1995) 70ff.
"Each to His Own" The Banker (August 1994) 46.
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Table 5
OWNERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN SECURITIES INDUSTRY
Bank
Full-Service
broker
Discount
broker
Major trust 
company Mutual funds
Bank of 
Montreal
Nesbitt Bums InvestorLine Trusteo First
Canadian
Scotia
Bank
Scotia McLeod Scotia
Securities
Montreal
Trust
Montreal 
Trust funds, 
Scotia funds
CIBC CIBC 
Wood Gundy
Investors
Edge
CIBC Trust CIBC funds, 
Hyperion 
Talvest
National 
Bank of 
Canada
Levesque
Beaubien
National Bank 
Securities
General Trust 
NatCan
NatCan
funds
Royal Bank 
of Canada
RBC Dominion 
Securities
Action Direct Royal Trust Royal Trust 
funds, 
Royfund
Toronto-
Dominion
Evergreen
Investment
Greenline TD Trust Green Line 
funds
Laurentian
Bank
BLC Rousseau None Laurentian
Trust
Laurentian
funds
Source: 1994 annual reports of respective banks listed in Table 1.
Concerning property, banks in Schedule I have a widely-held capital base. No more 
than 10% of any class of shares of a Schedule I bank may be held by a person or 
associated group of persons266. The banks’ main functions include the creation of 
deposit facilities and transfer of deposit monies. Moreover, the Bank A cf67 
prescribes that, in Canada, Schedule I banks can exercise various commercial 
activities.
Firstly, certain commercial activities can be exercised directly by banks. Banks can 
directly exercise all the activities linked to "the business of banking" such as the 
delivery of financial services, act as a financial agent; deliver investment and portfolio
R.S.C., 1985, c. B-1, ss. 8, 372.
The Act is updated every five years. Ibid, s. 21. This unique sunset clause allows the 
regulation of banks to adjust to recent developments in the financial sector. The law is 
to be updated by March 31, 1997. On the coming reform, see, e.g., D. SLOCUM, 
"Banks Step Up Insurance Pitch" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (28 December 1995) 
B2.
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management counsel sen/ices; and issue payment, credit or debit cards and the use 
of a system of such cards268. Other than these activities, banks may also directly 
lead all other types of activities such as: to hold movables or make operations 
concerning them; to exercise certain information business activities in Canada or 
elsewhere; to promote goods or services with payment, credit card holders that the 
bank delivers; to sell tickets; and to act as guardian to property, as depository or as 
liquidator269.
Second, certain commercial activities are exercised indirectly by banks. As a starting 
point, the Bank Act expressly forbids banks from directly exercising a certain number 
of activities. In general, it forbids them from exercising any commercial activity such 
as the sale of goods or merchandise270. Further, they may not act in trust in 
Canada271. Finally a bank cannot deal in securities and insurance except to the 
extent permitted by the A cf72. Banks are, however, authorized to indirectly exercise 
a certain number of activities. They are entitled to act as proxy or to refer their clients 
to various businesses where they have acquired or increased a financial group 
interest, or an interest above 10%273, in fields such as financial institutions, 
factoring, leasing, information businesses, investment and portfolio management 
businesses, mutual fund management, mutual fund brokerage, real-estate brokerage, 
real-estate, service businesses, special financial businesses, etc.274. Banks are 
therefore able to acquire or increase their financial group interest in businesses that 
dispense a large array of financial services. To this end, they may exercise control 
over these subsidiaries in certain cases275. In other cases, banks need to obtain a 
written prior approval from the minister, that may be given upon recommendation from 
the superintendent276. Note that bank investments in other financial institutions are 
subject to the rules concerning the owners of those institutions. They shall notably
Ibid., s. 409.
Ibid, s. 410(1).
Ibid., s. 410(2).
Ibid., s. 412ff.
Ibid., s. 415 and 416.
Ibid., s. 10 and 411(1)
Ibid, s. 468.
Ibid., s. 468(3)(a)(i).
Ibid., 468(3)(b)(i).
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need to increase their public ownership if their capital reaches or surpasses Cdn $750 
million leading to the result that 35% of their shares will then have to be quoted and 
negotiable on a recognized Canadian stock exchange and become widely held all 
within a delay of five years277. This must be done at the holding level, as much as 
at the institution level278. As a result of all the changes allowing for Canadian 
domestic chartered banks to be more active in the securities business, the latest year 
was quite good, as illustrated in Table 6.
TABLE 6
BANKS REVENUE RANKING
REVENUE PROFIT" R E T U ftttO tf 
. O AfW Ak .
ASSETS
COMPANY AND 
YEAR END
$000 % CHOE $000 % CHTaE
Royal Bank o( 
Canada (Oc94)
i § i § i 1,169,000 290 16 49 12,22 173,079,000 5
Cdn Imp. Bank of 
Commerce (Oc94)
11.214 000 3 860,000 22 14.79 r ; 13.56 151,033,000 7
Bank of Nova 
Scotia (Oc94)
6,376.000 (3 482,000 •32 ' 17.43 20,70 132,928,000 25
Bank of Montreal 
(Oc94)
: 6,106,000 '■■■■%;:■ 825,000 16 : 16.76 19,63 138,175,000 18
Toronto Dominion 
Bank (Oc94)
6,093.000 11 683,000 148 16.74 13,88 99,759,000 17
National Bank of 
Canada (Oc94)
3,591 230 ■ • . t " . 217,172 24 12-33 44.774,288 5
Laurentian Bank 
of Canada (Oc94)
•:S' 937.336 13,177 •63 : 4.7$ 10,467,527 8
Average 0 47 11.80 12.56 11
(1) The Big Six (domestic banks had a record Cdn $5.18 billion profit in the year ended October 31, 1995. D.
GOOLD, 'The Anatomy of Bank Profits'' The [ Toronto]  Globe and Mail (15 December 1995) B11. J. 
PARTRIDGE, "Bigger Paydays Expected for Top Bankers" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (14 December 
1995) B5.
Source: Report on Business Magazine, July 1995 at 145.
In the case of foreign banks, the rules are somewhat different.
1.2.2 Schedule II (or Foreign) Chartered Banks
Subsidiaries of foreign banks have operated in Canada for a number of years and
Ibid., s. 411.
Ibid., s. 414.
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until 1980, unlike domestic chartered institutions, they were not allowed to accept 
deposits or call themselves "banks"279. Most restricted their activities to making 
corporate loans and collectively their assets grew from a little over Cdn $1 billion in 
1974 to about Cdn $12 billion in 1980. The 1980 Bank Act revision led to subsidiaries 
of foreign banks being chartered as Schedule II banks. This move brought them under 
similar resen/e requirements and Canadian government scrutiny and regulation as the 
Schedule I banks. There are over fifty foreign banks with letters patent to operate as 
Schedule II banks280. The major distinction between the two categories of banks is 
in ownership rules.
Subject to certain exceptions, no shareholder or group of shareholders may now hold, 
without authorization from the Minister, more than 10% of shares issued with voting 
rights inside a Schedule II bank281. All the same, authorization from the Minister is 
required during any share acquisition that confers a person, or the entity under their 
control, an interest of 10% in a Schedule II bank or anything that increases that 
percentage282. Schedule II banks owned by foreign banks can be closely held 
indefinitely283. A Schedule II bank must become widely held after the first ten years 
of its existence284, unless it is owned by a widely held federally regulated financial 
institution285. However, Schedule II banks which surpass the Cdn $750 million limit 
need to respect the 35% public ownership criterion, meaning that 35% of the shares 
need to be quoted and negotiable on a recognized exchange in Canada and be 
widely held within a delay of five years286.
A Schedule II bank may engage in all types of business permitted to a Schedule I 
bank. In practice, however, most foreign-owned bank subsidiaries are focusing on 
commercial loans to companies rather than on retail banking services to individuals.
Ibid, definition of foreign bank in s. 2.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 224 at 16. LAW, ed., 
supra, note 261 at 13-11.
See, supra, note 266, s. 372.
Ibid, s. 377.
Ibid, s. 375.
Ibid., s. 373(1).
Ibid, s. 374.
Ibid., s. 381.
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By allowing these foreign banks to operate in Canada, the government has facilitated 
the expansion in the operations of Canadian-owned Schedule I banks abroad. The 
presence of foreign-owned banks in Canada also provides a conduit for investment of 
foreign capital in Canada, as well as providing Canadian corporate borrowers with 
alternative sources of funds. Although the Schedule II banks have, as a group, 
experienced reasonable growth in the first fourteen years of operation, a small 
number of them have earned satisfactory rates of return as illustrated in Table T 267.
TABLE 7
FOREIGN BANKS REVENUE RANKING
REVENUE PROFIT RETURN ON
c a p ita l:  .
ASSETS
COMPANY AND 
YEAR END
• $ 00 0 ' * ch ,s e | $000 % CHTaE 1-Yfi % f r Y R % . $000 % CHOE
Hongkong Bank of 
Canada (Oc94)
1,050,010 ,  • :i o | 85,868 36 18,60 1582" 116,021,222 19
Citibank Canada 
(De94)
■ ' 460,477 •40,847 42 7.38 4,210,761 •19
Union Bank of SwKz. 
(Can)(De94)
26 3,520 •37 . 5.84 t.S1 2,040,800 3
Credit Suisse of 
Canada (De94)
171,574 •; 8 « 2,005 •75 4.1$ 481 3,698,553 •3
Banque Natl de 
Paris (Can.)(Oc94)
130,449 14 •29,973 16 '11,47 9.73 2,157,463 •4
SodAtd G6n6rale 
(Canada) (Oc94)
111 121,861 3 9 . 2,580 113 1646 • • 2,521,474 17
Banca Commerciale 
ltaliana(De93)
95,134 27 100 t.26 6,50 1,326,476 •6
Bank of Tokyo 
Canada (Oc94)
67,844 • •2,555 •8,342 1285 . 13.66 1,558,620 •3
Deutsche Bank 
(Canada) (Dec93)
•nil: 87,076 6,900 133 T1.86 ; -2.70 1,315,241 4
Nat’l Westminister 
Bank Canada(Oc94)
78,876 | | | l 7 . ; •13,790 •511 >1282 2.58 1,875,870 15
Fuji Bank Canada 
(Oc93)
7o,t$a 3,370 114 7 n . .. -48? 1,122,000 2
Swiss Bank Corp. 
Canada (De94)
84,710 •20,780 28 -1096 -12-27 866,572 •33
Average l i i i l i l l •' -26$ 1.99 t,19 8
Source: Report on Business Magazine, July 1995 at 147.
Consequently, the impact of North American free trade on Canadian financial laws
Note that under the 1992 Bank Act (s. 412), foreign banks no longer are required to 
publish financial results, and many of them now choose to keep details of their 
Canadian operations secret.
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regulating the "extended" securities industry has been quite important. Some laws of 
the governments of Canada and the provinces were modified or passed as a result of 
this. However, in this context two questions are predominantly important. First, strictly 
from a constitutional perspective, what is the impact of free trade in relation to 
Canada’s regulatory structure of the securities industry? Second, does the federal 
government have sufficient power to defend Canadian interests in such negotiations, 
with the corollary being, should there be a growing federal presence in the field of 
securities policy?
2. North American Trade Liberalization and the Canadian 
Regulatory Structure Relating to the Securities Industry: 
Constitutional Questions
It is generally understood that any international agreement (such as a North American 
free trade pact) which is binding upon the parties in international law is a treaty288. 
It may take the form of a convention, a declaration, a protocol, a memorandum of 
understanding or an exchange of notes or letters289. Any trade-in-services 
agreement presumably concerns only trade in services. But, what is a traded service? 
Many definitions can provide valuable indications290. Whatever approach one takes, 
a traded service transaction is sometimes characterized by an international aspect. 
With respect to sen/ices such as banking and securities services, globalization has 
lead to situations where it is difficult to conceive of a traded service transaction that is 
not (at least partly) international in character.
T.A. LEVY, Provincial Internatbnal Status Revisited, (1976) 3 Dal. L.J. 70 at 80.
M. AKEHURST, A Modem Introduction to International Law, 4th ed., (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1982) at 121.
For one, Helena Stalson has divided internationally traded services into two 
categories: (i) investment-related sen/ices that bring the producer to the user; and (ii) 
true exports (which include services) that bring the user to the producer and those 
which actually cross a border. H. STALSON, U.S. Service Exports and Foreign 
Borrowers: An Agenda for Negotiations, (Washington, D.C.: National Planning 
Association, 1985). For its part, Ronald Shelp conceived three categories: (i) trade- 
related services (such as transportation); (ii) investment-related services (such as 
banking and securities services); and (iii) trade-and-investment-related services (such 
as communications or computer services). R.K. SHELP, Beyond Industrialization: 
Ascendancy of the Global Service Economy (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1981). For 
other definitions see, e.g, M. JANETTE, Trade and Investment in Services: An Issue 
for the 1980’s, (Ottawa, Ont.: North-South Institute, 1984).
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The drafting, negotiation and implementation of international agreements on trade in 
financial services bring about a unique challenge for Canada because of the very 
nature of Canadian federalism291. Constitutionally, the federal government 
possesses the power to negotiate, sign and ratify international agreements on behalf 
of the entire country292.
Basically, difficulties exist because of the separation Of powers set out mainly in 
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 3 Viet., c. 3 [hereinafter 
Constitutional Act of 1867] in R.S.C., 1985, App. II, n° 5. Section 91 provides that the 
federal government may "make laws for the Peace, Order and Good Government of 
Canada" not coming within subject matters assigned exclusively to the provinces, 
including - but not limited to - a number of enumerated subject matters in section 92. 
Constitutionally, it is unsettled whether the federal government has the ability to deliver 
on international commitments in relation to the "trade-in-services” regulations of the 
provincial governments. M. SMITH & D. STEGER, "Canada Constitutional Quandary: 
The Federal/Provincial Dimension in International Economic Agreements", in Canadian 
Trade at a Crossroads: Options for New International Agreements, (Toronto, Ont.: 
Economic Council of Canada, 1985) 362. It appears, in the light of the FTA and 
NAFTA implementing legislations and the position the federal government was taking 
in the GATT talks, that Ottawa believes it does have the necessary authority. M. 
CORNELLIER, "Ottawa s’octroie le pouvoir d’empieter sur les provinces pour faire 
appliquer I’accord de libre-echange", Le Devoir [of Montreal], (25 May 1988) 8. G.A. 
DENIS, Le Canada face aux negociations commercials bilaterales et multilatSrales, 
(1987) 50 Les Cahiers Scientifiques 57. There is also a growing body of opinion which 
supports this position. See, e.g., H.S. FAIRLEY "Implementation of the Canada-U.S. 
FTA" in D. McCRAE & D. STEGER, eds, Understanding the Free Trade Agreement 
(Halifax, N.S.: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988). LEVY, supra, note 288, 
70. However, some take the view that, with respect to transborder flow of services and 
capital, the federal jurisdiction is not absolute. R.E. SULLIVAN, Jurisdiction to 
Negotiate and Implement Free Trade Agreements in Canada: Calling the Provincial 
Bluff, (1987) 24 U.W.O.L. Rev. 63 at 78ff. At the operational level, in the FTA, NAFTA 
and GATT negotiations, mechanisms for federal - provincial consultation have existed 
and have been used, although to what extent is not fully clear. D. BARROWS & M. 
BOUDREAU, "The Evolving Role of the Provinces in International Trade Negotiations" 
in A.M. MASLOVE & S.L. WINER, eds, Knocking on the Back Door: Canadian 
Perspectives on the Political Economy of Free Trade with the United States, (Halifax, 
N.S.: Institute for Research Policy, 1987) 144. In any case, on the basis of s. 91, para.
2 of the Constitution Act of 1867, the federal government does not have to accept the
provinces’ views. It may choose only to inform the provinces and listen to advice.
It is generally accepted that the executive branch of the federal government has the
power to make treaties. See generally, S.A. SCOTT, "NAFTA, the Canadian 
Constitution, and the Implementation of International Trade Arrangements" in RIGGS
& VELK, eds, supra, note 204, 238. G.J. SZABLOWSKI, "Treaty-Making Power in the
Context of Canada Politics: An Exploratory and Innovative Approach" in Royal
Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,
Recurring Issues in Canadian Federalism (Research Studies, Vol. 57) (Toronto, Ont.:
University of Toronto Press, 1986) (Research Coordinators: C. BECKTON & A.W.
MacKAY) 145. However, if the treaty is an important one, the practice is to lay it
before the Parliament between its signing and ratification. M. KRASNICK & M.
CHARTRAND, Canada's Negotiations for International Agreements on Trade in
Services. Federal - Provincial Issues (Halifax, N.S.: Institute for Research on Public
91
Therefore, the provinces cannot deal with matters relating to Canada’s external 
affairs293.
However, an international agreement can only be part of domestic law if it is 
implemented by enactment of legislation either by the Parliament of Canada or the 
provincial legislatures further to the division of powers in the Constitution294. Without 
such legislation making the provisions of an agreement effective as domestic law, 
Canadian courts will not enforce the treaty. If, for example, the subject of an 
international agreement relates to a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction (such as 
banking)295, then only the Parliament of Canada would possess the power to enact 
appropriate legislation. However, if the subject relates to a matter within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures, then only provincial legislatures would have 
the authority to enact legislation to implement its terms. In this context, the enactment 
of laws to implement treaties has proven to be the source of many disputes.
If the principal characteristics of a trade-in-services agreement are market access for 
foreign firms, national treatment and transparency, then a strong case can be made 
that the subject matter of any such agreement would be exclusively within the federal 
jurisdiction under section 91 para. 2 of the Canadian Constitution, i.e. the federal
Policy, 1987) at 2-3.
Although, treaty making is beyond the powers of the provincial legislatures, it is 
admitted that provinces can sign international MOUs with respect to subjects falling 
within their legislative authorities. On the international activities of Canadian provinces, 
see, e.g., V. LOUNGNARATH, L’incidence de I’Accordde libre-echange Canada/lztats- 
Unis sur le developpement de la paradiplomatie provinciale, (1992) 26 R.J.T. 301. 
I. BERNIER & A. BINETTE, Les provinces canadiennes et le commerce international: 
dynamisme economique et ajustement juridique (Quebec, Que.: Centre quebecois de 
relations internationales/lnstitut de recherches politiques, 1988). J. DAVIDSON, 
Uniformity in International Trade Laws: The Constitutional Obstacle, (1988) 11 Dal. 
L.J. 677.
LEVY, supra, note 288 at 80. Thus "[ajlthough the federal executive branch might bind 
Canada internationally, it might or might not be able to fulfil that commitment 
depending upon the nature of the subject matter of the international agreement". R. 
St. J. MacDONALD, International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of Canada, 
(1975) 2 Dal. L.J. 307 at 315. Both the FTA and NAFTA include treaty commitments 
which require provincial action.
Constitution Act of 1867 gives the federal Parliament exclusive power to regulate “the 
business banking" through s. 91(14) ("Currency and Coinage"), s. 91(15) ("Banking, 
Incorporation of Banks and the Issue of Paper Money"), s. 91(16) ("Savings Banks"), 
s. 91(18) ("Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes"), s. 91 (19) ("Interest") and s. 
91(20) ("Legal Tender").
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trade and commerce power. This section provides for federal jurisdiction with respect 
to trade in general which arguably includes trade-in-services (but not goods)296. 
However, the tribunals have used a "specific transaction analysis" to examine the 
question of jurisdiction on a case by case basis297. Having said this, it is clear that 
international services transactions reaching beyond provincial or national boundaries 
are outside the provincial jurisdiction. Still, the courts have found valid any provincial 
laws affecting interprovincial or international transactions only incidentally298.
The problem in many services areas is that although the federal government has 
certain subject matters allocated to it under section 91 of the Constitution, many other 
subject areas have, in practice, been the responsibility of the provinces under section 
92 para. 13, i.e. the power over "Property and Civil Rights in the Province". Under this 
heading, services such as securities traditionally have been regulated by the 
provinces. "Property and Civil Rights" has been interpreted by the courts "to include 
contracts, dealings with property, and the regulation of businesses, trades and 
professions."299. Financial activity (like any other business activity) is carried out by 
way of contract. Provincial authority under this section is considered wide in scope, 
since it encompasses all kinds of business transactions. Under section 92 para. 11 of 
the Constitution, provincial legislatures to make "laws pertaining to corporate powers
Section 122 of the Constitution Act of 1867 allocates to the federal government 
jurisdiction over customs and excise. This section is an important specific allocation of 
power which, by nature, applies to trade in goods only (and not services).
The courts have found that the federal Parliament has the authority to regulate the 
"flow of commerce" only when the main purpose of the law is to regulate a transaction 
that reaches across a provincial or national boundary.
For example, a provincial securities act applies to brokers in the province whose 
business involved customers outside the province. Gregory v. Quebec Securities 
Commission, [1961] S.C.R. 584. Similarly, a provincial securities act applies to brokers 
outside the province who sell stocks to customers inside the province f t  v. W. 
McKenzie Securities, (1966) 56 D.L.R. (2d) 56 (Manitoba C.A.). See, generally, N. 
ROY, Mobility of Capital in the Canadian Economic Union, Vol. 66 of the research 
studies prepared for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1986) at 26-28.
ANISMAN & HOGG, supra, note 55 at 144-148. On interprovincial transactions, see,
"The Impact of Federal Policies on Interprovincial Activity", in M.J. TREBILCOCK [et 
at.], Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union (Toronto, Ont.: Economic Council, 
1983) 201. J. WHALLEY, "Induced Distortions of Interprovincial Activity: An Overview 
of Issues", in TREBILCOCK [et al.], Ibid, 161.
ANISMAN & HOGG, supra, note 55 at 144.
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organization, internal management, and financing300. Although it is arguable that the 
federal government has jurisdiction over interprovincial and international securities 
transactions, it has not yet utilized its authority in this area. This dual set of powers 
means that not only do Canadian policy-makers and legislators have to develop a 
financial regulatory environment that serves the needs of a very rapidly changing 
marketplace but they must do so in a timely manner within the framework of Canadian 
federalism.
Harmonization of the regulatory framework has long been a major source of concern 
for Canadian politicians, legal experts and scholars alike301. The origins of the need 
for harmonization of the laws governing financial institutions among Canadian 
jurisdictions results from: (i) the need to arrange regulatory frameworks with measures 
adopted to facilitate the internationalization of financial markets302; and (ii) at the 
national level, the need to develop policies to prevent problems associated with a 
diversity of legislation and regulations drawn up by various jurisdictions in Canada.
However, in the securities area, there exists a problem of another dimension. Where 
both the federal Parliament and provincial regulators have enacted similar legislation 
with respect to a particular matter, the courts recently have demonstrated an 
inclination to allow the federal and provincial legislation to co-exist where there is no 
apparent conflict. The Supreme Court of Canada case, Multiple Access Limited v.
W. MOULL, E. WAITZER & J. ZIEGEL, “The Changing Regulatory Environment for 
Canadian Financial Institutions: Constitutional Aspects and Federal-Provincial 
Relations" in J. ZIEGEL, L. WAVERMAN & D. CONKLIN, eds, Canadian Financial 
Institutions: Changing the Regulatory Environment (Toronto, Ont.: Ontario Economic 
Council, 1985) 103 at 105.
See, e.g., A.L. CLOSE, Harmonizatbn of Provincial Legislation in Canada, (1986-87)
12 C.B.L.J. 425. W.H. HURLBERT, Harmonization of Provincial Legislation in Canada: 
The Elusive Goal, (1986-87) 12 C.B.L.J. 387. T.W. MAPP, Law Reform in Canada: 
The Impact of the Provincial Law Reform Agencies on Uniformity, (1983) 7 Dal. L.J. 
277. F. MULDOON, Law Reform in Canada: Diversity or Uniformity, (1983) 12 Man. 
L.J. 257. J.S. ZIEGEL Uniformity of Legislation in Canada: The Conditional Sales 
Experience, (1961) 39 Can. Bar Rev. 165. L.R. MacTAVISH, Uniformity of Legislation 
in Canada - An Outline, (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 36. J. WILLIS, Securing Uniformity 
of Law in a Federal System - Canada, (1943-44) 5 U.T.L.J. 352.
Currently, “[tjhere are two basic levels at which regulation of international securities 
transactions can occur: (1) the legislative or governmental level; and (2) the 
administrative or securities commission level". M. ROPPEL, Regulation of International 
Securities Transactions: The Proposed Canada - U.S. Multijurisdictional Disclosure 
System, (1991) 10 Nat’l Banking L. Rev. 51 at 55.
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McCutcheon [et a /./03 upheld insider trading provisions of the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act (hereinafter CBCA) applicable to federally incorporated companies 
which were similar to the insider trading provisions of the Ontario Securities Act 
(hereinafter OSA)304. Here, where the contrast between the relative importance of 
the federal and provincial laws was not clear, and neither appeared to dominate the 
other, the Court allowed essentially similar federal and provincial laws to co-exist. 
Although this case may have served to help the federal government to ascertain its 
place in the field of securities regulation, the evolution of Canadian laws during both 
the FTA and NAFTA negotiations have greatly influenced the harmonization process.
3. Recent Evolution of Provincial and Federal Laws Impacting on 
the Canadian Securities Industry
For many years, capital markets in Canada were structured in an orderly fashion, 
heavily regulated and protected against overlap and foreign intrusion. In order to 
curtail conflicts of interest and the potential danger of Canada’s vital financial industry 
becoming dominated by foreigners whose prime loyalties lay outside the country, the 
concept of four separate sectors (or pillars) became fundamental. Under this principle, 
government policies prohibited cross-ownership and the establishment of a foreign 
financial services industry. Rules were erected to protect domestic companies with 
each of the "four-pillars" as well as the core business carried on by each one. The 
resulting separation of function enabled each financial sector to pursue its primary 
purpose vigorously. However, revolutionary changes have recently overtaken 
traditional practices to create a radically different securities industry structure305. The 
following is a simplified overview.
(1982) 2 S.C.R. 161.
Mr. Justice Dickson, writing for the majority, found the federal provisions which 
established civil liability and accountability for insider trading valid under the federal 
peace, order and good government clause as an enactment by Parliament in 
discharge of its company law power over federally incorporated companies. Ibid. at 
170.
For a brief summary on some aspects of Canada’s approach to financial liberalization, 
see, e.g., R. DALE, International Banking Deregulation: The Great Banking 
Experiment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) at 120ff.
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3.1 Key Provincial Reforms
Provincially, the major reforms resulted from efforts by various governments to assert 
autonomy in their traditional areas of jurisdiction306. In essence, the provinces 
decided that it would be necessary to make effective use of the financial levers 
provided by certain institutions, such as securities dealers, to promote their economic 
development. Reforms were also the result of the growing internationalization of 
financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s which increased pressure to remove the 
remaining obstacles to cross-border trade in securities-related services.
In the securities area, the entry of foreign firms into Canada is rather a recent 
occurrence. The ownership of securities firms in Canada by foreign residents was not 
a serious issue before the end of the 1960s. Then, the industry was dominated by 
Canadian firms. However, in 1969, Royal Securities was acquired by Merrill Lynch (a 
U.S.-based firm). Provinces such as Ontario began to fear growing foreign control of 
its securities industry. In the early 1970s, regulations were introduced in Ontario 
establishing a ceiling of 10% on the portion of the shares of a securities firm that a 
single non-resident and its associates and affiliates could hold, and a ceiling of 25% 
on the portion that all non-residents could hold307. Existing firms owned by non­
residents that did not meet the criteria were "grandfathered". In 1974, the 
"grandfathered" firms were limited to a rate of growth of assets that could not exceed 
the average rate of major Ontario securities firms. Foreign-owned firms could, 
however, operate without restriction in the exempt market308.
In the province of Quebec, the Bouchard Report (written in 1972) recommended that
The rivalry between the provinces of Quebec and Ontario "[...] has, in part, fuelled the 
pace of change". C. JORDAN, Canadian Financial Services— The New Broom, (1987)
3 Rev. Fin. Serv. Reg. 177 at 178.
In essence, the rationale of this rule comes from the fact that because national interest 
required the retention of Canadian control of banks, the same conclusion should apply 
to securities firms. GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, Report of the Committee to Study 
the Requirements and Sources of Capital and Implications of Non-Resident Capital for 
the Canadian Securities Industry (Toronto, Ont.: Ontario, 1970) at 17.
The so-called "exempt" market in Ontario was where government bonds and large 
blocks of other securities, with a value of Cdn $150,000 or more were traded.
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the Quebec securities market remain open to foreigners309. Contrary to the 
prevailing opinion in Ontario, it was felt that foreign participation would reinforce the 
capitalization of the Quebec securities industry. Consequently, the government of 
Quebec decided not to impose any restriction on the entry of foreign securities firms 
into the province or on foreign participation in existing securities firms. In 1983, the 
QSC ordered the ME to remove its restrictions on membership by foreign participants. 
Thus, Quebec was the first province to accept the participation of other types of 
Canadian financial institutions and foreign financial institutions in its securities 
market310.
Because the province of Ontario (which houses the highest number of institutions in 
Canada) continued to maintain strict rules concerning the ownership of securities 
dealers operating in its territory, Quebec’s innovative measure311 initially had but 
limited impact312. It was to be another four years313 before Ontario relaxed its 
rules314 governing the ownership of securities dealers and allowed financial
QUEBEC, Ministere des institutions financieres, £tude sur flndustrie des valeurs 
mobilieres au Quebec, Rapport final (Quebec, Que.: Editeur officiel du Quebec, 1972). 
La propriety et la diversification des firmes de courtage, Decision n° 6861, (1983)
14:24 B.C.V.M.Q. 2.1.1. COMMISSION DES VALEURS MOBILIERES DU QUEBEC, 
Rapport d’activites 1983-1984 (Quebec, Que.: Direction generate des publications 
gouvernementales, 1984) 37.
“There is no doubt that Quebec has been an innovative force in the financial services 
sector, and the catalyst for the recent [Canadian] wave of regulatory change." 
JORDAN, supra, note 306 at 178.
In November 1986, the Bank of Nova Scotia (now known as Scotiabank) became the 
first to register a wholly-owned subsidiary with the QSC as a fully licensed dealer. 
Dispense, en vertu de I’article 263 de la Loi, de I’inscription a titre de courtier de la 
Banque de Nouvelle-Izcosse pour la diffusion de la publicite sur les services offerts 
par 683 657 Ontario Limited, Decision no 7991, (1986) 17:47 B.C.V.M.Q. A1.
Note that this announcement occurred scarcely a month after the Bank of Nova Scotia 
registered a securities dealer subsidiary in Quebec. "Toronto was not about to risk 
taking a back seat to Montreal." JORDAN, supra, note 306 at 179.
For more information on the subject and on subsequent developments in Ontario, see 
P.D. MADDAUGH, International Banking and the Emergence New Regulatory Setting 
in Canada, (1988) 4. B.F.L.R. 27 at 43ff. Since no securities firms could allow 
themselves not to have access to the TSE, Ontario therefore got to control the 
Canadian securities industry for a while. J.L. DARROCH & I.A. LITVAK, Gaps, 
Overlaps and Competition Among Jurisdictions: Evolving Canadian Financial Services 
Policies and Regulations, (1992) 26:2 J.W.T.L. 119 at 128.
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institutions doing business in Ontario to acquire them315. In the end, Ontario’s move 
was provoked by a challenge by TD Bank that proposed setting-up a subsidiary that 
would offer brokerage sen/ices to bank customers316. As at June 30, 1987, 
Canadian banks, insurance companies and trust companies were allowed to own up 
to 100% of a Canadian securities firm. Also, foreign firms could hold up to 50% of an 
existing firm or start their own Canadian securities subsidiary, but such businesses 
were restricted to trades in the exempt securities market for a one year period. The 
one year restriction was to give domestic institutions a one year head start in 
organizing their own full-service operations. As of June 30, 1988, foreign firms could 
then engage in full range of activities in Canadian securities market. Today, there are 
absolutely no foreign ownership restrictions for securities firms in Canada317. A 
foreign firm may now enter all areas of securities transactions in Ontario upon 
registration as a foreign dealer. A foreign securities firm may be refused entry, 
however, if its home country does not allow the unrestrained establishment of 
Canadian firms in its home market. In addition, all foreign firms must now register with 
the OSC, since the exempt market in Ontario has been eliminated. Consequently, in 
addition to the fact that a number of investment dealers have attracted large foreign 
investors, numerous foreign brokerage firms have acquired a seat on the various 
Canadian stock exchanges.
3.2 Key Federal Reforms
Until the 1950s, foreign banks with offices in Canada focused their activities on the 
acquisition of portfolio investments. Even as late as the beginning of the 1960s, the 
presence of foreign banks was at best marginal. This was a period when a Canadian 
bank could take over another Canadian bank, even though no law prevented a foreign
Statement in the Legislature by the Honourable Monte Kwinter, Minister of Financial
Institutions: Re: Entry Into and Ownership of the Securities Industry, (1986) 9 O.S.C.B. 
3234. Statement in the Legislature by the Honourable Monte Kwinter, Minister of 
Financial Institutions: Re Entry Into and Ownership of the Securities Industry, 
December 4, 1986, (1986) 9 O.S.C.B. 6727. See J. RILEY & B. HANSEN, "Canada’s 
Big Bang", Int'l Fin. L. Rev. (September 1987) 31. C.L. SUGIYAMA, Canadian 
Securities Regulation Update Comment: Canada's "Little Bang", (1987) 1 R.I.B.L. 99. 
CHANT, supra, note 17 at 14.
The other important Canadian market, British Columbia, also removed its ownership 
restrictions. W.R. MILES & D.C. FRYDENLUND, British Columbia's Securities 
Industry-The Quiet Bang, (1988) 2 R.I.B.L. 243.
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bank from acquiring partial or total control of a Canadian bank, provided the approval 
of the Minister of Finance had been secured beforehand. In 1963, after the purchase 
of the Mercantile Bank by the First National City Bank of New York (now Citibank), 
the Bank Act was revised in 1967 to restrict access to the domestic Canadian market 
by foreign banks318. Here again during this period, FDI in Canada raised much 
concern about the ability of Canadians to control their own destiny. Thus, restrictions 
were introduced into laws relating to federal financial institutions to prevent any 
foreign entry into Canada’s banking industry, and limit transfers of shares of other 
federal financial institutions to foreigners. The 1967 revision of the Bank Act also had 
the effect of expanding the powers of the banks with respect to the consumer loan 
and mortgage markets319.
In part, these changes occurred due to the continuing growth of global financial 
markets. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, large MNCs frequently issued 
securities usually in the Euromarket, instead of borrowing from their bankers320. 
Countries and institutions that had strong international underwriting and placement 
capabilities responded well to this demand. Canada’s commercial banks were 
sufficiently large and capitalized to enter the international market. However, their lack 
of domestic experience due to the existence of the four-pillars regime prevented them 
from acting in a significant manner. At the same time, Canadian securities firms were 
too poorly capitalized to strongly attack the Euromarket. These facts support the 
argument that, if the Canadian regulatory structure could allow Canadian banks to 
acquire Canadian securities firms or to inject large sums of capital into them,
Here, the rules concerning property prevented banks from entering the market of other 
financial institutions. No Canadian bank could hold more than 10% of the shares of 
another Canadian financial institution. In return, the rules concerning property forbade 
other Canadian institutions from entering banking. No shareholder, resident or non­
resident, could hold more than 10% of the shares of a Canadian chartered bank. 
Rules concerning property also prevented the entrance of foreign banks into Canadian 
banking. The total number of shares that could be held by non-residents was then set 
at 25%. Bank Act of 1967, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1, s. 53.
Ibid, s. 15.
ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, Globalization and Canada’s Financial Markets 
(Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989) at 119. ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL OF CANADA, A New Frontier: Globalization and Canada’s Financial 
Markets (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989) at 14. 
ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, A Framework for Financial Regulation (Ottawa, 
Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987) at 26.
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Canadian financial institutions could easily adjust to the international competition in 
securitized instruments321.
The philosophy behind the four-pillars system was founded on many grounds322. 
Restrictions concerning property or commercial powers were explained by the will of 
regulatory authorities to diminish the insolvency risk or to prevent conflicts of interest 
and insider trading. For their part, the restrictions concerning foreign participation was 
guided by the "national interest" or the declared objective of preserving Canadian 
control over the Canadian financial industry.
Certain events at the start of the 1980s gave rise to a reexamination of the philosophy 
behind the four-pillars. Banks were the primary instigators of the renunciation of the 
philosophy of the four-pillars. They were anxious to enter into other financial sectors. 
For their part, foreign banks, which could only create "quasi-banking subsidiaries", 
were looking to enter the Canadian market directly. The first major piece of legislation 
which marked the end of protectionist trends in the financial sector was the 1980 
Bank AcF*. It added a new dimension to the Canadian bank activities by 
distinguishing between two types of banks: Schedule A and B banks (which later 
became Schedule I and II banks).
The pressure for the creation of Schedule II banks came from Canadian borrowers 
who sought greater competition from foreign lenders and foreign banks who saw 
profitable business opportunities in Canada324 and from Canadian banks who 
sought "reciprocal expansion opportunities" abroad325. Thus, foreign banks that
B.A. KALYMON, Global Innovation: The Impact on Canada’s Financial Markets 
(Toronto, Ont.: John Wiley & Sons, 1989) at 14.
For a full rationale of the four-pillars legislation, see W. GROVER & N. CHEIFETZ, 
"Federal Regulation of Securities Activities of Banks and Other Financial Institutions" 
in L.S.U.C. Special Lectures, Securities Law in the Modern Financial Marketplace 
(Toronto, Ont.: Richard De Boo, 1989) 9 at 10.
K.J. FRIEDMAN, The Canadian Banks and Banking Law Revision: Competitive 
Stimulus or Protectionist Barrier ?, (1981) 13:3 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 483 at 484.
For a brief assessment of Schedule II banks see, e.g., D. WALKER, "Pacing Change" 
Canadian Banker (July/August 1992) 12. D. WALKER, "A Good Presence" Canadian 
Banker (April 1987) 16.
Bank Act of 1980, s. 8. Being analogous to retaliation in trade policy, the principle of 
reciprocity as it is conventionally applied to trade in financial services implies that a 
host country discriminates in its treatment of foreign firms by affording each of them
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wished to do business in Canada could now do so by establishing banking 
subsidiaries in Canada that were incorporated following Schedule II of the Bank 
A cf26. However, they could not open more than one branch in Canada apart from 
their head office without authorization from the Minister327. Overall, the 1980 
revisions to the Bank Act brought the affiliates of foreign banks under the control of 
the Canadian regulatory authorities. However, the idea was only to allow entry to 
foreign banks, not to allow them national treatment. Although, theoretically, they had 
all the same* powers as the Schedule I banks, foreign banks remained subject to 
many restrictions that limited their operations in Canada. We will examine these more 
fully when we consider the objectives sought by American banks in the negotiations of 
the FTA328.
During the mid-1980s, the government of Canada initiated a major reform of all its 
financial institutions329. In doing so, it could not ignore the new legislative framework 
of the EU nor the outcome of the American financial reform legislation330. This 
movement was accentuated by certain exterior events such as the bankruptcy of 
certain banking institutions331. It is also important to recall that the calls for reform
exactly the same treatment that the host country’s own firms receive in the foreign 
firms host country. C.J. LOHMANN & W.C. MURDEN, "Policies for the Treatment of 
Foreign Participation in Financial Markets and their Application in the U.S.-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement" in D.M. McCRAE & DP. STEGER, eds, Understanding the 
Free Trade Agreement (Toronto, Ont.: Carswell, 1989) 147 at 151. "Reciprocity is the 
threshold of mutual concession that trade partners consider satisfactory enough to 
sign a trade agreement". PA. MESSERLIN, "Country Experiences and Perspectives - 
The European Community" in P.A. MESSERLIN & K.P. SAUVANT, eds, The Uruguay 
Round - Services in the World Economy (New York, N.Y.: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1990) 132 at 142. Note that the policy of reciprocity 
has occasionally contributed to trade liberalization. OECD, supra, note 5 at 69.
Bank Act of 1980, s. 302. See the definition of foreign bank subsidiary in s. 2 of the 
Act Foreign banks could also open a representative office, in accordance with s. 302, 
or create, like before, subsidiaries incorporated in the provinces subject to the 
restrictions of s. 303.
Ibid., s. 173(2).
See infra, notes 530-538 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., J.D. SCARLETT & R.S.G. CHESTER, Canada Deregulates its Financial 
Services Industry, [1987] Int’l Bus. Law. 104. On the consultation process, abundant 
studies and reports of all kinds, see the complete enumeration given by MADDAUGH, 
supra, note 314 at 28ff.
S. HANDFIELD-JONES, Harmonization in Financial Regulation in Canada, Report 42- 
89 (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 1989) at vi and 5.
See supra, note 261.
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were set in the context of worldwide deregulation of financial services. At the 
Canadian federal level, the movement started in 1985 when a policy statement332 
revealed the intention of Ottawa to challenge the division of power in the 
Constitution333. It suggested that the way to solve problems of interprovincial 
coordination was by centralizing them at the federal level. A committee formed to 
study this policy statement followed the same path by proposing the establishment of 
a national financial institutions regulatory and supervisory agency that would replace 
federal and provincial agencies334. In 1986, another report335 proposed that the 
federal deposit insurance program336 apply to securities dealers. The next year, the 
federal government passed two bills in Parliament: it authorized federally-chartered 
financial institutions to acquire securities dealers337 and set up the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (hereinafter OSFI)338.
CANADA, The Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions: Proposals for Discussion 
(Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985).
J. BINAVINCE & H.S. FAIRLEY, Banking and the Constitution: Untested Limits of 
Federal Jurisdiction, (1986) 65 Can. B. Rev. 328.
CANADA, The Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic 
Affairs (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985).
CANADA, The Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce: Towards a More Competitive Financial Environment (Ottawa, Ont.: 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1986).
Financial Institutions Depositors Compensation Act, S.C., 1985, c. 51.
An Act to Amend Certain Acts Relating to Financial Institutions, S.C., 1987, c. 26 and 
Bulletin N° E-1-1, Shareholdings by Federally-Regulated Financial Institutions in 
Securities Dealers, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, September 
1991. Schedule I banks, trust and insurance companies were allowed to own up to 
100% of a securities dealer or securities dealer holding company and operate as a 
full-line securities dealer as at June 30, 1987. They could either purchase an existing 
dealer firm or start their own. For a detailed discussion of the amendments and 
repercussion on the Canadian securities industry, see J.M. STRANSMAN & A. 
GREENWOOD, "Provincial Regulation of Securities Activities of Banks and Other 
Federal Financial Institutions: The Ontario Perspective" in L.S.U.C. Special Lectures, 
Securities Law in the Modern Financial Marketplace (Toronto, Ont.: Richard De Boo,
1989) 27. A. GREENWOOD, The Chinese Wall Doctrine: Substantive Legal Theory or 
Rule of Evidence?, (1989) 3 R.I.B.L. 271. The reform however did not put Canadian 
and foreign banks on an equal footing. Foreign banks wishing to gain an important 
stake in a Canadian securities firm had to obtain authorization from the federal cabinet 
and proceed to acquire it by means of their Canadian subsidiary. Bank Act of 1980, s. 
307 and Bulletin N° E-2, Shareholdings in Investment Dealers by Foreign Banks, 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, September 1991.
The Financial Institutions and Deposit Insurance System Amendment Act, S.C., 1987, 
c. 23.
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The consequences of these reforms were soon felt339. The large Canadian 
chartered banks acquired the most important Canadian securities firms. The 
Japanese, European and Americans also got into position in the market340. But the 
Canadian banks with their established network of branches across the country were 
well positioned to face foreign competition341. These linked operations created a 
Canadian investment dealer structure that was significantly strengthened in its capital 
base and in its international presence. At the same time, the Canadian banks were 
able to acquire significant expertise in the securities business, and could strengthen 
their ability to participate in the trend to securitization.
For the provinces, however, the permission given to federal financial institutions to 
acquire securities dealers caused disagreement. In practice, Canada started to 
experience the birth of a dual-regulation system concerning securities. In fact, the 
federal government wanted to regulate and supervise this newest category of bank 
subsidiary as well as its environment to make certain that nothing out of its control 
would threaten the solvency of the banking system. The OSFI’s conditions imposed 
on federal financial institutions acquiring a securities firm affected several aspects of 
the securities dealers operations (from the choice of name to the rules governing self-dealing)342.
MADDAUGH, supra, note 314 at 45-46. J.E. FORDYCE & M.L. NICKERSON, An 
Overview of Legal Developments in the Banking and Financial Industry in Canada, 
(1991) 25 Int’l Law. 351 at 359ff.
Many foreign firms bought stakes in a number of Canadian brokerage houses and a 
number of foreign investment dealers opened offices in Canada. See, e.g., B. 
McGOLDRICK, "Little Bang Brings Down Barriers" Euromoney (November 1988) 159. 
J. LEWIS, "Little Bang’s Sputtering Start" Institutional Investor (October 1988) 267. 
M. CRABBE "Canada: Banking and Dealing — A Question of Synergy" Euromoney 
(November 1987) 67. "Deregulation: Canada Lifts All Barriers Between Banks and 
Brokers" Asian Finance (15 November 1987) 13. D.R. FRANCIS, "Canada’s Baby 
Bang Resounds Beyond Securities Industry" Financier (July 1987) 14.
G.F. BOREHAM, "The Changing Landscape of the Financial Services Industry in 
Canada" Services Industries Journal (April 1989) 191 at 193. B.M. LEWITT & S.P. 
BATTRAM, Canada/United States Trade in Financial Services, (1987) 3 J. of Int’l 
Banking L. 159 at 161.
The banks that had acquired securities dealers also complicated the separate 
regulation of the banking and securities businesses even further by sharing premises 
and personnel. This problem was solved by provincial securities commissions which 
adopted national regulation principles to distinguish between the activities of a deposit 
institution and those of its securities-dealer subsidiary. In Ontario, see Notice — 
Principles of Regulation; Re: Full Service and Discount Brokerage Activities of 
Securities Dealers in Branches of Related Financial Institutions, (1988) 11 O.S.C.B. 
4627. In Quebec, see Avis - L’activite de courtier de plein exercice et de courtier 
executant dans les succursales destitutions financidres, (1988) 19:46 B.C.V.M.Q. 1.
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At the time when the FTA negotiations were under way, the Americans saw the dual­
regulation system as constituting an important barrier to trade of securities-related 
services. While Ontario, Quebec and other provinces had liberalized their securities 
markets and had welcomed foreign investors, the federal government implemented a 
policy of reciprocity which held up the application for entry by U.S. securities firms and 
banks. To better understand this situation, it is necessary to note that the immediate 
issue that arose from the ownership by Canada banks of the major securities dealers 
in Canada was that of regulation. A major issue to be determined was the degree to 
which securities activities ought to be determined by federal banks regulators. In the 
course of a series of negotiations between the federal government and the province of 
Ontario, an agreement (commonly known as the "Hockin-Kwinter Accord") was 
reached in April 1987 as to what types of activities might be carried on in the financial 
institutions and what activities could only be carried on in the securities 
subsidiary343.
Under the Hockin-Kwinter Accord, it was agreed that only a securities dealer or the 
securities subsidiary of a federal financial institution would engage in the primary 
distribution of both equity and debt securities, the secondary trading of shares, 
portfolio management and investment counselling. These activities would have to be 
regulated at the provincial level. Under the Accord, certain securities-related activities 
were to be performed by the federal financial institutions and be regulated by the 
OSFI. Some of these activities included those with respect to government-related 
securities, money market, debt securities of federal financial institutions (including
COMMISSION DES VALEURS MOBILISES DU QUEBEC, Rapport d’activites 
1988-1989 (Quebec, Que.: Publications du Quebec, 1989) 35.
Federal - Ontario Accord: Securities Related Activities of Banks and Federally 
Incorporated Insurance Companies, (1987) 10 O.S.C.B. 2553. The Hockin-Kwinter 
Accord was incorporated into the regulations under the OSA (R.S.O., 1980, c. 
466-O.Reg. 345/87, s. 181). On the Accord, see W. McKEE, "The Federal-Ontario 
Securities Accord" in Insight Educational Services, How to Survive in the New 
Financial Marketplace, (Toronto, Ont.: Insight, 1987), Tab. 1. STRANSMAN & 
GREENWOOD, supra, note 337 at 28-29. In the other provinces, there was no MOU 
similar to that of the Hockin-Kwinter Accord. In the case of the province of Quebec, 
the QSC and the OSFI signed a broader agreement. Avis — Entente entre la 
Commission et le Bureau du surintendant des institutions financieres, (1988) 19:14
B.C.V.M.Q. 1.
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bankers’ acceptance) and all secondary market trades in corporate debt 
securities344. The parent financial institution was permitted, if it chose, to deal in 
securities which previously had been part of the "exempt market"345 and, to the 
extent permitted by the governing statute, engage in investment advisory activities 
and provide portfolio management services.
The government of Ontario thought the Accord would allow it to keep exclusive 
jurisdiction over the activities of the securities subsidiaries of federal financial 
institutions. Ontario (much like the other provinces) was disappointed346 when during 
the FTA negotiations, the OSFI published its guidelines G-17(a) and G-17(b)347. A 
rapid analysis of these guidelines lead to three conclusions. First, it was the intention 
of the federal government to regulate (directly or indirectly) the brokerage activities of 
subsidiaries of federal financial institutions and foreign brokerage firms. Second, in the 
name of a political reciprocity, the federal government unilaterally gave itself the right 
to approve all requests made by foreign banks interested to obtain a participation of 
more than 10% in the capital of a Canadian broker or interested to establish a 
Canadian securities brokerage subsidiary348. Thirdly, these rules also applied to
Ibid, STRANSMAN & GREENWOOD, supra, note 337 at 42. Other in-house securities 
activities of a federal financial institution not subject to provincial regulation included: 
(i) capital market activities in syndicated or consortium loans; and (ii) unsolicited 
participation in secondary trading of equity securities (provided execution is through a 
registered dealer).
Not covered under provincial regulations are exempt securities consisting of 
government bonds, short-term commercial paper and privately placed corporate 
securities distributed without prospectus qualification. With respect to the "exempt 
market": see, e.g., K.G. OTTENBREIT, Exemptions for Institutional Investors or
Concepts of Non-Public Offerings: A Comparative Study — Canada, (1993) 13 U. of 
Penn. J. Int’l Bus. L. 477.
N. LADOUCEUR, Le controls des conflits d’interets: mesures legislatives et murailles 
de Chine (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1993) at 43. J.P. CRISTEL, "Les barrieres 
canadiennes a I’acces au marche des entreprises de services financiers" in A.L.C. de 
MESTRAL, ed., Access to Markets Under the CanadaAJ.SA Free Trade Agreement 
(Montreal, Que.: Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University, 1988) 61 at 62. 
Guideline N° G-17(a), Shareholding in Investment Dealers, August 20, 1987, and 
Guideline N° 17(b), Shareholding in Investment Dealers by Foreign Banks, August 20, 
1987. For full text of the Guidelines, see STRANSMAN & GREENWOOD, supra, note 
337 at 50-55.
After guidelines G-17(a) and G-17(b) were adopted, "[cjomplaints were voiced that the 
Canadian federal government was deliberately dragging its feet in approving 
applications by non-residents for entry into the securities industry in an attempt to win 
concessions from [...] the [U.S.] with respect to the ownership of securities dealers by 
Canadian banks in such [jurisdiction]”. JORDAN, supra, note 306 at 181 n. 18.
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foreign banks, even if they had no intent to have banking operations in Canada. 
Moreover, the federal government indicated that it would not approve any request 
prior to the signing, by the financial institution concerned and its brokerage subsidiary, 
of all complex contractual undertakings based on guidelines G-17(a) and G-17(b).
In practice, the implementation of the guidelines was considered by some experts to 
be an interference with the liberalization process which took place under the FTA349. 
Hence, this policy was considered to have compromised the approach of openness 
undertaken by the provinces towards foreign brokers and financial institutions. Other 
critics believed the federal government had jurisdiction to apply all its policies, where 
de novo incorporations were concerned350. With regards to this controversy, the 
FTA remained neutral and respected the present status quo in that it allowed the 
federal government to maintain its restrictive and somewhat discriminatory policy 
towards U.S. brokers and financial institutions, even though all provinces had adopted 
an open-door policy since 1986351. The result was postponement and delayed 
approval of applications for entry by U.S. brokers and banks352. A quick solution 
was sought to this important problem. To determine who should conduct the audit of 
securities activities and what rules should apply to deal with conflicts of interest that 
may arise between the securities subsidiary and its parent financial institution, the 
province of Ontario addressed the issues in a Memorandum of Understanding
"Canada Seeking Concessions, Is Stalling Firms Entering Its Securities Fields" The 
Wall Street Journal [of New York] (7 October 1987) 16.
CRISTEL, supra, note 346 at 63.
Their opinion was to the effect that the government had, subject to the expression of 
principle set out in Article 1703 para. 3 of the FTA, jurisdiction because the 
liberalization provisions of Article 1703 only apply to "Canadian-controlled financial 
institutions". See comments made by D.C. ROBERTSON, in de MESTRAL, ed., supra, 
note 346, 64 at 65.
FTA, Article 1703 para. 4.
For the U.S. the FTA somewhat solved this problem. "[Wjhile Ontario, Quebec and 
other provinces have liberalized their securities markets and have welcomed foreign 
investors, the Federal government implemented a policy of reciprocity which has held 
up applications for entry by U.S. securities firms and banks. Under [the FTA] these 
applications [...] will be reviewed strictly on a prudential basis, just as for Canadian 
firms, and not on a reciprocity basis". Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs (statement of Thomas J. Berger, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Monetary Affairs, Department of the Treasury) May 24, 1988 at 9.
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(hereinafter MOU) entered into between the OSC and the OFSI in 1988353. Despite 
this arrangement, the federal government maintained its interest in the area of 
securities regulation.
In 1989, a federal government study354 confirmed the intention of Ottawa to 
intervene in the securities field. This desire of intervention was justified by the fact that 
it had to achieve its objectives which concern: (i) allocation of investor capital in the 
economy; and (ii) encouraging the use of savings for certain purposes to which the 
federal government assigns a high priority (Canadian ownership, etc.). Also, the study 
reproduced the familiar argument of the "Canadian voice" in other countries355. 
Under this view, only the federal government should hold the power to define, 
negotiate and participate in decisions taken in international forums on securities 
issues. In addition, it should protect the integrity of the Canadian regulatory framework 
against international pressures from other jurisdictions which, in theory, could cause 
provincial authorities to relax rules governing trade and circulation of securities in 
Canada. Consequently, Ottawa mounted an attack to gain accrued powers.
As a result, the banks obtained a number of privileges with respect to securities- 
related activities conducted in bank branches. For instance, numerous provincial 
regulations now deal with "networking arrangement" entered into between Canadian 
chartered banks (generally referred to in the regulation as "financial intermediaries") 
and their securities subsidiaries or affiliates356. In addition, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators (hereinafter CSA357) issued a notice dated November 4, 1988 which 
established "Principles of Regulation" to be applied to arrangements under which 
securities dealers related to financial intermediaries are permitted to sell mutual funds
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions and the Ontario Securities Commission, (1988) 11 O.S.C.B. 1411. 
CANADA, Federal Involvement in the Canadian Securities Industry (Ottawa, Ont.: 
Minister of Supply & Services, 1989).
This view was reiterated in the 1991 federal government’s constitutional proposals for 
the Canadian economy. M.M. HARRIS, "Securities Regulation: Should the Scope of 
Federal Regulation Expand?" Canadian Financial Services Alert (April 1992) 14.
In Ontario, see the Regulation published under the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 
1980, c. 466, as amended (hereinafter OSA) at s. 219. In Quebec, see the Regulation 
published under the Quebec Securities Act, R.S.Q., c. V-1.1 as amended (hereinafter 
QSA) at s. 236.3.
On the CSA, see supra, note 224.
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through the branch offices of such financial intermediaries358. A second notice 
published by the CSA dated November 17, 1988 established "Principles of 
Regulation" to be applied to arrangements under which securities dealers related to 
financial intermediaries are permitted to conduct full service and discount brokerage 
activities through such branch offices359. A third notice dated May 11, 1990 
established further "Principles of Regulation" dealing with selling arrangements 
between related financial institutions and securities firms, transfers of client 
information between related financial institutions and securities firms and the settling 
of securities transactions by securities firms through a client’s account at a related 
financial institution360. However, having established it wanted more powers, the 
federal government decided to orchestrate further attacks to regulate the securities 
sector.
On June 1, 1992, the federal government implemented a framework of the various 
categories of federal financial institutions361. However, this legislative phase of
Distribution of Mutual Funds by Financial Institutions — Canadian Securities 
Administrators Principles of Regulation, (1988) 11 O.S.C.B. 4436. Avis— Le placement 
des titres d’organismes de placement collectif par les institutions financieres — 
Principes de r4glementation, (1988) 19:45 B.C.V.M.Q. 1 and 39. COMMISSION DES 
VALEURS MOB I LITRES DU QUEBEC, Rapport d’activMs 1988-1989 (Quebec, Que.: 
Les Publications du Quebec, 1989) 29.
Full Service and Discount Brokerage Activities of Securities Dealers in Branches of 
Related Financial Institutions — Canadian Securities Administrators Principles of 
Regulation, (1988) 11 O.S.C.B. 4630. Avis — L’activite de courtier executant dans les 
succursales ^institutions financieres, (1988) 19:46 B.C.V.M.Q. 1. COMMISSION DES 
VALEURS MOBILlkRES DU QUEBEC, Rapport d’activites 1988-1989, Ibid. at 35. 
Principles of Regulation— Re: Activities of Registrants Related to Financial Institutions, 
(1990) 13 O.S.C.B. 1778. Avis — Les activites de personnes inscrites reliees a une 
institution — Principes de reglementation, (1990) 21:19 B.C.V.M.Q. 3; COMMISSION 
DES VALEURS MOBILISES DU QUEBEC, Rapport annuel 1990-1991 (Quebec, 
Que.: Publications du Quebec, 1991) 33.
On that date, a new framework for competition in the financial sector was put in place 
by removing many restrictions on financial institutions. See, e.g., F. DANIEL, C. 
FREEMAN & C. GOODLET, "La restructuration du secteur financier au Canada" 
Revue de la Banque du Canada (Winter 1992-1993) 21. A.L. WOOD, Canadian 
Federal Financial Institution Legislative Reform, (1992) 5:4 Canada-U.S. Trade 25. 
Overall, legislative reforms broke down barriers and allowed financial institutions to 
compete more directly with each other. Also it laid the groundwork for discussions on 
harmonizing the regulation and supervision of all Canadian financial institutions. 
Changes had to be made to the Trust and Loan Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 45, the 
Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46, the Insurance Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 47, and the
Cooperative Credit Associations Act, S.C. 1991, c. 48. New acts arising from the 
reform totalled nearly 1300 pages and 2500 sections. The new Bank Act has almost
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reform raises serious problems in terms of the division of powers362. Indeed, some 
say the reform brings about the superimposition of federal rules on already existing 
provincial rules363. Overall, the reform follows a double objective: to allow greater 
competition in the financial sector in Canada and to ensure greater protection of 
consumers.
Rightly so, Canadian banks are described as the big winners of reform364. Enlivened 
by their new powers, they are able to build veritable financial empires or even 
becorrie, following the expression, financial supermarkets365. The reform also had
twice as many sections as the previous one. A. GREENWOOD, Federal Financial 
Reform Legislation — A New Era, (1993) 8 B.F.L.R. 215 at 236.
The intentions of the federal government to touch upon provincial jurisdictional powers 
were made public a year earlier. In 1991, the federal government put forward 
proposals (Shaping Canada’s Future Together - Partnership for Prosperity (Ottawa, 
Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991) set out to incorporate both constitutional 
and non-constitutional changes intended to bring about a new political and economic 
renewal. The government proposed "to enhance the functioning of the economic union 
" ... "by working actively with the provinces to clarify responsibilities in the financial 
sector". To do so, it also proposed to "work closely with the provinces to develop more 
efficient and better coordinated corporate securities regulation which will be essential 
in an international environment where unnecessary duplication risks business going 
elsewhere. It will also be important for Canada to have a more effective presence in 
international groups dealing with securities matters". Ibid. at 31. The federal 
government’s desire to gradually penetrate the securities areas was reaffirmed when 
it suggested that regulation could develop into a "more formalized federal-provincial 
action to co-ordinate approaches to regulation, international negotiations and 
standard-setting, involving securities matters". Ibid. at 26. See also J.S. GRAHAM, 
"Proposed Constitutional Reform - Implications for the Financial Sector" Canadian 
Financial Services Alert (December 1991) 44. D.G. LENIHAM, L’Union Izconomique: 
remarques sur les propositions federates, Reseau sur la Constitution, Dossier special, 
numero 1, 1991 at 4.
According to a former chairman of the OSC, "[ejven those who are strongest 
advocates of a federal securities commission shudder at the thought of there being a 
federal securities regulatory authority superimposed upon the structure which presently 
exists". K. HOWLETT, "Federal Securities Regulation a Nightmare, OSC Head Says - 
Wright blasts Ottawa for not Consulting with Provinces" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail 
(25 June 1992) B1. Notice — Remarks of Robert J. Wright — Toronto Society of 
Financial Analysts — Wednesday, June 24, 1992, (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 2889 at 2891.
G.F. BOREHAM, "Three Years After Canada’s Little Bang" Canadian Banker (May
1990) 6 at 6. P. Durivage, "Entree en vigueur de la reforme du systeme financier" La 
Presse [of Montreal] (30 May 1992) H-1. Independent investment dealers argue that 
Canada’s banks already control too much of the industry and want the Bureau of 
Competition Policy to intervene in a coming federal reform of financial services laws. 
J. PARTRIDGE & K. HOWLETT, "Watchdog to Aid Reform of Financial Laws" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 December 1995) B1.
S. HAGGETT, "Banks Become Financial Supermarkets" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (Special Report) (10-12 September 1994) S25.
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important spin-offs for foreign banks. With the breaking down of the barriers to the 
entry of foreign firms into the Canadian domestic market, the question of their 
sensitivity to the host country’s national goals became more prominent. The American 
Express case illustrates the difficulties that can arise when foreign institutions enter 
markets that are subject to different regulations than their home market366. To 
further understand the FTA and NAFTA and measure their impact on the securities 
industry in Canada, a brief overview of the salient points of the 1992 reform is 
necessary. However, the reader should note that it is impossible to summarize and 
deal with all the relevant sections in one brief commentary within a thesis.
On many aspects, the Bank Act is modeled after the Cooperative Credit Associations 
Act; the Insurance Companies Act and the Trust and Loan Companies Act61. The 
understanding reached in the Hockin-Kwinter Accord has been implemented in the 
Bank Act in a number of places, including the restriction on the securities activities of 
banks (s. 415), in the Regulations made thereunder and in the inclusion of investment 
counselling and portfolio management services in the business of banking (s. 
409(2)(c».
A considerable number of regulations have been revoked by the reform of financial
The uproar about the approval, by the federal government, of the application by 
American Express to establish a Schedule II bank through its Travel Related Services 
division led to several types of complaints. The first is that the approval came 
immediately prior to the coming into force of the reform. The second issue is that only 
a bank may open a foreign-bank subsidiary, and some have argued that the Travel 
Related Services division did not conform to the definition of a bank. A. TOULIN, 
"Amex to Launch Bank Before Legislative Reform" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (7 
February 1990) 1. "Cabinet Gives Approval of American Express Bank" The [Montreal] 
Gazette (27 May 1989) C3. J. KOHUT, "MPs Determined to See Amex File" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (10 May 1989) B1. J. KOHUT, "Bank Regulator Will Not Hold 
Hearings on Amex Request for Canadian Licence" The [ Toronto] Globe and Mail (6 
May 1989) B5. G. BRETT, "Banks Are Right to Test Amex Bank Decision" The 
Toronto Star (31 January 1989) B6. At one point, American Express was to be 
followed by Merrill Lynch and become the second U.S. non-bank financial institution to 
establish a bank in Canada. However, in view of all the controversy, Merrill Lynch 
dropped its request. J. McNISH, "Merrill Lynch Seeks Bank Licence" The [Toronto] 
Globe and Mail (12 January 1989) B1.
In fact, the initial model to all four acts was the proposed Bill C-83 Trust and Loan 
Companies Act, 22nd Sess., 34th Parliament, 38 & 39 Eliz. II, 1989-1990. C.J. BOIVIN, 
"La nouvelle Loi sur les banques" in SERVICE DE LA FORMATION PERMANENTE 
DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC, ed., Developpements recents en droit bancaire (1991) 
(Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1991) 99 at 100.
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institutions360. Most of these revoked regulations have been replaced at the time of 
the reform or shortly thereafter369. The core regulations stating the banks’ securities 
powers are entitled the Securities Dealing Restrictions (Banks) RegulationsJ7°.
This regulation states that, with respect to primary market activities, a bank may not, 
in Canada371, deal in securities if it consists in the distribution: (i) of shares or 
ownership interests, or warrants; or (ii) of debt obligations of a corporate body372. 
However, a bank is not prevented from dealing in securities (for its own account or 
any account it administers) where it consists in the distribution of debt obligations or 
warrants, or is guaranteed by: (i) the federal, provincial or municipal governments (or 
any agency thereof); (ii) a public utility corporation owned by a government; (iii) a 
foreign government one of its political subdivision or agency; and (iv) an international 
agency of which Canada is a member373. Moreover, a bank may deal in the same 
distribution of debt obligations, shares, ownership interests or warrants of the bank 
itself (or an affiliated entity it guarantees) or that are money market securities374. 
Also, a bank may engage in the effecting of a private placement of securities of a 
corporation on the basis that it is similar to the basis on which a member of a selling 
group participates in respect of an underwriting375. Further, a bank is not prevented 
from being part of a consortium or syndicate of financing or lending institutions to 
effect a loan376. Finally, a bank may act as a member of a selling group with an
368 Department of Finance Omnibus Revocations Order, SOR/92-329.
369 For a general description of the new Regulations, see Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Statement, Canada Gazette Part I (22 February 1992) 423.
370 SOR/92-279 modified by SOR/92-364. Compare Securities Dealing Restrictions (Trust 
and Loan Companies) Regulations, SOR/92-272 modified by SOR/92-362. Securities 
Dealing Restrictions (Insurance Companies) Regulations, SOR/92-280 modified by 
SOR/92-365. Securities Dealing Restrictions (Cooperative Credit Associations) 
Regulations, SOR/92-278 modified by SOR/92-363.
371 On overseas securities activities of Canadian banks, see, e.g., J.C. PATTISON, 
"Banking the Crucible" Canadian Banker {February 1987) 16.
372 Bank Act, supra, note 266, s. 2(a), (c). "Astonishingly, until the 1980 revision of the 
federal Bank Act there was no formal prohibition on banks dealing in corporate 
securities; the banks had voluntarily withdrawn from the market during the 1930s". 
JORDAN, supra, note 306 at 179.
373 Bank Act, supra, note 266, s. 3(2), (a).
374 Ibid., s. 3(2)(b), (c), (d).
375 Ibid., s. 3(2)(h).
376 ibid., s. 3(2)(i).
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underwriting of securities377.
As for secondary market activities, a bank may not trade in shares or ownership 
interests or warrants378. However, it may trade shares, ownership interests or 
warrants if it is done by a registered broker379. About mutual fund activities, a bank 
may not act as a selling agent380 except in special cases381. Currently, banks may 
establish and manage their own investment funds and may distribute them through 
their branch network. These activities are subject to regulation under the securities 
legislation of the various Canadian jurisdictions. Over the last decades, the CSA have 
been concentrating their efforts in respect of the regulation of the investment fund 
industry on the development of uniform requirements for investment funds, as 
evidenced by NPS N°* 36382 and 39383. Unless an exemption is granted by the 
CSA, the Principles of Regulation384 do not permit a bank (and trust company) to 
sell third party funds through their branch network although they are permitted to sell 
third party funds through their discount brokerage firms. Among the reasons for this 
restriction on the sale of third party funds through branch networks are concerns 
about the adequacy of the education and proficiency skills of employees of banks 
(and trust companies) to sell investment fund securities to the public. Also, the 
traditional bank products substantially differ from investment fund securities. Thus, 
employees in branches cannot devote their full time and attention to investment fund 
sales.
The key point of the reform was the removal of the restrictions imposed on banks with
Ibid., s. 3(2)(g).
Ibid., s. 2(b).
Ibid., s. 3(2)(e).
Ibid., s. 2(d).
Ibid., s. 3(2)(f).
National Policy Statement AT 36 — Mutual Funds: Simplified Prospectus Qualification 
System, Avis — Prospectus simplifie de la societe d’investissement a capital variable et 
du fonds commun de placement, (1985) 16:2 B.C.V.M.Q. 15.
National Policy Statement AT 39 — Mutual Funds, (1988) 11 O.S.C.B. 5041 (as 
amended). Instruction generate n ‘ C-39 — Organismes de placement collectif, (1988) 
19:51 B.C.V.M.Q. 51 (as amended).
Avis — Le placement des titres d’organismes de placement collectif par les institutions 
financieres — Principes de rSglementation, (1988) 19:45 B.C.V.M.Q. 1; 39; 
COMMISSION DES VALEURS MOBILISES DU QUEBEC, Rapport d’activites 1988- 
1989 (Quebec, Que.: Publications du Quebec, 1989) at 35.
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
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respect to providing investment advice and portfolio management. However, according 
to the Hockin-Kwinter Accord, the removal of these restrictions was not total. Under 
the Accord, it was agreed that some unspecified portion of investment counselling and 
portfolio management would be permitted in-house but that the balance would have to 
be carried on through subsidiaries or affiliates of the bank and would be regulated at 
the provincial level. The duality of this approach raised several difficult issues such as: 
(i) where should the dividing line be drawn between activities permitted in-house and 
those require to be carried out through subsidiaries?; (ii) who should regulate which 
activities, and should such regulation be overlapping?; (iii) should officers, employees 
and even premises be separate in order to facilitate regulatory supervision and avoid 
conflicts? etc. The Hockin-Kwinter Accord addressed these issues only to a limited 
degree. For this reason, the Accord called for possible further consultation between 
the two levels of government and recognized the need for harmony between the two 
sets of regulations.
As of yet, no banking regulation has been promulgated proposing terms or conditions 
on the provision of investment counselling and portfolio management services (s. 
410(3)(b)). However, a draft regulation385 has been prepared and is being discussed 
with the various Canadian securities commissions and SROs. These activities have 
long been a bone of contention between the provinces and the federal government. 
Traditionally, they have been the territory of provincial regulators, but banks have 
steadily been pushing into the lucrative, fee-generating business386. The federal 
government’s plan has drawn fire from the provinces387. Essentially, the draft 
regulation is intended to apply to the in-house services of federally-regulated financial 
institutions that are equivalent to those provided by advisory firms registered with
Portfolio Management Services and Investment Counselling Services 
(Banks/Insurance Companies/Trust and Loan Companies) Regulations - Draft (Ottawa, 
Ont.: Ministry of Finance, 1993). For an overview, see "Background Paper on Portfolio 
Management and investment Counselling by Federally-Regulated Financial 
Institutions" Canadian Financial Services Alert (December 1993) 33.
G. PITON, "Banks Moving Into Management of Portfolios" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (26 November 1991) C5.
H.D. WHYTE, "Ontario May Change Role as Watchdog" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (14 November 1992) 8. H.D. WHYTE "Looser Rules Loom for Banks: 
Provinces Oppose New Ottawa Plan on Investing" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (21 
July 1992) 3. D. SLOCUM, "Securities Rules Overlap Attacked: Provincial Regulators 
Want Feds to Keep Out" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 September 1992) B7.
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provincial securities commissions in the investment counsellor/portfolio manager 
category. The draft regulation would require that investment advice be formulated and 
delivered to clients by individuals employed by federally-regulated financial institutions 
who meet qualifications that are at least as stringent as those that have to be met by 
registrants under provincial securities legislation in the investment counsellor/portfolio 
manager category388. The draft regulation would also generally track comparable 
provincial rules with respect to institutional conflicts of interest, duties to clients and 
supervision.
Some suggest that banks and other federal financial institutions should be required to 
provide portfolio management and investment counselling services through 
provincially regulated subsidiaries to provide a more level playing field with other 
advisors389. Others argue that the use of provincially regulated subsidiaries is 
unnecessary, costly and inefficient390. Still, one thing is certain: by gradually 
expanding the regulated powers of banks, the federal government Is able to expand 
its jurisdiction and control over the financial system391. Eventually, if banks can
The draft regulation calls for two different designations for in-house bank portfolio 
managers and investment counsellors. The banks are expected to perform the 
regulatory function in both cases. The first category (a qualified advisor) must either 
be registered with a provincial securities commission or, in the view of the bank, meet 
the same criteria as a provincially registered counsellor. A list of these non-registered 
advisers is provided to the OSFI on a periodic basis. There are no set qualifications 
for the second category (associate advisor). A bank, at its discretion, will be able to 
appoint employees to use investment portfolios created by the bank’s qualified 
advisors when dealing with clients.
C.F.M. WALSH, "Why Worry About PMIC?" Canadian Financial Semces Alert 
(December 1993) 37 at 38. H.D. WHYTE, “Big Banks Battling For Slice of Portfolio 
Management Action" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (11 September 1993) 22. H.S. 
WHYTE, "Banks Rethink Portfolio Management" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (11 
September 1993) 16.
B. GOULARD, "Portfolio Management and Investment Counselling Services: 
Duplication and Over Regulation" Canadian Financial Services Alert (December 1993) 
38.
J. FERRABEE, "Banks’ Power More Worrisome than their Huge Profits" The 
[Montreal] Gazette (9 December 1995) C4. K. HOWLETT & J. PARTRIDGE, 
"Investment Dealers Warn of Bank Oligopoly" The [Toronto] Gbbe and Mail (6 
December 1995) B1. D. WESTELL, "Banks’ Securities Practices Spark Complaints by 
Brokers" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (6 December 1995) 3. In 1992, OSC’s then- 
Chairman Wright expressed the view that "there is every indication that the federal 
government is, whether intentionally or not, developing a parallel system of regulation 
[...]. Notice — Remarks of Robert J. Wright— Toronto Society of Financial Analysts — 
Wednesday, June 24, 1992, (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 2889 at 2890.
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engage in virtually all financial services, the "financial services" might become 
equivalent to the "business of banking" referred to in s. 409 of the Bank A cf92. This 
distinction may be crucial to the Canadian securities industry as a whole when 
delivering "financial services" or being defined as "financial institutions" under NAFTA.
Having said this, another federal-provincial conflict concerning the securities industry 
lurks on the horizon and may have a determining effect on the eventual interpretation 
of NAFTA: the ever-existing possibility of witnessing the creation of a national 
securities commission.
3.3 Towards a Canadian Securities Commission
The pressures for international rules may be seen in juxtaposition with the long-time 
controversy in Canada about the desirability of a single national securities 
commission393.
As mentioned before, securities legislation was first enacted in Canada at the 
provincial level394. Despite the Depression and a recommendation in 1935 by a 
Royal Commission that an "Investment or Securities Board" be created to review the 
capital structure of any federal corporation that wished to sell its securities to the 
public395, no attempt was made by the federal government to enter this field, in part, 
perhaps because of the Privy Council’s restrictive interpretations of Parliament’s
The concept relating to the "business of banking" existed prior to the reform of 1992. 
See Bank Act of 1980, s. 173 (1). Traditionally, this term has been given a liberal 
interpretation by the courts. B. CRAWFORD, Crawford and Falconbridge Banking and 
Bills of Exchange, 8th ed., Vol. 1 (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1986) at 11-20, 
329-330, 1190-1191.
See generally, J.L. HOWARD, "Securities Regulation Structure and Process" in 
Proposals for a Securities Market for Canada, Vol. 3, Background Papers (Ottawa, 
Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979) 1607 at 1689-1697.
The first statute was enacted in Manitoba; see Sale of Shares Act, S.M. 1912, c. 75. 
See also Sale of Shares Act, S.S. 1914, c. 18. The history of Canadian securities 
regulation is discussed in J.P. WILLIAMSON, Securities Regulation in Canada 
(Toronto, Ont.: U. of Toronto Press, 1960), c. 1. Supplement (Ottawa, Ont.: 
Government of Canada, 1966) c. 1.
CANADA, Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads (Ottawa, Ont.: King’s 
Printer, 1935) at 44.
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legislative jurisdiction over matters involving business relations396. Whatever the 
reason, during the succeeding decades, even though there was some dissatisfaction 
expressed over the inconvenience and cost resulting from a lack of uniformity in the 
various provinces, local administration of legislation designed to prevent fraudulent 
sales of securities was generally accepted as preferable to a centralized federal 
scheme397. By 1964 however, a desire for uniform securities laws with "high 
standards of disclosure, competence and ethics" and an antipathy towards 
unnecessary duplication under the existing provincial legislation led the Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance to recommend the creation of a federal 
regulatory agency to clear interprovincial and international distributions of securities 
and to enforce the securities fraud provisions in the Criminal Code398. The Report of 
the Royal Commission of Banking and Finance Initiated a period of active and 
constant reconsideration and reform of securities laws in Canada. Also, the 
Commission’s recommendation, with assistance from the Canadian Bar Association 
directed the attention of the federal government to the securities market. It resulted In 
the creation of a "Securities Task Force" to examine topics such as criminal law and 
securities markets, mutual funds and self-regulation399. It also considered possible 
mechanisms for federal-provincial co-operation in light of the Canadian Securities and 
Exchange Commission (hereinafter CANSEC) proposal circulated by the OSC400.
Although no bill was introduced in Parliament, the possibility of a federal agency 
continued to receive attention. The provinces, however, during this period made 
substantial progress towards uniformity. The Ontario Act had been adopted (with
See, e.g., ANISMAN & HOGG, supra, note 55 at 157-158.
See, e.g., CANADA, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
Relations (Ottawa, Ont.: King’s Printer, 1940) at 57-58.
CANADA, Report of the Royal Commission of Banking and Finance (Ottawa, Ont.: 
Queen’s Printer, 1964) at 348-349.
CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Aide Memoire: Re Canadian Securities Legislation 
and Administration, Ottawa, April 1966.
On the Ontario proposal, see CANSEC: Legal and Administrative Concepts, [1967]
O.S.C.B. 61. H.H. MAKENS, An American State-Federal Perspective on the 
Proposals, (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 424 at 439. See also, R. LANGFORD & J. 
JOHNSTON, The Case for a National Securities Commission, [1968] U. Toronto 
Commerce J. 21. P.F. De RAVEL D’ESCLAPON, Fondements constitutionnels d’une 
reglementation des valeurs mobilieres au Canada, (1968) 3 R.J.T. 377 at 409.
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minor modifications) by the other provinces401. A series of NPSs applicable across 
the country plus another series of uniform act policies applicable in some provinces 
were initiated by the provincial commissions in an attempt to avoid unnecessary 
delays in processing prospectuses and to ensure consistency of administrative 
interpretation402.
In the early 1970s, the federal government examined its policy with respect to the 
Canadian securities market. In response to the OSC’s proposed CANSEC, the federal 
government indicated a desire to introduce legislation regulating international and 
inter-provincial issues of and trading in securities403. By 1975, the federal 
government had commissioned the preparation of a draft federal securities act. In 
1979, the result was the release of Proposals for a Securities Market Law for 
Canada40*. Just a few years afterwards, the Supreme Court of Canada opened a 
door for the creation of a federal securities commission405. Later, Ottawa continued 
to take the view that the federal government should intervene in the securities field 
but only through a reform of federal financial institutions406.
However, many provinces wanted Ottawa to act more quickly in creating a 
CANSEC407 and seek to harmonize securities regulation as soon as possible408.
See, e.g., Notice: Statement by the Honourable Eric A. Winkler, Minister of Consumer 
and Commercial Relations on Introduction of the Securities Act, 1972, for First 
Reading, June 1st, 1972, [1972] O.S.C.B. 94.
L. LOCKWOOD, "Procedures in Cross-Country Prospectus Clearance and Regulation 
by Policy Statement" in L.S.U.C. Special Lectures, Corporate and Securities Law 
(Toronto, Ont.: De Boo, 1972) 111.
This desire was articulated in 1971 and 1972, respectively, by various federal cabinet 
ministers. Z. ZIEGEL, Canadian Company Law, Vol. 2 (Toronto, Ont.: Butterworths, 
1973) at 370 and 470. In 1972, the joint Senate and House of Commons Committee 
shared the same views. ROY, supra, note 298 at 58.
P. ANISMAN [et a!.], Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, 3 vols. (Vol. 
1: Draft Act; Vol 2: Commentary; Vol. 3: Background Papers) (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of 
Supply and Sen/ices, 1979).
Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, supra, note 303.
H.D. WHYTE, "Ottawa May Fight to Oversee Securities" The Financial Post [of
Toronto] (31 May 1989) 4. S.M. BECK [et a!.], Cases and Materials on Partnerships 
and Canadian Business Corporations (Toronto, Ont.: Carswell, 1983) at 487.
Some of the concern came from the fact that Canada was beginning to have a 
growing international reputation for easy listing and stock fraud (especially in the 
VSE). J. WILSON, "How Securities Agencies Could Close Jurisdictional Loopholes" 
The Financial Times of Canada (5 March 1990) 5. H. SOLOMON, "Ottawa Eyes 
Stocks Role: "Fraud" Concerns Grow" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (26 May 1989)
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Still, others (like the provinces of Quebec and British Columbia) opposed a federal 
securities role on the basis that it infringed on provincial responsibilities409. For their 
part, most SROs endorsed the idea of a CANSEC410. In order to avoid a political
1. "Ottawa Considers Regulating Stock Exchanges" The [Montreal] Gazette (26 May 
1989) B5. J. KOHUT, "Federal Government Considers Creation of a National 
Securities Commission" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 May 1989) B1. H.D. 
WHYTE, "Bennett Charges Revive Calls for National Watchdog" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (1 February 1989) 4. D. FRANCIS, "We Need a National Stocks Watchdog: 
Fraudsters Are Playing One Province’s Regulators Against Another’s" The Financial 
Post [of Toronto] (30 January 1989) 3.
"Provinces Seek Harmony on Securities Regulations" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(25 April 1989) 5. The largest movement came from the Atlantic provinces where the 
premiers of this region of Canada worked on a uniform securities legislation and a 
Maritime Securities Commission. M. MaclSAAC, "A Maritime Watchdog On Its Way" 
The Maritime Report (October 1991) 2. E. WEISS, "Investors Look at Regional 
Regulation" Ibid, 1.
"Quebec s’oppose a un projet visant a confier a Ottawa la competence en matiere de 
valeurs mobili&res" La Presse [of Montreal] (27 August 1993) C12. L. LEVESQUE, 
"Quebec s’oppose & un reglement federal" Le Devoir [of Montreal] (12 May 1993) A6. 
EDITORIAL, "Needed: A National Securities Regulator" The Financial Times of 
Canada (6 July 1992) 22. R. DUTRISAC, "Louise Robic craint I’ingSrence federate 
dans les valeurs mobilteres" Le Devoir [of Montreal] (2 July 1992) 5. S. TRUFFAUT, 
"La CVMQ s’oppose a la creation d’une commission federate des valeurs mobilieres" 
Le Devoir [of Montreal] (19 September 1991) A5. M. VAN DE WALLE, "La CVMQ 
s’oppose a toute tentative du federal de reglementer les valeurs mobilieres" La Presse 
[of Montreal] (19 September 1991) D8. C. DONVILLE, "B.C. Minister Rejects Federal 
Securities Rote" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 June 1989) B9. P. LUSH, "BCSC 
Against Federal Regulation" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 June 1991) B7. J. 
KOHUT & K. HOWLETT, "Provinces Oppose Bigger Federal Securities Rote" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 May 1989) B2.
In 1989, the IDA took the stand as being in favour of CANSEC but expressed the view 
that ”[f]or now, the system works". D. HATTER, "Dealers Agree One Securities Body 
"Undesirable" Now" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (7 June 1989) 15. C. DONVILLE, 
"Investment Dealers to Discuss Merits of a National Securities Commission" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (6 June 1989) B5. Later, the IDA suggested jt could become 
the CANSEC, much to the displeasure of certain provinces. EDITORIAL, "Dealers 
Deal, Not Watch" The Financial Times of Canada (18 November 1991) 38. D. KELLY 
& C. LAKSHMAN, "Opposition Grows to IDA Self-regulation Proposal” The Financial 
Post [of Toronto] (20 September 1991) 3. K. DOUGHERTY, "Hands Off Quebec, 
Regulator Tells IDA” The Financial Post [of Toronto] (19 September 1991) 3. This 
stand by the IDA may explain the reason why the QSC has yet to recognize it as a 
SRO in Quebec. "La CVMQ [...] se dit prete a entendre toute proposition de 
I’ACCOVAM pour son accreditation au Quebec, a la condition toutefois qu’elle 
respecte la decentralisation [...]." J. PELLETIER, "Paul Fortugno s’oppose a la creation 
d’un organisme pancanadien de controle boursier" Le Journal de Montreal (19 
September 1991) 51. THERIAULT & FORTIN, Vol. 2, supra, note 16 at A-197. The 
centralization proposal was also approved by the TSE. K. HOWLETT, "TSE Wants 
Out of Watchdog Rote" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 November 1991) B15. D. 
KELLY, "TSE Set to Go It Alone" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (21 November 1991) 
14. However, again, the QSC opposed the project as being "a Bay Street plot to 
centralize watchdog functions". B. McKENNA, "QSC Opposes National Watchdog" The
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confrontation, Ottawa used diplomatic language411. On the one hand, the federal 
government was rejecting any ideas of forming a national securities commission. On 
the other hand, however, it was maintaining that more competition from foreign stock 
brokerage firms and the growing number of international stock deals could force the 
central government to look at new ways of regulating stock markets.
The 1992 federal reform and the newest pressures on the provinces imposed by the 
free trade agreements have encouraged the re-examination of the possibility of 
creating a Canadian securities commission412. The latest attempt to set up a 
CANSEC was initiated by the federal government413 with the support of the Atlantic 
provinces414. In May 1994, Ottawa presented all the provinces (except Quebec 
which walked away from the negotiating table in early spring415) with a prototype to
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 September 1991) B9. J. RAVENSBERGER, "QSC 
Rejects Proposal for National Watchdog" The [Montreal] Gazette (19 September 1991) 
D2.
R. DUTRISAC, "Ottawa ne creera pas de Commission federate des valeurs" Le Devoir 
[of Montreal] (10 June 1992) A5. J. GEDDES & D. KELLY, "Securities Harmony is 
Urged" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (27 September 1991) 4. B. DALGLISH, 
"National Securities Commission Plans Put on Back Burner" The [Montreal] Gazette 
(28 June 1989) E5. H.D. WHYTE, "Ottawa May Oversee Regulation of Securities 
Industry: Loiselle" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (28 June 1989) 3. "Wilson Rejects 
the Idea of National Stock Agency" The [Montreal] Gazette (6 June 1989) B1. L. 
WELSH, "Wilson Rejects Federal Agency to Regulate Securities" The [Toronto] Globe 
and Mail (6 June 1989) B1. H.D. WHYTE, "Ottawa May Fight to Oversee Securities" 
The Financial Post [of Toronto] (31 May 1989) 4. EDITORIAL, "A Federal Eye on 
Securities" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 May 1989) A6. "Ingerence federale dans 
les valeurs mobilieres" Le Droit [of Ottawa] (26 May 1989) 26.
Even back in 1991, the financial reform and free trade were cited as key reasons for 
Ottawa to create a CANSEC and comprehensive securities legislation. A. TOULIN, 
"Feds Assert Right to Be Securities Policeman" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (18-20 
May 1991) 1.
In its red book of policies, the recently elected Liberals identified the costs of 
overlapping government as an early priority. LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, supra, 
note 216 at 21.
J. M. McFARLAND, "Backing a National Watchdog" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(19 April 1994) 5. B. DALGLISH, "Trading Places: A National Securities Commission 
Takes Shape." Maclean’s (4 April 1994) 38.
When Quebec walked out, the proposal was in serious jeopardy. Although Quebec 
has kept up to date on the discussions with the other provinces, the directors of the 
financial services policy branch in Ontario’s Finance Ministry expressed the view that 
"if the key jurisdictions are not in, you really have to look at what is the best thing to 
do. One has to be careful about going with a partial system because the fact is that 
we have a well-functioning system today." J. McFARLAND, "Provinces Cooling on 
SEC-type Body" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (15 July 1994) 3. "Quebec Balks at 
National Securities Body" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (12 May 1994) 4.
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replace the provincial securities commission with a national regulatory body having its 
headquarters in Toronto with several regional offices416. The proposal was different 
from the U.S. national regulatory system (which allows for some power sharing with 
the States). Ottawa wanted the provinces to amend their securities acts to delegate 
jurisdiction to the federal government417. According to a MOU draft prepared by 
federal Finance Department officials, the national commission would be a reality by 
January 1st, 1996418. The draft MOU provides for a complicated process of 
implementation of federal securities legislation, repeal of existing provincial securities 
legislation, incorporation by reference of the federal securities legislation into the 
provincial legislation, and delegation by the provinces of the authority to administer 
CANSEC. It would resemble the U.S. SEC and be based in Toronto (with regional 
offices throughout the country). However, negotiations hit an impasse with the 
provinces419. Many of them do not believe CANSEC would reduce costs and 
overlap. Others are worried that local markets would be trampled420. In fact, the 
differences are so important that some provincial governments are looking at setting 
their own national commission — without Ottawa. The idea appears to be to maintain 
a policy network through the CSA and expand it into a national commission which 
would handle cross-border issues or even replace provincial securities commissions 
altogether421. All these changes are proposed at a time when Ontario looks at
J. MARTEL, "Comments on Coordinated Securities Regulation: Getting to a More 
Effective Regime" in QUEEN’S SYMPOSIUM, supra, note 243, 145 at 146ff.
"Ottawa se bute aux reticences de plusieurs provinces" Le Devoir [of Montreal] (7 
September 1994) 2.
The latest proposal arrives at a time when preparations are under way by the federal 
government to re-examine regulation of the financial services industry. B. McKENNA, 
"Financial Supervision Under Scrutiny: System ’Not Broken’ But Could Use Small 
Fixes, Peters Says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20 September 1994) B4.
G. MclNTOSH, "Securities Commission Plan Stalls" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7 
September 1994) B10.
EDITORIAL, "Need National Securities Rules" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (9 
September 1994) 10.
One recent CSA initiative designed to make the securities industry more efficient was 
the formation of a committee of industry participants to identify and catalogue 
opportunities to eliminate duplication and overlap. NOTICE— “Addressing Duplicative 
RegulationRem arks by Edward J. Waitzer, Chairman of the OSC - March 3, 1994, 
(1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 1059 at 1062. Also, see J.J. OLIVER, President & CEO, 
Investment Dealers Association of Canada, Structure of Securities Regulation, (1995) 
18 O.S.C.B. 5256. Back in 1990, a similar idea was formulated by some provinces. B. 
JORGENSEN, "Yes, Virginia, There Is a National Securities Body" The [Toronto] 
Globe and Mail (28 September 1990) B9.
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seriously reforming its securities rules422 following two recent court decisions which 
confirmed that regulating the securities industry through policy statements is 
unacceptable423. So far, Ottawa’s attempt to create a CANSEC does not have 
enough support424. At the same time, the OSFI issued its 1994 annual report 
stressing the fact that with banks becoming larger players in the securities field (either 
as owners or traders), both federal and provincial levels of regulation need to work 
closely together425. As an incentive to convince the provinces to accept the plan, 
Ottawa offered to split Cdn $150 million among provinces agreeing to participate in a 
CANSEC in order to compensate for lost revenues from surrendering provincial 
regulatory powers426. However, this proposal was not approved.
In view of the fact that globalization is redefining the scope of domestic laws, Canada 
must improve coordination of securities regulation and find an effective voice in 
deliberations on international securities regulation427. Despite the efforts of the CSA
Setting an Agenda for the Ontario Securities Commission — Remarks by Edward J. 
Waitzer, Chairman, December 1, 1993, (1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 5882. R. DANIELS, 
"Responsibility and Responsiveness: Interim Report of the Ontario Task Force on 
Securities Regulation" in SECURITIES SUPERCONFERENCE (Toronto, Ont.: 
Canadian Securities Institute, 3 & 4 March 1994) at Tab. 1. J.G. MaclNTOSH, The 
Interim Report of the Task Force on Securities Regulation, (1994) ll:3 Corporate 
Financing 92. EDITORIAL, "Get On with Securities Reform" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (7 September 1994) 12. J. DAW, "New Teeth Urged for OSC" The Toronto 
Star (8 July 1994) B2.
In Re Pezim and Superintendent of Brokers and Two Other Appeals, (1992) 96 D.L.R. 
(4th) 137 (B.C.C.A.), Mr. Justice Lambert raised questions as to the validity of a policy 
statement of the British Columbia Securities Commission. [...] Mr. Justice Blair 
declared invalid an OSC policy statement because the Commission "exceeded its 
jurisdiction under its enabling legislation in promulgating it." Ainsley Financial 
Corporation [...] v. Ontario Securities Commission [...], (1993) 14 O.R. (3d) 280 
(General Division) at 306. On the validity of the securities regulatory requirements 
contained in policy statements, see D. STRATAS, The End of Securities Regulation by 
Policy Statements?, (1994) ll:2 Roland on Corporate Litigation 71.
N. OLIVARI, "Is a National Commission the Answer?" Investment Executive 
(December 1995) 42. M. INGRAM, "Ottawa Strikes Out With Pitch for Securities 
Agency" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 September 1994) B19.
A. TOULIN, "Mackenzie Knocks Links of Banks, Securities Firms" The Financial Post 
[of Toronto] (15 October 1994) 7. "Mackenzie Urges More Co-ordination" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (15 October 1994) B2. "Attention aux emptetements, met en 
garde Mackenzie" Le Devoir [of Montreal] (15 October 1994) B2.
J. CHEVREAU, "Ottawa Pushing Securities Plan" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (20 
September 1994) 1.
"Financial Rules Seen As Worldwide Concern" The [Montreal] Gazette (21 November
1989) C9. J. MAXWELL, "Need For Financial-rule Harmony Spumed By Outside 
Competition" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (20 November 1989) 12.
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in promulgating a series of national policies, the existing regime is costly and difficult 
to manage inside federalism428. While supporters of provincial regulation have 
expressed the need for control for the benefit of local economies429, the federal 
government is bound to pursue an active role in the regulation of financial 
institutions430. To do so, Ottawa could proceed in two ways: (i) negotiate 
responsibilities with the provinces in a give-and-take manner; or (ii) draft a statute of 
uniform securities regulations and ask the provincial securities regulators to enforce 
those rules in return for jurisdiction of securities distribution. Either way, the federal 
government and the provinces would need to exercise tact to negotiate an acceptable 
deal. Still, the only viable solution may be to blend these two options together431. 
The recent tentative rules authorizing banks to carry on investment counselling and 
portfolio management activities directly rather than through subsidiaries signals a new 
phase in the creation of a CANSEC432. In view of the fact that market forces are 
forcing provincial administrators to agree on a growing series of overlapping regulation 
and policies, there are fewer obstacles to a more active involvement by the federal 
government433. Although the latest federal by-law on registration of federally 
regulated financial institutions employees engaged in investment counselling and 
portfolio management may be another step towards a nationally-oriented system, a 
federal-provincial co-operation could signal the beginning of a more efficient regulatory
K. HOWLETT, "National Securities Watchdog Urged" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail 
(16 February 1995) B3.
QUEBEC, Ministry of Finance, Promoting the Financial Sector: Dividends for Quebec 
— Policy Proposals for Quebec’s Financial Sector (Quebec, Que.: Ministry of Rnance, 
1993) at 15. J. MARTEL, "The General Policy Statement of Louise Robic (March 
1993): Promoting the Canadian Financial Space" Canadian Financial Service Alert 
(April 1993) 9.
P. ANISMAN, "The Regulation of the Securities Market and the Harmonization of 
Provincial Laws" in CUMMING, supra, note 10 at 129.
Recently, it was suggested that two pre-conditions must be satisfied before CANSEC 
can exist: (i) there must be a political will by all the provinces; and (ii) the conflict with 
respect to regulatory jurisdiction over the securities activities of federal financial 
institutions must be resolved. Federal Securities Regulation-Paper Delivered by JA. 
Geller, Q.C., (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 658 at 659.
T.N. UNWIN & G. WARREN, "Towards a Federal Securities Law?", Canadian 
Financial Service Alert (December 1992) 25.
In 1992, the IDA responded to the federal government’s constitutional proposals for 
the Canadian economy "Canadian Federalism and Economic Union — Partnership for 
Economic Union", it proposed a framework designed to improve co-operation between 
the federal and provincial Parliaments. M. M. HARRIS, "Securities Regulation: Should 
the Scope of Federal Regulation Expand?", Canadian Financial Service Alert (January 
1993) 14.
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framework. In this regard, Australia’s experience with cooperative securities legislation 
may be instructive434 . However, due to the very nature of Canadian federalism, the 
intended solution would need to be purely Canadian435. Later, these preliminary 
initiatives could led towards another level of discussion.
Building on the 1979 Proposals fora Securities Market; a federal securities Act could 
be introduced to facilitate national financing. It could be administered provincially (to 
take advantage of the existing expertise) or within a federal agency (perhaps based in 
Ottawa in order to alleviate the existing political rivalry between Toronto and 
Montreal)436. At the same time, a provincial law would govern intra-provincial 
transactions to reflect local market conditions and economic concerns. CANSEC
The Australian experience began in 1974 when a Senate committee recommended 
that the federal government enact a statute to regulate the field of securities law 
previously occupied by the states. After a series of various committee hearings, it was 
found that there was administrative duplication and general inefficiency. The main 
recommendation was that a single national regime was essential. In 1991, a truly 
national securities commission (which is required, by statute, to maintain a regional 
office in each state and territory) began operations. E.J. WAITZER & A. SAHAZIZIAN, 
"Coordinated Securities Regulation: Getting to a More Effective Regime" in QUEEN’S 
SYMPOSIUM, supra, note 243, 101 at 115-117. P. RAYMOND, Companies and 
Securities Law: Commentary and Material (Sydney: Law Book, 1988) at 37ff. R. 
BAXT, C. MAXWELL & S. BAJADA, Stock Markets and the Securities Industry, 3rd ed. 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1988). C.C.H. Company Law Editors, Proposed National 
Companies and Securities Legislation Explained (Sydney: C.C.H. Australia, 1988) at 
12ff. UNWIN & WARREN, supra, note 432 at 28.
However, the "Australian model" is not admired by all Canadian securities experts. 
"Australia has struggled to adopt old-fashioned British style corporate-securities 
legislation [...] to a federal state. It has done so through complicated mechanisms that 
sound rather like those proposed by [Canada’s] draft MOU. Australia tied itself in 
knots". C. JORDAN, "Canada Needs a National Securities Regulator" The Financial 
Post [of Toronto] (24 February 1995) 13. For Australia’s reaction to this opinion, see, 
L. PEARCE, "Australia’s Securities Regulation Uncomplicated" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (1 March 1995) 14.
J.S. ZIEGEL, "A Securities Commission" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 March 1995) 
A21. J.S. ZIEGEL, "Must we Settle for Second Best? Comments on Ed Waiter's 
Paper" in QUEEN’S SYMPOSIUM, supra, note 243, 129 at 134. If a CANSEC was 
created, the securities industry has already expressed the view that it should not be 
affiliated to the OSFI because of problems when the regulation of deposit-taking 
institutions is mixed in with the regulation of financial intermediaries. As a result, a 
separate body could be created and report to the same federal minister as the OSFI.
B. CRITCHLEY, "National Body for Securities?" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (29 
March 1994) 5. For its part, the OSC once expressed the concern that if a greater 
federal involvement occurs, "[t]here is no guarantee [...] that the cooperation that 
marks OSFI’s relationships with commissions [...] will always exist". Notice— Remarks 
of Robert J. Wright — Toronto Society of Financial Analysts — Wednesday, June 24, 
1992, (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 2889 at 2891.
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would prove to be of immediate use. The Canadian Securities Commission would 
have to face the inevitable coming reality of having to deal with a growing number of 
issues of international importance. Currently, Canada is the only country of the 
IOSCO to have a multiple representation437. This situation may be likely to change 
in a not so distant future. Having to choose a single representative could prove to be 
a political problem if no federal representation is in place.
In a nutshell, the current trend is towards harmonizing and streamlining the existing 
fragmented Canadian financial system rather than trying to confront the political 
problems of creating a single national regulatory framework438. However, the 
necessity for a rapid solution to this "crisis" may come from the unequivocal tendency 
to "americanize" the Canadian securities system.
CHAPTER II: Indirect Consequences of North American Free 
Trade: The "Americanization" of Canadian Securities 
Policies
Policy harmonization is a sensitive issue because the essence of this process is the 
modification of national policies. Naturally, whenever national control over policy­
making is reduced, there is a curtailment of national sovereignty439. This issue is 
especially sensitive in both Canada and Mexico, because the sheer difference in size 
vis-a-vis the U.S. With the FTA and NAFTA, policy harmonization has involved a 
substantial degree of policy "americanization" in several sectors of activities440 
(including the securities industry)441.
The provinces of Ontario and Quebec are both members. On their role at IOSCO, see 
generally EDITORIAL, "In a Global Market, With Provincial Rules" The [Toronto] Globe 
and Mail {2 July 1992) A25. P. CAMPBELL, "Global Security Rules: Who Speaks for 
Canada?" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (6 October 1989) 11. W. LECLERC, "Who 
Should Be Securities Regulators" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (27 May 1989) 5.
D. WESTELL, "Regulators "Lurching" Towards Harmonizing Securities Industry" The 
Financial Post [of Toronto] (30 December 1995) 34. M.D. SHADBOLD, "A Principled 
Approach to the Reform of Financial Sector Regulation" Canadian Financial Services 
Alert (July 1993) 17.
HANSSON, supra, note 69 at 25.
See, e.g., L. MARTIN, Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada in the 
Mulroney Years (Toronto, Ont.: McClelland & Stewart, 1993).
R.G.M. SULTAN, "The Impact of Free Trade on Canadian Capital Markets, Pension 
Funds and Investment Counsellors" Business Quarterly (Summer 1989) 76 at 77. Over 
the past few years, "[t]he active Canadian regulatory focus has been very much on the
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The law governing securities transactions has largely been shaped by the demands 
and the circumstances of the securities markets. Canadian securities markets have 
always been heavily influenced by events in the much larger markets in the U.S.442 
This has been to such an extent as to warrant judicial notice443.
In addition to the common law, Canadian statute law relating to securities transactions 
has been patterned closely after U.S. law444. Moreover, some Canadian securities
United States, largely as a result of the acceleration of integration of North American 
capital markets C. JORDAN, "Canadian Participation in International Capital 
Markets: A Reassessment", in McGILL UNIVERSITY: FACULTY OF LAW, Meredith 
Lectures 1993, Crossborder Transactions (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1994) 1 at 
33. In part, this "Americanization" gradually occurs through bodies like the North 
American Association of Securities Administrators (or "NAASA"). This has led one 
author to say that "Canadian similarities, except in the forms of government and 
conduct of courts, are such that one wonders whether or not there has become one 
Canadian-American nation (less, only possibly, Quebec) with some sixty-odd centres 
of power. Most assuredly the North American Association of Securities Administrators, 
in which the Canadian Provinces and territories as well as the states and D.C. fully 
participate, gives mute testimony. I hasten to say Mexico is a NAASA member." J.A. 
MAHER, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Engaged To Be Engaged?, 
(1993) 13 Dickinson J. Int’l L. 1 at 5.
The U.S. capital markets’ influence on other markets appears to have been 
substantial. OECD, The Committee on Financial Markets - International Trade in 
Sen/ices: Securities (Paris: OECD, 1987) at 13-15.
For example in the 1911 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Clarke v. Baillie, 
(1911) 45 S.C.R. 50, Mr. Justice Anglin stated at page 76: "It is common knowledge 
that the business of stock-brokers in this country is conducted in a manner more 
closely resembling that which prevails in the United States, and particularly in the 
State of New York, than that which exists in England. Many customs and usages of 
English brokers are unknown in Canada; and many practices prevalent in our markets, 
which have come to us from the United States, would not be recognized on the 
London Stock Exchange".
Even before the introduction of the Canadian Business Corporations Acts, Canadian 
laws relating to securities trading tended to follow American law. E. GUTTMAN & T.P. 
LEMKE, The Transfer of Securities in Organized Markets: A Comparative Study of 
Clearing Agencies in the United States of America, Britain and Canada, (1981) 19 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 400 at 407. E. GUTTMAN, The Transfer of Shares in a Commercial 
Corporation — A Comparative Study, (1964) 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 491. This 
tendency became more pronounced as the Business Corporations Acts’ provisions 
governing securities transfers were closely based upon the U.S. Uniform Commercial 
Code ("UCC"). One report referred to "obvious need for uniform laws within the North 
American securities markets" and stated: "[Cjlearly it would be preferable for all 
Canadian jurisdictions ... to adopt a uniform law that adheres as closely as possible to 
the UCC model ...". R. DICKERSON, J. HOWARD & L. GETZ, Proposals for a New 
Business Corporations Law for Canada, Vol. I, Commentary (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of 
Supply and Services, 1971) at 59-60. Also, see F.J. PIiPIN, Le transfert des valeurs 
mobilieres de corporations commerciales, (1978) 9 R.G.D. 243 at 250 n. 14. Y. 
RENAUD & J. SMITH, Droit quebecois des corporations commerciales, Vol. 2
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lawyers have noted the necessity and practical effect of understanding U.S. securities 
law445. However, Canadian law in this area has always been some years behind 
that of the U.S. In turn, the U.S. law has generally trailed behind events and practices 
within the securities industry446.
Generally, it can be said that there are market differences between the U.S. and 
Canadian parameters with respect to securities regulation447. More specifically, 
Canadian securities regulators have broader range of discretionary powers and they 
have used them to move into the domain of corporate law to a level not seen in the 
U.S448. However, free trade has had a relative impact on Canadian securities 
regulators449. Even if the FTA and NAFTA do not explicitly put de jure pressures on 
Canadian sovereignty, it can create them de facto450. These are the policy 
harmonization pressures Canada may have to accede to in order to remain 
competitive with U.S. firms in a liberalized trading environment451. Because the past
(Montreal, Que.: Judico, 1975) at 1137.
BLOOMFIELD, supra, note 53 at 89. J.K. WILLIAM, 1990 Year in Review: 
Harmonization with U.S. Securities Law Increases Pace of Regulatory Change, (1990) 
5:12 S.C.R.R. 153 at 155.
GREENE [etal.j, Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 25.
R.J. DANIELS & J.G. MaclNTOSH, Towards a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law 
Regime, (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 863 at 900.
One author points out that the broad discretionary powers by Canadian securities 
regulators create a great deal of uncertainty for market participants planning 
transactions that may or may not be found to breach the "public interest". As a 
solution he suggests that Canadian regulators could consider the adoption of a "no 
action letter" procedure similar to that used in the U.S. J.G. MaclNTOSH, supra, note 
222, 73 at 73. On the discretionary powers of Canadian securities regulators, see, 
e.g., R. CRETE, "L’appreciation de I’interet public dans, le marche des valeurs 
mobilieres: un pouvoir discretionnaire trop envahissant?" in SERVICE DE LA 
FORMATION PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC, ed., Deveioppements 
recents en droit commercial (1992) (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1992) 21. 
However, in the province of Ontario, that power has recently been under review. See, 
e.g., J.G. MaclNTOSH, supra, note 422.
Generally "[GATT and NAFTA] [...] significantly affect the future of [the] domestic 
financial services industry". J.R. DOTY, The Role of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in an Internationalized Marketplace, (1992) 60 Fordham L. Rev. S77 at 
S78.
See C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE, Policy Harmonization: The Effects of a Canadian- 
American Free Trade Area (Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1986) at 11.
However, some critics have not been convinced by this harmonization argument, 
arguing that Canadian capital markets have distinctive properties that regulators 
should be sensitive to in formulating policy objectives in order to determine how they 
impact on the securities regime. DANIELS & MaclNTOSH, supra, note 447 at 865. 
Some mentioned the increasing globalization of markets to be the driving force behind
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few years have witnessed Canadians securities regulators adopt (sometimes stricter 
and more detailed) U.S. norms452, one expert ventured the opinion that Canada has 
been free riding on the back of Uncle Sam as a regulatory technique453. If so, the 
SEC has a great deal to say as to which way Canadian securities regulation goes.
1. The Influential Role Played by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission
Prior to the 1980s, the SEC’s main focus was on domestic concerns because U.S. 
investors, issuers and markets were dominating the world capital markets454. The 
rapid growth of the internationalization of securities trading led both individual and 
institutional American investors to seek higher returns and greater diversification of 
risk by purchasing foreign securities in foreign markets. As the mobility of the capital 
increased on a worldwide basis, questions arose as to whether or not to allow more 
trading of foreign securities to take place within the U.S.455. Doing so would require 
easing foreign access rules. However, in view of market developments, changes 
would need to be addressed by regulatory authorities if American financial markets 
wanted to continue to play a leading role. The SEC could no longer avoid its growing 
international responsibilities.
In determining a pattern for future international policies of the SEC, opposite views 
revealed the complexity of the problems lying ahead. The first approach was to have
harmonization, not the U.S. J.F. HELLIWELL, From Now Till Then: Globalization and 
Economic Cooperation, Canadian Public Policy, XV Supplement (February 1989). 
"Ontario securities "regulation" has changed significantly in both form and substance. 
Directly inspired by U.S. rules are recent changes, both implemented and proposed, in 
the area of liability for continuous disclosure, management’s discussion and analysis, 
and, most controversially perhaps, executive compensation." C. JORDAN, The Thrills 
and Spills of Free-Riding: International Issues Before the Ontario Securities 
Commission, (1994) 23 C.B.L.J. 379 at 381 n. 7. In addition, civil remedies under U.S. 
(and sometimes U.K.) law are occasionally considered equivalent to Canadian law. 
See, e.g., Staff Notice Regarding International Private Placements, (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 
1350. Notice-Blanket Ruling for Certain International Offerings by Private Placement 
in Ontario, (1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 5888.
JORDAN, ibid, at 328.
B. LONGSTRETH, Global Securities Markets and the SEC, (1988) U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. 
L. 183 at 185.
B.S. THOMAS, Internationalization of the World’s Capital Markets: Can the S.E.C. 
Help Shape the Future?, (1982-83) 15 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y. 55 at 58.
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the SEC adopt a protectionist attitude by rigidly restricting access to American capital 
markets456. The argument was founded on the assumption that such measures 
would prevent U.S. capital to be diverted from American companies to foreign issuers. 
This theory was opposed by those who supported the view that the American system 
should reconcile with an increasingly interdependent world457. This second approach 
suggested that any efforts to restrict the free flow of capital would go directly against 
the best interest of U.S. business458. By closing the doors to foreign companies 
wishing to raise capital in the U.S., American issuers seeking international financing 
alternatives could be faced with retaliatory measures by other nations459. However, 
the removal of unnecessary barriers by the SEC could create a more hospitable 
environment for foreign issuers in U.S. markets, resulting in tangible benefits to the 
U.S. economy, but without compromising investor protection460.
In 1984 and 1985, the SEC began articulating its modem thinking by elaborating three 
"concept releases" which would accelerate the process towards 
internationalization461. Each one was based on the assumption that 
internationalization is inevitable and desirable, and addressed the technical issue to 
which it gave rise.
Ibid, at 56 n. 2.
B.S. THOMAS, Internationalization of Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 
(1981-82) 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 155.
C.C. COX, Internationalization of Capital Markets: The Experience of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, (1987) 11 Md J. of Int’l L. & Trade 201 at 202.
Moreover, "protecting" American companies from competition in the U.S. market 
"would merely shift the competitive arena to another trading forum such as the 
Euromarket for debt offerings". THOMAS, supra, note 455 at 62.
In the U.S., there were no direct barriers to capital trade, but indirect barriers did exist 
such as the requirement to register under securities law and the potential liability that 
followed if a trader did make a full entry into capital markets under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. For some other barriers into U.S. securities markets existing at 
that time, see C.M. NATHAN, Special Problems Arising as a Result of Trading in 
Multiple Markets, (1982) 4 J. Comp. Corp. L. Sec. Reg. 1.
A "concept release" is meant to expose a general area for public comment. It can 
further lead to the formulation of specific rules. On the three releases, see L.B. 
SPENCER Jr., The Reaction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the 
Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Three Concept Releases, (1986) 4 B.U. 
Int’l L.J. 111. R.S. KARMEL, Can Regulators of International Capital Markets Strike a 
Balance Between Competing Interests?, (1986) 4 B.U. Int’l L.J. 105 at 109.
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Beginning with the assumption the U.S. has the best capital markets in the world462, 
the so-called "waiver-by-conduct" release was concerned with the principle that one 
who trades in the U.S. has to respect U.S. laws463. The purpose of the "waiver-by- 
conduct" rule was to create an exception to foreign bank secrecy laws. Also it dealt 
with matters of sovereignty and raised problems of enforcement464. However, this 
proposal could only become effective if accepted by the foreign states concerned465. 
Eventually, it was abandoned altogether.
The Securities Act Release N° 6568466 discussed revisions of prospectus rules in 
Canada, the U.S. and the U.K. to alleviate the problems involved in the qualification of 
a new securities issued for sale in the three countries467. The SEC put forward two
Even today, this assumption has not subsided. "It has become [SEC] theology that [its] 
regulations are the best in the world, and that they best serve the interests of all U.S. 
investors. Through [IOSCO], the SEC is trying to build an international consensus on 
the benefits of U.S.-type disclosure rules". W.C. FREUND, "Another SEC Curb on 
Stock Exchanges" The Wall Street Journal (2 September 1992) 2.
SEC Release - 30 June 1984. SPENCER Jr., supra, note 461 at 113-114. M. 
FEDDERS [et ai], Waiver By Conduct - A Possible Response to the 
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, (1984) 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt L. 1. 
For some views against the "waiver-by-conduct" approach, L. NELSON, Insider 
Trading Originating Abroad and "Waiver-by-Conduct", (1985) 19 Int’l L. 817. M.U.T., 
The SEC’s Waiver-by-Conduct Proposal: A Critical Appraisal, (1985) 71 Va. L. Rev. 
1411. P.J. BSCHOOR, “Waiver By Conduct": Another View, (1984) 6 J. Comp. Bus. & 
Cap. Mkt L. 307. J.-L. LUPINE, A Response to Fedders’ "Waiver By Conduct", (1984) 
6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt L. 319. E.J. BOYLE, J.C. THAU, The Newest 
Configuration of the Ugly American: A Response to Mr. Fedders, (1984) 6 J. Comp. 
Bus. & Cap. Mkt. L. 323. W. de CAPITANI, Response to Fedders’ "Waiver By 
Conduct", (1984) 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt L. 331. E. WYMEERSCH, Response to 
Fedders’ "Waiver By Conduct", (1984) 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt L. 339. M. 
SINGER, The Internationalized Securities Market and International Law— A Reply to 
John M. Fedders, (1984) 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Mkt L. 345.
In response to the ambitious extraterritorial application of U.S. laws in American 
tribunals, a number of countries have enacted blocking statutes. The Canadian federal 
government enacted the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29. 
Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, SEC Release N° 33-6568 (28 
February 1985).
COX, supra, note 458 at 204-205. M.Q. CONNELY, Multinational Securities Offerings: 
A Canadian Perspective, (1988) 50 L. & Cont. Probl. 251. GIRA, supra, note 61 at 
157. SPENCER Jr., supra, note 461 at 115-116. "Canada and England were singled 
out in the SEC’s request for comments because the SEC felt that they were countries 
that were the closest to those of the United States and that, as a first step, their 
systems might be a place to start. [...] The SEC’s initiative in this area is clearly one 
that must go forward, and it certainly will not be limited, even in the near term, to the 
United Kingdom and Canada." B. WHACHTER [etal.], Harmonization of Company and 
Securities Law: The European and American Approach, (Tilburg: Tilburg University 
Press, 1989) at 115.
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possible approaches: (i) a reciprocal agreement between the three countries under 
which a prospectus would be accepted in each of the other two countries; and (ii) the 
development of a common prospectus to be filed simultaneously with each country’s 
securities administrators468. Commenting on this Release of the SEC, both the 
OSC469 and the QSC470 believed a modified reciprocal prospectus approach 
should (in the short term) be adopted in order to facilitate securities offerings in 
Canada and the U.S.471 Moreover, they proposed that the use of the reciprocal 
prospectus approach be restricted to senior issuers in order to ascertain its viability 
and effects on domestic and international capital markets472. Finally, the OSC 
considered the inclusion of the U.K. (either in the reciprocal prospectus or the 
common prospectus approaches) as a long-term objective473.
Finally, Exchange Act Release N° 21958474 discussed the operation of the 
international trading markets, focusing on the practical problems inherent in global 
markets475. Here, the SEC was primarily concerned by two things: firstly, what steps 
should be taken to assure that U.S. and global securities markets operate fairly and 
safely?; and secondly, how should nations and the securities industry cooperate to 
eliminate disparities and to ensure the existence of an equivalent regulatory treatment 
on an international scale? To tackle these questions, the SEC identified three issues
The SEC had hoped that the release and response and other initiatives would quickly 
result in concrete proposals. For a comprehensive summary of the comments see,
C.C. COX, "Internationalization of the Capital Markets: The Experience of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission" in IOSCO, Annual Conference of the 
International Association of Securities Commission, Vol. 1 (Paris: COB, 1986) 150 at 
155-158.
Submission of the Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Concerning the Facilitation of Multinational Securities 
Offerings, (1985) 8 O.S.C.B. 3972 [hereinafter OSC’s Submission].
Observations de la Commission des valeurs mobilieres en reponse a la demande de 
la Securities and Exchange Commission des Iztats-Unis (SEC) concernant les 
placements multinationaux, (1985) 16:31 B.C.V.M.Q. 9 [hereinafter QCS’s 
Submission].
OSC’s Submission, supra, note 469 at 3982. QSC’s Submission, supra, note 470 at 
19.
OSC’s Submission, Ibid., at 3989. QSC’s Submission, Ibid., at 20.
OSC’s Submission, Ibid., at 3994.
SEC Release N° 34-21958 (18 April 1985).
SPENCER Jr., supra, note 461 at 111-112. For a summary of the comments made by 
the OSC and QSC, see Summary of Comments on Concept Release, Release N° 
34-21958, SEC File N° 57-16-85, 1985.
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of contention: international trading, multinational distribution of securities and 
international enforcement problems.
Gradually, the SEC came to realize that the U.S. market was not, by itself, the 
dominant market, but rather the largest of several, linked globally, competing for 
investors worldwide. In 1987, a report by the SEC476 revealed that due to the growth 
of rival national markets (mainly those of Japan and the EU) and the existence of 
unregulated international market, the U.S. was gradually losing its dominance as the 
first primary capital market. To keep the U.S. capital market and its participants 
competitive, and to promote fair and equal treatment of U.S. shareholders owning 
securities in foreign companies, the SEC proposed and implemented several 
initiatives477. For instance, the SEC limited the jurisdictional reach of the registration 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. It eased 
access to the U.S. institutional market by foreign issuers. In one case, the SEC 
affirmed that it would follow a policy of national treatment in its regulation of financial 
institutions, by which U.S. and foreign entities would have the same access to and be 
treated equally in the U.S.478
By adopting these policies, the SEC has been in the forefront of discussions 
concerning the adoption of an international regulatory scheme. Using a step-by-step 
approach, the SEC has tried to increase access and to eliminate indirect barriers to
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Report of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (27 July 1987).
In 1990, a former Chief of the Office of International Corporate Finance at the SEC 
noted that "the SEC wants to meet the demands of U.S. investors to invest in foreign 
securities [...] [wjhile the SEC does not want to engage in a race to the bottom or 
lowering of standards, it is willing to be more flexible to increase the attractiveness of 
U.S. markets." S. HANKS, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) N* 3 at 103 (19 January
1990).
"National treatment is important insofar as it means that there is no significant 
distinction in the U.S. between the powers of a U.S. and foreign registered or 
regulated entity. In administering a policy of national treatment, however, the SEC has 
also sought the power to carry out functional regulation, under which all participants in 
the securities business (i.e. banks and broker/dealers) would be subject to the same 
rules. To acquire this power, the SEC has been asking the U.S. Congress to enact 
legislation that would overturn existing distinctions that permit banks to be in the 
securities business without SEC registration or oversight. To date, Congress has 
refused to act". GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 25.
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foreign participants in U.S. markets and thus assure its dominance of global markets. 
Regulation S479, Rule 144A480 and other initiatives of this nature have all been 
attempts to increase foreign access to U.S. capital markets481. By doing so, the U.S. 
promoted "the adoption of U.S.-style regulatory regimes and free-riding in the 
emerging markets"482. But more importantly, many of these policies have an impact 
on the Canadian financial regulatory framework483.
SEC Release N09 33-6863; 34-27942, as amended. In essence, Regulation S declares 
that the prospectus filing requirements apply only to offers and sales of securities 
made in the U.S. GREENE [et ai], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 191. Regulation S is 
memorable for its "general statement" which "[...] marks the moment that the United 
States openly acknowledged the existence of the international capital markets as 
separate and apart from its own". JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 9.
SEC Release N°* 33-6862; 34-27928. Rule 144A relates to the U.S. private placement 
market by improving liquidity in the secondary market for large institutional investors. 
It applies equally to U.S. and non-U.S. issuers and has managed to attract many 
foreign issuers into the U.S. markets. GREENE [et ai], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 153- 
154.
On the adoption of Regulation S and Rule 144A, see, e.g., R.W. McQUISTON, Rule 
144A, Regulation S and Amending the Glass-Steagall Act: A new Look at Foreign 
Banks and Foreign Issuers Participating in the United States Securities Markets, 
(1991) 17 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Comm. 171. H.S. BLOOMENTHAL, The SEC and 
Internationalization of Capital Markets: Herein Regulation S and Rule 144A, (1991) 20 
Denver J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 343. A.R. BRANDON, Securities Regulation - Great 
Expectations and the Reality of the Rule 144A and Regulation S: The SEC’s Approach 
to the Internationalization of the Financial Marketplace, (1991) Georgia J. Int’l & Comp. 
L. 145. N. SILVERMAN & D.A. BRAVERMAN, Regulation S and Other New Measures 
Affecting the International Capital Markets, (1991) 23 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 179.
H.S. BLOOMENTHAL, The SEC and Internationalization of Capital Markets: Herein 
Regulation S and Rule 144A, (1989) 18 Denver J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 83 
JORDAN, supra, note 452, 379 at 386. For some, the SEC has been (and ought to 
continue to be) a "standard-setter" in the internationalization process. DOTY, supra, 
note 449 at S90. For instance, the regulatory climate in the U.S. has permitted its 
securities markets to become a leader in financial innovation. This led SEC’s then- 
Chairman Breeden to foresee a role for the Commission as "the world’s securities 
police when the age of global trading arrives". "American Depository Receipts" The 
Economist (15 June 1991) 73.
"Regulation S, Rule 144A and, their later companion, the Multijurisdictional Disclosure 
System have had an impact, both direct and indirect, on the way Canadian issuers 
raise capital, and in ways that are only now emerging, the Canadian securities 
regulatory regimes and the industry they govern. All Canadian crossborder financing 
activities, both inbound and outbound, are now driven by this trio of SEC initiatives 
[...]. For Canadian regulators, Ontario in particular, the initiatives are shaking the 
regulatory system to its roots". JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 1.
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2. Major Identifiable American Regulatory Impacts on Canadian 
Securities Law
While many U.S. regulation and policy initiatives have influenced the Canadians, 
explicit cooperation between both countries recently occurred through the signing of 
MOUs on enforcement and disclosure.
2.1 Cooperation in Enforcement
The U.S. has probably been the country to most aggressively apply its securities laws 
extraterritorially484. To minimize the effects of such behaviour, there has been a 
recognized need for international cooperation485. In recent years, the SEC has relied 
less on unilateral enforcement activity and more on MOUs surveillance agreements 
and other arrangements with foreign regulators and markets. Not surprisingly, 
similarities in securities laws and regulatory structures combined with the great deal of 
cross-border financial flows have favoured the development of a special relationship 
between the SEC and Canadian securities commissions.
Until a few years ago, co-operation in the securities field between the two countries 
generally consisted in trading information and investigating particular problems or 
collaborating in series of arrests486. Stock exchanges implementing market linkage 
programs have concluded agreements establishing standards of enforcement487. So 
did the SEC and some Canadian securities commissions, who signed a MOU during
J.-G. CASTEL, Extraterritoriality in International Trade Canada and United States of 
America Practices Compared (Toronto, Ont.: Butterworths, 1988) at 118.
For the U.S. view on the need for greater co-operation to enforce securities laws, see, 
e.g., P. JIMENEZ, International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act and 
Memoranda of Understanding, (1990) 31 Harv. Int’l L.J. 295. D.K. CHARTER & S.M. 
BECK, Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, (1987) 9 U. 
Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 467. E.F. GREENE, A.B. COHEN & L.S. MATLACK, Problems of 
Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, (1987) 9 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 325. 
J.P. WILLIAMSON, Securities Regulation in Canada (Toronto, Ont.: University of 
Toronto Press, 1960) at 46.
BLOOMFIELD, supra, note 53 at 90. At another level, regulatory cooperation among 
global financial markets expanded significantly with the signing of an information 
sharing agreement by ten marketplaces in Canada, the U.S., the U.K. and the 
Netherlands. Montreal Exchange, Circular N° 143-93 (11 June 1993).
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the time of the FTA negotiations488. It states that the Parties intend to provide the 
fullest mutual assistance in facilitating the performance of securities market oversight 
functions, obtaining information, conducting investigations, litigation and prosecution to 
determine or prove whether the laws or regulations of the requesting authority have 
been violated489.
Moreover, it extends to the enforcement of disclosure requirements and fiduciary 
duties of securities professionals490. Another striking feature of the agreement is that 
the Memorandum applies where there has been a violation of a law which exists only 
in one jurisdiction; usually in such agreements, a violation must be a violation in both 
jurisdictions. This provision has not created much difficulty given the similarity 
between U.S. and the Canadian securities law.
2.2 The Multiiurisdictional Disclosure System
The importance of disclosure in securities legislation has continuously gained 
acceptance throughout North America491. However, until a few years ago, there 
were no comprehensive rules designed to facilitate North American cross-border 
securities transactions. Essentially, Canadian issuers were treated the same as U.S.
The MOU was signed between the SEC, and the Ontario, Quebec and British 
Columbia securities commissions. Memorandum of Understanding with U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission to Enhance Cooperation in Enforcement, (1988) 11 
O.S.C.B. 113. Avis-Entente avec la Securities and Exchange Commission concernant 
la cooperation dans I’application des lois, (1988) 19:3 B.C.V.M.Q. 1.
C. VAUGHN BALTIC III, The Next Step in Insider Trading Regulation: International 
Cooperative Efforts in Global Securities Market, (1992) 23 Law & Pol. 167. JIMENEZ, 
supra, note 485 at 295. P.J. MAHONEY, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: An 
International Perspective, (1990) 7 Yale J. on Reg. 305. C.T. HAY, Exchange of 
Information Among the Canadian Provincial and American Securities Commissions, 
(1988) 2 R.I.B.L. 219. H.L. PITT, D.B. HARDISON & K.L. SHAPIRO, Problems of 
Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, (1987) 9 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 375. 
However, assistance under this MOU may be denied on grounds of public interest. 
ROPPEL, supra, note 302, at 52.
See, e.g., Report on the Securities Markets submitted to the Board of Governors of 
the New York Stock Exchange (5 August 1971). Report of the Committee of the 
Ontario Securities Commission on the Problems of Disclosure Raised for Investors by 
Business Combinations and Private Placements (February 1970). Report of the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (11 March 1965). 
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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issuers for purposes of registration and reporting under the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Acts because of their proximity to the U.S. securities market492. Canadian 
issuers were restricted from using documents reserved for foreign issuers and instead 
had to report securities on forms used by U.S. issuers, thus requiring more 
comprehensive information in accordance with U.S. domestic standards. In order to 
facilitate cross-border registration and reporting of securities and to reduce duplicative 
regulation, a detailed set of rules, forms and schedules was adopted by the SEC and 
the CSA.
The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (hereinafter MJDS) was negotiated between 
the SEC493 and the OSC494 and QSC495 on behalf of all Canadian jurisdictions 
and became effective July 1 (ironically Canada’s national day), 1991496. Canada is 
the first country to establish MJDS with the U.S., but it should not be the last497. 
Hence, the MJDS system was designed by the SEC with the broader goal of
Numerous U.S. and Canadian reports have studied the question of disclosure. 
GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 30 n. 1. BERNIER, J., "Internationalisation 
des marches financiers: le cas du Regime d’information multinational" in SERVICE DE 
FORMATION PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC, ed., supra, note 53, 175 
at 193-194.
The genesis of the MJDS is SEC Release N° 33-6568 (28 February 1985), supra, 
note 466. "[The MJDS] is a hybrid of [the "common prospectus" or "harmonization" 
approach; and the "reciprocal prospectus" or "mutual recognition" approach]". 
GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 309 n. 2. It was originally proposed in 1989; 
see SEC Release N° 33-6841 (24 July 1989) and re-proposed in 1990. See SEC 
Release N° 33-6879 (16 October 1990). It became effective in 1991. See SEC 
Release N° 33-6902 (1 July 1991).
In Canada, the MJDS was implemented pursuant to NPS N° 45. See National Policy 
Statement N° 45, (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 2889 (28 June 1991). Draft National Policy 
Statement N° 45, (1990) 13 O.S.C.B. 4573 (2 November 1990). Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure System (Outline), (1989) 12 O.S.C.B. 2919 (28 July 1989).
Instruction generate n° C-45 - Regime d’information multinational - Annexe 2, Decision 
n° 91-C-0194, (1991) 22:26 B.C.V.M.Q. 2, Annex 2 and Annex 4. Projet d’instruction 
general n° C-45 - Regime d’information multinational, (1990) 21:44 B.C.V.M.Q. 16. 
Avis - Regime d’information multinational, (1989) 20:29 B.C.V.M.Q. 1.
E. REGULY, "Now ... Free Trade in Stock Markets" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(31 May 1991) 1.
"The SEC chose Canada as its initial partner for the MJDS because of the similarity of 
the U.S. and Canadian regulatory regimes and the significant presence of Canadian 
companies in the U.S. trading market." GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 309- 
SI 0 n. 2. ”[T]he MJDS was developed initially with Canada due to its mature capital 
markets and strong regulatory tradition" ... and "highly developed accounting and 
auditing standard". L.C. QUINN, "Internationalization of the Securities Markets" in 
Advanced Securities Law Workshop 1991, N° 748 (Washington, D.C.: Practising Law 
Institute, 1991) 571 at 593-594. BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra, note 47 at 5A-10.
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extending the system to a number of other countries including Mexico498.
This initiative is designed to facilitate the free flow of capital between Canada and the 
United States499. The MJDS does not change the liability provisions of the securities
Immediately prior to the formal NAFTA negotiations, the SEC announced first step 
negotiations with Mexico (3 Int’l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 7 (7 May 1990)) and with 
Japan (23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 42 (11 Jan. 1991)). During the SEC’s open 
meeting at which the MJDS was adopted, the SEC Chairman reaffirmed that the 
Commission would want to extend the system to Mexico in an effort to create a North 
American market. Richard C. BREEDEN, then-Chairman, SEC, Opening Statement on 
Adoption of Rules, Forms and Schedules for Multijurisdictional Disclosure with Canada 
at Open Meeting (30 May 1991). The U.K. is another logical candidate for the MJDS. 
Regulatory Flexibility Agenda, 56 Fed. Reg. 4586 (22 April 1990). Initially the U.K. was 
included in the discussions relating to the MJDS. However, it dropped out of the 
negotiations to turn its attention to the reform concerning financial services in the EU.
C. JORDAN, (Address about the MJDS, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 17 
February 1994) [unpublished]. On the extension of the MJDS in the future, see 
generally, DOTY, supra, note 449 at S87 n. 35. So far, however, no other formal 
measures have been taken toward extending the MJDS to other countries.
On the mechanics of the MJDS, see generally, S.H. HALPERIN, "SEC Initiatives 
Benefit Canadian Issuers" Nation Law Journal (18 October 1993) 19. BERNIER, 
supra, note 492. D.R. CRAWSHAW, "Internationalisation des marches financiers: le 
cas du Regime multinational”(Address to a conference organized by Service de la 
formation permanente du Barreau du Quebec, 8 October 1992) [unpublished]. T.N. 
UNWIN, "Introduction of the Canada-U.S. Multijurisdictional Disclosure System" 
Canadian Financial Services Alert (February 1992) 14. GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, 
note 47, Chap. 8. H.S. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WOLFF, The Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure System and Other Cross-Border Offerings, (1992) 20 Denver J. Int’l L. & 
Pol’y 551. W.K. ORR & S.E. DUNLOP, New Developments in Cross-Border Financing: 
The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, (1992) 5:1 Canada - U.S. Trade 1. W.M. 
AINLEY, U.S. Cross-Border Financing for Canadian Issuers, (1992) 1:1 Corporate 
Financing 3. C. JORDAN, Securities Law: Proposed Multijurisdictional Disclosure 
System between Canada and the United States, (1991) 4 C.U.B.L.R. 141. SHERMAN 
STERLING, U.S. Financing After the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System: A Practical 
Guide for Canadian Issuers (New York, N.Y.: SHERMAN, STERLING, 1991) 
(Pamphlet produced and distributed by the law firm). M. PRICHARD, Proposed SEC 
Rules for Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System, (1991) 4 C.U.B.L.R. 68. A.T. 
DRUMMOND, Securities Law: Internationalization of Securities Regulation — 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System for Canada and the U.S., (1991) 36 Villanova L. 
Rev. 774. P.S. HUGHES & M.R. COHEN, "Canada-United States Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure System" in International Securities Market 1991: Corporate Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series Number 743 (New York, N.Y.: Practising Law 
Institute, 1991) 93. B. JENKINS & A. HUDEC, Canada-United States Cross-Border 
Offerings, (1991) 8 Bus. and L. 54-56, 60-62. L.C. QUINN, "Internationalization of the 
Securities Markets", in International Securities Markets 1991: Corporate Law and 
Practice. Course Handbook Series Number 743 (New York, N.Y.: Practising Law 
Institute, 1991) 170. ROPPEL, supra, note 302. H.S. BLOOMENTHAL, The 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (Part 2), (1991) 13 Securities and Federal 
Corporate Law Report 177. H.S. BLOOMENTHAL, The Multijurisdictional Disclosure 
System (Part 3), (1991) 13 Securities and Federal Corporate Law Report 185. H.S.
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laws of the U.S. or Canada nor the discretionary authority of the securities regulatory 
authorities. In essence, it is intended to ease certain U.S.-Canadian cross-border 
securities offerings (including those by "substantial" issuers)500 and, takeover-bids 
and other filings by permitting such dealings to proceed in both countries on the basis 
of home jurisdiction disclosure and rules, as well as allowing the use of the system to 
satisfy the required continuous disclosure requirements501. The Canadian MJDS is 
essentially reciprocal to the MJDS adopted by the SEC502. Thus, for example, 
eligible U.S. issuers may use prospectuses prepared in accordance with SEC 
requirements to offer securities in Canada (generally without regulatory review). The 
U.S. shelf rules may be used for MJDS shelf offerings in Canada503. Compared to
BLOOMENTHAL, The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (Part 4), (1991) 13 
Securities and Federal Corporate Law Report 197. A. GOGGINS, Taking the First 
Step: The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Proposed Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure System, (1990) 14 Md J. Int’l L. & Trade 43. H.S. BLOOMENTHAL, The 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (Part 1), (1990) 12 Securities and Federal 
Corporate Law Report 169. C. JORDAN, Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, (1990) 
23:6 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 55. C. JORDAN, Multijurisdictional Disclosure System: 
Just Over the Horizon, (1990) 5 S.C.R.R. 109. E.B. CLAXTON, H.S. FOULKES & K.G. 
OTTENBREIT, "Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure: A Practitioner’s View", In f I Fm. L. Rev. 
(October 1989) 11.
The core of the MJDS adopted by the SEC is the stipulation of "substantial" Canadian 
issuers (meaning those meeting certain size or credit rating test and Canadian 
reporting history) to offer in the U.S. by ways of a prospectus prepared in conformity 
with Canadian disclosure requirements (with certain U.S. additions). The notion of 
"substantial" issuer derives from that of "world class" issuer suggested in SEC 
Release N° 6568 (see, supra, note 466). On "world class" issuer, see, e.g., THOMAS, 
supra, note 455, 55 at 65 n. 35.
"Inspired by the Euromarket and based on the fact that investment decisions were 
more influenced by investment grade rating than by prospectus disclosure, the initial 
idea behind the MJDS was the standardization of the offering documentation for 
issuance of debt securities. In the end, this simple idea developed into a complex 
system in which there was even a reference to the recognition of Canada as being a 
sovereign nation". JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 27.
"The system, said [SEC’s then-Chairman] Breeden, is one of "reciprocity based on 
quality of reporting and disclosure" and is aimed at improving access and reducing 
costs for issuers. C. JORDAN, "Cross-border shopping for securities markets?: How 
rule changes will affect investments in U.S., Canada" The Financial Post [of Toronto], 
(19 June 1991) 9. Note that "[rjeciprocal recognition, as a regulatory technique, has 
shown better results, not that it is not a slow and painful process — but it has shown 
results". JORDAN, supra, note 452 at 380.
In Canada, NPS N° 44 has formally introduced the shelf prospectus system as well as 
a system to allow pricing of securities after issuance of the final receipt. National 
Policy Statement N° 44 — Rules for Shelf Prospectus Offerings and for Pricing 
Offerings After the Final Prospectus is Receipted, (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 2932. In the 
U.S., see also Simplification of Registration Procedures for Primary Securities 
Offerings, SEC Release N°* 33-6943, 34-30930. In essence NPS N° 44 follows the
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other initiatives undertaken to facilitate international offerings, the magnitude of the 
MJDS makes it a significant development in the movement towards the globalization 
of securities regulations. Being a complex initiative, issuers have yet to fully familiarize 
themselves with the system and evaluate the costs and benefits504. Although it may 
be seen as a means of attracting more Canadian issuers, the MJDS represents, more 
importantly, a significant milestone for the SEC in terms of its recognition of the 
securities laws of a foreign jurisdiction. However, its impact on the Canadian capital 
market has been very significant. Hence, the MJDS has created the infrastructure for 
an integrated North American capital market based on U.S.-style regulation505. The 
MJDS has increased the awareness of cross-border financing opportunities in both 
jurisdictions. Overall, it should continue to contribute to a more closely linked and
similar procedures in the U.S. Rule 415 and Rule 430A of the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. §77 a ff. Offerings made in reliance upon the SEC’s shelf registration and 
post-effective pricing rules (Rule 415 and Rule 430A) may be made in Canada under 
the MJDS in accordance with those rules. Canadian issuers are now able to make 
those offerings in accordance with NPS N° 44 into the U.S. pursuant to the U.S. 
MJDS. See generally C. JORDAN, "Un nouveau raccourci pour les emetteurs: 
prospectus prdalable", in SERVICE DE LA FORMATION PERMANENTE DU 
BARREAU DU QUEBEC, supra, note 53, 61. JORDAN, supra, note 502. P.S. 
HUGHES, "Canada Proposes Shelf Prospectus System" Inf I Fin LRev. (July 1990) 7. 
However, note that Quebec did not implement NPS N° 44 "compte tenu de son 
incompatibility avec certaines dispositions du Reglement." See Instruction generate n° 
C-44 — Le prospectus prealable et la fixation du prix apres le visa du prospectus, 
(1991) 22:18 B.C.V.M.Q. 2 at 2. In all fairness, it is noteworthy to mention that the 
province of Quebec was the first province in Canada to adopt a shelf prospectus 
system almost identical to that of the U.S. which still exists in its legal regime today. 
(QSA, ss. 24.1, 24.1). QSC’s Submission, supra, note 470 at 14.
In practical terms, investment grade debt offerings under the MJDS outnumber equity 
offerings by a ratio of 2:1. Projet de modification de I’lnstruction generate n° C-45, 
Regime d’information multinational, (1993) 24:23 B.C.V.M.Q. 12 at 12. In fact, the first 
offerings by U.S. issuers into Canada only occurred two years after the regime was 
implemented. "Vigoro Scores at First" The Financial Post [of TorontoJ (4 September 
1993) 17.
"So closely linked as it is to the U.S. domestic regulatory regime, [the MJDS] is 
extremely sensitive to changes in it. [...] It will certainly ensure that Canadian 
regulators will be compelled to take into account, in a very timely fashion, 
developments in the United States." JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 33. When adopting 
the MJDS, the QSC said that "[t]he advent of the multijurisdictional disclosure system 
and the trend towards the "North Americanization" of securities legislation further 
entrenches the American influence in Quebec securities legislation." MAVRIDIS, 
supra, note 231 at 7-8. Further it has recognized this trend in the introduction to the 
publication of NPS N° 44. Instruction generate n° C-44— Le prospectus prealable et la 
fixation du prix apres le visa du prospectus, (1991) 22:18 B.C.V.M.Q. 2 at 2.
138
interdependent U.S./Canadian capital market506.
2.3 Other Canadian Regulatory Initiatives Responding to the 
North Americanization of Securities Policy
In parallel to the MJDS, a series of new regulatory responses have been adopted in 
Canada to guarantee, in a sense, reciprocity based on equality of Canadian and U.S. 
requirements507.
Moreover, recent initiatives are in the process of being instigated to help foreign 
issuers to overcome some regulatory barriers currently hindering global issues on 
Canadian securities markets508. A nation-wide initiative (developed by the OSC) 
suggests an enhanced access to the Canadian capital markets by all "world-class 
foreign issuers" of G7 countries. Bowing to pressures from the Canadian securities 
industry, the move made by the CSA is a recognition of the increasing globalization of 
securities markets509. Interim NPS N° 53510 is designed to reduce impediments to
K. BENZINQ, "Job 1 in Securities Sector is Rebuilding Retail Base: More to 
Continental Market Could Help Woo Investors" The [ Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 
November 1991) C1. CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, The Canadian Securities 
Industry: A Decade of Transition (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 1991) at 
5.
Apart from NPS N° 44 (supra, note 503), see, e.g., OSC Policy Statement 5.1, (1990) 
12 O.S.C.B. 943. OSC Policy Statement 5.6, (1991) 14 O.S.C.B. 2956 and QSC 
Policy Statement Q-26, Restrictions on Trading During a Distribution by Prospectus,
(1991) 22:35 B.C.V.M.Q. 2. Other examples are cited in GREENE [et ai], Vol. 1, 
supra, note 47 at 309-310, n. 2.
JORDAN, supra, note 452 at 380. These initiatives came on the heels of an 
announcement by the OSC expressing its outmost desire to ease large international 
issuer access to the Canadian markets. Notice — Remarks of Joseph J. Oliver — 
Executive Director of the Ontario Securities Commission in London, England — May 
19, 1992, (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 2369 at 2371.
"The investment industry has long complained that the absence of such issuers from 
the Canadian market deprives securities dealers and investors of lucrative 
opportunities, and reduces liquidity in the country’s securities markets." "Canada 
Makes It Easier for Foreign Firms to Issue Stock." The [Montreal] Gazette (24 August 
1993) D3. D. KELLY, "New Regulations Proposed" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (24 
August 1993) 4. "La CVMQ veut un regime pour emetteurs etrangers." La Presse [of 
Montreal] (24 August 1993) B8.
Proposed Foreign Issuer Prospectus and Continuous Disclosure System (Draft 
National Policy Statement N° 53), (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 1893. Avis des autorites 
canadiennes en valeurs mobilieres - Projet de regime du prospectus et de 
Tiinformation continue pour les emetteurs etrangers (Projet d'instruction generate r f C- 
53), (1995) 26:17 B.C.V.M.Q. 2. B. CRITCHLEY, "OSC Smooth Path for Foreign
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these issuers that wish to: (i) include Canada in large international offerings; (ii) 
increase opportunity for foreign investment by Canadian individuals and institutions in 
the primary market; and (iii) preserve the potential for Canadian dealers to underwrite 
such public offerings while maintaining an appropriate level of investor protection. 
Being a direct outgrowth of the MJDS511, it is partly designed with coming Latin 
American privatization in mind512. With NAFTA, Mexican capital markets are likely to 
be centred in the U.S. NPS N° 53 would allow for many large Latin American 
companies entering the U.S. institutional investor market to leapfrog into the Canadian 
public markets513. Another recent interesting initiative has been Ontario’s private 
placement ruling allowing for the use of foreign offering documentation for a certain 
number of cases514.
Issuers" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (10 December 1994) 44. The interim policy 
draws on a Draft National Policy Statement N° 53 - Foreign Issuer Prospectus and 
Continuous Disclosure System, (1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 4125. Projet d’lnstruction generate 
n° C-53 — Le regime du prospectus et de Information contenue pour les dmetteurs 
etrangers, (1993) 24:33 B.C.V.M.Q. 4.
The MJDS has served to develop other ideas (which have yet to fully materialize) 
designed at including Canada in international issues. Notice — Remarks of Joseph J. 
Oliver, supra, note 508 at 2371.
JORDAN, supra, note 452 at 382.
Ibid. at 385.
OSC Blanket Ruling: Re Certain International Offerings by Private Placement in 
Ontario, (1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 5931. JORDAN, supra, note 452 at 382-383.
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PART II: FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN NORTH AMERICA AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN RELATION TO THE SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY
Compared to the domestic situation, the complex financial regulation of foreign 
providers of financial services in a cross-border context are more difficult. Moreover, 
the stability of the domestic financial system may be undermined by aggressive 
foreign competition. For these reasons, many countries restrict foreign ownership of 
domestic financial institutions and foreign participation in the domestic market for 
financial services.
The FTA and NAFTA focus on specific aspects of trade in financial services such as 
the liberalization of cross-border capital flows and FDI in the industry (the so-called 
"right of establishment"). Issues relating to the right of establishment have a special 
significance in the financial industry because of the importance that institutions attach 
to having a physical presence in the markets that they serve.
TITLE I: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The Canada - U.S. Free Trade Agreement is the first legally binding trade agreement 
to include the service sector. Its coverage of the financial area is however less 
extensive than in other categories of services. Because it is tacitly built on the concept 
of national treatment, the FTA does not achieve convergence of regulation between 
the two countries. It does, nevertheless, formally establish the principles of freedom of 
capital movement and of the right of establishment515.
CHAPTER I: The Prevalent Situation Before the Negotiations
Over the last 50 years, it is interesting to note that while Canada has almost always 
had a surplus in trade in goods with the Americans, the U.S. has almost always had 
a surplus in trade in services with the Canadians. In the FTA negotiations, it is
The only guiding principle incorporated in the FTA was to presen/e "the access that 
our respective financial institutions have to each other’s market". CANADA, 
Department of External Affairs, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Securing 
Canada’s Future (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987) at 249.
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understandable that the Americans attached a priority to the negotiations of a 
framework of rules relating to trade in sen/ices516 (particularly financial 
services)517. Because financial services are not traded goods or services in the 
conventional sense, it was decided that their negotiations would be kept completely 
separate from the negotiations on non-financial services518. The focus of the talks 
aimed at the liberalization of financial services and were centred around the right of 
establishment or the right to operate in the other Party’s market519. One should 
recall that the FTA negotiations occurred when the Canadian financial services sector 
was being restructured at both the federal and provincial levels520. At the same time, 
U.S. policy-makers began to re-examine their methods of ensuring the continued 
health of American financial institutions521. Thus, the FTA must be looked upon 
against a backdrop of changing regulatory frameworks. Canadian laws imposed some 
foreign ownership restrictions and limited activities to be carried on by some foreign- 
owned financial institutions. American financial regulation, although very open in terms 
of the ability of foreigners to participate, was seen to be very restrictive in terms of the
The FTA broke new ground by establishing firm contractual obligations on services for 
both the U.S. and Canada. J.J. SCHOTT, United States-Canada Free Trade: An 
Evaluation of the Agreement, N° 24, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1988) at 31.
The inclusion into the FTA of a financial sen/ices Chapter "would provide Canada and 
the U.S. with a useful precedent for bilateral negotiations with other nations and for 
the GATT negotiations". P. MANSON, Impact of the Free Trade Agreement on 
Financial Services, (1989) 3 B.F.L.R. 329 at 331.
D.A. RUTH, "The U.S.- Canada Services Agreement: Review and Assessment" in 
FRY & RADEBAUGH, eds, supra, note 199. Because so technically complex, financial 
services were negotiated by the Canadian Department of Finance and the U.S. 
Treasury Department. R.B. POTTER & S.M. LUSSENBURG, U.SJCanada Free Trade 
Agreement and Trade in Services: A Timorous First Step or a Bold New Stoke?, 
(1988) 2 R.I.B.L. 123 at 125.
R. MACINTOSH, then-President of the Canadian Bankers’ Association Address 
(Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, 4 November 1988), 
[Published in the Proceedings of the Standing Committee at 34:36]. It has been said 
that the FTA "[...] approach permits each country to maintain most domestic regulation 
with change required only where operations of other’s financial institutions are 
affected." CHANT, supra, note 17 at 2.
It has been said that the more open Canadian environment occurred as much 
because of the deregulation of financial services as the FTA itself. D.D. PETERS & 
P.L. DRAKE, "Implications for Financial Services of the Canada-United States Free 
Trade Agreement" in M. GOLD & D. LEYTON-BROWN, eds, Trade-Offs on Free 
Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Toronto, Ont.: Carswell, 1988) 332 
at 336.
J.R. JOHNSON & J.S. SCHACTER, The Free Trade Agreement: A Comprehensive 
Guide (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Books, 1988) at 116.
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activities carried on by domestic or foreign financial institutions. Consequently, 
harmonization of financial regulation between Canada and the U.S. was seen as 
difficult because their approaches to regulation differed522.
Before the negotiations, the Canada-U.S. financial markets were, in general, relatively 
open. The six largest Canadian domestic chartered banks all did business in the 
U.S.523 On the American side, no less than seventeen banks had already 
established banking subsidiaries in Canada524. Nonetheless, important restrictions 
subsisted525. In the eyes of the U.S. financial community, the two-level Canadian 
federal and provincial regulation of financial services was viewed as a significant trade 
barrier preventing the American export of financial services to Canada. Moreover, they 
argued that severe restrictions were imposed which prohibited full and fair competition 
in the Canadian marketplace. For its part, Canada also identified several barriers to 
Canadian financial institutions in the U.S. market. Before examining the negotiation 
results, it is important to review the negotiation objectives of both countries and 
determine the terms of the restrictions affecting the Canada-U.S. financial services 
business526.
The American negotiators sought a form of equality of competitive opportunity 
(hereinafter ECO) for U.S. financial institutions which would permit different regulatory
CHANT, supra, note 17 at 6-7.
Canadian banks have had roots in the U.S. for many years. For example, the Bank of 
Montreal has had significant U.S. operations for over 100 years. F. SWEDLOVE, "The 
Current State of Trade in Financial Services" in CANADA, Department of Justice, 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Trade Law Seminar (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of 
Supply and Services, 1992) 105 at 105. MANSON, supra, note 517 at 329.
B.M. LEVITT & S.P. BATTRAM, Canada/United States Trade in Financial Sen/ices, 
(1987) 3 J. of Int’l Bank. Law 159 at 162.
POTTER & LUSSENBURG, supra, note 518 at 134.
For a good understanding of the positions of both the Canadian and U.S. governments 
with respect to Chapter 17 in general, see various debates and reports (prior and after 
the coming into force of the FTA). In Canada, see, CANADA, Senate,"Proceedings of 
the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs" in Proceedings, Issue N° 4 (6 
June 1989), Issue N° 3 (30 May 1989), Issue N° 28 (26 July 1988) at 7-113, Issue N° 
27 (25 July 1988) at 7-29. In the U.S., see U.S. SENATE, Hearings Before the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May 20, 1988, Congressional 
Information Service 88S241-22. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Hearings Before 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce (subcommittee on Commerce, Consumers 
Protection and Competitiveness), February 23, March 22 and April 26, 1988, 
Congressional Information Service 88H361-88.
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treatment of foreign and domestic institutions although it would allow both to compete 
on an essentially equal basis527. ECO differs from national treatment, both in 
offering greater regulatory flexibility and in preventing de facto discrimination where de 
jure national treatment might create inherent disadvantages for foreign 
institutions528.
Coming into the negotiations, the Canadian Bankers’ Association (hereinafter CBA) 
did not embrace the principle of "national treatment"529. The reason for that was 
because the Canadian framework for regulation of the securities industry promised to 
open up new business possibilities for banks in Canada-possibilities unavailable in 
the U.S. because of the Glass-Steagall Act (hereinafter GSA). Thus, the CBA 
favoured the principle of reciprocity in the hope of at least preserving current access 
enjoyed by securities firms, even once they became bank subsidiaries.
CHAPTER II: Negotiation Objectives of Both Countries
The necessity to conclude a trade agreement between Canada and the U.S. resulted 
from a desire to lower the barriers as identified by members of the financial 
communities of both countries. These aspirations constituted the grounds for the 
negotiation.
"Our objective in these negotiations was to make significant progress in obtaining 
equality of competitive opportunity for United States financial firms operating in or 
wishing to enter Canada. Putting it another way, we sought treatment equivalent to 
that accorded domestic institutions. In a Treasury Department report prepared for 
Congress in December of 1986 we highlighted the barriers that existed in Canada’s 
financial sector. This document, the National Treatment study, served as our road map 
in our quest for equal treatment for U.S. firms." Hearing Before the Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra, note 526 at 4. 43 (statement and 
testimony of Thomas J. Berger, Deputy Assistant for Monetary Affairs, Department of 
Treasury).
For a discussion of various models for the entry of financial institutions into foreign 
markets, see LOHMANN & MURDEN, supra, note 325 at 147.
"[A] national treatment agreement is not appropriate to Canada and the United States 
because the United States government cannot negotiate the right of Canadian banks 
to establish throughout the United States, while in Canada, the right of establishment 
is under federal authority only, guaranteeing nation-wide access." LEVITT & 
BATTRAM, supra, note 524 at 163.
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1. American Demands
The American demands can be summed up into three major points530. First, the 
U.S. government insisted that the American banks have guaranteed access to 
information networks, telecommunications and electronic services system distribution. 
Second, restrictions concerning American banking activity in Canada were to be 
ended in areas such as: entry on Canadian market; assets held in Canada; 
commercial loans; parent company loan transfers; foreign bank subsidiaries’ funds 
origin; taxation and data processing.
Under the existing system, foreign banks wishing to enter and do business on the 
Canadian market did not have the right to choose the form of entry they pleased. 
They could only enter the market by establishing Canadian subsidiaries as opposed to 
just branches531. Furthermore, foreign banks were not entitled to open more than 
one branch other than their head office without authorization from the Minister of 
Finance532. As for assets held in Canada, individual domestic assets held by a 
foreign bank (meaning the total domestic assets of a foreign bank) could not exceed 
twenty time its authorized capital533. At the time of the FTA negotiation, the global 
amount of domestic assets held by foreign banks located in Canada was limited to
This analysis is taken from the U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Study on the 
Treatment of U.S. Banks in Foreign Financial Markets (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 
1986). G. LEFEBVRE, Accord de libre-echange et institutions financieres: le cas des 
banques, (1991) 25 R.J.T. 345 at 354-356. J.W. SWENDSEN, "A Banking 
Perspective: Will It Make a Difference?" in E.H. FRY & L.H. RADEBAUGH, eds, The 
Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement: The Impact on Service Industries (Provo, Utah: 
DMK Centre for International Studies of Brigham University, 1989) at 183. M.A. 
JACOBY, "The U.S. Financial Services Sector: Business Ambitions and Negotiation 
Realities in the Canadian/U.S. Free Trade Agreement" in E.H. FRY & L.H. 
RADEBAUGH, eds, Canada-U.S. Economic Relations. (Provo, Utah: DMK Centre for 
International Studies of Brigham University, 1985) 65. POTTER & LUSSEMBURG, 
supra, note 518 at 136-138.
This condition was sine qua non. Bank Act of 1980, s. 173(2).
Bank Act of 1980, s. 173(2). This provision did not keep foreign banks from opening 
as many branches as they pleased in Canada. Approval from the minister has always 
been given to foreign banks that sought it. FORDYCE & NICKERSON, supra, note 
339 at 358.
Bank Act of 1980, s. 174(2)(e); 174(6).
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16% of total assets held in banks in Canada534. With respect to commercial loans, 
the total amount of loans that could be made to its clients by a foreign bank could not 
exceed its own funds (nor that of its parent company). Moreover, the loans granted to 
a single client could not exceed 50% of its own funds535. Parent company loan 
transfers were also limited in order to avoid that foreign banks circumvent the global 
limit of domestic assets set for foreign banks in Canada. Foreign bank subsidiaries’ 
funds were limited to no more than 50% originating from offshore536. Foreign banks 
could only be granted limited tax deductions for interest on loans obtained by the 
parent company537. Finally, foreign banks had to keep and process in Canada all 
information or data purporting to keeping or maintaining their bank books538.
Thirdly, the Americans further demanded that Canadian markets be opened to 
American banks therefore allowing them to supply financial services to the 
government and to Canadian governmental entities on par with Canadian financial 
institutions.
2. Canadian Demands
For their part Canadian financial institutions had demands of their own. Canadian 
banks insisted on nine points539, beginning with free access to the American 
securities market through the withdrawal of the GSA.
Bank Act of 1980, s. 302(8). Note that this restriction never really had any impact on 
the activities of foreign banks in Canada. FORDYCE & NICKERSON, supra, note 339 
at 358. "For instance, in 1986 foreign banks’ assets were only about 80 percent of 
their potential markets, determined by the asset ceiling". S. MAGUN [et ai], Open 
Borders: An Assessment of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Discussion 
Paper N° 344 (Ottawa, Ont.: Economic Council of Canada, 1988) at 128.
These rules are now included in the Guideline N° B-2: Limits Concerning Important 
Engagements, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, 1991.
Guideline N° G-6: Funding of Canadian Dollar-Dominated Assets of Foreign Bank 
Subsidiaries, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, 1988.
Bank Act of 1980, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 18(4).
Bank Act of 1980, s. 157(4). This provision was abandoned in the Bank Act of 1991. 
This analysis is taken from the Canadian Bankers’ Association, Submissbn to United 
States International Trade Commission on Free Trade on Financial Services Between 
the United States and Canada, November, 1986, at 15. MANSON, supra, note 517, 
329 at 331-332. LEFEBVRE, supra, note 530 at 360-362. LEVITT & BATTRAM, 
supra, note 524 at 163-164. POTTER & LUSSEMBURG, supra, note 518 at 135-136.
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2.1 The Case of the Glass-Steaaall Act
In many securities markets outside the U.S., banks (or their affiliates) are major 
participants as underwriters, dealers and brokers. However, the U.S. legal framework 
in many respects is frozen in an earlier era of the financial history of the nation540, 
when banks and investment companies saw one another as complementary players 
rather than direct competitors541. The increasing globalization of both securities and 
banking activities, combined with the growing overlap between the two areas have 
enticed U.S. banks to obtain increased securities opportunities (both at home and 
abroad)542. In addition, foreign banks (using the investment banking aspects of 
"universal banking")543 have also sought additional opportunities to do business in 
the U.S544.
For the Canadian securities industry, the fragmented system of the U.S. has, for many 
years, created serious difficulties. Under the GSA545, banks546 and their affiliates
For a brief summary of the reasons leading to the enactment of the GSA, see, e.g., 
"The Sound of Breaking Glass", A Survey of Wall Street The Economist (15 April 
1995) 27. ECONOMIST IINTELLIGENCE UNIT, Foreign Financing Operations (United 
States) (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995) at 8. H. ROSE, The Changing 
World of Finance and its Problems, Issue Paper N° 2 (Washington, D.C.: British-North 
American Committee, 1993) at 30. J.J. NORTON, Up Against “The Wall*: Glass- 
Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated (“Reregulated*) Banking Environment, 
(1987) 42 Bus. Law. 327 at 334.
The GSA "[...] is currently one of the most controversial and beleaguered statutes in 
the United States, pitting the community of securities dealers against the commercial 
banking community in a leviathan struggle over territory." JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 
36.
F.M. TAVELMAN, American Banks or the Glass-Steagall Act-Which Will Go First?,
(1992) 21 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1511. P.J. FERRARA, The Regulatory Separation of 
Banking From Securities and Commerce in the Modern Financial Marketplace, (1991) 
33 Ariz. L. Rev. 583. C.E. ENGROS, Jr. & P.K. SCHLEGEL, Integrating the U.S. into 
Global Securities Markets, (1991) 24 Rev. Sec. & Comm. Reg. 169 at 170.
For comments on the rejection of the efficiency justification for the dual banking 
system being used in the U.S. see, e.g., H. BUTLER & J. MACEY, The Myth of 
Competition in the Dual Banking System, (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677.
R. TORTORIELLO, "Glass-Steagall Act: Current Issues Affecting Bank Underwriting, 
Dealing and Brokerage Activities" in the 12th Annual Institute, Securities Activities of 
Banks (Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1992) 77.
Actually, what is commonly known as the GSA is not a self-contained law. Instead, it 
consists of several sections (§§16, 20, 21 and 32) of the Banking Act of 1933 (now 
codified as 12 U.S.C §§ 24(7), 377, 378 and 78 respectively). The Banking Act was 
passed by the U.S. Congress after the 1929 market crash and subsequent waves of 
bank failures, see, e.g., FAULHABER, supra, note 52 at 2ff.
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have been subject to severe limitations on permissible securities underwriting and 
dealing activities. These restrictions have had a direct impact on certain beneficiaries 
of the recent Canadian deregulation. Hence, a short period of time after the Canadian 
legislative changes during the FTA negotiations in 1987 that allowed banks to acquire 
and own securities firms547, most of the underwriting capacity of the Canadian 
securities industry gradually came under the control of banks548. By doing so, 
Canadian banks infringed on the GSA due to the fact they possessed securities 
affiliates principally engaged in non-permissible activities549.
In essence, the GSA Imposes prohibition against commercial banking and Investment 
banking in the same entity. It is supplemented by the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 (BHCA)550 and the International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA)551. On the one 
hand, §§ 16 and 21 of the GSA approach the legislative goal of separating "the 
securities business" from the "business of banking" from different directions. Section
The GSA defines a "bank" as an organization engaged "in the business of receiving 
deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate 
of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor..." 12 U.S.C. 
§378 (a)(2).
Supra, note 337.
However, remember that the Canadian model of "universal banking" provides for 
investment banking activities to only be conducted (with certain exceptions) by 
affiliates.
POTTER & LUSSENBURG, supra, note 518 at 135. DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, 
supra, note 137 at 27,108 para. 38-405.
12 U.S.C. § 1841, as amended. A "BHC" is "[...] any company which has control over 
any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company [...]." 12 
U.S.C. § 1841 (a)(1). In the context of the GSA, Section 4(a) of the BHCA prohibits a 
BHC and its non-bank affiliates from engaging in any non-banking activities (such as 
dealing in, underwriting or purchasing securities) except as otherwise provided in the 
BHCA. Generally, "[tjhe standard for determining whether a BHC subsidiary may 
engage in a particular activity (including securities-related activity) under § 4(c)(8) of 
the BCHA is whether the proposed activity is "so closely related to banking ... as to be 
a proper incident thereto"." GREENE [et at], Vol. 2, supra, note 47 at 721.
12 U.S.C. § 3101, as amended. Until the enactment of the IBA in 1978, banks 
organized under non-U.S. law (i.e. foreign banks) were regulated only by state law. 
Therefore, because federal banking laws did not apply to foreign banks, Congress felt 
they had a competitive advantage over U.S. domestic banks. The IBA eliminated 
these disparities. GREENE [etal.], supra, note 47. In the context of the GSA, the IBA 
"[...] applies the non-banking activity limitations of the [BHCA] to foreign banks that 
have U.S. branches or agencies or certain other U.S. banking interests." Ibid., Vol. 1 
at 14.
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16 places a limit on the power of a bank to engage in securities transactions552. 
Hence, §16 prevents national and state member banks from "dealing in underwriting 
and purchasing" securities, subject to certain exceptions553. Section 21 prohibits 
deposit-taking by any entity "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling 
or distributing ... securities" except as permitted by §16 or in certain other cases554. 
On the other hand, §20 forbids any Federal Reserve System (hereinafter FRS) 
member bank (including a national bank) from being "affiliated"555 with an entity 
"engaged principally" in the "issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution" of 
securities. Section 32 prohibits certain interlocks to occur between FRS member 
banks (including a national bank) and entities "primarily engaged" in the securities 
activities mentioned in §20 (except as permitted by the FRB)556.
However, §§16 and 21 by their terms (and §20 by interpretation) specifically provide 
for certain important exemptions. Thus, in general terms, banks may: (i) do brokerage 
for customers; (ii) underwrite and deal in certain government securities; and (iii) 
purchase and sell various securities as an investor557.
2.2 Other Canadian Demands
The power to establish and exploit branches in many American states was sought 
after by demanding the withdrawal of the IBA which forbade interstate banking and
According to §5(c) of the Banking Act of 1933 (now codified as 12 U.S.C. §335), §16 
of the GSA applies to state member banks. Moreover, the provisions of §16 also apply 
to both federal and state chartered branches of foreign banks by virtue of §§4(b) and 
7(b)(2) of the IBA.
Until the FTA was entered into by the U.S., section 16 set forth categories of eligible 
securities which included the following: (i) obligations of the U.S.; (ii) general 
obligations of any State or any political subdivision thereof; and (iii) obligations listed in 
section 16 as obligations issued under specified statutory authority or as obligations 
issued by specified governmental subordinate agency. GREENE [etal.], Vol. 2, supra, 
note 47 at 716ff.
For a list of other cases, see, e.g., DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 
at 27,103 para. 38-405.
For this purpose, "affiliates" are subsidiaries, parent or sister companies or other 
companies being, to some degree, interlocked. See 12 U.S.C. §221(a)(b).
12 C.F.R. §218.108.
GREENE [et ai], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 718.
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subjected foreign banks to the same restrictions as U.S. banks558. Canadian banks 
also sought the right to acquire local banks in certain states559 and lead banking 
activities in others without having to establish a commercial presence. Exemption from 
the discriminatory tax provisions of certain states was also requested by Canadian 
banks. The possibility of no longer having to get their letters of credit issued by certain 
governmental agencies confirmed by American banks was yet another Canadian 
concern, as was obtaining deposit insurance more easily from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for sums deposited by their clients. Finally, Canadian 
banks wished for the power to transfer employees more easily to the U.S. and to be 
protected from the extra-territoriality policy of American law.
CHAPTER III: Negotiation Results
When it was signed, the FTA was unique in that it addressed financial sen/ices560 In 
a comprehensive manner561. The entirety of this aspect of the Agreement between 
Canada and the U.S. is comprised in Chapter 17562. Thus, except for the parts of
L. BIERMAN & D.R. FRASER, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement and 
U.S. Banking: Implications for Policy Reforms, (1989) 29 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 at 24-29.
On the possibility of acquiring local banks, see, e.g., ibid, at 12ff.
The FTA is embodied in a 315 page document and is divided into eight Parts and 
twenty-one Chapters. It comprises 126 Articles, various Annexes and Schedules, a 
Preamble, and three sets of Letters. Of all this, sixty-eight pages, two Parts (Four and 
Five), four Chapters (Fourteen to Seventeen inclusive) and thirty Articles are devoted 
to Sen/ices. Of these, one Part (Five) and one Chapter (Seventeen), encompassing all 
of six Articles, are specifically concerned with financial services.
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 10-
11 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings Before Subcommittee on Trade] (statement of James 
A. Baker, III, Secretary of Treasury). At the time the FTA was signed, the only other 
free trade agreement to take-up financial services was the Israel-U.S. FTA. See supra, 
note 72. However, it contains only a non-binding Declaration on Trade in Services and 
does not specifically name the securities industry.
FTA, Article 1701 para. 1. Preliminary transcripts of the negotiations did not indicate 
that financial services were to be treated separately. CANADA, Department of External 
Affairs, Preliminary Transcript-Canadian - U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Elements of 
the Agreement (7 October 1987). Interestingly enough, insurance is not covered by 
Chapter 17 but by the general "Services- provisions of Chapter 14. Unlike Chapter 17, 
Chapter 14 applies at both federal and the state or provincial level and is subject to 
the dispute resolution mechanism of the FTA. Moreover, Chapter 14 (again unlike 
Chapter 17) expresses agreement on a code of conduct in the area of trade in 
services and each provision is equally applicable to both the U.S. and Canada.
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the FTA which it specifically incorporated, Chapter 17 stands alone563. The 
preamble (of Chapter 17) clearly sets the scope for the FTA in financial services. 
Neither of the countries wished to move towards an integrated and harmonized 
financial sector. Instead, the intention seems to have been the preservation of the 
existing integration of the financial systems in the face of changing regulation564.
Both in Canada and the U.S., an important problem concerned the constitutional 
powers of political subdivisions. Hence most of the interesting questions related to the 
relationships between: (i) Canadian federal and U.S. federal regulators; (ii) Canadian 
federal and provincial regulators; and (iii) U.S. federal and state regulators. In the 
FTA, the financial services Chapter does not apply to "a political subdivision of either 
Party"565. Furthermore, the Agreement does not have an effect on future restrictions 
at provincial or state level. As a result, U.S. state restrictions remain in place. On the 
Canadian side, provincial laws (such as the various securities acts) governing 
financial services are not affected by the Agreement566. Thus, provincially regulated 
securities dealers do not come within the terms of the FTA567. However, the 
Canadian deregulation of financial services undertaken by the provincial and federal 
governments has rendered it more difficult to specify which level of government
Some incidental provisions are incorporated in Chapter 17. Those relate to Chapters
16, 20 and 21. More specifically, they refer to: (i) the investment provisions (Article
1601); (ii) the Canada - U.S. Income Tax Convention (Article 2001); (iii) balance-of-
payments trade measures (Article 2002); (iv) maintaining or designating a monopoly
(Article 2010); (v) statistical requirements (Article 2101); (vi) amendments (Article
2105); and (vii) duration and termination. (Article 2106). PETERS & DRAKE, supra,
note 520, 332 at 334-335. JOHNSON & SCHACTER, supra, note 521 at 122 n. 68.
The fact that Chapter 17 stands alone means that Chapter 13 (respecting government
procurement) and 19 (referring to dispute settlement do not apply to trade in financial
services). Moreover, Article 1701 "[...] does not include application of the preamble
and Chapters 1 and 2 to the Financial Services Articles for interpretational purposes."
DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,054 para. 38-215.
CHANT, supra, note 17 at 10.
FTA Article 1701 para. 2. A "political subdivision" is defined in Article 1706 as a
province, state and local government of either Canada or the U.S.
Article 1703 para. 1 of the FTA specifically excludes "provincially constituted financial
institutions" from the "commitments of Canada". "The major financial institutions not
subject to the commitments of Canada in the FTA are provincially incorporated
insurance companies, financial cooperatives, i.e. credit unions and caisses populaires
(which are owned cooperatively by their members), investment dealers and mutual
funds." DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,204 para. 38-705.
POTTER & LUSSENBURG, supra, note 518 at 140. DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds,
supra, note 137 at 27,051 para. 38-205.
151
regulates what. In view of what was mentioned earlier concerning CANSEC, the 
federal government in Canada could have alleged the federal supremacy to enact 
legislation concerning the securities sector. However, it was not prepared to take the 
internal political risk, especially when both countries were just beginning to explore the 
subject of trade in financial services568.
The FTA states that "financial service" is defined as a service of a financial nature 
offered by a "financial institution", which institutions are defined as those authorized to 
do business relating to financial institutions under the laws of a Party or its political 
subdivisions569. This definition implies that the scope of authorized services remains 
within the sole jurisdiction of each Party or its subdivisions. Therefore, when federally 
regulated companies were allowed into the provincially regulated securities industry, 
the question of jurisdiction finally had to be resolved by agreements between Ottawa 
and Ontario570 and between Ottawa and Quebec571. This is only an example of 
how access to the Canadian financial market by virtue of federal regulation can in 
some cases be blocked by provincial regulation, depending on whether the federally- 
regulated institution is Canadian or foreign-owned.
On another aspect, the principle of ECO is more apparent in Chapter 17 than is 
reciprocity. However, some elements of national treatment can also be found572.
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 334.
FTA, Article 1706.
See, supra, note 343.
Ibid
The FTA did not explicitly define "national treatment". PETERS & DRAKE, supra, note 
520 at 332-333. "[Bjoth sides were unable to agree on a definition of "national 
treatment" in the financial services area. But the consultative mechanism should help 
to resolve, in a practical way, major differences in this area." Hearing Before the 
Commission on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. May 20, 1988, supra, note 526 
at 80 (testimony of Robert D. Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs International 
Corp.). However, the problems surrounding the negotiations of a concept which would 
please all parties were explained by former Canadian ambassador to the U.S. Allan 
Gottlieb when he said that "[t]he negotiators struggled with various concepts to 
address the asymmetries. They debated applying the reciprocity principle, equality of 
access, various discriminatory models, de jure national treatment and so on down the 
list of concepts. In the end, the two sides opted for what has been styled "equality of 
competitive opportunity" and that is not a bad way of putting it. Although de jure 
national treatment was not accepted, the approach of "equality of competitive 
opportunity" looks a lot like de facto national treatment". See "Comments by Allan 
Gottlieb" in The Future of Financial Services: The Michigan Conference — Proceedings
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Chapter 14 of the FTA (which applies to services in general but not to Chapter 17) is 
based on the concept of allowing national treatment to entities of the other country 
providing traded sen/ices (i.e. services sourced and provided from the other country). 
In the financial sector, most industrial countries (including Canada and the U.S.) 
regulate financial services on the basis of such services being offered within their 
borders or to residents or citizens of their country. Still, the uniqueness of Chapter 17 
appears to be a series of exchanges of concessions between the countries573.
Some major points of the Agreement consisted of: (i) the exclusion of financial 
services from the Chapter concerning services; and (ii) the disenfranchisement of 
future differences in financial service matters from the general system for resolving 
differences574. It is important to note that neither the International Trade Commission 
(created in Chapter 18) nor the dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 19 have 
jurisdiction over financial services575. Instead, it has been replaced by a consultative 
process between the Canadian Department of Finance and the U.S. Department of 
Treasury. Moreover, note that the nullification and impairment provisions contained in 
Chapter 20576 and the Chapter 13 provisions relating to government procurement do
(Detroit, Mich.: Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau, May 1990) 21 at 22. 
Nonetheless there is confusion on that matter. For example, certain authors maintain 
that the key principle of the financial Chapter is "national treatment". BIERMAN & 
FRASER, supra, note 558 at 3. A. SAUMIER, "The Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement and the Services Sector" in GOLD & LEYTON-BROWN, eds, supra, note 
520 at 328.
FTA, Article 1702 para. 1. A consulting mechanism between the Canadian Department 
of Finance and the U.S. Treasury Department was established instead. FTA, Article 
1704 para. 2. This includes prior notice of any proposed legislative or regulatory 
changes in order to give time for comment. G. LOHMANN & R. LABROSSE, "The 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and Financial Services" in J. CHACKO, ed., The 
Future of Canadian and U.S. Financial Sem'ces in the Global Context (Windsor, Ont.: 
Centre for Canadian-American Studies, 1990) 90 at 92.
It has been said that Chapter 17 was exempt from the general dispute settlement 
provisions to avoid a situation where "a panel would be second-guessing the court 
system" if there already exists a FRB or court decision. United States-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, 100th Congress, 2nd Session 16-17 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings Before 
Comm, on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs] (statement of Thomas J. Berger, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary Affairs, Department of 
Treasury). On the other hand, some say that the consultative process gives the U.S. 
Treasury a greater influence over Canadian legislation as Canada continues its 
liberalization program. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 40.
FTA, Article 2011.
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not apply to Chapter 17. Finally, it should be pointed out that there is no mechanism 
provided to enforce the Financial Services Articles nor is there any route for the 
hearing of complaints voiced by the private sector with respect to same. Presumably, 
the only recourse of the securities industry in either country, if it believes that a law or 
a practice of the other Party unfairly favours or restricts the free-flow of financial 
services, is to complain to its own government and to request that the two 
governments "consult" on the issue.
Moreover, Canada and the U.S. made one commitment jointly and each made three 
commitments separately. Jointly, they respectively agreed to continue to provide each 
other’s financial institutions with the rights and privileges they enjoyed as a result of 
existing laws, regulations, practices and stated policies. However, this "standstill" 
approach is further complemented by an agreement to consult with each other 
regarding liberalization of their rules governing financial sen/ices and to extend the 
benefits of any such liberalization to each other’s financial institutions577. Thus, if 
one Party fails to extend the benefits of liberalization to the other Party, the "injured" 
Party is no longer obliged to fulfil the "standstill" commitment. The negotiators thought 
that this mechanism would encourage dispute resolution through consultation. In that 
vein, note that Article 1704 para. 1 requires each Party (to the extent possible) to 
make public and allow opportunity for comment on legislation and proposed 
regulations resulting from the agreement on financial sen/ices578
This vague commitment to liberalization is referred to in Articles 1702 para. 4 and 
1703 para. 4. However vague it is, this commitment sparked considerable debate in 
the U.S Congress. BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 4 n. 17. Hence, "[sjince 
Canada has already advanced far beyond the United States with respect to 
"liberalization" or "deregulation" of its financial markets, in an agreement based on the 
principle of national treatment of each side’s financial institutions, only the Canadian 
side had to gain from a commitment of the other side further to liberalize financial 
markets." JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 39. Therefore, the language to the effect that 
the financial services Chapter does not represent "the mutual satisfaction" of the 
parties is probably of Canadian origin.
"This commitment to public consultation on proposed legislation is somewhat novel for 
Canada although it is a more common practice in the United States. This requirement 
for public consultation softens somewhat the impact of the lack of a dispute settlement 
mechanism for the financial services sectors." DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, 
note 137 at 27,052 para. 38-205.
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1. Specific Commitments of Both Countries
Before analysing the various commitments of both the U.S. and Canada it is important 
to keep in mind that Chapter 17 (as elsewhere in the FTA)579 states that the Parties 
have made clear that benefits may be denied to a company of the Other Party if the 
Party establishes that the company is controlled by a person580 of a third 
country581.
Having said so, it is important to distinguish between the provisions applying to a 
"bank" and those applying to a "financial institution". In essence, Part Five of the FTA 
relates only to the "banking sector". Due to the fact that banking fell under federal 
jurisdiction in Canada and the U.S.582, Canadian Finance and U.S. Treasury officials 
were able to act fairly easily583. Still, we see here that the negotiators were careful 
to avoid the areas where there exists substantive provincial and state jurisdictions. 
Hence, references to investment dealers are made only sporadically in the FTA 
(Annex 1408 and Annex 1502.1) and their employees are given free access between 
both countries. However, to the extent that deregulation rocked the four-pillars system,
See FTA, Articles 1406 (Services) and 1611 (investment: definition of "investor of a 
Party").
"Person" is not defined in Chapter 17 but presumably includes individuals and 
corporations.
FTA, Article 1705 para. 2. "Arguably, this provision is unnecessary because the 
benefits of Chapter Seventeen are only available to Canadian and United States- 
controlled financial institutions and United States persons ordinarily resident in the 
United States". JOHNSON & SCHACTER, supra, note 521 at 122. According to Article 
1706 of the FTA, "Canadian-controlled" means controlled directly or indirectly by one 
or more individuals who are "ordinarily resident" in Canada. The expression "ordinarily 
resident" is also defined at Article 1706 and means sojourning in that country for at 
least 183 days during the relevant year. "United States-controlled" means either de 
facto or de jure control held, directly or indirectly, by one or more "United States 
nationals". For the purposes of Chapter 17, a "United States national" is an individual 
who is a citizen or permanent resident of the U.S. DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, 
supra, note 137 at 27,053-27,054 para. 38-210.
In the domain of "banking”, the U.S. federal jurisdiction is autonomous (if not 
exclusive) where banks can be set up under either federal or state statute.
Still, "[i]t is probably safe to conclude that the lack of post-implementation change is 
due more to the comparative strengths of Canadian banks, the weak American 
financial sector, and the fact that both markets were relatively open prior to 1987, than 
to any provision of the FTA." S. COOPER, "Trade in Financial Services: The Canadian 
Banks’ Perspective" in CANADA, Department of Justice, Proceedings of the Ninth 
International Trade Law Seminar (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 
1992) 115 at 116.
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the narrow "bank" focus of Part Five of the FTA proved to be less critical than it 
appeared at first sight.
2. Canadian Gains: Minimal and Symbolic584
Under Article 1702 para. 1 of the FTA585, the U.S. agreed (to the extent that the 
domestic and foreign banks are permitted to engage in the dealing in, underwriting 
and purchasing of debt obligations backed by the full faith credit of the U.S., its states 
or political subdivisions) that Canadian, American and foreign banks (including holding 
companies) and their affiliates be permitted to engage in the dealing in, underwriting 
and purchasing of debt obligations backed by the Canadian equivalent of the full faith 
credit of Canada, its provinces or political subdivisions586. This includes not only 
federal, provincial and municipal bonds, but also debt obligations of "agents" such as
For an understanding of the position of the U.S. government with respect to its 
commitments towards Canada, see U.S. SENATE REPORT, N° 100-509, September 
15, 1988. (1988) 5 Code Congressional and Administrative News 2395 - 2468 at 67. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Report of the Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs N° 100-816(V), August 5, 1988, Congressional Information Service 
88H243-6. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Hearings before the Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, May 24,1988, Congressional Information Service 
88H241 -37.
"[I]t is interesting to note that the only implementing legislation necessitated by the 
U.S. commitments in Article 1702 was the amendment to section 16 of the [GSA] 
pursuant to paragraph 1702(1)." DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 
27,122 para. 38-455. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 36. In comparison, the Canadian 
legislation designed to implement the FTA contained amendments to 27 federal 
statutes.
About the mere existence of that provision, it has been said that it has "more to do 
with the marketing of Canadian public debt in the United States than with the 
liberalization of trade in financial services." JOHNSON & SCHACTER, supra, note 521 
at 118. Also, it was predicted that it would "significantly affect the future ability of 
Canadian governmental entities to finance their debt." BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, 
note 558 at 7. One effect of the change, however, has been to allow Canadian bank- 
owned dealers to continue to underwrite Canadian government debt in compliance 
with the GSA. Historically, government debt underwriting was an important component 
of the Canadian securities dealers operating in the U.S. M. LALONDE, Trade in 
Financial Services Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian 
Perspective (Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association — National Institute of 
United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement, 1988) 161 at 173. It has even been a 
greater component of the business since U.S. subsidiaries of Canadian securities 
firms that were acquired by Canadian banks had to stop transacting in corporate 
securities under the GSA. C.S. MORTON, The Impact of the Free Trade Agreement 
on the Flow of Services Between Canada and the United States, (1991) 16 Can.-U.S. 
L.J. 91 at 99.
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federal and provincial Crown corporations (provided that these are fully backed587 by 
the Canadian government)588. Although bankers and their affiliates have gained 
access to what is called the "Canadian Yankee market" for U.S.-dollar bonds issued 
or guaranteed by Canadian governments, this American commitment did not 
"undermine the basic tenets of the Glass-Steagall Act"589. Since the bulk of the 
underwriting is done in New York590, this enables the different levels of Canadian 
government a considerable saving on servicing the debt which is estimated to be in 
the billions of dollars yearly591. Hence, it was considered that the sale of these 
securities by banks in the U.S. would promote competition and afford their holders 
greater market liquidity592. Consequently, the rate of interest paid on the debt of 
Canadian governmental entities would be lower593. However, this assurance does 
not address the requirements of state securities laws (which, of course, concern the
"This full faith credit standard is not free from uncertainty. In the U.S., for example, 
obligations of certain entities that are not instrumentalities of the U.S. government, 
such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, do not bear the express full 
faith and credit backing of the U.S. Nevertheless, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation is recognized as a government sponsored agency and viewed as bearing 
an implied full faith and credit backing of the U.S. Similar uncertainties may arise with 
respect to certain Canadian obligations." DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 
137 at 27,104 para. 38-405.
LALONDE, supra, note 586 at 161. In other words, "Article 1702.1 for purposes of 
restrictions on dealing in and underwriting securities, equates Canadian government 
securities with U.S. government securities." JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 35. The FRB 
supported this kind of underwriting activity "that with respect to U.S. Government and 
State and local government obligations, [...] can be undertaken by banking institutions" 
in the U.S. Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 
supra, note 526 at 9 (statement of Michael Bradfield, General Counsel, Board of 
Governors, Federal Reserve System).
Fact Sheet-Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement released by the White House (Office 
of the Press Secretary) on January 2, 1988 at 34; as reprinted in the Hearing Before 
the Comm, on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra, note 526 at 46 (May 20, 
1988).
R. LIPSEY & R.C. YORK, Evaluating the Free Trade Deal: A Guided Tour through the 
Canada-U.S. Agreement, Policy Study N° 6, (Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1988) 
at 91-92.
BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 19. Since the 1950s, Canada has run a 
current account deficit for every year (except for 7 years of surpluses). At the end of 
1994, the net external debt amounted to a record Cdn $ 637.6 billion. STATISTICS 
CANADA, Catalogue N° 67-202, System of Nation Accounts: Canada’s International 
Investment Position, 1994, Table 1 at 45.
It was said that this "relatively modest step" should be beneficial "by providing a larger 
market for [...] governments’ securities". See Hearings Before the Comm, on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs, supra, note 526 at 2-3 (comment by Rep. Chamlmers P. 
Wylie).
Ibid.
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securities offered within state boundaries)594.
The second U.S. commitment relates to interstate banking facilities595. Here, the 
U.S. agreed not to adopt or apply any measure that would accord treatment less 
favourable to nationals of Canada than (such treatment already) accorded under §§ 5 
and 7 of the I BA. These sections contain "grand-fathering" provisions for foreign 
banks relating to interstate branching and non-banking activities596. In other words, 
Canadian-controlled banks597 that operated branches in many American states prior 
to October 4, 1987598 are able to continue doing so at the level permitted by the 
federal regulation under the IBA. This protected the major Canadian banks with a 
significant number of branches in the U.S.599. The FTA does not, however, provide 
any assurances that the U.S. will extend to Canadian-controlled banks provisions for 
future interstate expansion beyond those provided under the IBA on October 4, 1987. 
Moreover, the U.S. would not agree to give Canadian banks a right of establishment 
in all states, interstate banking not being a matter that the U.S. federal government is 
constitutionally empowered to regulate600. Note that these were preserved with the 
coming of the IBA which contained a safeguard clause to that effect. The FTA freezed
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 332.
FTA, Article 1702 para. 2. For a detailed understanding of the interstate banking 
commitment under the FTA, see, e.g., DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 
137 at 27,115 to 27,121 paras 38-410 to 38-450.
Article 1702 para. 2 of the FTA protects Canadian-controlled banks that are foreign 
banks for the purpose of the IBA in maintaining their interstate banking networks 
established prior to July 27,1978. On the day the FTA was signed, 8 Canadian banks 
operating 15 subsidiary banks, 18 branches and 14 agencies were existing under this 
provision. Hearings Before the Comm, on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra, 
note 526 at 9 (statement of Michael Bradfield, General Counsel, Board of Governors, 
Federal Reserve System). The effect of the FTA was to "lock in this grandfathering so 
it would not be changeable by subsequent legislative action." Ibid.
The term "Canadian-controlled" is defined in Article 1706 and relates to beneficial 
ownership of more 50 percent of the shares which can elect the board of directors, or 
to control as a fact. DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,115 para. 
38-415.
October 4, 1987 is the date on which Canada and the U.S. agreed in principle on the 
elements to be included in the FTA. CANADA, Department of Finance, The Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement: An Economic Assessment (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1988) at 23.
LEFEBVRE, supra, note 530 at 369. POTTER & LUSSENBURG, supra, note 518 at 
142 n. 55. MACINTOSH, supra, note 519 at 34:47 and 34:56. It was estimated that 
probably 40 or 50 branches of Canadian banks were affected. However, their number 
dwindled as operations proved uneconomical. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 36. 
DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,122 para. 38-450.
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this benefit. This is not really a gain for Canada, for a future modification to the 
safeguard clause was, according to certain authors, highly unlikely601. Still, this 
second commitment of the U.S. has become less significant as states have moved to 
open up interstate branching602.
Finally, the U.S. undertook to treat Canadian-controlled financial institutions in the 
same way as American financial institutions during any future modification of the GSA 
and associated legislation and resulting amendments to regulations and administrative 
practices603. Of course, there is no guarantee that the GSA will be amended604. 
Thus, the members of the Canadian industry would have preferred more 
assurance605. They are just guaranteed that if any changes to the GSA caused by a 
protectionist attitude of the Congress is to occur, this will not affect them. Some 
maintain this is yet another symbolic and useless provision606. They state that the 
IBA aims at putting all banks on an equal stand and that any future amendment will 
do so as well. This reasoning is somewhat simplistic however. Since it was negotiated 
under a protectionist context in the U.S., it is clearly a non-negligible extra insurance
BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 25-26. "Although the inapplicability of 
Chapter 17 to political subdivisions has [...] greatly undercut the significance of Article 
1702.2, to Canada it may represent the preservation of the last vestige of privilege." 
JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 36.
On the rapid growth of interstate banking, see, e.g., "Interstatic" The Economist (4 
June 1994) 80. Note that it has been argued that "[the Foreign Bank Supervision 
Enhacement Act of 1991] requires foreign banks to obtain [FRB] approval before 
establishing a branch agency or acquiring control of a commercial lending company. 
By imposing a requirement that approval be obtained where none was previously 
required, this federal measure arguably accords less favourable treatment than existed 
on October 4, 1987." J.R. JOHNSON, The North American Free Trade Agreement: A 
Comprehensive Guide (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1994) at 355. However, 
against this requirement, it has been said that "[w]hile the negotiations protected 
against de jure changes in policy, it did not protect against discretionary changes in 
application of regulation." CHANT, supra, note 17 at 18.
FTA, Article 1702 para. 3. This guarantee by the Americans did not require any 
implementing legislation. DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,122 
para. 38-455.
SEC’s then-Chairman Ruder, in his testimony on behalf of the SEC before the Senate 
Committee on Banking, and Urban Affairs on December 3, 1987, and before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the 
House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on December 9, 1987, 
stated that the SEC is unable to support any proposals to repeal the GSA unless 
investor protection concerns arising from the entry of banks into securities activities 
are simultaneously addressed.
MACINTOSH, supra, note 519 at 34:57.
BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 21.
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for Canadian banks. Eventually, this commitment from the U.S. could help bridge the 
gap between the pace of regulatory change in the financial communities of both 
countries.
Finally, thanks to the provisions of Chapter 15 concerning temporary visiting rights for 
business people, Canadian banks have been able to transfer employees more easily 
to the United States607.
3. American Gains: Much More Considerable
As mentioned above, the commitments of the U.S. are mostly vague and phrased in 
general terms. However, the commitments of Canada are very specific and required 
legislative amendments to several Canadian statutory provisions. Canada agreed that 
U.S. nationals and U.S.-controlled companies receive treatment as favourable as 
Canadian nationals with respect to their ability to purchase shares of Canadian- 
controlled financial institutions608.
Following the coming into effect of the FTA, many modifications were brought to the 
Bank A cf09. American residents610 are no longer considered as non-residents with
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 336.
FTA, Article 1703 para. 1. In other words, Canada committed itself not to use specified 
sections of various named statutes to restrict U.S. ownership of the various financial 
institutions governed by these pieces of legislation: (i) the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B- 
1, s. 110(1); (ii) the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I- 
15, ss. 19(1), 20(2); (iii) the Investment Companies Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 33, ss. 
11(1), 12(2); (iv) the Loan Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-10, ss. 45(1), 46(2); and 
(v) the Trust Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-16, ss. 38(1), 39(2). These rules are 
generally referred to as the "10/25 rule". More precisely, these provisions limit the 
percentage of shares which can be held in these financial institutions by non-residents 
of the total amount of shares in circulation and that of an individual non-resident at 
10%. However, note that Article 1703 para. 1 in fine specifically exempts provincially- 
incorporated financial institutions from the application of this preferential treatment 
given to the U.S. Nevertheless, remember that as far as securities brokerage firms are 
concerned, foreign entry in domestic markets was open before the ratification of the 
FTA.
S.C. 1991, c. 46 [hereinafter referred to as the Bank Act of 1991]. This act replaces 
the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1 [hereinafter the Bank Act of 1980] as modified by 
the Act to Implement the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United 
States of America, s. 47. Note that some modifications were brought to acts 
concerning Canadian financial institutions other than banks. The modifications concern 
the Insurance Companies Act. (S.C. 1991, c. 47 replacing the Canadian and British
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respect to the application of certain provisions which limit foreign ownership of banks 
under Canadian control. To be more precise, it is the provisions preventing non­
residents from holding more than 25% of the total shares of a given category in 
circulation of a bank under Canadian control611. Such a modification was required 
by Article 1703 para. 1(a) of the FTA612. Consequently, banks under Canadian 
control, meaning the banks listed in Schedule I, are available for American control. 
Therefore, in theory at least, U.S. citizens could control, for example, the Royal Bank 
of Canada613. American residents remain subject to rules concerning property 
stating that banks listed in Schedule I must have a wide-spread capital base. A non­
resident cannot hold more than 10%614 of the total shares in a given category in 
circulation of a bank under Canadian control615. However, such a limit applies to
Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-12, as modified by the Act to Implement 
the Free Trade Agreement Between Canadian and the United States of America, s. 
134, repealed by S.C. 1991, c. 47, s. 761), and the Trust and Loan Companies Act, 
(S.C. 1991, c. 45 replacing the Trust Companies Act, R.S.C 1985, c. T-20, and the 
Loan Companies Act, R.S.C. 1985, L-12 as modified by the Act to Implement the Free
Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America, ss. 139 and 
147, and the Investment Companies Act, (R.S.C. 1985, c. I-22, as modified by the Act 
to Implement the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States of 
America, s. 138. These provisions, all of which are identical, are treated similarly.
The term "American residents" is defined in section 397 (3) of the Bank Act of 1991. 
Ibid, ss. 397 (2) and 399. Note that in order to give effect to the Agreement 
establishing the WTO, Canada had to make related or consequential amendments to 
the Bank Act of 1991. As a result, ss. 397 and 399 were repealed on January 1**, 
1995. An Act to Implement the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
S.C., 1994, c. 47, s. 20. However, Canada has retained its right to reinstate ss. 397 
and 399 with respect to a country that is not a WTO Member. Ibid., s. 13(2). 
CANADA, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Issue N° 2 at 39-48 and Appendix "FA-2A" (28 December 1988).
In the case of a U.S. BHC wishing to acquire a Canadian bank (that in turn owns, for 
example, a securities firm), the FRB would need to approve the acquisition to make 
sure it is safe and sound. One issue of safety would require the continuing 
assessment of the Canadian system of firewalls. See Hearings Before the Comm, on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra, note 526 at 11; 14-16. (Statement by 
Michael Bradfield, General Counsel, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). 
See, supra, note 266. According to this rule, no individual (Canadian or otherwise) 
acting alone or in association, can own more than 10% of a Schedule I bank. "The 
10% rule avoids concentration of ownership of Canadian domestic banks (considered 
to be good public policy), does not constitute a limitation on foreign ownership, and is 
not affected by the FTA". JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 37.
The commentary by the government of Canada said that because of that 10% rule, 
"control of our financial system will be maintained in Canadian hands". CANADA, 
Department of External Affairs, supra, note 562 at 250. However, this statement was 
misleading for: (i) it did not emphasize the fact that the 10 percent rule does not apply
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both Canadian residents and non-residents616. Note that the adoption of these new 
rules concerning property led to the registration of Canadian banks on the New York 
Stock Exchange617. Indeed, the restrictions that limited foreign participation in 
Canadian banks have been a major obstacle in the past618. Note that another set of 
rules applies to Canadian financial institutions other than banks619.
to the entire financial system (so nothing would prevent Canadian-controlled trust and 
insurance companies from being dominated by American residents); and (ii) it 
suggests that this rule makes it impossible for a U.S. resident to own the majority of a 
Canadian bank (which is not so). In this case, nothing would prevent a majority of a 
bank’s shares from being acquired by a group of Americans. On that second point, 
however, the CBA argued that this hypothesis is unlikely to materialize. See 
Testimony of Robert Macintosh, supra, note 519 at 34:51. Furthermore, "[ojver the last 
15 years [prior to the signing of the FTA], foreign ownership of the big six banks has 
actually declined — from about 25 per cent to 5 per cent." MAGUN [et al.], supra, note 
534 at 127. Still, there is no guarantee that in the future, the shareholder profile will 
not change. Thus, in view of the fact that banks control the ownership of the major 
brokerage firms, the Canadian securities industry could (theoretically) come under the 
control of foreigners. P. ROCHON, Strengthening Market Access in Financial Services 
Provisions of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference 
Board of Canada, 1989) at 8. A. CHAPMAN, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988) at 34. J.-P. CARON, 
"Les banques face au libre-6change" Le banquier (April 1994) 40 at 41.
Bank Act of 1991, s. 372.
See Infra., Part III, Title I, Chapter III.
Such a commentary also applies to other Canadian financial institutions, such as trust 
and loan companies. G. DAVIS & B.W. PUSCH, "Financial Services" in DEARDEN & 
PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,203 para. 38-705.
In the case of Canadian financial institutions other than banks, note that following the 
coming into effect of the FTA, American residents (as defined in Investment 
Companies Act, s. 141.1 para. 2; Insurance Companies Act, s. 427 para. 3; and Trust 
and Loan Companies Act, s. 395 para. 3) are no longer considered as non-residents 
with respect to the application of the provisions of these acts limiting foreign property 
of financial institutions under Canadian control. Such modifications were required by 
Article 1703 para. 1(b), (c) and (d) of the FTA. Unlike the situation prevalent in 
banking matters, the acts concerning financial institutions other than banks, impose no 
restriction on the percentage of share that can be held by an individual Canadian 
resident. (Investment Companies Act, s. 15 para. 1; Insurance Companies Act, s. 429 
para. 1; and Trust and Loan Companies Act, s. 397 par. 10). Consequently, an 
individual American resident, just as an individual Canadian resident can acquire more 
than 10% of the aforementioned institutions. MACINTOSH, supra, note 519 at 34:51. 
Many observers have underlined, and rightly so, that American financial institutions 
were thus enabled to take control of Canadian financial institutions other than banks. 
For example, see FORDYCE & NICKERSON, supra, note 339, 351 at 365. Such a 
statement however needs some distinguishing. The engagements of Chapter 17 
concerning financial services only apply to the federal government, not the provinces. 
American financial institutions, that wish to do business in the more important 
Canadian provinces remain subject to the rules of property regulating such financial 
institutions. In the field of securities brokerage, the Americans find no provincial 
restrictions to investment. However, the FTA would not preclude the provinces from 
creating such a condition in the future. STEGER, supra, note 85 at 59.
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The modifications to property ruies on chartered banks for Americans have brought 
correlative modifications to provisions of the Bank Act which limit the exercise of 
voting rights pertaining to shares held by non-residents. The following limits no longer 
apply to American residents: (i) the suspension of voting rights pertaining to bank 
shares held by a non-resident if he already owned more than 10% of the total shares 
of a given category in circulation620; and (ii) the absence of voting rights pertaining 
to banks shares held by a resident in the name of or for a non-resident621. Again, 
different rules apply to Canadian financial institutions other than banks.
At the time of the 1980s reform, the Canadian government opened the door to foreign 
banks that could not obtain a bank charter before. In that sense, it created the bank 
categories found in Schedule II of the Bank Act Under this scheme, foreign banks 
wishing to do business in Canada could now do so by establishing banking 
subsidiaries in Canada622. However, they remained subject to many restrictions in 
the running of their banking activities in Canada. The FTA has eliminated some of 
these restrictions for American banks623. However, despite many changes, U.S.- 
controlled Canadian banks may be created only as a Schedule II bank subsidiary, and 
this has not changed under the FTA.
The banks listed in Schedule II controlled by American residents may now open 
branches in Canada without having to obtain prior authorization from the minister624.
Bank Act of 1991, s. 397 para. 2 and s. 400 para. 1. As of January 1st, 1995, these 
concessions were extended to all WTO members. See the Act implementing the WTO, 
supra, note 611, ss. 19 and 21.
Ibid, s. 397 para. 2 and s. 401. Again, as of January 1st, 1995, these concessions 
were extended to all WTO members. See the Act implementing the WTO, supra, note 
611, ss. 19 and 22.
Bank Act of 1980, s. 302. See the definition of foreign bank subsidiary in section 2 of 
the Act. They could also establish representative offices, following section 302, or 
create, like before, incorporated subsidiaries in the provinces.
However, note that during the FTA negotiations, "Canadian federal regulators have 
insisted on maintaining the foreign bank subsidiary structure (and have not succumbed 
to pressures to permit Canadian branches of U.S. banks) on the grounds that unlike 
their American counterparts, Canadian regulators do not indulge in the extraterritorial 
application of Canadian banking laws; they [are] applied only to Canadian entities. The 
Canadian regulators, however, wish to ensure that there is a Canadian entity to be 
regulated". JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 38.
Bank Act of 1980, s. 173(2.1) as modified by the Act to Implement the Free Trade 
Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America, s. 48. This provision 
has been reproduced in full in the Bank Act of 1991, s. 422(2). H[S]uch ministerial
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Such a modification was required by Article 1703 para. 2(c) of the FTA. In addition, 
the last provision of Article 1703 para. 2 (which is of relatively limited significance) 
permits a U.S.-controlled Schedule II bank to transfer loans to its parents (subject to 
prudential requirements of general application)625.
The FTA then dispensed American banks from the application of rules concerning 
individual and collective assets that can be held by foreign banks in Canada. 
Subsidiaries of foreign banks controlled by American residents are no longer subject 
to rules limiting the global domestic assets of foreign banks in Canada626. Also, 
foreign banks subsidiaries controlled by American residents are no longer subject to 
rules limiting individual domestic assets held by a bank listed in Schedule II627. Such 
modifications fulfilling Canada’s undertakings in the FTA628, ensure the future growth 
of American banks in Canada. In fact, except for the obligation of American banks 
wishing to do business in the Canadian market to first establish Canadian subsidiaries 
constituted under Schedule II before opening branches629, they now benefit from the
approval has never been denied in the past. Thus, dropping of the requirement of 
ministerial approval merely removes and irritant.M MAGUN [et al.], supra, note 534 at 
128. BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 27. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 38. 
Note that the other foreign banks cannot open more than one branch in Canada 
(except for their head office) without prior authorization from the minister. Bank Act 
1991, s. 422(1).
"With some limited exceptions, current Canadian tax regulation, which requires 
withholding on interest payments made to non-residents of Canada on certain debt 
obligations, is a strong disincentive to such transfers." JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 
38.
Prior to the signing of the FTA, there existed a 16% ceiling on total authorized capital 
of foreign-owned banks as a percentage of total assets of all banks in Canada. Bank 
Act of 1980, s. 302(8). Later, that ceiling was lowered to 12%. However, with the FTA 
American banks are now excluded from this calculation following s. 302 (8.1) of the 
Bank Act of 1980 as modified by the Act to Implement the Free Trade Agreement 
Between Canada and the United States of America, s. 49. This provision has been 
reproduced in full in the Bank Act of 1991, s. 424(2). On January 1st, 1995, the 12% 
ceiling stopped to apply to foreign banks subsidiaries other than U.S.-controlled 
Schedule II banks. Note, however, that s. 424 was repealed on January 1**, 1995 as a 
goodwill gesture towards WTO members. See the Act implementing the WTO, supra, 
note 611 s. 25.
Bank Act of 1991, s. 423. No foreign bank subsidiary may, during any three month 
period, have average domestic assets exceeding an amount fixed by order of the 
Minister. For further details on the mode of calculation of domestic assets, see the 
Domestic Assets Regulations, Canada Gazette Part I, p. 429.
Article 1703 para. 2(b) and (c).
See, supra, note 622 and accompanying text.
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national treatment630. Thus, U.S. commercial banks are allowed to establish or 
acquire securities firms or federally regulated Canadian insurance and trust 
companies in the same manner as Canadian banks.
According to Article 1703 para. 3 of the FTA, Canada is not to use review powers 
governing the entry of U.S.-controlled financial institutions in a manner inconsistent 
with the aims of the Financial Services Articles. This provision is in place of the 
general relaxation of investment review as set out in Chapter 16. Hence, following the 
coming into force of the FTA, modifications were brought to the Investment Canada 
Act (hereinafter ICA)631. The level of examination for a direct acquisition of control of 
a Canadian business by an American632 has progressively been raised from Cdn $5 
to 10 million, whereas the examination level for an indirect acquisition involving a 
Canadian business, which was set at Cdn $50 million before the adoption of the FTA, 
has been progressively eliminated during the same period633. Such modifications 
were required by Article 1607 para. 3 of the FTA and Schedule 1607.3 para. 2 and
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 332. FORDYCE & NICKERSON, supra, note 339 at 
365. On this aspect of the FTA, the CBA was greatly disenchanted with the result of 
the negotiations. "The problem with national treatment — as opposed to some form of 
reciprocity — is that it does not take into account the disparity in the level of financial 
sector liberalization between the two negotiating parties. COOPER, supra, note 583 at 
116. However, note that "[o]n April 19, 1988, the American Bankers Association and 
the [CBA] joined together in a joint letter to the chairman and ranking member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressing support for the [FTA] because it 
would provide "equality of treatment within the national boundaries" of the [U.S.] and 
Canada for banks and securities firms of both nations." Hearings Before the Comm, 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May 20, 1988, supra, note 426 at 69 
(Statement of Edward L. Yingling, Executive Director, American Bankers Association). 
R.S.C. 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 28 modified by Act to Implement the Free Trade 
Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America, s. 135-137. "Statutory 
limitations on foreign investment in Canada have always been particularly irksome to 
the United States (which has eschewed formal limitations), even where such 
limitations were more in the nature of political window dressing than effective 
obstacles." JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 37. More generally, C. JORDAN, Bye-Bye 
Investment Canada, (1988) 1 Int’l L. Prac. 29. For a brief overview of the Canadian
implementing legislation, see, e.g., D. LEMIEUX, La mise en oeuvre de I'Accord de
libre-echange entre le Canada et les Iztats-Unis en droit interne, (1992) 22 C. de D. 
385. H.S. FAIRLEY, Once More With Feeling: A Brief Commentary on Re-Legislating 
the Canada-United States Free Agreement, (1989) 3 R.I.B.L. 57.
Definition in ICA, ibid., s. 14.1 para. 9.
Ibid., s. 14.1 para. 1 and 7.
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3634. In the post-FIRA period initiated by the Conservatives in 1984, American 
businesses were mostly looking to prevent a return to FIRA or to equivalent 
investment rules635. In practice, the majority of American investments subject to 
examination procedure in the past have now fallen below levels determined under the 
ICA because of the FTA636. These new examination levels also prevail during the 
acquisition of a Canadian business under American control by a non-Canadian other 
than an American. In order to determine if a business is under American control, the 
existing rules on the Canadian status of the business find application for Americans 
with the appropriate changes in terminology637. In this context, it should also be 
noted that the law has been modified to enable application of the Minister’s opinion in 
order to determine if the business is American638. However, it is of paramount 
importance to mention that the new examination levels do not apply to the acquisition 
of a controlling interest in a Canadian business operating in certain strategic 
sectors639. More accurately, this means amongst others the financial sen/ices 
business640. The exclusion of financial institutions businesses (except insurance 
companies, which are concerned by Chapter 14 rather than Chapter 17) echoes 
Articles 1601 para. 2(a) of the FTA641. Nevertheless, Article 1703 para. 3 allows 
Canadians to apply the same type of discretion to the incorporation of federally- 
regulated financial institutions by Americans as it applies to the incorporation of such
Commenting the investment provisions in the FTA, SEC’s then-Chairman Ruder said 
he was troubled by the fact that the U.S. entities would continue to be subject to the 
ICA. (Letter of SEC’s David S. Ruder in response to questions by Sen. Jim Sasser as 
reprinted in Hearings Before the Comm. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (20 May 
1988), supra, note 426 at 66.
See Hearings Before the Comm, on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, May 24, 
1988 supra, note 426 at 28 (testimony of Stephen J. Canner, Director, Office of 
International Investment, U.S. Department of Treasury). MORTON, supra, note 586, 
91 at 97.
G. ADDY, "Investment" in DEARDEN & PALMETEER, supra, note 137 at 25,014 para. 
35-000. R.B. LECKOW & I.A. MALLORY, The Relaxation of Foreign Investment 
Restrictions in Canada, (1991) 6 F.I.L.J. 1 at 7.
Investment Canada Act, s. 14.1 para. 10, s. 26 paras. 1 and 2, s. 27.
Ibid., s. 37 para. 1.
Investment Canada Act, s. 14.1 para. 8.
Ibid., s. 14.1 para. 8(c). Here "financial services" stand for the services included in the 
definition of Article 1706 of the FTA. Ibid., s. 14.1 para. 9.
MORTON, supra, note 586, 91 at 98.
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institutions by Canadians642. This vague commitment might be relied upon in the 
consultation process found in Article 1704.
Finally, thanks to the provisions of the general Chapter on sen/ices (Chapter 14), 
American banks now have guaranteed access to information and telecommunication 
networks as well as to electronic sen/ices distribution systems643.
As could be predicted, non-U.S. foreign bank subsidiaries have not been enthusiastic 
about the advantages given to American foreign bank subsidiaries. Immediately after 
the signing of the FTA, non-U.S. competitors lobbied the Canadian governmental 
authorities to have the same benefits extended to them644. However apart from 
Mexico (as we will later see), their requests have yet to be heard.
4. A Balanced Exchange of Concessions?
Generally, Chapter 17 of the FTA falls short of the objectives of both Parties in 
numerous areas. If we consider each country’s goals during the negotiations, we are 
forced to admit that very few gains have been made with the FTA645. But given the 
results achieved, is it a balanced exchange? In our opinion, the U.S. has had the 
upper hand over Canada which made no "substantial gains in trying to get better
This provision may have been useful to the U.S. in light of the Canadian government 
plan allowing the federal Minister of Finance to review transactions involving changes 
to the ownership of federally-regulated financial institutions. A. WOOD, Chapter 17 of 
the Free Trade Agreement-Trade in Financial Services One Year Later, (1990) 3:4 
Canada-U.S. Trade 25. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 38-39. “[Rjequests for 
incorporations may be turned down for valid prudential reasons, including the past 
history of the applicants or the fact that they are not of "good character" in the opinion 
of the regulatory authorities." DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 
27,205 para. 38-715.
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 336.
WOOD, supra, note 642 at 26.
Articles 1702 para. 4 and 1703 para. 4 of the FTA underline the fact that the financial 
services Chapter "shall not be construed as presenting the mutual satisfaction of the 
Parties concerning the treatment of their respective financial institutions." Such 
wording has led some experts to view Part Five of the FTA as representing "an 
incomplete, piecemeal approach to some isolated issues in the financial services area 
that are not the same on both sides of the border." A Guide to the Canada - United 
States Free Trade Agreement (Toronto, Ont.: Fraser and Beatty, 1988) at 49 
(Pamphlet).
167
access to the U.S. financial market646. Despite supporting it647, Canadian financial 
institutions and the CBA expressed concern over Chapter 17648. American financial 
institutions greatly benefited from the FTA and the reform of financial institutions in 
Canada with a greater access to the Canadian market than Canadian banks and 
securities firms to the U.S. market649. Even though the primary impact of the FTA 
has been to make the Canadian financial market more competitive650 some 
pessimistic commentators have expressed the view that the implementation in 
Canada of Chapter 17 would result in "increased American takeovers of Canadian 
financial institutions and an expanded American presence in financial markets"651. In
P.S. PETTIGREW, "Free Trade: A Challenge for Canada’s Industrial Heartland" in 
F.C. MENZ & S.A. STEVENS, eds, Economic Opportunities in Freer U.S. Trade with 
Canada (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1991) 127 at 128. The reason for 
an unbalanced exchange of concessions may be explained by the fact that, while the 
U.S. approached the FTA negotiations table with a list of irritants it wanted to 
eliminate, Canada felt uneasy with the protectionist attitudes present in Congress. 
Thus, "[mjaintance of the status quo for the Canadian side was considered a victory". 
JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 40.
POTTER & LUSSENBURG, supra, note 518 at 150 n. 72.
WOOD, supra, note 642 at 25. Because of the FTA’s treatment of GSA issues, 
Canadians were clearly frustrated by what they perceived as the Agreement’s 
imposition of an "unfair playing field”. BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 21. 
However, "[w]hat’s good for Canada is good for its banks” was the brave face put on 
by the CBA. "Canadians Bank Free Trade Pact Though U.S. May Get a Better Deal" 
American Banker (AS March 1988) 2 at 2.
JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 33-34. After expressing the opinion that Chapter 17 led 
to significant access to the Canadian market, one U.S. senator was happy to point out 
that in return the Americans were "asked to make only [...] very minor, 
noncontroversial changes in U.S. law". See Hearing Before the Comm, on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, supra, note 426 at 23 (May 20, 1988) (statement of 
Senator John Heinz).
”[T]he Canada-U.S. agreement on trade in services, including financial services, is 
likely to have a minor impact on the flow of business services between the two 
countries. By providing national treatment for new regulations and by guaranteeing 
reciprocal access to service and sales personnel, it will likely improve competition, 
lower prices, and give some stimulus to employment and output." ECONOMIC 
COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra, note 95 at 13-14. MAGUN [et a!.], supra, note 534 at 
128-129.
K. FALCONER, "The Trade Pact, Deregulation and Canada’s Financial System" in D. 
CAMERON, ed., The Free Trade Deal (Toronto, Ont.: Lorimier, 1988) 156 at 163. 
”[M]any major U.S. banks see Canada’s deregulated banking environment as 
something of a "training ground" for U.S. banks when greater banking deregulation 
hits the United States. [...] For this reason alone, and geographic risk diversification 
issues aside, it is likely that many U.S. banks will buy major stakes in Canadian 
banks." BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 9 n. 50. "Financial Concerns React 
Favourably to U.S.-Canadian Trade Agreement" American Banker (19 November 
1987) 2 at 2. However, others argued that, although "Americans will enjoy Canada’s 
more relaxed regulations, [...] they will discover that the highly competitive Canadian
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this context, no one was surprised by the results of a study made by the American 
Treasury Department in 1990 revealing that conditions had greatly improved for U.S. 
financial institutions doing business in Canada652. Such a situation could eventually 
change with a deregulation (perhaps better described as "re-regulation") of financial 
services in the U.S., as was proposed by the American Treasury Department in 
1991653. However, many years after the signing of the FTA, liberalization of the U.S. 
markets has been discussed but no significant progress has helped the Canadian 
securities industry654.
The only real concession given to Canada in the area of securities services under the 
FTA concerns underwriting and trading in Canadian governmental securities. For the 
purposes of the GSA, the Canadian government securities are considered to be 
"exempt securities" (as are U.S. government securities)655 and not subject to GSA 
prohibition on underwriting and dealing by banks and bank holding companies656. As
market affords less room for exploiting those advantages." LIPSEY & YORK, supra, 
note 590 at 91. The same argument was used by MORTON, supra, note 586 at 98. 
SAUMIER, supra, note 573 at 329. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 40. In the end, it 
appears that during post-implementation of the FTA, "American banks [were] in such 
a financially precarious state and preoccupied with domestic restructuring, they [could 
not] afford, from both a financial and managerial perspective, to take advantage of 
new opportunities made available in Canada." COOPER, supra, note 583 at 116. 
CHANT, supra, note 17 at 17.
U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, National Treatment Study: Report to Congress on 
Foreign Treatment of U.S. Financial Institutions (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1990), as 
cited in United States International Trade Commission. "The Economic Effects of 
Significant U.S. important Restraints, Phase III: Services with a Computable General 
Equilibrium Analysis of Significant U.S. import Restraints", a report on the Committee 
on Finance of the United States Senate on investigation N° 332-262 under section 332 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, USITC publication 2422, September 1991, (1991) 15:1 World 
Competition 47 at 77.
U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Modernizing the Financial System: 
Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 
1991) as cited in LEFEBVRE, supra, note 530 at 359. Some experts expressed the 
idea that the FTA forced the U.S. to question the existence of their state banking 
regulation and dual banking system. BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 11-17. 
"It is somewhat ironic that deregulation in [Canada] was initially modeled on proposed 
or supposed U.S. initiatives. While it has progressed [in Canada] it is fairly stalled [in 
the U.S.]..." SAUMIER, supra, note 573 at 330 n. 6.
Exchange Actot 1934, §15.
Note that for many years, Canada has been very aggressive in protecting its "territory" 
in the U.S. "Even before the coming into force of Article 1702.1 [...], Canadian banks 
by order under the [BHCA] obtained permission for their securities dealer subsidiaries 
in the [U.S.] to continue activities in Canadian government securities on an interim 
basis, pending implementation of the FTA". JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 41.
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a result, Canadian bank-owned dealers in the U.S. can remain in the Canadian 
government securities business, which represents a major percentage of their 
activities657. In view of the fact that at the time of the negotiations there existed a 
high degree of protectionist sentiment in Congress658 that was an important 
concession659.
Unfortunately for the Canadian side, the U.S. commitments under the FTA have not 
been viewed by many Americans as commitments at all660. Article 1702 para. 3 
demonstrates that the FTA does not take into account the differences between the 
Canadian and the U.S. laws. At one time in the future, if the GSA permits (for 
example) a bank to conduct both banking and commercial activities under a holding 
company and Canadian law does not, could the Canadian banks engage in both 
banking and commerce in the U.S.? If the major reference to the GSA is with respect 
to the securities business, how long will Canadian banks have to wait to fully enter 
this field, all the while during which time U.S. banks already operate in the business in
At the time when the FTA was signed, Canadian governments’ business was said to 
represent up to 90% of activity for Canadian bank-owned dealers. P. WOOD, "Free 
Trade and Canada’s Financial Services Industry" Inf I Fin. L. Rev. (December 1988) 11 
at 12. WOOD, supra, note 642 at 26. JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 35. J. STEPTOE & 
J. JOHNSON, "The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in BUREAU OF 
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: The Complete Resource 
Guide; Volume II: A Legal Guide (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1988) 
at E-79.
See the comments by Rep. Jim Leach in Hearings Before the Comm, on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs, supra, note 426 at 13.
W. GROVER, "The Free Trade Agreement and Financial Services" in GOLD & 
LEYTON-BROWN, eds, supra, note 520, 340 at 341. PETERS & DRAKE, supra, note 
520 at 336. DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,122-27,123 para. 
38-455.
Many examples can be cited. According to one U.S. administration official, Article 
1703 represented only "general verbiage". BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 
17-18. Concerning the commitment towards further liberalization of the rules, the 
language of Article 1702 para. 4 was in the eyes of the Americans, "state-of-the-art", 
meaning no specific commitment was associated with that language. Hearings Before 
the comm, on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra, note 426 at 12 (statement 
of T.J. Berger). In replying to questions by Rep. St-Germain, Rep. Berger also said 
that the FTA committed neither party. "Banking Committees Approve Provisions of U.S.- 
Canada FTA", BNA Banking Report (May 30, 1988) 919. About Article 1702 para. 2, 
Rep. Dingell said the "like other banking provisions in the FTA, [it] is primarily symbolic 
in nature". JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 36.
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Canada? These questions remain unanswered661. Still, some experts predicted that 
the FTA would lead to demise of the "dual banking system" in the U.S.662. However, 
others have said that changes of this sort were not likely to occur in the near 
future663. For their part, Canadian financial institutions vowed to press hard for U.S. 
domestic reforms. Moreover, the increasing familiarity by U.S. financial institutions 
operating under the Canadian regime may also accelerate the pace of reform in the 
U.S.664
Another problem in the FTA comes from the fact that the various terms and definitions 
to be found in this Chapter are sometimes vague and imprecise665. For instance, the 
FTA does not define the word "bank". In view of the reform of the Canadian financial 
institutions, may we associate a "trust company" as being a "bank"? Moreover, Article 
1706 vaguely defines a "financial institution" since the words "as defined by a Party" 
cannot easily be identified. Finally, does the term "administrative practices" refer to 
the SEC, the Bank of Canada or another financial regulator? Here, Canada and the 
U.S. are left to define individually both terms. At the outset, experts were baffled666. 
In Canada, there is no singular definition of "financial institution" or "financial 
sen/ice"667. Similarly, the American definition of these terms is ambiguous668.
"U.S. issues which concerned the Canadians, such as the Glass-Steagall Act, 
interstate banking restrictions and unitary taxation, were problems of fundamental U.S. 
policy which will only be resolved for Canadians when they are solved for Americans". 
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 333.
BIERMAN & FRASER, supra, note 558 at 12.
J.W. SWENDSEN, "A Banking Perspective: Will It Make a Difference?" in FRY &
RADEBAUGH, eds, supra, note 530, 183 at 188-189.
It has been suggested that ”[t]he pressures created by the principle of national 
treatment will undoubtedly compel a certain degree of harmonization of the regulatory 
regimes, and initially most of the pressure will flow from the north." JORDAN, supra, 
note 103 at 41. U.S. financial institutions stand to profit "from their experiences under 
the Canadian regulatory regime, experiences that can suggest solutions to some of 
the very hard questions facing U.S. regulators." Ibid at 42.
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 335.
"It is difficult to understand how the Parties will enforce the provisions of the Financial 
Services Articles if each is left to unilaterally define what the parameters of the sector 
in question are" DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,052 para. 38- 
210.
It has been suggested that M[b]ased on the approach adopted by the Hockin Paper 
and other industry reports [...], it appears that all the institutions referred to in Chapter 
Seventeen, as well as provincially regulated [...] securities dealers [...] might [at one 
point in the future] be considered "financial institutions". JOHNSON & SCHACTER, 
supra, note 521 at 117. According to the recent Canadian federal financial institution
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Would it have been preferable to build an agreement on a reciprocity basis rather 
than on an exchange of concessions669. In the past, U.S. retaliatory threats quite 
often encouraged its trading partners to open their markets to U.S. exports. One 
factor that seemed to have contributed to the success of threats is the existence of an 
anti-protectionist coalition within the country targeted for retaliation. Similarly, the 
strength of the U.S. coalition favouring the use of retaliatory threats is another 
important variable. However, the U.S. has created dangerous precedents and policy 
instruments that it would probably not accept being used against it by other countries. 
Therefore, at some point, other economic superpowers (i.e. either the EU or Japan) 
may choose to imitate U.S. retaliatory policy to the detriment of U.S. firms670.
Specifically in the securities sector, the U.S. retaliatory threats have worked against 
large traders such as Japan and the EU. A 1987 amendment to the Omnibus Trade 
Bill concerned Japanese firms671. It required that the FRB deny Japanese firms 
"primary dealer" status672 if U.S. firms did not receive reciprocal treatment in Japan. 
As a result, U.S. policy changed from national treatment to reciprocal national 
treatment. The threat worked so well that within two weeks of the passage of the 
1988 Omnibus Trade Bill, Japan announced a substantial liberalization of its bond 
markets.
legislative reform, a financial institution includes "an entity that is incorporated of 
formed by or under an Act of Parliament or the legislature of a province and that is 
primarily engaged in dealing in securities, including portfolio management and 
investment counselling." See the definition of "financial institution" of the Bank Act of 
1991 s. 2. On the other hand, because the federal authorities see the term "financial 
services" as continually evolving, it was purposely left undefined in the Bank Act 
GREENWOOD, supra, note 337 at 272.
DELOITTE & TOUCHE, "FRB Redefines Financial Institution" Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (May 
1994) 39.
On reciprocity, supra, note 325 [and accompanying texts].
According to a U.S. Chamber of Commerce report, "Europe will eventually become the 
richest market in the world with enough clout to demand changes in the U.S. legal and 
regulatory system". The Financial Observer (March 1991) 5.
T.O. BAYARD, Comments on Alan Sykes’ Mandatory Retaliation for Breach of Trade 
Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, (1990) 8 B. U. 
Int’l L.J. 325 at 327. W. COOPER, "Banking: The Financial Services Trade War", 
Institutional Investor (November 1987) 203.
"Primary dealers" solely are authorized to deal with the Federal Reserve. In NAFTA, 
Annex VII (Schedule of the United States), Section A, refers to the U.S. Primary 
Dealers Act of 1988 (22 U.S.C. §§ 5341-5342) which "prohibits a foreign firm from 
being designated as a primary dealer in U.S. government debt obligations unless [...]" 
ECO is accorded.
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Now, in the context of the FTA negotiations, would it have been possible for Canada 
to force the Americans to accept an accord founded on reciprocity? If so, this would 
have certainly helped the Canadian securities industry to do business in the U.S. In 
the past, other countries have already attempted to obtain reciprocity with the U.S. 
only with relative success673.
Even though most of the U.S. financial community supports a wide liberalization to 
improve their competitiveness in global markets, it appears Congress still refuses to 
react and create a "big bang". Whether or not further retaliatory threats by economic 
giants would work, it has yet to be demonstrated. In any case, being far less than a 
small economic power compared to the U.S. giant, Canada has been unable to 
achieve this through the FTA negotiations. Although it would have been difficult in 
light of the differences in regulatory structures of both countries674, this would have 
been, in our opinion, more advantageous for the Canadian securities industry675. 
Hence, Canada might have designed a plan to apply a reciprocity policy676 aimed at 
preventing U.S. banks’ subsidiaries and securities firms to accede to the Canadian 
securities market until the time the GSA was eliminated (or at least exempt the 
Canadians from it). Instead, the strategy may have backfired.
DARROCH & LITVAK, supra, note 314 at 123. For many years the EU has maintained 
that the American federal regulatory system constitutes an obstacle to the financial 
services business. EU Commission, Report on United States Trade Barriers and 
Unfair Trade Practices, 1990 at 54-57, as cited in United States International Trade 
Commission at 51.
MACINTOSH, supra, note 519 at 163. POTTER & LUSSENBURG, supra, note 518 at 
150.
See also MADDAUGH, supra, note 314 at 48. DARROCH & LITVAK, supra, note 314 
at 123.
For many years, Canada has employed this policy for its financial sector. Supra, note 
325. "[Reciprocity] has established effectively bilateral horse-trading which has made 
[...] financial services somewhat unique in the trading context relative to other 
tradeable goods." F. SWEDLOVE, "The Current State of Trade in Financial Services" 
in CANADA, Department of Justice, Proceedings of the Ninth International Trade Law 
Seminar (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) 105 at 106. Most 
recently, while the word "reciprocity" is not used, s. 24(b) of the Canadian Bank Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, prohibits the issuance of a bank charter to a foreign bank 
subsidiary unless "the Minister [of Finance] is satisfied that [...] treatment as favourable 
for [Canadian] banks to which this Act applies, exists or will be provided in the 
jurisdiction in which the foreign bank principally carries on business, either directly or 
through a subsidiary." Since its inception, the Canadian Bank Act policy of reciprocity 
has not been a problem of U.S. bank subsidiaries in the Canadian banking industry.
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At the end of 1986, Canada’s chief free trade negotiator Simon Reisman convinced 
the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs Monte Kwinter to open the 
doors to unlimited competition677. Reisman’s objective appears to have been the 
elimination of the state banking laws which restricted Canadian banks to operations in 
one state only. Although the U.S. chief free trade negotiator Peter Murphy appeared 
flexible, this highly emotional issue was negotiated by the hard-nosed U.S. Treasury 
Department. With this, Canada introduced its committee on financial trade issues 
formed with experts from the Department of Finance. About the impact of this 
negotiation strategy, some critics say that, considering the relatively small size of the 
Ontario securities market compared to the U.S., liberalization of Ontario’s securities 
industry was not "a lost bargaining chip"678. Others believe that the Canadian 
markets were already under-capitalized and had to react to threats to the effect that 
much of the trading activity on the Canadian exchanges (mainly in Toronto and 
Montreal) might migrate from Canada to the U.S. (such as through trading of inter­
listed Canadian stocks) if U.S. brokers had to continue to share their commissions 
with their Canadian agents679. However, in view of the fact that the OSC (Canada’s 
most influential securities commission) decided during the FTA negotiations to lower 
barriers of entry to foreign firms, it is quite possible this move may have hindered 
Canada’s chances to obtain better concessions from the U.S.680
In any case, the use of reciprocity by Canada towards the U.S. could have resulted in 
a worse situation. For instance, to counter Canada's use of reciprocity to discriminate 
against the U.S. securities industry, the Americans could have prohibited the entry of 
Canadian banks as a branch of a parent. The situation would have been worse than 
the status quo. Overall, despite the fact that the financial service component of the 
FTA did not achieve very much, it had the merit to force discussions over the U.S. 
bank regulatory structure which affects the Canadian securities industry as well as to 
open some doors for the NAFTA negotiations, and that was no insignificant
"Capital-Market Changes Linked to Trade Talks" The [Montreal] Gazette (5 December 
1986) B1.
LOHMAN & MURDEN, supra, note 325 at 151.
H. LAZAR, A. MAYRAND & K. PATTERSON, Global Competition and Canadian 
Federalism: The Financial Sector, (1992) 20 C.B.L.J. 1 at 25.
SAUMIER, supra, note 573 at 327-328.
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achievement681.
TITLE II: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
As already discussed before, NAFTA has become an important economic charter 
which will have an ongoing impact upon the economic, legislative and legal 
development of its Parties for a long time to come. While NAFTA was built upon the 
framework set up by the FTA, it is a fundamentally different document. Thus, in order 
to understand what NAFTA means, it is not enough to merely rely upon that earlier 
bilateral treaty.
NAFTA’s Financial Sen/ices Chapter applies its commitments to all financial 
institutions and services in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico. The Chapter also contains 
a list of specific financial service commitments from each NAFTA country. Moreover, 
the Agreement breaks new ground for international treaties by creating an ability for 
individual investors to challenge governments before international arbitration tribunals 
if a NAFTA investment obligation has been impaired.
CHAPTER I: The Prevalent Situation Before the Negotiations
The NAFTA negotiations in the financial sector (like those in most other sectors) did 
not take place on a clean slate. Already, Canada and the U.S. had set a pattern 
through FTA negotiations that provided a starting point for many of the more difficult 
problems posed by the financial sector. The most extreme commitment (i.e. a 
"common market" in financial services with fully harmonized regulation) was not an 
issue in the FTA negotiations. Both Canada and the U.S. were committed to their own 
distinct approaches to regulation. This stance was repeated during the NAFTA 
negotiations. However, of all the NAFTA Parties, Mexico was under the greatest 
pressure to amend its laws to make them consistent with the trilateral Agreement.
Some authors predicted that the FTA would "serve as a catalyst for reform". BIERMAN 
& FRASER, supra, note 558 at 32. Also, see, M. HART, Reconcilable Difference 
Negotiating the Free Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Ont.: Centre for Trade Policy and 
Law, 1992) at 27. H. HASSANWALIA, "Financial Services and the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement" in F. SIDDIQUI, ed., The Economic Impact and Implications of the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Queenston, Edwin Mellen, 1991) at 209.
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Consequently, many sections of NAFTA were to be negotiated on account of the 
absence of certain laws in Mexico relating to many issues.
CHAPTER II: Negotiation Objectives of All Three Countries
Foreign policy objectives of the signatories varied greatly. Trade, and more 
specifically, the preservation of a trading relationship with the U.S. were important to 
Canada. For the U.S. NAFTA offered an opportunity to ensure long-term access to a 
large and underdeveloped market. Finally, the Mexicans saw NAFTA as the 
culmination of the economic reforms that began in the 1980s.
1. Mexican Demands
Not long ago, Mexico started to replace its decades-old and very protectionist 
regime682. To the Mexicans, need for reform followed a series of economic crisis 
through the 1970s and 1980s (including huge problems with foreign debt). Because 
the intervention of the IMF limited the options of the government, Mexico looked to the 
private sector for solutions. Freer trade was encouraged through a series of economic 
reforms and the injection of foreign capital683. As a result, the past several years 
have brought important changes to the Mexican financial sector684. Until 1978,
In the eariy 1990s, Mexico’s then-President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced he 
would transform the "[...] backyard, protected and centralized [Mexican] economy into 
a market economy open to all comers." R. GWYN, "Salinas Must Make Democracy 
His Top Priority" The Toronto Star (6 February 1994) B1 at B6. U.S. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A Budgetary and Economic Analysis of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1993) at 56ff. J.F. TORRES & R. LANDA, The Changing Times: Foreign 
Investment in Mexico, (1991) N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 801.
I.P. ALTSCHULER & C.G. PASCHE, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The
Ongoing Liberalization of Trade with Mexico, (1993) 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 7 at 9. 
For an excellent summary of these reforms, see, e.g., E. LEROUX, South of the Rio 
Grande, the Financial Landscape Changes Rapidly: A Review of the Liberalization of 
the Mexican Financial Market Prior to and After the Peso Crisis, (1995) 5:2 FTU 11. R. 
BRAVO, Mexican Legal Framework Applicable to Operations Involving Financial 
Services, (1994) 25 St. Mary’s L.J. 1239. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 212-215. J.W. 
KOLARI, "A North American Free Trade Area: Implications for Commercial Banking" in 
S.R. STANLEY, ed., International Financial Market Integration (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1993) 212. T. HEATHER, Comments on Financial Sen/ices, Other Services, 
and Temporary Entry Rules, (1993) 1 U.S.-Mexico L. J. 73 at 90-91, 95-97. 
C. NALDA, NAFTA, Foreign Investment and the Mexican Banking System, (1992) 26
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foreign banking institutions had the limited rights to establish representative offices in 
Mexico685. After the nationalization of commercial banks in 1982, the government 
slimmed down the number of banks from almost 60 to just 19686. In the same year, 
18 of these banks, in which the government had a majority shareholding, were 
returned to private ownership687. In 1993, the total number went up to 30 after 
authorization was given for the establishment of new domestic licences to subsidiaries 
of Canadian and American banks. Moreover, there was also a significant increase in 
the number of all financial entities following a series of new foreign investment 
regulations688.
As far as the securities industry is concerned, an important element of the financial 
markets is the Mexican stock exchange, known as the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores
Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L & Econ. 379 at 384. The far-reaching changes in Mexico were 
recently compared to London’s "Big Bang". "A Survey of Mexico". The Economist (13 
February 1993) at 16.
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION The Likely Impact on the 
United States of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico (Washington, D.C., USITC, 
1991) at 4-41. For some time, foreign banks were banned from setting up branches in 
Mexico. The only exception was Citibank. Its right to operate comes from an historical 
accident. LEROUX, Ibid. at 11. L.A. GLICK, Understanding the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Second Edition (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1994) at 31. S. ANDERSON, 
J. CAVANAGH & S. GROSS, NAFTA’s Corporate Cadre: An Analysis of the 
USA/NAFTA State Captains (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1993) at 
10. C. MITCHELL, NAFTA, and Financial Services in Mexico, (1993) 209 N.Y. L.J. 1 
at 3. G.C. HUFBAUER & J.J. SCHOTT, North American Free Trade: Issues and 
Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992) at 
310.
For a detailed description of the nationalization process, see, e.g., J.J. NORTON, 
NAFTA: A New Framework for Regulation and Supervision of Financial Services in the 
Americas, (1994) J. Bus. Law 394 at 396ff. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE COMMISSION, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 42nd Report 
(Washington, D.C.: USITC, 1991) at 90.
J. CAMIL, Mexico’s Motivation to Enter intro NAFTA, (1993) 15 Loy. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 
909 at 913. J. CAMIL. Mexico in Contemplation of NAFTA: Is the Government 
Abdicating the Rectoria del Estado?, (1993) 15 Loy. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 761 at 761- 
763, 765-766. G.C. HUFBAUER & J.J. SCHOTT, North American Free Trade: Issues 
and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992) 
at 305-326. "Mexico: Suddenly, this Summer" The Banker (September 1991) 22 at 26- 
27. Revenues from the sale amounted to US $ 12.4 billion and the average weighted 
price amounted to more than three times book value. S. JOHNSON, "North America’s 
Financial Hot Spot" Canadian Banker (November/December 1993) 20 at 21.
See, e.g., C. Von WOBESER, "New Mexican Foreign Investment Law" in Doing 
Business with Mexico: Recent Developments and Innovations, Vol. 1 (Irvington-on- 
Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational Juris Publications, 1994) at 82. A BERDEJA-PRIETO, 
"Mexico Streamlines Foreign Investment Law" Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (February 1994) 31.
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(hereinafter Bolsa)689. Federal regulation of the securities markets falls under the 
National Securities Commission or Comisidn Nacional de Valores (hereinafter CNV). 
The CNV is a unit of the Finance Secretariat. It is charged with regulating all aspects 
of the securities industry. The CNV also maintains general supervisory control over 
the largely self-regulating, self-registration system by which securities firms are asked 
for formal registration. Apart from the Bolsa, the leading SRO is the Mexican 
Association of Brokerage Houses, known as Associaddn Mexicans de Casas de 
Bolsa, which represents all securities firms in the country. The Securities Market Law 
provides the legal and regulatory framework for securities operations in Mexico. 
Mexican regulations allow simultaneous issuance of shares in Mexico and the U.S., 
and procedures generally conform to U.S. practice. In 1994, there were 26 brokerage 
houses in Mexico690. These firms were operating close to 200 branches nationwide, 
as well as 13 in the U.S. Mexican securities houses are authorized to act as full 
service investment firms, offering underwriting, corporate finance and mergers and 
acquisitions, in addition to securities trading. As for banks, their role in the securities 
markets has been expanded to allow them to compete for some securities business. 
Conversely, securities firms are generally barred from providing commercial banking 
services.
Mexico’s objectives were quite simple: gain greater access to Canada and the U.S. 
and; try to obtain from the Americans certain concessions not granted to Canada 
through the FTA (like obtaining movement on the interstate bank branching and GSA 
provisions)691.
2. American Demands
Both Canada and the U.S. were dissatisfied with the results of the FTA 
negotiations692. The U.S. negotiators were not satisfied with the fact that foreign 
banks could only carry on banking activities in Canada solely through foreign bank
BOLSA MEXICANA DE VALORES, Mexico Company Handbook (Mexico City: ICH 
International Company Handbook, 1994) at 5-6.
Ibid, at 30-34.
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 374.
See, supra, note 645.
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subsidiaries693. Thus, the chief U.S. negotiating objective consisted in obtaining the 
right for U.S. banks to branch directly into Canada694. The Americans saw the 
negotiations as providing an opportunity to open up Mexican financial markets to U.S. 
financial institutions695. This approach was a logical follow up to the U.S. agenda 
started in the early 1980’s directed towards the opening of financial markets 
throughout the world. The U.S. negotiators favoured a principle-based approach696.
3. Canadian Demands
While the banking and securities industries supported the FTA, they were 
disappointed with Chapter 17. For that reason, they saw the NAFTA negotiations as 
having two major objectives: (i) to gain entry to Mexico; and (ii) to improve access to 
American financial sen/ices markets697. However, for Canada, the negotiations of 
NAFTA came at a very hard time domestically698.
When negotiations started, Mexican institutions had no presence in Canadian financial
JONHSON, supra, note 602 at 355.
C. JORDAN, Financial Services Under NAFTA: The View from Canada, (1993) 9 Rev. 
Banking & Fin. Sen/. 45 at 53.
J.F. CHANT, "The Financial Sector in NAFTA: Two Plus One Equals Restructuring" in 
S. GLOBERMAN & M. WALKER, eds, Assessing NAFTA: A Trinational Analysis, 
Studies on the Economic Future of North America (Vancouver, B.C.: The Fraser 
Institute, 1993) 173 at 180. P.A. LONDON & J. WHITTLE, Investment, Trade, and 
U.S. Gains in the NAFTA: The Economic Impact of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement on the United States: A Review of the Debate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Council of the Mexico - U.S. Business Committee, 1992) at 13ff. Also, see, generally 
U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Finance, North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Hearings 102nd Congress, 2nd Session. September 8-30, 1992 
(Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1993). U.S. Trade Policy and NAFTA Hearing, 103d 
Congress, 18* Session, March 9, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1993).
The U.S. Treasury wanted "to use NAFTA (and the GATS) as a mean of anchoring 
trade-liberalizing principles in a legally binding treaty to which future domestic 
legislation would need to conform." P. SAUVE & B. GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, 
Implications of the NAFTA for Canadian Financial Institutions, Commentary N° 44 
(Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1993) at 5.
This analysis is taken from Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra, note 193 at 
172-173. COOPER, supra, note 583 at 118-121. N.M. GRETENER, Canada - U.S. 
Trade Update, (1992) 5 C.U.B.L.R. 343. CANADA, Canada and a Mexico-United 
States Trade Agreement (Ottawa, Ont.: Working Paper prepared by the International 
Trade and Finance Branch at the Department of Finance, July 1990).
N[T]he economy was mired in recession and the political leaders absorbed by a 
national referendum on the future of the Canadian confederation." JORDAN, supra, 
note 694 at 51 n. 38.
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markets. Likewise, there were no Canadian financial institutions operating in Mexico 
(either on a branch or subsidiary basis). A certain number of Canadian banks had 
Mexican representative offices for marketing purposes only. Apart from syndicated 
loans to Mexico (which totalled almost Cdn $5 billion for all Canadian banks in early 
1990), there was no other direct dealing by Canadian financial institutions in 
Mexico699.
The genesis in Mexico by Canada’s financial institutions interest came largely from 
the Improved economic management and outlook for the country700. Any increase in 
trade was expected to result in greater opportunities for Canadian financial institutions 
to service the companies involved in that trade. Moreover, when negotiations began, 
Mexico had just completed a comprehensive deregulation of its financial sector 
industry. Still, Canadians believed the Mexican financial system to be Ill-prepared for 
the demands that would be made on it by the post-NAFTA marketplace701. For that 
reason, they were prepared to offer logistical and technological support to Mexican 
banks and securities firms. But, more importantly, Canada sought assurance that 
Canadians would be allowed to establish full-service operations and have an ability to 
invest in existing non-core financial institutions in Mexico702. For its part, the IDA 
was asking for "unrestricted limits" on entry into Mexico703.
While the Canadian financial industry was greatly interested in the new opportunities 
in Mexico704, the U.S. market remained of vital interest to them705. The most
Ibid, at 47.
The greatest involvement came from the banks. Canadian banks have maintained a 
market presence throughout most of the 20th century. However, the relationship was 
strained during the early 1980s due to the problems of LDC debate. JORDAN, supra, 
note 694 at 51 n. 38.
R. GAFFORD, "The Financial Services Chapter of NAFTA: The Canadian Banks’
Perspective" Canadian Financial Services Alert (December 1992) 56 at 57.
CHANT, , supra, note 695 at 180. House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence of the Sub-Committee on International Trade of the Standing Committee on 
External Affairs and International Trade, 9 February 1993, Issue N° 32 (Statement of 
Helen Sinclair, President of the CBA) at 32:4. Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 34th Parliament, 3rd Session, 19 May 1992, 
Issue N° 12 (Statement of Helen Sinclair, President of the CBA) at 12:18.
"The NAFTA Blueprint" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (6 March 1992) 6.
Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 34th 
Parliament, 3rd Session, 11 May 1993, Issue N° 22 (Statement of Robert Clark, Deputy 
Chief Negotiator, Office of NAFTA) at 21:22.
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important negotiating objectives related to the GSA and interstate branching 
restrictions706.
Based on a set of trade principles to govern a multilateral trade agreement on 
financial services, Canada proposed a framework for the purpose of the trilateral 
negotiations707. The more salient principles consisted in: (i) a commitment to 
progressive liberalization; (ii) the recognition of de facto national treatment; (iii) the 
establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism applied to financial services; (iv) 
restrictions on extra-territorial application of domestic laws; (v) regulatory 
transparency; (vi) inclusion of sub-national governments and SROs; (vii) mobility of 
business personnel; and (viii) protection of core financial institutions.
CHAPTER III: Negotiation Results
The NAFTA is embodied in a 1016 page document divided into eight Parts and 
twenty-two Chapters, and is comprised of 270 Articles, a Preamble and various 
Annexes. Of all this, one Part (Five), six Chapters (Eleven to Sixteen inclusive), 
eighty-two Articles and seven Annexes are devoted to Investment, Services and 
Related Matters. Of these, one Chapter (Fourteen) encompassing all of nineteen 
pages and three Annexes (I, II and VII), are specifically concerned with financial 
services708.
Generally, NAFTA replicates the basic provisions of the FTA and extends them to 
Mexico709. Moreover, it goes well beyond the FTA in widening and deepening the
SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 199. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 355.
CHANT, supra, note 17 at 18. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 199. JORDAN, supra, note
694 at 49.
JORDAN, ibid., at 48.
On many issues, note that financial services are subject to provisions of other 
chapters of NAFTA, sometimes as the result of cross-references (see, e.g., NAFTA, 
Articles 1401 para. 2, 1412 para. 2, 1414, 1415, 1416) or, in other times, because 
some provisions of NAFTA apply to all chapters of the Agreement (see, e.g., NAFTA, 
Articles 105, 201, 1101 as well as Chapters 20 to 22).
"NAFTA reaffirms [FTA] principles governing trade in services. In particular, NAFTA 
reaffirms and strengthens [FTAj’s "bill of rights" [...]." B.J. ZANGARI, NAFTA: Issues, 
Industry Sector Profiles and Bibliography (Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science, 1994) at 26. 
V.J. McNEVIN, Policy Implications of the NAFTA for the Provincial Services Industry, 
(1994) 5 Col. J. of Int’l Env. L. & Pol’y 369 at 370.
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scope of financial services deregulation and limiting the power of governments710. 
When FTA negotiations began, it was suggested that financial services be excluded 
from negotiations. However, that impression proved to be wrong and the negotiations 
proceeded in part to serve as a precedent for negotiations with other nations and for 
the GATT negotiations711. The same can be said about the NAFTA negotiations.
NAFTA is consistent with the GATT712. Unlike the FTA, the trilateral agreement 
incorporates some general principles similar to those proposed under the GATT713. 
It reflects an attempt to apply trade policy concepts to the financial services sector, an 
innovation stemming from prior efforts to develop the GATT714. These include: (i) 
treatment and access; (ii) the MFN clause; (iii) a dispute settlement mechanism; (iv) 
transparency; (v) coverage of sub-national governments; and (vi) extra-territoriality. 
Moreover, in addition to listing a series of commitments, each country submitted a list 
of exclusions which allow the adoption or maintainance of measures that do not 
comply with provisions respecting MFN treatment, national treatment or market 
access, or pertaining to the place of residence and nationality of the board of directors 
and senior managers.
International trade may have been the major item on the NAFTA agenda, but the 
U.S., Canada and Mexico did not simply negotiate a trade agreement — they have
CHANT, supra, note 695 at 180. C. JORDAN, "The Problem with Banking on NAFTA",
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 April 1993) A19.
MANSON, supra, note 517 at 331.
J.H. JACKSON, Reflections on the Implications of NAFTA for the World Trading 
System, (1992) 30 Colum. J. Transnat. L. 501 at 503-505.
More specifically, the trade principles invoked in NAFTA have been developed from 
the experience of the GATS, the committee-level discussions of the OECD in the late 
1980s and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision at the BIS. SAUVI= & 
GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 5. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 356. 
J.J. NORTON, NAFTA: A New Framework for Regulation and Supervision of Financial 
Services in the Americas, (1994) J. Bus. L. 394. P. SAUVE & B. GONZALES- 
HERMOSILLO, Financial Services and the North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Implications for Canadian Financial Institutions, unpublished paper (Ottawa, Ont.: 
External Affairs and International Trade Canada and Bank of Canada, 1993). W.P. 
BRYSON, "Free Trade and Financial Institutions" in CANADA, Department of Justice, 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Trade Law Seminar (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of 
Supply and Services, 1992) 109 at 109.
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negotiated a "special relationship"715. However, this is not to pretend that NAFTA is 
a step towards a political and economic union, despite the fact that most of the 
discussion surrounding the negotiations has focused on specific economic and 
technical issues716.
NAFTA (as the FTA before that) is designed to help cure the economic ills by 
increasing trade and investment with the U.S., a major trading partner and source of 
capital717. In turn, it presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. to try to have an 
impact on the development of both Canadian and Mexican political and economic life. 
Hence, by using "free access" to U.S. markets as a lure, the Americans hope to 
influence Canada and Mexico into making changes in their domestic legislation718. 
In other words, the U.S. can use these two agreements (i.e. the FTA and NAFTA) to 
"Americanize" its closest neighbours719. This "Americanization" began by the 
insertion into the NAFTA discussions of important non-trade issues either: (i) as a part 
of the formal NAFTA negotiations, or (ii) in parallel discussions and negotiations that 
are taking place outside of NAFTA between U.S., Canadian and Mexican agencies.
Chapter 14 is comprised of three related sections: (i) one section dealing with general 
principles; (ii) a second section describing the specific liberalization commitments 
made by all three Parties to the Agreement; and (iii) a final section outlining each
Some even view the "special relationship" to have been negotiated mainly between 
Mexico and the U.S. S. WEINTRAUB, A Marriage of Convenience: Relations Between 
Mexico and the United States, 1990; Symposium, Mexico and the United States: 
Strengthening the Relationship, (1989) 18 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 1.
The NAFTA does not refer to the conclusion of a free trade agreement as a step 
towards a more complete unification. In the long term, however, future historians will 
have to decide the long-term geopolitical significance of NAFTA.
A. DRISCOLL, "Embracing Change, Enhancing Competitiveness" Business America 
(18 October 1993) 27.
NAFTA imposes obligations with regards to "measures" (like laws, regulations and 
related requirements) of each Party to the Agreement (including the measures of any 
state, province or local government in a NAFTA country). NAFTA, Article 1401 para. 1 
as well as Articles 105, 201 para. 2 and 2409 para. 1. For a brief analysis of the 
impact of NAFTA on internal Mexican law see, e.g., R. PATINO MANFER, "Effets de 
I’Accord de libre-echange nord-americain sur le droit interne mexicain" in LACASSE & 
PERRET, eds, supra note 75, 217. R.I.R. ABEYRATNE, The Legal and Economic 
Effects of NAFTA on Canada, Mexico and the United States, (1994) 18:2 World 
Competition 139.
That is to promote a political and economic system that more closely reflects the 
American one.
183
NAFTA country’s reservations.
1. Major Principles of the Agreement on Financial Services
NAFTA includes many "non-trade" chapters720, one being the financial services 
chapter (Chapter 14)721. The inclusion of non-trade subjects in the FTA and NAFTA 
is indicative of a trend pushed by the U.S. to incorporate into international trade 
negotiations the conclusion of agreements on subjects that lie beyond the treatment of 
exports and imports of goods722. Of course, the incorporation of these subjects into 
NAFTA creates special problems and raises a new concern, that is, whether the 
international trade regime should be used to further the harmonization of domestic 
laws covering non-trade subjects723.
In each of the "non-trade" areas covered in the FTA and NAFTA, some Canadian 
laws have been criticized by U.S. government and business groups as limiting U.S. 
interests and slowing down economic development724. By including these subjects in 
the Agreements, the U.S. has undertaken to make Canadian law reflect more 
accurately the approach taken by the U.S. in these areas. Still, from a Canadian 
standpoint, the provisions of Chapter 14 of NAFTA have had little immediate impact 
on Canadian financial institutions725. Even though NAFTA has resulted in the 
opening of Mexico’s financial services markets to Canada and vice versa, the
"Non-trade" issues are subjects that are either indirectly related or unrelated to 
international trade in goods.
Other "non-trade" chapters concern investment (Chapter 11), cross-border trade in 
services (Chapter 12), telecommunications (Chapter 13), competition policy (Chapter 
15), and intellectual property (Chapter 17). Chapter 6 (dealing with the energy and 
petrochemical sector) also includes non-trade subjects. On the differences between 
Chapters 11, 12 and 14, see, JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 356-359. However, note 
that some service industries (like maritime shipping and Canada’s cultural industries) 
are exempted from NAFTA. ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 31.
This was evident in the last Round of trade negotiations in the GATT, which included 
important new proposals to conclude a GATS.
On this subject, see, e.g., K. ABBOTT, R. HUDEC & J. BHAGWATI, Research Project 
Launched on the Use of Trade Law to Promote Harmonization of Domestic Law, 
(1992) Int’l Econ. L. News 17.
ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 31.
Prior to NAFTA, profound regulatory changes already occurred in Canada with respect 
to financial institutions. Also, the FTA helped draw the rules with the U.S. CHANT, 
supra, note 17 at 6-7.
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business that flows between the two countries is not very significant726.
Compared with the FTA727, NAFTA generally creates a regime based on defining 
principles (instead of one based on piecemeal concessions)728. Hence, much like 
the domestic laws of the three Parties, NAFTA’s provisions are largely institution- 
based rather than product-based729. This means that NAFTA focuses on “financial 
institutions" rather than on specified "financial services"730. Thus, the provisions of 
Chapter 14 apply only to the following731: (i) "investors of a Party"732; (ii) "financial
SENATE OF CANADA, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade 
and Commerce, 34th Parliament, 3rd Session, 14 November 1991, Issue N° 2
(Statement of Nicholas Le Pan, Assistant Deputy-Minister, Financial Sector Policy 
Branch, Department of Finance, Government of Canada) at 2:15.
Summarizing Canadian financial industry views on the FTA, a CBA official noted that 
"[...] the FTA is a static document, allowing little room for change and allowing no real 
incentives for further liberalization or regulatory cooperation." R. GAFFORD, "Three for 
Free Trade" Canadian Banker (March/April 1992) 99 at 99.
SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 3-5. F. SWEDLOVE & P. 
EVANOFF, "Financial Services in the NAFTA Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian 
Perspective" Canadian Financial Services Alert (December 1992) 49 at 49. However, 
note that the bilateral commitments between Canada and the U.S. made under the 
FTA are carried forward under the new agreement. NAFTA, Article 1401 para. 4 and 
Annex 1401.4. Commenting on the different approaches between the FTA and 
NAFTA, the Canadian lead negotiator for the NAFTA negotiations in financial services 
explained Canada’s point of view: H[i]f you look at Chapter 17 of the [FTA], you will 
find that there is no statement of principles. That is because we were extremely 
concerned as a government in 1987 about what such principles would lead to in the 
financial services area. So the FTA was very much an exchange of concessions and 
not a statement of principles. Well, we’ve learned quite a bit since that time and we do 
feel more comfortable with the concept of principles. [...] By having principles 
established, it allows us to more easily determine what we actually will get at the end 
of the day from our trading partners. So we have very much become a proponent of 
these concepts of principles." F. SWEDLOVE, "The Current State of Trade in Financial 
Services" in CANADA, Department of Justice, Proceedings of the Ninth International
Trade Law Seminar (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) 105 at 107. 
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 355. J. ROBINSON, NAFTA and Doing Business with 
Mexico: Financial Services Under NAFTA (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Institute 
Conference, 1994) at 5. SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 6. 
K.L. BACHMAN, J.S. MURPHY, S.N. BENEDICT & A. ANZALDUA, "The Financial 
Services Provisions of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement" in R.E. 
HERZSTEIN & E. ROBERTS LEWIS, eds, Mexico Investment and Trade: Progress 
and Prospects (New York, N.Y.: Practising Law Institute, 1993) 244 at 250. K.L. 
BACHMAN & R.A. ANZALDUA MONTOYA, South of the Border, NAFTA Boosts 
Financial Servbes, (1993) 209 N.Y.L.J. S5. A.V. GIL, NAFTA to Open Most Mexican 
Markets, (1992) 15:10 Nat’l L.J. 19 at 24.
NAFTA, Article 1401 para. 1.
NAFTA, Article 1416. The same Article defines an "investment" as meaning generally 
the term in Chapter 11. NAFTA Article 1139. However, an exception to that treatment 
exists with respect to "debt securities" and "loan". NAFTA, Article 1416. Finally, note
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institutions of another Party"733; and (iii) "financial service providers of a Party"734.
NAFTA greatly liberalizes trade and investment in financial services among all three 
signing countries735. Basically, Article 1401 states that NAFTA covers: (i) regulated
financial institutions from another NAFTA country; (ii) investments in financial
(
institutions by investors from another Party to the Agreement; and (iii) cross-border 
trade in financial services736. In order to benefit from the provisions of Chapter 14, 
financial institutions and investors (or their investments) must satisfy a number of 
"rules of origin"737. Under these rules a Party to the Agreement can deny the 
benefits of NAFTA to a financial service provider tha t: (i) is owned or controlled by
that for the purposes of NAFTA’s market access provisions, an "investor of another 
Party" is defined more specifically as an investor engaged in the business of providing 
financial services in the territory of that Party. NAFTA, Articles 201 and 1403 para. 5. 
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 356-357.
NAFTA, Article 1416. The same Article defines a "financial institution" as being any 
financial intermediary or other enterprise that is authorized to do business and 
regulated as a financial institution under the law of the Party in whose territory it is 
located. JOHNSON, ibid, at 356.
NAFTA, Article 1416. The same Article defines a "financial service" to mean a service 
of a financial nature and a sen/ice incidental or auxiliary to a service of a financial 
nature. However, note that some types of services, like those provided by 
government-related entities or backed by government resources, are excluded from 
the Agreement. See, e.g., NAFTA, Articles 1401 and 1410 para. 3, Annex VII (B)(15), 
Schedule of Mexico, Annex VII (A), Schedule of the United States. Note that [t]he 
definition includes insurance but does not mention any other activity, and "financial 
nature" is not defined." JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 358.
This is especially true in Mexico which has significantly opened its markets for the first 
time in fifty years. R.S. WEINERT & P. SINCLAIR, NAFTA and Financial Services, 
Paper 7 (Coral Gables, Fla.: The North-South Centre, 1994) at 4. Also, see generally, 
H.J. JOHNSON, Banking Without Borders: Challenges and Opportunities in the Era of 
North American Free Trade and the Emerging Global Marketplace (Chicago, III.: 
Probus, 1995).
NAFTA, Article 1401 para. 1. "Chapter [14] does not cover laws of general application 
in a NAFTA country that affect the ability of investors of other NAFTA countries to 
invest." JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 357-358.
"Both Mexico and the U.S. opted for a liberal approach by choosing to apply the 
criteria of "country of incorporation"." SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, 
note 696 at 9. In this context, these sets of rules (incorporated by reference from the 
Chapter on Cross-Border Trade in Sen/ices) are used to differentiate between financial 
services originating in one country from those originating in another for the purpose of 
application of trade measures. NAFTA, Articles 1211 and 1401 para. 2. One of the 
most important concern of many financial institutions from non-NAFTA countries 
relates to the possibility for them to share in the opening of the Mexican financial 
markets. Mexicans have decided to allow outside firms to benefit from NAFTA 
treatment through expansion into Mexico from their American or Canadian operations. 
SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, Ibid.
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nationals or entities of a non-NAFTA country; and (ii) that does not have substantial 
business activities in any NAFTA countries738.
As a matter of law, the most difficult problem comes from the fact that only the federal 
governments of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico are "Parties" to NAFTA. However, each 
of the federal governments commit to enforce the Agreement on their respective sub­
national governments. NAFTA obliges each respective federal government to "ensure 
that all necessary measures" are taken to enforce the rules of the Agreement739. 
The stronger provisions of NAFTA commit each Party to use all its powers to compel 
compliance even in the areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction and without provincial 
consent740. Note, however, that there is an exception in the area of securities where 
Canada has reserved the right to adopt new measures which are not consistent with 
NAFTA741
1.1 National Treatment
Under Article 102 of the NAFTA (corresponding to Article 105 of the FTA), national 
treatment applies to trade in goods, services and investment. The extraordinary scope 
of national treatment creates much uncertainty. Since its rules now apply to services 
and investment, the GATT may provide guidance for the interpretation of this concept. 
However, its definitive meaning will have to await a litigation and dispute settlement 
under NAFTA.
One notable difference between the FTA and NAFTA concerns the underlying 
principle of national treatment742. Chapter 14 states that the Parties must give 
investors, financial institutions and cross-border providers of other NAFTA Parties a
NAFTA, Article 1211 para. 2. For its part, Canada has chosen to establish more 
severe rules of origin by reserving its right to deny the benefits of NAFTA to any 
enterprise not controlled by persons from NAFTA countries. NAFTA, Annex VII (B) 
para. 2, Schedule of Canada.
NAFTA, Article 105.
NAFTA, Article 105. Canadian Statement of Implementation, supra, note 193 at 77-78. 
D. RADOCCHIA, "NAFTA and Financial Sen/ices: A Provincial Perspective" Canadian 
Financial Service Alert (December 1992) 52 at 52.
NAFTA, Annex II (C) 7, Schedule of Canada.
NAFTA, Article 1405.
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treatment that is no less favourable than they give their own domestic providers "in 
like circumstances"743 (further defined by ECO)744 with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or 
other disposition of an institution or investment or with respect to the provision of a 
financial service745. However, the concept stops short of requiring the de facto 
national treatment746. Thus, different treatment may be accorded to NAFTA 
investors, institutions or service providers, provided that they are not disadvantaged 
thereby relative to their domestic counterparts. Differences in market share, 
profitability or size (while not sufficient to show inequality of competitive opportunity) 
may be evidence of the same747. In practical terms, Article 1405 allows for the 
investors or financial institutions establishing for the first time in a country to receive 
the best treatment offered to new entrants (including any domestic investors)748. 
Moreover, those investors or institutions already established in a country and wishing 
to expand their activities into a new province or state also have the right to receive 
the best treatment given any investor or institution coming from the province or state
NAFTA, Article 1405 paras 1 to 4. The ambiguous notion of "like circumstances" has 
caused some problems in the financial services area. As the U.S. Treasury reported to 
Congress in its various National Treatment studies (1979, 1984, 1986, 1990), the use 
of "like circumstances" notion can result in restrictive practices. LOHMAN & MURDEN, 
supra, note 325 at 154. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 362.
"National treatment does not mean identical treatment. It only means no less 
favourable treatment. The effect of the "competitive opportunities test" of compliance 
allows somewhat greater latitude for differential treatment than applies with national 
treatment provisions set out elsewhere in NAFTA." JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 
363.
NAFTA, Article 1405 para. 5. From the Canadian perspective, "[e]qual competitive 
opportunities allow for different treatment of foreign investors or institutions as long as 
it does not disadvantage the foreign institutions or investors in comparison with their 
domestic counterparts. Change in market share, profitability or size alone is not 
sufficient indicator of a denial of equality of competitive opportunity, but such changes 
can be considered when determining whether a Party provides equality of competitive 
opportunity and, therefore, national treatment." Canadian Statement on 
Implementation, supra, note 193 at 174. Generally this concept places the country with 
the more liberalized market at a disadvantage. Article 1405 para. 5 seems to be based 
on Article XVII:3 of the GATS. APPLETON, supra, note 146 at 106. Note that under 
NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 4, "[...] reservations from NAFTA 1102 such as that taken 
by Canada under Annex I in respect of the [ICA] [...] apply to [...] NAFTA 1405." 
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 367. NAFTA, Annex I, Schedule of Canada, para. 8; 
Description.
SAUVE & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 7.
NAFTA, Article 1405 para. 7. "In other words, opportunity, not outcome, is the 
determining factor". SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 206.
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 362.
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it is established749.
On the surface, it appears that because broker-dealer regulatory requirements are not 
greatly different for U.S.-based firms and those that are not750, NAFTA does not 
have a great impact on U.S. regulation of broker-dealers751. Still, the possibility 
exists for a Canadian or Mexican firm to challenge some SEC requirements752 or 
SRO’s special rules753 imposed solely on non-resident brokers.
Besides an absence of "like circumstances", a type of defence to an allegation that a 
measure is contrary to national treatment is the prudential carve-out. It is all 
encompassing. The prudential carve-out allows the annulment of any term of Chapter 
14 by a "reasonable" measure that is adopted or maintained for prudential 
reasons754. NAFTA offers some examples of prudential reasons. As could be 
expected in the context of financial regulations, the term includes measures such as: 
(i) the protection of investors or depositors or financial market participants755; (ii) the 
maintenance of the soundness and integrity of financial institutions or cross-border
Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra, note 193 at 174-175. From Canada’s 
point of view, while it need not ensure that the provinces treat NAFTA financial 
institutions, investments and service providers equally, they must treat them no less 
favourably than they treat Canadian institutions, investors and service providers.
L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, Securities Regulation, 3rd ed., Vol. VI (Boston, MA: Little, 
Brown, 1990) at 3002.
GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 389. In the case of foreign banks, "the U.S. 
government has followed a general policy of national treatment [...] since the [IBA] of 
1978." ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 32.
Regarding some requirements imposed by the SEC on non-resident broker-dealers, 
see, e.g., GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 401.
Regarding certain of the special rules imposed by the U.S. SROs on non-resident 
broker-dealers, see, e.g., Ibid., at 404.
NAFTA, Article 1410 para. 1. "Typically [prudential carve-out] means that regulators 
are not convinced that a company has the resources or expertise to compete or that 
their products or practices are hazardous to consumers or the system as a whole. 
While such concerns may seem in terms of general services to be rather paternalistic, 
they are considered appropriate in financial services because of the sector’s role in 
the overall economy." W.P. BRYSON, "Free Trade and Financial Institutions" in 
CANADA, Department of Justice, Proceedings of the Ninth International Trade Law 
Seminar (Ottawa, Ont.: Minister of Supply and Services, 1992) 109 at 111.
In addition, reasonable measures for prudential reasons may be taken to protect 
“policy- holders, policy-claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a 
financial institution or cross-border financial service provider". NAFTA, Article 1410 
para. 1 (a). However, note that it is puzzling to have included in that list measures 
adopted for the protection of financial market participants.
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financial service providers756; and (iii) stability and integrity of a financial 
system757. Because the extent of the financial service obligations were narrower, the 
FTA did not contain any provision similar to the NAFTA prudential exception. Although 
NAFTA’s prudential exception has its limits, these can be assessed by the Free Trade 
Commission (during any investor-state dispute)758 and the dispute settlement panel 
(during a state-to-state dispute)759.
1.2 Market Access
The market access principle prohibits a jurisdiction from adopting any measures that 
restrict commercial presence and cross-border services by financial providers of other 
countries760. Because NAFTA limits this benefit to financial service providers, it 
presupposes that an "investor of another Party" is already engaged in providing 
financial services761.
NAFTA states that financial services providers of a Party that does not own or control 
a financial institution in the Party’s territory may establish one in that territory762. 
Concurrently, a Party may require an "investor of another Party"763 to incorporate 
under its domestic law764 and impose terms and conditions consistent with the
NAFTA, Article 1410 para. 1(b).
NAFTA, Article 1410 para. 1(c).
NAFTA, Article 1415 para. 2.
NAFTA, Article 1414. SAUVF & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 9. 
NAFTA, Article 1403. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 360. Note that, although NAFTA 
urges the Parties to recognize certain principles with respect to market access, the
Parties are not required to amend their domestic laws to reflect those principles. 
However, the Parties will review and assess market access sometime in the future. 
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 3. Note that Article 1403 para. 3 and Annex 1401.4 
(through its extension of the FTA) both indicate that Canada and Mexico will be able 
to benefit from future liberalization in the U.S. G. DUNNE, The Glass-Steagall Wall: 
Subtle Hazards Revisited, (1994) 111 Banking L. J. 115.
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 5.
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 4. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 360. SAUV£ & 
GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 6.
This term refers to "an investor of another Party engaged in the business of providing 
financial services in the territory of that Party". Article 1403 para. 5.
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 4(a). Consequently, a NAFTA country may bar entry by 
direct cross-border branching. NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 4. Note that direct bank 
branching is a special matter which would, at one time in the future, be reviewed by 
the Parties to the Agreement. NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 3. JOHNSON, supra, note 
602 at 361. SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 6-7. In this
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national treatment obligation contained in Chapter 14.765.
In principle, the U.S., Mexico and Canada agree on the fact that the enhancement 
occurs when investors can choose the juridical form of their investment (i.e. subsidiary 
or branch)766. Moreover, it is recognized by all Parties to NAFTA that an investor of 
another Party to the Agreement should be able to provide a range of financial 
services in a market through separate financial institutions (as may be required by 
domestic law), expand geographically within a territory, and not be subject to any 
ownership requirements specific to foreign institutions767. Still, Article 1403 paras 1 
and 2 do not consist of a "statement of willingness to act in any given manner768.
Chapter 14 also applies to SROs. In this context, a SRO is a non-govemmental body 
(including any securities or futures exchange or market, clearing agency, or other 
organization or association) exercising regulatory or supervisory authority over 
financial service providers769. As a result, any requirements imposed upon a 
financial service provider requiring it to be member of, participate in, or have access 
to an SRO, by a NAFTA country, must respect the principles of Chapter 14 (i.e. 
national treatment, MFN treatment, etc.)770
context, Canada has expressed its point of view by stating it would assess the 
situation in view of the state of the GSA and other constraints on market access in the 
U.S. Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra, note 193 at 173-174.
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 4(b).
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 1. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 204.
NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 2. All three of the foregoing principles are already 
applicable to the U.S. as a result of the FTA and they have now been extended to 
Mexico. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 361. SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, 
supra, note 696 at 6.
Canadian statement on implementation, supra, note 193 at 173.
NAFTA, Article 1416.
NAFTA, Article 1402. NAFTA applies to a SRO only if it is mandatory to be a member 
in order to conduct financial operations. Thus Chapter 14 applies to the Mexican Bolsa 
and to the NASD but not to the TSE or the NYSE. HOUSE BANKING COMMITTEE, 
Aspects of NAFTA Affecting the Financial Services Industry, 103rd Congress, 29 
September 1993 at 23.
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1.3 Cross-Border Trade771
In essence, cross-border trade refers to transactions by which services are supplied 
by financial firms from their home country to customers in another country. Given a 
recent history of substantial interferences to cross-border trade in financial services in 
Mexico, the issue was comprehensively treated by NAFTA772. It is also bound to 
become an even more important issue if the Agreement is extended to additional 
countries.
Chapter 14 addresses the issue of mobility in cross-border trade from two distinct 
perspectives773. First, citizens and residents of each NAFTA country are permitted 
to purchase the financial sen/ices of a provider located in the territory of another Party 
to the Agreement (upon condition it satisfies Chapter 14’s rules of origin)774. Having 
said this, no obligation requires the Parties to permit providers of other NAFTA 
countries to do or solicit business in their respective territories unless established 
there775. Second, each Party agrees that existing restrictions respecting the 
provisions of cross-border trade in financial services have been frozen776. However, 
this "standstill" rule has a number of exceptions. The most notable concerns trade in 
securities between Canada and the U.S.777 Another exception relates to cross­
"The concept of "cross-border" is identical to that in Chapter Twelve." JOHNSON, 
supra, note 602 at 358.
"Issues of cross-border trade were given little attention in the FTA because the degree 
of interference with freedom of trade in these services between Canada and the U.S. 
has been rare in its extent and duration." CHANT, supra, note 695 at 182.
SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 204-205. K.L. BACHMAN, S.N. BENEDICT, R.A. 
ANZALDUA, Financial Services Under the North American Free Trade Agreement: An 
Overview, (1994) 28 Int’l Law. 291 at 296. Note that it has been suggested that, while 
considerable energy was expended on these provisions, their impact will not be 
significant. ROBINSON, supra, note 729 at 9-11.
For a discussion of the rules of origin for financial services, see supra, notes 737, 738 
and accompanying text.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, The North American Free 
Trade Agreement Implementation Act: Statement of Administrative Action 
(Washington, D.C.: Government of the United States of America, 1993) at 164. Thus, 
each NAFTA country can adopt its definition of "soliciting" and "doing business". 
NAFTA, Article 1404 para. 2. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 362.
NAFTA, Article 1404 para. 1. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 361. SAUVIz & 
GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 7.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) para. 1, Schedule of Canada; Annex VII (B), Schedule of the 
United States. For a summary of these commitments, see infra, note 906 and 
accompanying text.
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border insurance services778. However, all three countries have agreed to consult 
(no later than January 1, 2000) on the possibility of further liberalization on cross- 
border trade in financial sen/ices779.
1.4 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
NAFTA makes the concept of MFN treatment applicable to financial services. 
According to Article 1406, any concession granted by one Party to investors, financial 
institutions and cross-border financial service providers of another Party or of a non- 
Party must be given to the same of any other Party in "like circumstances"780. 
However, there is a possibility that mutual recognition781 of regulation results in 
preferential treatment of one NAFTA partner’s institution. Such recognition may be 
awarded unilaterally, obtained through means like harmonization or based upon an 
agreement or arrangement concluded with another Party or a third country782.
The resulting preferential treatment will be allowed to continue as long as any other 
Party obtains the possibility to demonstrate that it qualifies for similar treatment, and is 
given an adequate opportunity to negotiate such recognition783. This provision 
permits, for example, the continuation of the arrangements that already exist between 
the SEC and the securities commissions of various Canadian provinces. In practical 
terms, the MJDS may be a good example784.
NAFTA, Annex VII (A), Schedule of Mexico.
NAFTA, Annex 1404.4. ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 40. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 
at 362.
NAFTA, Article 1406 para. 1. SAUVIz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 
at 8.
“This concept, similar to the GATT concept, provides that two countries may come to 
an agreement that does not necessarily have to be extended to a third party. For 
example, the [SEC] [(through the MJDS)] has a special relationship with provincial 
securities commissions that results in the unique treatment of Canadian securities 
firms operating in the [U.S.]." SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 206.
NAFTA, Article 1406 para. 2. If the U.S. proceeds with bilateral treaties with Central or 
South America or the Caribbean countries, "Canada and Mexico could benefit from a 
more liberal American trade regime." SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 206.
NAFTA, Article 1406 para. 4. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 364. SAUVIz & 
GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 8.
BACHMAN [et al], supra, note 773 at 295.
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1.5 New Financial Services and Data Processing
National treatment is also to be accorded with respect to the provision of new financial 
services by financial institutions of another Party of a type similar to new services that 
the host Party permits its own financial institutions to provide785. However, the host 
Party remains free to determine the institutional and juridical form through which such 
new services may be provided786. The host Party may also require authorization for 
the provision of the new service, which authorization may only be refused for 
prudential reasons (for example, safety and soundness of regulatory concerns)787. 
Parties must also permit the financial institutions of another Party to transfer 
information in electronic or other form into and out of the host Party’s territory for data 
processing, if the transfer is required in the ordinary course of business of such 
institutions788.
1.6 Nationality Requirements
A Party may not impose nationality requirements for senior management or boards of 
directors of the financial institutions of another Party other than the requirement that a 
simple majority of the board of directors be composed of nationals of the last 
Party789.
NAFTA, Article 1407 para. 1. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 364-365.
For instance, a provider may be limited to offering the new service through a separate 
subsidiary. SAUVIz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 9.
Ibid See, also G.B. KNECHT, "Major U.S. Banks Plan Units in Mexico: Move Could 
Help Modernize Financial Structure" The Wall Street Journal [of New York] (31 May
1994) A13. S. JOHNSON, "North America’s Financial Hot Spot" Canadian Banker 
(Nov./Dec. 1993) 20 at 23. G.E. BAROUDI "Banking on Business in Mexico: There’s 
an Exciting New Financial Frontier South of the Rio Grande" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (23 November 1993) C3. C.M. NALDA, NAFTA Foreign Investment and the 
Mexican Banking System, (1992) 26 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 379 at 398, 411. 
This issue caused frictions under the FTA because some U.S. firms complained that 
data processing within Canada’s borders increased costs. BACHMAN [et ai], supra, 
note 773 at 297.
NAFTA, Articles 1407 and 1408. "NAFTA 1407 permits nationality or residency 
requirements respecting boards of directors but unlike NAFTA 1107, without the 
caveat that the requirement does not impair the ability to exert control." JOHNSON, 
supra, note 602 at 365. To comply, Canada had to amend its Bank Act which now 
requires a bare majority of Canadians for NAFTA country bank subsidiaries but 
requires that at least three quarters of the directors of any (local) bank be Canadian. 
Bank Act, s. 159. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 208. However, the U.S. has taken 
reservation to preserve citizenship and residency requirements for national bank
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1.7 Transparency
As a means of injecting greater transparency into the financial sen/ices sector790, 
Parties are required to provide advance notice to all Interested persons of measures 
of general application; to make available their respective requirements for completing 
applications relating to the provision of financial services; to inform applicants of the 
status of their applications upon being requested to do so; to make administrative 
decisions on completed applications within 120 days, such period can however be 
extended where meeting the 120-day deadline is not practicable; and finally, to 
maintain inquiry points to which persons can turn for information and relevant 
documentation791. Overall, the transparency obligations are proving to be useful to 
Canadian and U.S. firms operating in Mexico given the long-standing complaint that 
Mexico often changes regulations without prior consultation with the private 
sector792.
1.8 Exceptions and Reservations
An important exception to Chapter 14 obligations which would otherwise apply is 
made in respect of prudential concerns. Thus, all three Parties remain free to adopt or 
maintain non-conforming measures that are reasonably necessary for prudential 
reasons (such as the protection of investors and the maintenance of the safety, 
soundness, stability and integrity of financial institutions, cross-border service 
providers or financial systems)793. Parties may also maintain non-discriminatory 
measures of general application taken by any public entity in pursuit of monetary and
management under existing law. NAFTA, Annex VII (A), Schedule of the United 
States.
The transparency provisions have an impact on all Parties to the Agreement, In 
Mexico, its effects are easy to see with the country’s massive bureaucracy. In the 
U.S., it can be said that § 20 orders are a change to the provisions of the GSA without 
a change in the law. In Canada, the regulatory practices of the OSFI do not always 
comply with NAFTA’s obligations. SAUVfz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 
696 at 5. CHANT, supra, note 695 at 179. DUNNE, supra, note 760 at 119. 
ROBINSON, supra, note 729 at 13. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 207-208.
NAFTA, Article 1411. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 365.
SAUVIz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 7.
NAFTA, Article 1410 para. 1. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 209-210.
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related credit policies or exchange rate policies794. Moreover, each Party has taken 
reservations that permit them to derogate from otherwise applicable NAFTA 
obligations795. In the case of Canada, for example, reservations were taken that will 
permit the adoption and maintenance of measures relating to cross-border trade in 
securities.
1.9 Special Commitments and Reservations of All Three 
Countries
Generally, a Party to the Agreement may not enforce any federal, provincial, or state 
measure that does not follow the rules of NAFTA. With regards to market access, 
many specific commitments and undertakings have been made by all Parties. 
However, each NAFTA country has "reserved" a number of measures by including 
them in a special list796. These reservations (aimed at preserving certain existing 
discriminatory practices or take exception to specific provisions under the Agreement) 
modify Chapter 14 in important ways, especially with respect to Mexico. Thus, a real 
understanding of the provisions relating to market access can only be obtained by a 
careful review of these annexes797.
Annex VII (which must be read together and in the context of Chapter 14) sets forth 
reservations which consist of two types798. First, each of the three Parties have 
taken reservations (listed in Annex VII, Part A) to preserve its right to enforce current 
measures that do not conform to Articles 1403 to 1408799, provided the measure
NAFTA, Article 1410 para. 2. "However, this exception does not affect the obligations 
respecting performances requirements in NAFTA 1106 or transfers in NAFTA 1109." 
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 366.
NAFTA, Article 1409. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, North 
American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major Issues, Vol. 2 (Washington,
D.C.: Government of the United States of America, 1993) at 44.
NAFTA, Article 1409. The reservations taken by each NAFTA country with respect to 
the financial services Chapter are set out in Annex VII and in the Annexes to many 
specific articles of Chapter 14.
In other words, M[u]nder the NAFTA’s negative-list approach to coverage, failure to list 
a nonconforming measure within the agreed time frame implies its full and immediate 
liberalization." SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 6. 
BACHMAN [et al.j, supra, note 773 at 299.
NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 367.
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existed on January 1, 1994800. Second, reservations listed in each NAFTA country 
under Part B of Annex VII must also be taken only against certain provisions of 
Chapter 14 but are not limited to pre-existing measures801. As for Annex VII, Part C, 
it sets forth a series of commitments of all NAFTA countries that modify or expand 
provisions with regard to market access issues.
1.9.1 Mexico
As with trade in goods, there is a general understanding that opening all trade 
immediately on the entry into force of NAFTA would be too disruptive to the local 
Mexican economy. For that reason, Mexico is allowing any financial institution 
established pursuant to the laws of another NAFTA country to set up or acquire 
financial institutions in Mexico. Once established, U.S. and Canadian financial service 
investors are eligible to form a Mexican "financial group holding company" to expand 
their activities into various types of services (on the same terms as domestic Mexican 
investors)802.
NAFTA. Article 2203. JOHNSON, Ibid. However, the deadline for listing such reserved 
measures varies. Existing non-conforming federal and Canadian provincial measures 
as well as measures of six states (California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio and 
Texas) had to be listed by January 1,1994. NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1 (a)(i) and (ii); 
Annex 1409.1. As for the remaining U.S. states, reservations had to be listed by 
January 1, 1995. NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1 (ii); Annex 1409.1. Because Mexican 
states do not regulate financial services, Mexico did not take reservations for state 
measures. As for measures of local governments, they may be reserved without being 
listed. NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1 (iii). Finally, all the above-mentioned measures 
may be amended, so long as there is no decrease of the measure’s conformity of the 
Agreement. NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1 (b), (c). On another front, it has been 
suggested that the importance of many state and provincial reservations was reduced 
by the prudential carve-out. S. OTTEMAN, Canadian Row With Provinces Delays 
Financial Exemptions Reporting, (1994) 1:1 Inside NAFTA 1.
NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 2. JOHNSON, Ibid.
NAFTA, Annex VII (C) para. 5, Schedule of Mexico. BACHMAN [et al.], supra, note 
773 at 305. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 212. S.T. ZAMORA, Comments on the 
Regulation of Financial and Legal Services in Mexico under NAFTA, (1993) 1 U.S.- 
Mexico L. J. 77 at 77. SAUVIz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 10- 
11. The entities of the financial group (or grupo financiered are essentially holding 
companies for a series of financial operations. They can own 100% of banks and 
certain other financial institutions. In fact, all of the 18 reprivatized banks were bought 
by financial groups organized for the purpose and owned by brokerage houses. The 
regulations governing financial groups allow holding company groups, bank groups 
and brokerage groups. If a group is headed by a bank, it cannot have a brokerage 
member and vice versa. However, a holding company group can combine both a bank 
and a brokerage, as has been the case with most of the major groups formed to date.
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Market access to U.S. and Canadian financial sen/ice providers and investors seeking 
access to Mexico is limited by a number of conditions and restrictions listed in Annex 
VII803. Under NAFTA, Mexico may require a U.S. or Canadian financial service 
investor to already be engaged In providing the same general type of service in its 
home jurisdiction804. Moreover, it may limit ownership to no more than one financial 
institution of each type805. Also, the Mexicans may require that a financial institution 
(to be established or acquired by U.S. or Canadian investors) be wholly-owned806.
Annex VII, Part B of Mexico’s Schedule allows U.S. and Canadian banks, securities 
firms and insurance companies to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in Mexico 
immediately upon the entry into force of the Agreement807. However, during a 
transitional period808, a cap has been placed on the size809 of foreign financial 
affiliates810 to prevent the establishment of foreign-owned firms that would capture a 
sizeable portion of the Mexican market811. Generally Mexican-chartered firms owned 
by NAFTA investors, enjoy the same powers (but are subject to the same limits) as 
locally owned companies. Still, there are some exceptions to this rule regarding: (i)
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Financing Foreign Operations (Mexico) (London: 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995) at 21. WEINERT & SINCLAIR, supra, note 735 at
3.
"The mode adopted by Mexico for limiting U.S. and Canadian access to the Mexican 
financial sen/ices industry is a Canadian one, a market share variation on the 10/25 
rule." JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 53.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) para. 14 (a), Schedule of Mexico. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 
at 371.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) para. 14 (b), Schedule of Mexico.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) para 12, Schedule of Mexico. Note that investments in 
insurance companies are excluded from that requirement. NAFTA, Annex VII (B) para.
4, Schedule of Mexico.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra, note 802 at 15-16.
The transitional period is "the period beginning with the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement and ending on the earlier of January 1, 2000, or six years from the date of 
entry into force of this Agreement". NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, paras 
1, 9 and (c) Definitions.
Mexico limits the size of an affiliate owned by a NAFTA country investor. NAFTA, 
Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, paras 1 to 8. These limits (referred to as "market 
share limits") relate to: (i) regulatory capital requirements (paras 1 to 7) and; (ii) assets 
(para. 8).
"Foreign financial affiliate" has been defined to mean "a financial institution established 
in Mexico and owned and controlled by an investor of another Party". NAFTA, Annex 
VII (C), Schedule of Mexico, Definitions. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 368.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) paras 1 to 6, Schedule of Mexico.
198
capital812 and asset limits; and (ii) the establishment of offices, branches, or 
subsidiaries outside Mexico813.
First, in the case of capital and asset restrictions, there are 2 types of market 
share814 limits: (i) individual limits (established for foreign-owned firms); and (ii) 
aggregate limits (for all foreign-owned financial service companies of the same 
type)815. In the case of banks and securities affiliates, these limits can be 
summarized briefly816. During the transitional period, Mexico has set a 1.5% ceiling 
on the individual market share of foreign commercial bank affiliates817, and 4% on 
the individual market share of foreign securities firm affiliates818. By January 1, 
2000, all Mexican restrictions will be eliminated819. Thereafter, temporary safeguard 
provisions may be applicable in the banking and securities sectors and may be 
imposed for a further seven years820. On another front, if a Canadian or American 
firm acquires a Mexican financial institution in Mexico, the sum of the authorized 
capital of the foreign financial affiliates already controlled by the acquiring firm and 
that of the acquired institution cannot exceed a preset limit821. During the six-year
"Capital" is "as defined in Mexican measures, applied on a national treatment basis". 
In the case of commercial banks, this concept refers to capital neto, while for 
securities firms it means capital global. NAFTA, Annex VII (C), Schedule of Mexico, 
Definitions.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) para. 12, Schedule of Mexico.
Market share is measured by the ratio of the capital of one or all foreign affiliates to 
the aggregate capital of all financial institutions of the same type doing business in 
Mexico. NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, para. 2.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, paras 2, 5 and 6.
As of the insurance sector and other financial services, see BACHMAN [et ai], supra, 
note 773 at 308-310. Note that foreign exchange and mutual fund management firms 
are not subject to capital limits. Ibid at 309.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B) Schedule of Mexico, para. 13. SAUVIz & GONZALES- 
HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 11.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, para. 2.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, paras 5, 9.
More specifically, until 2004, Mexico may (under certain conditions) extend and freeze 
(for a period of 3 years) the total capital limit of foreign-owned banks and securities 
firms. NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, para. 9.
"This prohibition effectively fences off from foreign acquisition the [...] largest [financial 
institutions] operating in Mexico." ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 37. The fencing off "is 
not opposed by the U.S. [...] in the context of the overall achievements of [NAFTA]. [I]t 
should not set the standards for future negotiation, however, and must be viewed in 
the context of the recent [liberalization of financial institutions]." Ibid., quoting Potential 
Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Publication N° 2596 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Trade 
Commission, 1993).
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transition period, Mexico will limit aggregate market capitalization of the market in the 
following way822. Mexico will gradually increase from 8 to 15% the maximum share 
of the Mexican banking services market open to foreign commercial bank 
affiliates823. The maximum share of the Mexican market allowed to foreign securities 
firm affiliates will gradually rise from 10% (in the first year of the transition period) to 
20% in the last824. As of the year 2000, Mexico may continue to partially protect 
from foreign control its overall banking system and securities sector. In the event that 
all foreign commercial bank affiliates (whether acquired or established) accounted for 
25% of the capital of all institutions of this type doing business in Mexico, the Mexican 
government could freeze this percentage for up to three years, but only once during 
the period from 2000 to 2004825. Furthermore, in the case of foreign securities firm 
affiliates, the government could intervene where such subsidiaries account for 30% of 
the aggregate capital of institutions of this type826.
Second, with regards to the establishment of offices, branches or subsidiaries outside 
the country, NAFTA gives Mexico a right to approve any affiliation between a foreign 
bank or securities firm and a commercial or industrial corporation established on its 
territory827. However, Mexicans may consider (on a case-by-case basis) exempting 
a bank or securities firm from this restriction if: (i) the affiliation is "harmless"; and (ii) 
90% of the income of the commercial corporation derives from financial-related 
activities. Moreover, such affiliations are permitted to U.S or Canadian investors 
seeking to own Mexican financial services companies if made with non-resident
Ibid.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, para. 5.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, para. 5. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 
370.
"Even if Mexico implements the onetime moratorium, there will be no permanent caps 
on banking or securities firms, either in terms of aggregate market share or in terms of 
individual firm size, after the year [2007]." ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 37.
However, note that temporary limitations on market participation are not the only 
possible solutions to the problem. Hence, Mexico may request consultations with 
Canada and the U.S. to discuss the situation. If such consultations do not result in a 
consensus, arbitration under NAFTA may be sought by any Party. NAFTA, Annex 
1413.6 (B). Annex VII (B), Schedule of Mexico, para. 9; (c) Definitions. JOHNSON, 
supra, note 602 at 371.
"According to a U.S. negotiator, this provision means, for example, that the Mexican 
government will be able to prohibit the Mexican subsidiary of a U.S. bank or securities 
firm from establishing a branch or subsidiary in Israel, Costa Rica, the [U.S.] or any 
other foreign country". ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 35-36.
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commercial or industrial companies operating only outside Mexico828. On the other 
hand, Mexico has until January 1, 1996 to decide whether or not to authorize a new 
type of securities firm829. If permitted to exist, such firms could be subject to lower 
capital requirements than what is required from full-service Mexican firms (i.e. casas 
de bolsa). However, the new firms would have very limited powers.
1.9.2 United States
Under Chapter 14, the U.S. has taken many reservations830 and it granted little to 
Mexico and Canada in the way of new concessions831. The Americans did not 
provide the same concessions to Mexico under NAFTA as some of those granted to 
Canada under the FTA832. NAFTA countries generally have agreed not to increase 
impediments to cross-border trade. However, the U.S. has excluded from trilateral 
trade negotiations any measure pertaining to cross-border trade and MFN treatment 
with respect to cross-border trade in services related to securities with Canada, even 
though such an agreement does exist between the U.S. and Mexico833.
1.9.3 Canada
Compared to Mexico, Canada has taken fewer reservations but has made fewer 
commitments. Moreover, some benefits offered to the Mexicans are an extension of
NAFTA, Annex VII (C) para. 1, Schedule of Mexico. JOHNSON, Ibid, at 372.
NAFTA, Annex VII (C) para. 3, Schedule of Mexico.
NAFTA, Annex VII (A), Schedule of the United States. The U.S. took a reservation 
respecting the obligation for all directors and the president of a national bank to be 
American citizens. Also, certain reservations were taken respecting the BHCA and the 
IBA. Other reservations have been taken similar to the one respecting primary dealers 
in U.S. government debt obligations. NAFTA, Annex VII(A) Schedule of the United 
States. Moreover, there are reservations non-conforming state measures. (NAFTA, 
Article 1409, Annex 1409.1). JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 372-373.
E. LEROUX, Canadian Financial Institutions and Canada-U.S. Free Trade: Is NAFTA 
About to Fulfil its Promises?, (1995) 5:1 FTU 3.
"In particular, the [U.S. has] not [been] amending its National Bank Act to permit 
domestic and foreign banks and [BHCs] to deal in, underwrite, and purchase without 
limitation Mexican government-backed debt securities. The [Americans have] not, 
moreover, [exempted] Mexican-based broker-dealers that conduct securities activities 
in the [U.S.] from the requirement to maintain reserves in the [U.S.]." SAUVIz & 
GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 13.
NAFTA. Annex VII (B), Schedule of the United States. JOHNSON, ibid, at 373.
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those already enjoyed by the U.S. under the FTA.
Canada has chosen to elaborate two stripes of reservations. The first concerns 
specifically the adoption of measures relating to cross-border trade in securities 
services. Section B of Canada’s Schedule establishes similar restrictions as Section B 
of the U.S. Schedule, except that a portion also applies to Mexico. In essence, 
Canada has chosen the option to adopt measures that derogate from Article 1404 
para. 1 of NAFTA or, with respect to the U.S., that derogate from Article 1406834. By 
the same token, Canada has also taken many reservations with respect to any 
existing non-conforming provincial measures835.
The second set of reservations relates to restrictions that limit foreign ownership of 
Canadian-controlled financial institutions and for purposes of restrictions on total 
domestic assets of foreign bank subsidiaries in Canada836. Under NAFTA, Canada 
exempts Mexican bank subsidiaries in Canada from requirements to obtain approval 
from the Minister of Finance prior to opening branches in Canada837. Mexicans are 
allowed to control Canadian financial institution subsidiaries operating under a federal 
charter (without regards to the 10/25 investment rules)838, which foreigners other 
than Americans could not do839. Furthermore, Mexican bank subsidiaries operating 
in Canada are no longer subject to the aggregate ceiling applicable to foreign banks 
of 12% of total domestic assets of the banks established in Canada840. U.S. bank 
subsidiaries established in Canada already benefit from these advantages.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Canada, para. 1.
NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1. Annex 1409.1. One set of reservations affecting the 
securities industry in Canada relates to Ontario laws covering securities brokers and 
dealers. NAFTA, Annex VII(A), Schedule of Canada (Ontario). Similar reservations 
cover laws of other provinces. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 368. See infra, notes 
895 to 897 and accompanying text.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Canada, para. 2. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 
210. SWEDLOVE & EVANOFF, supra, note 728 at 51.
NAFTA, Annex VII (C), Schedule of Canada, para. 2. Remember that the FTA also 
extended this benefit to U.S.-controlled bank subsidiaries. FTA, Article 1703 para. 2(c).
NAFTA, Annex VII (C) Schedule of Canada, para. 1.
FTA, Article 1703.
NAFTA, Annex VII (C), Schedule of Canada, para. 1.
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1.10 Dispute Settlement
In order to avoid the invocation of dispute settlement procedures to the maximum 
extent possible, NAFTA requires that each Party give "sympathetic consideration" to 
the request of another Party to consult with respect to matters affecting financial 
services. The basic idea is that officials of designated government departments of the 
three Parties841 shall (and the regulatory authorities of the consulting Parties may) 
participate in such consultations842.
In NAFTA, the issue concerning the settlement of disputes that may arise with respect 
to an investment is somewhat complicated. For matters relating to financial services, 
the Free Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) is the institutional body that oversees 
the smooth operation of NAFTA and its annexes and the procedures available to the 
signatories to settle disputes that may arise843. The FTC is comprised of cabinet- 
level representatives of the three nations’ governments. It supervises the 
implementation of NAFTA, oversees its further elaboration, resolves disputes that may 
arise regarding its interpretation and supervises the work of various committees 
established under NAFTA, including the Financial Services Committee (hereinafter 
FSC) which supervises the implementation of Chapter 14, considers financial services 
issues referred to it by any NAFTA country and participates in dispute settlement 
procedures844. The FSC meets every year and reports to the FTC.
Before the member countries submit a dispute to the FTC, they must make every 
attempt to arrive to a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through 
consultation845. Should they fail to reach agreement, the dispute is then brought
The three designated government departments are: (i) in Canada, the Department of
Finance; (ii) in the U.S., the Treasury Department; and (iii) in Mexico, the Finance 
Secretariat.
NAFTA, Article 1413. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 373. According to Article 1413, if 
a Party requests consultations with another Party, that Party "shall give sympathetic 
consideration to the request". "Given the hard-nosed reputation of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and the Treasury, "sympathetic consideration" is a lot to 
expect." JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 52.
NAFTA, Article 2001.
NAFTA, Articles 2001 paras 2 (d) and 3; Annex 2001.2. The FSC is composed of 
financial services regulatory officials from all three NAFTA countries. NAFTA, Article 
1412; Annex 1412.1. SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 10. 
NAFTA, Articles 1413 and 2003.
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before the FTC846. If a dispute arises that cannot be resolved by the Parties, then 
according to the Chapter 20 mechanism, any NAFTA country involved may request 
the establishment of an arbitration panel chosen from a trilaterally approved roster of 
experts847. The Chapter 20 mechanism may result in a final report by the panel, but 
the recommendations are not binding on the Parties848. If the recommendations are 
not followed by the disputing Parties, retaliation by the prevailing Party is possible but 
only through denying benefits in the financial services sector that have an equivalent 
effect of the offending measure849.
The dispute resolution provisions address many important issues, such as the 
interrelationship of proceedings under NAFTA, alternative dispute resolution 
programs850 and other trade agreements851. There are three main dispute 
settlement mechanisms established by NAFTA: (i) the mechanism in Chapter 11 for 
the settlement of investment disputes; (ii) the mechanism created by Chapter 19 for 
the settlement of disputes related to anti-dumping and countervailing duties; and (iii) 
the mechanism in Chapter 20 for other disputes under NAFTA. For financial services, 
the Investment Chapter and Chapter 20 are the most important.
In this case, the FTC meets within 10 days of delivery of the request and attempts to 
settle the dispute as quickly as possible. It may call upon technical advisors, have 
recourse to conciliation and mediation and ultimately make recommendations. NAFTA, 
Articles 1414, 1415, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007.
NAFTA, Articles 1414 and 2008 to 2011. The arbitration panel is a "state-to-state 
dispute settlement panel". It is made up of five panellists with expertise or experience 
in law and international trade and financial services matters drawn from a special 
roster of up to 15 individuals agreed upon by the member countries for a period of 
three years. The experts must be independent of, and not be affiliated with or take 
instructions from, the government of any NAFTA country. The panel’s hearings, 
deliberations and initial report are strictly confidential. The final report is issued within 
the prescribed deadline and submitted to the FTC, which may publish it within 15 days 
of receipt. SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 209. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 500, 510. 
SAUVfz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 9-10.
NAFTA, Articles 2016 to 2018.
NAFTA, Article 1414 para. 5. Compare NAFTA, Article 2019. JOHNSON, supra, note 
602 at 500.
NAFTA, Article 2022.
R.G. LIPSEY, D. SCHWANEN & R.J. WONNACOTT, The NAFTA: What's In, What's 
Out, What’s Next, Policy Study 21 (Toronto, Ont.: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994) at 122- 
123. BACHMAN [et ai], supra, note 773 at 304. A Party could choose to bring a 
dispute under either GATT or NAFTA (understanding that the selection of one forum 
excludes the other). NAFTA, Article 2006. As for disputes between Canada and the 
U.S., it remains unclear if the FTA’s dispute resolution procedures could be used.
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Chapter 20 covers most NAFTA-related disputes. A private person may not initiate an 
action against a country by alleging that the country in question has failed to comply 
with NAFTA852. Only a country may lodge a complaint against another country on 
points of interpretation and application of NAFTA853. The chapter on financial 
services incorporates certain sections of Chapter 11’s dispute resolution 
procedures854. Investment disputes that fall into this category are resolved under 
Chapter 11 arbitration proceedings, which can result in binding decisions which are 
enforceable in court855. In this context, investors have the power to initiate an 
arbitration with respect to two key areas of concern: (i) transfer to investors by way of 
dividends, profits or royalty payments856; and (ii) expropriation and just 
compensation857.
The non-binding Chapter 20 approach governs disputes on financial services unless 
the dispute involves an investment issue covered by Chapter 11 and specifically 
incorporated into Chapter 14858. When an investor’s claim is countered by the 
"prudential reasons" defence, the Tribunal shall refer the matter in writing to the FSC. 
The Committee shall then decide whether "prudential reasons" is a valid defence to 
the investor’s claim, but the ultimate result is that the Parties are subject to Chapter 
11 binding arbitration.
NAFTA, Articles 2004 and 2021. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 501.
NAFTA, Article 2004. In the case of dispute between private parties, NAFTA 
encourages and facilitates recourse to arbitration. Each country has adopted 
procedures to ensure observance of the agreements to arbitrate. It is the Advisory 
Committee on Private Commercial Disputes that advises the FTC on matters such as 
the existence, use and effectiveness of arbitration procedures in the free trade area 
and makes recommendations in this respect. NAFTA, Article 2020.
In the case of a violation of certain provisions of Chapter 11, a private investor may 
bring a claim directly against a NAFTA country. NAFTA, Articles 1116 and 1117. 
NAFTA, Articles 1118 to 1138 and 2020. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 502. 
"Whereas the FTA applied only to business enterprises, the NAFTA investment 
provisions will apply to all forms of investments, including minority equity interests 
certain forms of debt securities, and intangible property." SWEDLOVE & EVANOFF,
supra, note 728 at 52.
NAFTA, Article 1109.
NAFTA, Article 1110.
Note that "[djisputes involving [securities dealers] may be subject to both the general 
regime of state-to-state dispute settlement and a wider regime of investor-state 
arbitration." RADOCCHIA, supra, note 740 at 53.
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The following examples illustrate the effects of Chapters 11 and 20859. For instance, 
assume that a Canadian securities firm applies to the Mexican government for a 
permit to establish a Mexican subsidiary that would engage in the securities 
brokerage business. The Mexican government denies the permit on the grounds that 
the authorized capital of the subsidiary would exceed the maximum 4% of the 
Mexican industry’s aggregate capital. The investor claims that Mexico overcalculated 
the proposed company’s authorized capital or that it undercalculated the aggregate 
capital of the Mexican securities industry. This dispute does not involve any of the 
Chapter 11 provisions incorporated into Chapter 14. Therefore, the investor would 
have to convince the Canadian government to initiate a proceeding under Chapter 20. 
The Canadians could request consultations with the Mexican government or a 
meeting of the FTC under NAFTA. If the matter defied resolution, the Canadian 
government could demand the establishment of an arbitral panel, chosen from a 
roster of financial experts. The final report of the arbitral panel would be issued to the 
disputing parties, but it would not be binding on the losing party and would not be 
enforceable in court.
On the other hand, suppose that a Canadian brokerage firm established with a permit 
from the Mexican government is expropriated and the investor believes the 
expropriation is in violation of NAFTA (perhaps because the compensation, according 
to the investor, is not equivalent to fair market value) then the investor can directly 
seek a remedy under NAFTA. According to Chapter 11, expropriation matters should 
be settled under binding arbitration. The Canadian investor could initiate arbitration 
without the need to persuade the Canadian government to do so.
Now, if we assume that the same firm has not been expropriated but that the Mexican 
government has announced that the investor must meet performance requirements 
involving a restriction on the transfer of funds by the Mexican subsidiary to its 
Canadian parent, the matter would be governed by a Chapter 11 provision 
incorporated into Chapter 14 so that the investor could initiate arbitration procedures 
that would lead to a binding award. On the other hand, if the Mexican government 
says the Canadian firm must buy computers from Mexican suppliers approved by the
APPLETON, supra, note 146 at 154-155.
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government, such a performance requirement would appear to breach NAFTA’s 
provisions. However, because this situation is not covered under Chapter 11 
provisions incorporated into Chapter 14, the dispute would be settled under the non­
binding Chapter 20 procedure. The investor would have to convince the Canadian 
government to initiate a Chapter 20 proceeding that would lead to a non-binding 
recommendation by the arbitral panel.
Note that although recommendations from a Chapter 20 panel are not binding, a Party 
which fails to comply with such recommendations in a financial sen/ices dispute will 
run the risk that the other Party may deny benefits in the same sector360. Thus, if 
Mexico fails to comply with a Chapter 20 panel’s report that Mexico wrongfully denied 
a Canadian investor’s application to establish a Mexican brokerage, the Canadian 
government could deny a Mexican investor’s otherwise valid application to establish a 
Canadian bank.
Despite the fact that Chapter 14 creates important dispute settlement mechanisms for 
Parties to the Agreement as well as private interests in each Party, it raises an 
important cause for concerns for the provincial and state governments. Disputes can 
involve provincial or state measures. Yet, NAFTA does not contemplate any particular 
role for provincial governments. Provinces and States do not have the right to make 
submissions to dispute settlement panels, to make complaints before the FTC, or to 
request consultations with other Party officials. Only the federal governments enjoy 
these rights. Consequently, these rules have an important effect on new provincial 
policy initiatives. Many specific policies are limited or prohibited by NAFTA. Therefore, 
virtually any provincial or state measure may be subject to complaint under the 
Agreement’s nullification and impairment provisions861.
Overall, all three North American countries are affected by the provisions of NAFTA. 
Having said that, the principal gains from financial integration of this sort have largely 
to do with the efficiency of rules governing the financial sen/ices industry. In this 
context it seems, that the implications of NAFTA are likely to be greater for the
NAFTA, Article 2019. 
NAFTA, Annex 2004.
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relatively closed Mexican financial system than for the financial systems of either the 
U.S. or Canada.
2. Mexican Gains: Fewer than Few
Since the end of the 1980s, the Mexican financial system has undergone major 
liberalization, the most important of these reforms being the establishment of a 
universal banking system862. Foreign minority ownership has been permitted since 
1989863. The right for banks to have a representative office in Mexico was 
maintained and foreign participation up to 30% was permitted in Mexican banks, with 
an individual limit of 10%864. The new regulation also allowed foreign participation 
up to 30% in Mexican securities firms, with an individual limit of 10%865. Following 
the December 1994 peso crisis, Mexico decided to raise the limit to 49%866. Finally, 
financial groups were permitted by way of a holding company controlling different 
types of financial institutions867. However, control of these groups was kept in 
Mexican hands because of a limit to foreign participation in holding companies set at
MITCHELL, supra, note 685 at 1. WEINERT & SINCLAIR, supra, note 735 at 3. 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra, note 802 at 9. S. WOLFF & J. LIZARDI 
CALDERON, The Securities Market and Regulation Of Mexico, (1991) 19 Denver J. 
Int’l L. & PoPy 569 at 611.
SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 14. A.E. SAFARI AN, 
Harmonizing Investment Policies in Canada, the United States and Mexico: Is 
Liberalization Possible?, Studies on the Economic Future of North America 
(Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 1993) at 4.
Y.E. LEPAGE & D. BAYROCK, "Mexico Improves Foreign Access to Financial 
Services Sector" Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (April 1994) 10. N. LUSTING, Mexico: the Remaking 
of an Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992) at 129. UNITED 
STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, The Year in Trade: Operation of 
the Trade Agreements Program, 43rd Report (Washington, D.C.: USITC, 1992) at 4. P. 
MORICI, Trade and Talks with Mexico: A Time for Realism (Washington, D.C.: 
National Planning Association, 1991) at 29. J. SILVA & R. K. DUNN, A Free Trade 
Agreement Between the United States and Mexico: The Right Choice, (1990) 27 San 
Diego L.R. 937 at 970.
BERDEJA-PRIETO, supra, note 688 at 32. L. CONGER, "The Banks Go on the Black" 
Institutional Investor (March 1991) 123 at 124.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra, note 802 at 39. W. ACWORTH, 
Foreigners Allowed Up to 51% of Mexican Banks, but Banamex, Bancomer and Serf in 
Seen Out of Reach, (1995) 9:5 LDC Debt Report /Latin American Markets 6.
G. NEWMAN & A. SZTERENFELD, Business International’s Guide to Doing Business 
in Mexico (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1993) at 247-248. For a current list of the 
most active financial groups, see, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra, 
note 802 at 22-23.
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30%. In February 1995, these limits were raised to 49% and 20% respectively868. 
However, although the Mexican government has made numerous changes to its 
banking and financial laws and regulations since the late 1980’s, Mexico continued to 
prohibit the establishment and limited the operations of foreign banks, securities firms 
and insurance as well as other nonbank financial services providers. NAFTA allowed 
financial institutions from both Canada and the U.S. to gain significant access to the 
restricted and protected financial services market.
Not only is the financial services regulation exclusively federal, but there are no 
impediments to market access, like the GSA869. In some respects, the Mexican 
financial system resembles that of Canada. The similarities include: (i) an important 
concentration in the banking and securities sectors; (ii) little restrictions to branching 
throughout Mexico; and (iii) a financial sector in the process of being restructured870. 
NAFTA (much like the FTA) may have a fairly limited short-to-medium term impact on 
domestic legislation and the securities industry initiatives871. But, overall, did the 
Mexicans manage to get a better deal under NAFTA than Canada did under the FTA? 
For the Mexicans, negotiations in the financial sector required a trade-off between the 
preservation of a national presence in the financial system and necessary 
concessions. In fact, the Mexican government did not obtain the same preferential 
treatment under NAFTA as Canada managed to negotiate for itself under the FTA. 
For instance, Mexico did not obtain national treatment for its government securities in 
the U.S., such as Canada obtained under Article 1702 para. 1 of the FTA. This is not 
surprising given the fact that the Mexican debt-crisis is less than fifteen years old. By 
comparison, the Canadian government debt securities are relatively strong.
On the other hand, Mexico surprised Canada by making the Americans reexamine 
their approach to the Mexican securities industry operating in the U.S. On the surface, 
Mexico seems to have made a breakthrough. Here, one very important concession 
obtained from the Americans concerns a limited exception to the provisions of the 
GSA. According to NAFTA, the U.S. agreed (subject to some limitations) to allow for
ACWORTH, supra, note 866.
NALDA, supra, note 684 at 380.
SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 15.
Ibid., at 12.
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a Mexican financial group created prior to January 1, 1992, and that acquired a 
Mexican bank and securities company owning or controlling an American securities 
company to pursue the activities in which the U.S. firm was engaged for a period of 
no more than five years from the acquisition872. While this relief from the GSA 
appears significant, the fact that it is limited to a five-year period and to a small 
number of grandfathered groups present in the U.S. on the first day of 1992 are 
frozen as of that date873. Nevertheless, this favourable treatment may be seen as a 
symbolic victory for the Mexicans.
As for the international operations, it was agreed that no Canadian and American 
institutions are obliged to set up operations in Mexico but may nonetheless sell 
financial services to residents and citizens in Mexico, except for transactions 
denominated in Mexican pesos874. This restriction regarding the peso has been 
adopted to avoid interference with the application of Mexican monetary and exchange 
rate policies875. However, considering that all Parties to NAFTA have agreed to 
consult before the year 2000 on the possibility of further liberalization876, this 
restriction could very well disappear altogether.
In Canada, NAFTA extends the benefits gained by the Americans under the FTA to 
the Mexican financial institutions. Here, the Canadian commitment involves specific 
statutory changes to restrictions on foreign ownership and access to financial markets. 
For instance, Canada permits Mexican investors to establish subsidiary financial 
institutions that are exempt from the 10/25 ownership rules. Also, a Mexican-
NAFTA, Annex VII (C), Schedule of the United States. JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 
373.
"This [...] waiver, would appear to benefit only a few Mexican banks that became 
affiliated with Mexican securities firms (and their U.S. securities operations) during the 
privatization of Mexican state-owned banks in 1991." BACHMAN [et a/.], supra, note
773 at 312.
NAFTA, Annex VII(B) para. 16, Schedule of Mexico.
B. DAVIS, "Mexico’s Commercial Banking Industry: Can Mexico’s Recently Privatized 
Banks Compete with the United States Banking Industry After Enactment of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement?" in B. KOZOLCHYK, ed., Making Free Trade Work 
in the Americas: Towards Seamless Boarders (Tucson, AZ.: National Law Centre for 
Inter-American Trade, 1993) 289 at 292. R.O. KING, The North American Free Trade 
Agreement: Liberalizing Trade and Investment in Insurance (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 1993) at 7.
NAFTA, Article 1404 para 4, Annex 1404.4.
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controlled Schedule II bank subsidiary does not have to obtain Canadian Ministry of 
Finance approval before opening additional branches in Canada877.
3. American Gains: Constant
According to U.S. negotiators, NAFTA (unlike the FTA) is more advantageous878. 
Instead of the barrier-removal approach used in the FTA, NAFTA includes a very 
detailed set of principles governing trade and investment. It also differs from the FTA 
in that it covers state or provincial laws in the banking and securities field. Moreover, 
NAFTA provides a "standstill" approach for state or provincial laws which do not 
respect the terms of the Agreement.
Although NAFTA does not provide American and Canadian firms with additional 
access to each other’s market as agreed in the FTA, they gain major access to the 
restricted and protected Mexican market879. The fact that NAFTA enables American 
banks and securities firms to establish full-service offices in Mexico for the first time in 
more than half a century is greatly significant. In addition, U.S. (and Canadian) 
securities firms can now assist Mexicans in issuing securities on the Mexican market, 
thus helping to expand the size of the Mexican So/saP80. However, note that the 
American negotiators failed to persuade either Canada or Mexico to surrender their 
requirements that foreign banks carry on business through subsidiaries881.
4. Canadian Gains: Mixed
The shortcomings of the FTA was acknowledged by both Canada and U.S. through 
Articles 1702 para. 4 and 1703 para. 4. From the Canadian standpoint, NAFTA was 
particularly important in order to redress the FTA’s flaws. Because no new 
liberalization commitments was secured from the U.S. under the NAFTA (beyond 
those agreed in the FTA), the impact of the Agreement on American operations of
NAFTA, Annex VII (C), Schedule of Canada.
ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 33.
Ibid. at 34-35.
In the past,"[...] according to [U.S.] negotiators, Mexican companies [were] borrowing 
abroad to finance a substantial part of their domestic needs.” Ibid. at 35.
JOHNSON, supra, note 602 at 374.
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Canadian financial firms is marginal882. In its ongoing struggle with the U.S., Canada 
did little better under NAFTA than it did under the FTA. Given the underlying principle 
of national treatment, this was only to be expected. In the context of the negotiations, 
the chief Canadian objective vis-a-vis the Americans consisted of obtaining relief from 
both the GSA and the McFadden Act. Recognizing that a complete repeal of either 
laws was unlikely, Canada sought to obtain regulatory accommodation aimed at 
allowing Canadian financial institutions to widen the scope of their American 
operations883. However, the adoption of national treatment prevents Canadian banks 
from being even stronger in the U.S. Hence, given their experience in operating as 
universal banks, the Canadian industry can make full use of this competitive 
advantage in Mexico but not in the U.S.884 While Canadians may be concerned by 
the lack of new market opening commitments by the U.S., NAFTA’s liberalization 
principles are an improvement over the FTA. Hence, advantages may be gained from 
the adoption of a principle-based approach and the development of a dispute 
settlement mechanism. On another front, NAFTA’s establishment provisions may 
pressure Canada to allow U.S. banks the right to branch directly into Canada885.
Canadian firms wishing to enter the Mexican market must respect NAFTA’s 
transitional market-share limitations. However, if Canadian financial institutions do not 
act before those limits are reached, their market share position in the Mexican market 
may be much more difficult to achieve and certainly costlier886.
WEINERT & SINCLAIR, supra, note 735 at 4.
CHANT, supra, note 17 at 18.
After NAFTA was negotiated, the CBA expressed the view that its objective was not 
met. JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 53 n. 49.
The right to branch directly into a country is recognized as a trade-liberalization 
principle. Of course, the danger for Canada comes from the fact that "[...] when a 
country permits [bank] entry by a foreign branch, it is implicitly or explicitly accepting 
the adequacy of home-country [in this case, the U.S. or Mexico] regulation and 
supervision, including the enforcement of those rules." S.J. KEY & H.S. SCOTT, 
International Trade in Banking Services: A Conceptual Framework, Occasional Paper 
(Washington, D.C.: Group of Thirty, 1991) at 21.
SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 18.
5. A Genuine Balanced Exchange of Concessions?
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In financial services the existing differences between the American and Canadian 
regulatory regimes were offset to a large degree by the similarities of the economies. 
However, Mexico was a very different case. Many events were all within recent 
memory: nationalizations, currency controls and the debt crisis. For this reason, many 
of the provisions of a tripartite agreement would need to necessarily be directed 
towards Mexico.
NAFTA offers significant new opportunities for Canadian providers of financial 
services to enter the potentially large Mexican market. However, Canada and the U.S. 
missed an opportunity to further liberalize trade in financial services with each other 
and to redress some of the imbalances contained in the financial services chapter of 
the FTA. In that respect, NAFTA’s results are particularly disappointing for the 
Canadian financial community887. Nevertheless, all is not lost because the 
commitments made in the context of the FTA are now subject to dispute settlement 
under NAFTA. Also, in the long run, it is not impossible that NAFTA’s principles of 
ECO888 and market access could lead to: (i) a greater liberalization of restrictions 
still facing the Canadian financial services industry doing business in the U.S.; (ii) the 
lifting of rules currently preventing American banks to branch directly into Canada; 
and (iii) increased regulatory harmonization within North American countries.
The most contentious issue in NAFTA is market access. Here, Canada feels 
disadvantaged889. Since the liberalization of Canada’s financial sen/ices regulation, 
the only restriction on American banks has been the Canadian Bank Act requirements 
that their operations be conducted through a Canadian-incorporated subsidiary. Then,
J. McFARLAND, "U.S. Still Restricted, Canadian Banks Say" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (14 August 1992) 6.
"NAFTA on financial services enlarges the meaning of [ECO] by allowing 
considerations of market size, concentration and profitability in the assessment of 
market opportunities." D. CHAPUT, Regulatory Issues and Cross-border Investment in 
Financial Services After NAFTA: A Canadian Perspective, Report 94-06 (Montreal, 
Que.: Centre d’etudes en administration internationales, 1994) at 9.
Note that it has been said that "[t]he potential competitive advantage of the Canadian 
and Mexican corporate structures for financial institutions could have materialized in 
the U.S. market only under the reciprocity principle." Ibid., at 6.
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the subsidiary may set up branches throughout Canada890.
Given that the gradual opening of Mexico’s financial markets involves the 
maintenance of aggregate foreign-market share limitations, the treatment afforded by 
Mexico to non-NAFTA firms may prove controversial. This could be the case in 
instances during the transition period, when aggregate ceilings are close to be met, if 
Mexico was to choose to give preference to American or Canadian financial firms over 
non-NAFTA applicants891.
NAFTA constitutes a compromise between three federal governments. The national 
treatment principle applied to Canada and the U.S. guarantees nationwide market 
access for foreign financial institutions. On the other hand, Mexico’s regulation of 
financial services is solely federal892. In this context, NAFTA does not require local 
governments to remove regulatory obstacles to the creation of a nationwide market for 
foreign or domestic institutions or to harmonize their regulations on foreign ownership 
in the financial sector893. Thus, sub-national governments may maintain and renew 
any existing measure that does not conform with NAFTA. Hence, there is an implicit 
assumption in the accord that the required disclosure of state and provincial 
regulations that are not consistent with the national treatment principle is a step 
towards a future round of negotiations on market access involving both levels of 
government jurisdiction.
As of now, all the Canadian provinces and U.S. states have listed the measures they 
wish to maintain894. With regards to the securities sector, the province of Ontario 
took reservations against Articles 1404, 1405 and 1408. The protected measures 
relate to provisions in provincial legislation that enable Ontarians to maintain control
Hence, note that Canada negotiated that it would consider permitting direct cross- 
border branching of commercial banks into Canada only at such time as the 
Americans permit interstate branching in the U.S. NAFTA, Article 1403 para. 3. 
SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 212. CHANT, supra, note 17 at 19.
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A Guide to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement: What It Means for U.S. Business (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, 1992) at 14.
NALDA, supra, note 684 at 380.
Early, the federal governments of all three countries made specific commitments and 
submitted reservations. NAFTA, Article 1409 para. 1 a)(i); Annex VII(A).
NAFTA, Annex 1409.1.
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over financial institutions along with those that allow regulatory authorities to use their 
discretionary powers when the economic viability of financial institutions is at 
stake895. The province of Quebec took reservation against Article 1408896. The 
other Canadian provinces also submitted their lists of non-conforming measures897. 
Note that Canadians declare an important reservation, i.e. the right to adopt a "control 
test" as the rule of origin for Chapter 14898. This approach contrasts with the 
"residency rule" adopted by the U.S and Mexico899.
The impact of NAFTA on institutions operating in the field of capital markets is 
significant900. It permits American and Canadian firms to establish subsidiaries in 
Mexico that will benefit from national treatment901. As a result, they are able to 
develop some capabilities in the peso market902. However, note that NAFTA does 
not address in any consistent way the subject of harmonization of internal regulations 
over the financial services industry. A de facto tendency does exist, however. As is 
already evident in Canadian securities law reforms to date, there has been a natural
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5; NPS N° 39.
Regulation Respecting Securities, Order in Council 660-82, 30 March 1983, (1983)
G.O. 2 , 1269 (eff. 83-04-06), s. 203ff. which broadly state that a securities dealer must 
have a principal establishment in Quebec under the direction of a person who is an 
officer residing in Quebec.
Newfoundland (reservations: 1404 and 1408); Securities Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. S-13; 
NPS N° 39, s. 7. Prince-Edward Island (reservations: 1403 and 1405); Securities Act, 
R.S.P.E.1.1988. British Columbia (reservations: 1404 and 1408); Securities Act, S.B.C. 
1985, c. 83; NPS N° 39. Manitoba (reservation: 1404); Securities Act, R.S.M. 1988, c. 
S-50. New Brunswick (reservation: 1404); Securities Act, R.S.N.B. 1973; NPS N° 39, 
s. 7. Alberta (reservations: 1403, 1404, 1405 and 1408); Securities Act, S.A. 1981, c. 
S-6.1. Saskatchewan (reservations: 1403, 1405 and 1408); Securities Act, S.S. 1988, 
c. S-42.2. Nova Scotia (reservations: 1404, 1405 and 1408); Securities Act, R.S.N. 
1989, c. 418; NPS N° 39, s. 7.
NAFTA, Annex VII (B), Schedule of Canada paras 1 and 2. "Under Canada's control 
test, only foreign-owned financial sen/ices providers controlled by one or more 
residents of the [U.S.] and for Mexico (i.e. individual(s) own(s) more than a 50-percent 
interest) will be considered a resident of NAFTA party and thus eligible for NAFTA 
benefits, such as national treatment." ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 34.
Here, a company incorporated in a NAFTA country possessing a "substantial interest" 
(whether or not it is the subsidiary of a third country such as Japan) could benefit from 
the Agreement. ZANGARI, Ibid.
However, note that M[l]ike the European program for a unified financial market, NAFTA 
on financial services [has] little direct influence on capital markets." CHAPUT, supra, 
note 888 at 1. JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 53.
PAUL, HASTINGS, YANOFSKY & WALKER, North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Summary and Analysis (New York, N.Y.: Matthew Bender, 1993) at 72.
WEINERT & SINCLAIR, supra, note 735 at 6. E. ORTIZ, "NAFTA and Foreign 
Investment in Mexico" in RUGMAN, ed., supra, note 186, 155 at 174.
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tendency among Canadian securities legal reforms to look to U.S. examples in 
seeking regulatory solutions to new problems. In Mexico, securities regulation has 
also changed as the financial system gradually opened up to the American influence.
One of the difficulties experienced by Canada under FTA has been the lack of 
measures to ensure compliance with Chapter 17. For instance, if the FRB exempted 
certain holding companies of American financial institutions from the application of the 
GSA and refused to exempt a Canadian firm, Canadians could not obtain relief under 
the FTA. NAFTA allows the Canadian institution to complain that it has been denied 
national treatment903. Note that in the context of the national treatment standard, it 
could be argued that the effect of the GSA contravenes the principle of the de facto 
national treatment. In this regard, the most important complaint voiced by Canadian 
financial institutions relates to the §20 limited exemption from the GSA 
restrictions904. However, note that Canadian laws preventing foreign banking 
institutions from branching directly into Canada have also been viewed as preventing 
full and effective access in the Canadian market905. Thus, given the nature of such 
interpretation, the principle of de facto national treatment may well need to be 
administered using the dispute settlement mechanism.
Another concern relates to the "standstill" provision. Although Articles 1702 para. 4 
and 1703 para. 4 were used to inspire NAFTA’s "standstill" provision, a real failing of 
the tripartite Agreement becomes apparent where the securities area becomes 
concerned906. Part B of Annex VII of the Canadian and U.S. Schedule means that
SIMSER, supra, note 127 at 209.
CANADIAN BANKERS’ ASSOCIATION, A Canadian Banking Perspective on Trade in 
Financial Services under North American Free Trade Agreement (Toronto, Ont.: 
Canadian Bankers’ Association, 1991) at 7.
National Treatment Study 1990, supra, note 530 at 122.
"[W]ith respect to cross-border trade in securities, Canada (generally perceived to 
have the most permissive set of regulations) did not commit the standstill — largely in 
response to the refusal by U.S. negotiators to grant Canadian securities firms 
equivalent crossborder access into the U.S. market. Consequently, the [U.S.] also 
declined to commit to a standstill in the area of crossborder trade in securities with 
Canada, while they did commit to one vis-a-vis Mexico." SAUV£ & GONZALES- 
HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 7. CANADA, supra, note 770 at 174. JORDAN, 
supra, note 694 at 53-54. SWEDLOVE & EVANOFF, supra, note 738 at 51. B. 
DIETRICH, "Implications and Opportunities Created by the NAFTA in the Securities 
Sector in Canada" Canadian Financial Services Alert (December 1992) 56 at 56.
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all existing measures in the area of securities designed to harmonize the regulation 
between the two countries (like the MJDS) may be at risk of disappearing or being 
altered significantly907. Nevertheless, keep in mind that this restriction may be 
abolished if coming consultations on future liberalization of cross-border trade in 
financial services allow corrections908. Among the issues to be addressed in the 
future, the Mexicans agreed to conduct a study two years after the coming into force 
of NAFTA to determine the possibility of requiring smaller capital requirements for 
securities firms909.
Overall, NAFTA’s long list of exclusions, reservations and commitments as well as 
detailed annexes and the inclusions of a dispute resolution process will most certainly 
lead to a number of interpretations by all three Parties. As a result, the 
interrelationships among NAFTA’s various chapters, provisions and annexes may lead 
to some disputes between the signatories of the Agreement.
BACHMAN [et al.J, supra, note 773 at 299.
See supra, note 779.
"The Mexican government sets a minimum capital requirement of [U.S.] $10 million to 
establish a securities firm in Mexico. According to Treasury Department officials, this 
substantial downpayment could prohibit smaller U.S. firms that provide limited services 
from establishing a commercial presence in Mexico." ZANGARI, supra, note 709 at 
40-41 n. 50.
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PART III: THE EFFECTS OF NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE ON THE WAY
OF DOING BUSINESS OF THE CANADIAN SECURITIES INDUSTRY
With the occurrence of new sets of regional trading rules surrounding the financial 
services industry, some restrictions gradually eroded. However, the approach of 
dealing with new rules and new competitors vary greatly in the U.S. and Mexico. For 
the Canadian securities industry, the post-free trade era marks the beginning of a 
redefined way of doing business in North America.
TITLE I: THE CANADIAN SECURITIES INDUSTRY VERSUS ITS U.S. RIVALS
The signing of the FTA and NAFTA is progressively leading the Canadian securities 
industry on a new path towards excellence. However, Canadian securities firms face 
great competition from the Americans who play under a different set of domestic 
regulation. Still, the MJDS is indirectly changing the way the game is being viewed in 
both countries. For that reason, the Canadian players are starting to position 
themselves for a coming North American confrontation.
CHAPTER I: The Canadian Securities Industry and The Post Free 
Trade Era
For many years the GSA was understood to bar banks (and their affiliates) from 
engaging in securities activities other than those activities explicitly permitted by the 
Act. During the time preceding the signing of the FTA, U.S banks lobbied strongly to 
repeal the GSA in order to broaden their range of services910. The effect of the GSA
U.S. banks claimed that they were losing business to other international firms. Today, 
the ranks of the world’s largest banks are now dominated by other than U.S. 
institutions. On the possible repeal of the GSA prior to the coming into force of the 
FTA, see, e.g., Requiem on the Glass-Steagall Act: Tracing the Evolution and Current 
Status of Bank Involvement in Brokerage Activities, (1988) 63 Tulane L. Rev. 157. 
M.L. FEIN, Facing the Future Without Glass-Steagall, (1988) 37 Catholic University L. 
Rev. 281. C. POLK, Banking and Securities Law: The Glass-Steagall Act — Has It 
Outlived Its Usefulness?, (1987) 55 Geo. Wash. L.R. 812; Beyond the "Wall": The 
American Financial System and the Glass-Steagall Reform, (1987) 62 St. John’s L. 
Rev. 67. W.M. ISAAC &J.J. NORTON, Up Against “The Wall": Glass-Steagall and the 
Dilemma of a Deregulated (aReregulatedH) Banking Environment, (1987) 42 Bus. Law. 
327. Fifty-Two Years After the Glass-Steagall Act: Do Commercial Bank Securities 
Activities Merit a Second Look?, (1984) Det. C.L. Rev. 933. A Banker’s Adventure in 
Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services, (1983)
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restrictions have been eroded by various courts and administrative decisions and are 
subject to a number of exceptions. The move towards broader securities powers to 
banks mainly occurs on two fronts. While Congress has been debating extent to 
which deregulation would occur311, state regulators have been easing the way 
domestically912. More importantly, the Federal Reserve Board (hereinafter FRB) has 
been able to use its role as regulator to expand permitted banking activities913.
1. The Glass-Steagall Act and Section 20’s Canadian Subsidiaries
The U.S. restrictions of bank activities in the fields of underwriting and dealing in 
securities have had a direct impact on certain beneficiaries of the recent Canadian 
deregulation. Hence, a short period of time after the Canadian legislative changes in 
1987 that allowed banks to acquire and own securities firms, most of the underwriting 
capacity of the Canadian securities industry gradually came under the control of 
banks. By doing so, Canadians infringed on the GSA due to the fact they possessed 
securities "affiliates" principally engaged in impermissible activities. Here, Canadian 
securities businesses could still do a traditional order-taking brokerage business, 
acting as agents for clients who wanted to buy or sell stock, and they could still collect 
fees for such work as advising companies on mergers and acquisitions. But they were 
barred from trading stock with their own money, which meant they could no longer do
81 Michigan L. R. 1498. H.L. PITT & J.L. WILLIAM, The Glass-Steagall Act: Key Issue 
for the Financial Services Industry, (1983) 11 Sec. Reg. L.J. 234. J.A. ADAM, Market 
Mutual Funds: Has Glass-Steagall Been Cracked?, (1982) 99 The Banking L.J. 4.
W. ROGER, Banking Reform in the 102d Congress-Glasnost for Glass-Steagall?, 
(1991) 22 University of Toledo L. Rev. 1003. E.J. MARKEY, Why Congress Must 
Amend Glass-Steagall: Recent Trends in Breaching the Wall Separating Commercial 
and Investment Banking, (1990) 25 New Eng. L. Rev. Destroying the Barriers Between 
Commercial and Investment Banking: Should Congress Repeal the Glass-Steagall 
Act?, (1988) 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1115. R. NATTER, Glass-Steagall Act Reform: 
The Next Banking Issue on Congressional Agenda, (1988) 35 Fed. Bar News & J. 
185. C. McGARVEY, Federal Regulation of Bank Securities Activities: Will Congress 
Allow Glass-Steagall to be Shattered?, (1986) 12 J. Contemp. L. 99.
P.B. SABA, Regulation of State Nonmember Insured Banks’ Securities Activities: A 
Model for the Repeal of Glass-Steagall?, (1986) Harv. J. on Legis. 211.
The courts have reviewed several FRB authorizations in the securities area. For 
example, in 1984, it affirmed the FRB order of BankAmerica Corp. (a bank holding 
company) to acquire 100% of the voting shares of Charles Schwab Corp. (a company 
engaged, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, in retail discount brokerage). 
BankAmerica Corp., (1993) 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 105. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, note 
750 at 2998-2999.
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any underwriting (i.e. buying and distributing blocks of newly issued stocks) nor 
operate in the over-the-counter market, where dealers act as principal rather than as 
agent. To solve this problem, Canadian banks cited Section 20’s limitation on 
affiliation with companies in the investment business914. Moreover, they held that the 
securities brokerage services offered by the subsidiaries were "closely related" to 
banking within the meaning of Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act 
(hereinafter BHCA)915.
The primary vehicle for engaging in underwriting activities in the U.S. are the so-called 
"Section 20 subsidiaries" which, subject to a number of conditions and restrictions, 
may engage in equity underwriting activities916. In essence, a Section 20 exemption 
lets a bank subsidiary get into an otherwise forbidden or "ineligible" business provided 
that it is "not principally engaged" in that business and that it does not collect more 
than 10% of its total revenue from "ineligible" sources917. Section 20 subsidiaries
LOSS & SELIGMAN, Ibid, at 3002. In 1991, the FRB adopted Regulation K to govern 
the international operations of U.S. banks and the U.S. operations of foreign banks. 56 
Fed. Reg. 19549 (29 April 1991) (adoption of final provisions); 55 Fed. Reg. 32424 (9 
August 1990) (notice requesting comments or proposed revisions to Regulation K). 
Fed Eases Underwriting, Equity Rules for International Banking Under Reg. K, 23. 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 475 (1990).
M.R SCHROEDER, The Law and Regulation of Financial Institutions, Vol. 1 (Boston, 
MA: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1995) (loose-leaf) at 8-76ff. The FRB has adopted, in 
§25 of Regulation Y, a list of activities which it has determined to be closely related to 
banking (12 C.F.R. §225.25(b) et ff.).
Breaches of the GSA wall occur on a case-by-case basis. In 1987, the FRB 
authorized bank holding companies for the first time to underwrite and deal in certain 
limited types of ineligible securities. Citicorp, J.P. MORGAN & Co. Incorporated and 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation, (1987) 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473. The FRB has 
effectively applied the provisions of Section 20 to the U.S. affiliates of foreign banks by 
virtue of Section 8 of the IBA. In 1989, the FRB expanded the scope of securities that 
could be underwritten and transacted so as to include all types of debt and equity 
securities. J.P. MORGAN & Co. Incorporated, the Chase Manhattan Corporation, 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation, Citicorp and Security Pacific Corporation, (1989) 
75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192. It also permitted underwriting and dealing in securities of 
affiliates where the securities are rated by an unaffiliated nationally recognized 
statistical rating organization (NRSRO). Immediately after that decision, several 
Canadian banks or their subsidiaries applied for underwriting powers in the U.S. K. 
YAKABUSKI, "Canadian Dealers Eyeing U.S. Stock Underwriting Powers" The Toronto 
Star (25 September 1990) E3.
In 1989, the FRB placed at 10% the revenue limit on the amount of total revenues a 
holding company subsidiary may derive from ineligible securities underwriting and 
dealing activities. See Orders Approving Modifications to Section 20 Orders, (1989) 54 
Federal Register 26840. Initially, the limit was set at 5%. Limited §20 Order, (1987) 73 
Fed. Res. Bull. 479. J.L. BERNIER, "Internationalisation des marches financiers: le
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are subject to a number of firewalls918 limiting the role of affiliated banks in its 
underwriting activities. However, many foreign banking organizations (including 
Canadian banks) do not have a bank holding company along the U.S. model. Thus, if 
the Section 20 requirements imposed by the FRB were rigidly imposed on Canadian 
banks wishing to conduct securities activities in the U.S., Canadian banks could not 
conduct securities activities in the U.S. unless they adopted a holding company 
structure. But on January 4, 1990, this situation changed when the FRB approved 
applications by CIBC, RBC and Barclays Bank PLC to engage in limited securities 
underwriting and dealing activities through Section 20 subsidiaries919. The FRB 
made an important concession to the structural requirements of the foreign banks by 
permitting the parent foreign banks to directly own and fund their Section 20
cas du Regime d’information multinational", in SERVICE DE FORMATION 
PERMANENTE DU BARREAU DU QUEBEC, ed., supra, note 53, 174 at 199. The 
revenue limit is consistent with the non-banking standards the FRB is required to 
apply under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA. This important exemption from a general 
prohibition on non-banking activities contained in Section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA allows 
bank holding companies to own shares of companies which engage in activities which 
the FRB has determined are "closely related to banking". See generally, F.E. 
DANGEARD, Le droit financier americain (Paris: Forum europeen de la 
communication sari, 1989) at 55. In 1990, three Canadian banks operating Section 20 
subsidiaries, filed a request for relief from the revenue limit arguing they would suffer 
competitive harm in view of the increase in offerings as a result of the MJDS. Their 
request remained unanswered. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, Securities Regulation 
of Banks and Thrifts 1991, N° 738 (New York, N.Y.: Practising Law Institute, 1991) at 
41.
GREENE [et al], Vol. 2, supra, note 47 at 732ff and Appendix B at B-141ff. The 
firewalls are aimed at preventing a spill-over of risks from the securities affiliate to the 
bank and to the federal safety net, to prevent conflicts of interest and to preserve 
competitive equality with independent securities companies. R. DALE, "Regulating 
Banks’ Securities Activities: A Global Assessment" in SINGLETON, ed., supra, note 14 
at 109.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, The Royal Bank of Canada and Barclays PLC, 
Order Approving Application to Engage, to a Limited Extent, in Underwriting and 
Dealing in Debt and Equity Securities, (1990) 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 158. "CIBC, Royal 
Get Nod to Deal in Securities in U.S." The Financial Post [of Toronto] (5 January 
1990) 4. H.D. WHYTE, "Three Banks Seeking Licenses to Crack U.S. Securities 
Market" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (8 December 1989) 5. "CIBC, Royal Seeking 
to Establish U.S. Securities Units" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 October 1989) 
B22. In essence, the application argued by its terms that the GSA "[...] prohibition 
against the affiliation of a bank and an organization principally engaged in underwriting 
the public sale of securities [did] not apply to Canadian banks to the extent that they 
and their subsidiaries are not members of the [FRB] [...]". JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 
41. JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 49. Also, see "Banks Asked Fed for Power to 
Underwrite Securities", The New York Times (26 October 1988) 29. "US Federal 
Reserve to Allow Banks to Enter Securities Underwriting Market" The [Toronto] Globe 
and Mail (19 January 1989) B2.
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subsidiaries, without the necessity of establishing a holding company structure. 
Moreover, the FRB decided that the Canadian banks, insofar as their foreign offices 
and operations are concerned, would be treated as bank holding companies for 
purposes of Section 20 conditions. Also, the responsibility for compliance with Section 
20 conditions was placed on the Section 20 subsidiaries rather than the parent 
Canadian bank, in order to avoid U.S. regulation having an extraterritorial impact. 
Finally, minor adjustments to the firewalls were approved and it was determined that 
personnel interlocks between the applicants and their securities subsidiaries would be 
permitted. In October 1990, the FRB extended the powers of Canadian bank-owned 
firms by allowing the securities arms of RBC, CIBC and Bank of Nova Scotia (later to 
become Scotiabank) to underwrite debt issues in the U.S. Then, by mid-January 
1991, the FRB allowed RBC and CIBC’s brokerage firms to underwrite and sell stocks 
in the U.S. market920
Although not directly implicated in these Section 20 orders, the FTA and NAFTA help 
to provide the broader context in which they operate. In essence, Canadian banks 
and their securities dealer subsidiaries possess a unique cross-border expertise that 
is considered when such orders are granted. Moreover, the argument that U.S. banks 
and securities dealers operating in Canada partly owe their recent expanded range of 
activities to the interaction of the FTA and NAFTA has been used as an argument 
upon which to base (through section 20 orders) expanded Canadian bank powers in 
the U.S.921. Although Canadian banks have to concede that nothing in the free trade 
agreements requires the U.S. to change its policy, Canadians nonetheless always 
argued that the policy unfairly put them at a disadvantage922. The Canadian bank 
subsidiaries appear to be getting equal consideration when Section 20 exemptions are
Note that when giving the approvals, the FRB underlined these were accepted on a 
case-by-case basis "[...] with a very critical eye to the financial strength of the 
institution involved". K. HOWLETT, "Fed Opens Doors to CIBC, Royal Bank" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (16 January 1991) B1.
JORDAN, supra, note 103 at 41.
"The CBA [wants Canadian banks to have] their freedom to do business in the [U.S.] 
[...]. Part of the impetus comes from a feeling that Canada’s financial institutions got a 
raw deal out of NAFTA. "We gave a lot more than we received." says the CBA’s 
[senior vice president Mr. Allan Cooper]. D. GOOLD, "Grouse Hunting With J.P. 
MORGAN" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (25 April 1995) B13. J. SAUNDERS, "Banks 
Call for Removal of U.S. Barriers" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20 October 1990) 
B5.
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handed out but they question whether it is an even trade, considering that U.S. 
brokers now have unlimited rights to grow in Canada regardless of who owns them. 
Another argument used by Canada to entice the gradual removal of at least some of 
the traditional barriers between the U.S. banking and securities businesses has been 
the implementation of the MJDS.
2. The Resounding Impact of the MJDS
Despite the implementation of the FTA, the Canadian securities industry continued its 
attacks on the GSA prohibitions restricting activities in the U.S. However, the 
battleground shifted away from trade to sectorial arrangements. During the MJDS 
negotiations, Canadian brokerage firms (all controlled by banks) tested the U.S. 
attitude towards free trade in financial services by asking for a special deal relating 
strictly to securities issued by Canadians, arguing this would let them compete on 
equal terms with U.S. firms wishing to handle cross-border issues. The MJDS was 
temporarily held hostage over the GSA issue. The Canadian bank-owned securities 
industry mounted a campaign to delay the implementation of the MJDS923. This 
attempt to try blocking implementation of the MJDS proved unsuccessful. However, 
these grievances were heard by the entire financial community. The fears of the 
Canadian securities industry came about from the very existence of the MJDS. In 
theory, the MJDS enhances the free-flow of capital between the two countries. In 
practice, however, the flow of issuances of securities (most of it being in the form of 
debt) under the MJDS has been (mainly) from Canada to the U.S924. There are 
reasons explaining this phenomenon925. First, the vast majority of Canadian 
companies can meet their capital requirement by tapping into markets in this country. 
Second, with a few exceptions, Canadian companies are not well-known to U.S. 
investors and it can take a long time to raise their American profile before a cross- 
border offering is feasible926. Third, the Canadian recession (the beginning of which
Canadian bank-owned dealers expressed the view that "[i]f the U.S. banks and 
investment firms are allowed to do certain things in Canada, we think it should be a 
level playing field [in the U.S.]." Their submission was supported by the CBA in a letter 
to the OSC. H.D. WHYTE, "Cross-border Equities Plan May Hurt Canada’s Dealers" 
The Financial Post [of Toronto] (13 July 1990) 10.
See JORDAN, supra, note 452 at 389.
JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 25.
D. KELLY, "New Setup Panned" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (1 October 1991) 16.
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coincided with the introduction of the MJDS) has been longer and deeper than the 
U.S.’s. Consequently, many Canadian companies did not qualify for the MJDS927. 
Fourth, the necessity for Canadian issuers to have financial statements that are in 
conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (hereinafter GAAP) has 
been a costly and time-consuming process928. At first, Canadian securities firms 
were confident that the MJDS would not be detrimental to them929. However, due to 
the fairly infrequent use of the MJDS by Canadian issuers, "Canadian dealers, 
(despite the existence of operations in the U.S.) have been virtually shut out of the 
U.S. syndicates for MJDS distributions of Canadian securities in the United 
States'030. Canadian dealers may have been partly responsible for their exclusion of 
U.S. syndicates931. However, the MJDS should have come with a reciprocal 
recognition of broker-dealers. In Canada, this problem is in the process of being 
addressed.
In order to ease Canada-U.S. cross-border trading, the CSA and Canadian SROs are 
developing new techniques helping Canadian brokers to compete for additional 
business from various local and foreign sources. For example, the TSE has recently
In early 1993, the OSC and the SEC considered reducing the “threshold" requirement 
to accommodate Canadian issuers. E. REGULY, "Free Trade Not "Hot" in Securities 
Sector" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (13 March 1993) 22. However, nothing 
concrete emerged from these discussions.
In 1993, the first steps towards addressing this problem came in the form of a report 
prepared by the Office of the Chief Accountant of the OSC. See Notice — Report of 
the Study of Differences Between Canadian and United States Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles, (1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 2195. On the re-thinking of the OSC’s 
approach to foreign issuers and GAAP reconciliation, see Notice — Remarks of Joan 
Smart Made to the International Conference on Strengthening Capital Markets in Latin 
America: The Ontario Experience: Coming to Grips With Financial Reporting Issues in 
a Global Market, (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 5795.
"[...] Canadian underwriters won’t disappear under free trade because they know 
Canadian stocks better and often can place them more expertly than their U.S. 
counterparts. That means smart Canadian issuers will ensure Canadian dealers are 
included in their U.S. syndicate. It also means that American companies that want to 
sell securities in Canada will be loath to eliminate Canadian underwriters from their 
team. Bay Street has developed a vast distribution system in Canada; Wall Street has 
not, nor is it likely to." E. REGULY, "Securities Dealers Are Safe Under Free Trade" 
The Financial Post [of Toronto] (28 June 1991) 11.
JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 50.
Generally, "[...] the Canadian dealer community’s view [the] use of the MJDS by 
Canadian issuers [to be] detrimental to Canadian dealer interests. Better to keep the 
transaction in Canada than to risk being frozen out of a large U.S. tranche by U.S. 
dealers." JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 30.
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amended its policies to extend the class of "eligible clients" to qualified institutional 
buyers under Rule 144A and to domestically registered investment counsellors and 
portfolio managers932. For its part, the OSC has proposed a waiver of certain 
requirements for sales persons (and their supervisors) registered and resident in the 
U.S.933 Subject to compliance of some requirements, such persons could register 
with the OSC and be subject to dual supervision by the U.S. broker-dealer and its 
affiliated Canadian dealer. Here, all transactions with Ontario residents and the 
issuance of confirmations and statements would be the responsibility of the Canadian 
dealer334. Subject to access by the OSC, record-keeping functions could be kept 
outside of Canada935.
Following these Canadian initiatives, it is possible that the SEC may be in favour of 
re-examining an interesting concept release (which appears to have been abandoned 
some years ago) on the recognition of foreign broker-dealers936. At the same time 
when Regulation S, Rule 144A and the MJDS were being drawn, the SEC proposed 
(and requested comments on) the concept of a conditional exemption from registration 
for certain foreign broker-dealers located in foreign countries: (i) that have regulatory 
schemes comparable to that provided by the Exchange Act; and (ii) whose local 
securities authority and the SEC have in place a MOU or treaty providing "the fullest 
mutual assistance possiblet'937. For many years, the CSA (as well as the IDA and
See Amendment to Part XXX of the TSE Policies (29 March 1994). "It should be noted 
that an eligible client must still utilize the services and facilities of a TSE member to 
enter orders into the Exchange. Interestingly, a proposal to extend the class of eligible 
clients to U.S. broker-dealers was rejected by the Exchange’s Board of Governors." 
Notice — Remarks of Edward J. Waitzer, Chairman of the OSC - April 8, 1994: 
"International Securities Regulation - Coping with the “Rashomon E f f e c t (1994) 17 
O.S.C.B. 1719 at 1722 n. 16.
Notice — Review of Residency Requirements for Salespersons and Supervisors of 
Registered Canadian Subsidiaries of U.S. International Dealers, (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 
1215.
"Rashomon", supra, note 932.
Note that this proposal differs from the OSA’s "international dealer" registration 
category which allows the dealing in certain securities with specified institutional clients 
without the need for substantive requirements for registration.
SEC Release N° 34-27018 (11 July 1989).
Note that on the same day that Release N° 34-27018 was made public, the SEC 
adopted a series of exemptions available to foreign broker-dealers regarding 
registration requirements. See SEC Release N° 34-27017 (11 July 1989). GREENE [et 
a!.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 368ff.
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TSE) has been asking the SEC to exempt Canadian dealers from Rule 15a-6938 that 
limits the activities of foreign brokerage firms in the U.S.939 It has been suggested 
that the SEC did not pursue this line of thinking because of pressures by U.S. 
registered broker-dealers who may not have wanted to be at a disadvantage in 
competition with foreign broker-dealers subject to a less restrictive scheme940. Still, 
these initiatives and proposals recognize a growing desire by several market 
participants to be fully recognized, particularly when adequate standards apply 
elsewhere.
On the issue of how much freedom Canadian investment dealers have in the U.S., 
the IDA has been very frustrated by what it sees as American protectionism in the 
securities market. Essentially, the IDA has argued that, despite the coming about of 
the MJDS, U.S. dealers have much more flexibility and freedom in Canada than 
Canadian dealers in the U.S. In Ontario, the only thing that a U.S. dealer has to do is 
to go through the relatively easy process of registering as an international dealer with 
the OSC. However, if a Canadian firm wants to tap into the vast U.S. market, it has to 
go through the laborious and expensive process of setting up a Wall Street subsidiary, 
(with employees and capital) and making sure it complies with the rules of the SEC, 
state regulators and the NYSE. The other option open for a Canadian dealer is to 
forge a link with a U.S. firm that will act as its "provider" by booking the Canadian 
firm’s orders (of course, in return for a commission). In the end, even if a Canadian 
firm becomes a full U.S. registrant, the GSA puts a strangle on its permissible 
activities. Despite these many clear differences, Canadian dealers have had 
difficulties levelling the existing playing field. First, Canadian firms cannot exactly be 
called powerhouses in the U.S. Thus, they have little influence over the SIA, the SEC 
and the dismantling of the GSA. Second, the U.S. firms see GSA as a fact of life
On the same day that SEC Release N° 34-27018 was made public, the SEC adopted 
SEC Release N° 34-27017 (11 July 1989) which is cited as "Rule 15a-6 Adopting 
Release". See also SEC Release N° 34-25801 (14 June 1988) which is cited as the 
"Rule 15a-6 Proposing Release".
H.D. WHYTE, "Canadian Dealers Seek Financial U.S. Status" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (18 June 1990) 3.
GREENE [etal.], Vol. 1, supra, note 47 at 380.
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which does not discriminate against Canadian dealers but treats everyone the 
same941. In the meantime, there has been a Canadian concern that the GSA puts 
Canadian bank-owned dealers at a disadvantage in competing for underwriting 
assignments when Canadian issuers use the MJDS to finance in the U.S. As a result 
of the GSA, these dealers are currently subject to various restrictions on their U.S. 
underwriting activities (which includes a limit on the dollar volume). This revenue limit 
was arrived at by the FRB because Section 20 of the GSA prohibits a member bank 
of the FRS from being affiliated with any corporation which is "engaged principally" in 
underwriting or distributing securities. Because the 10% revenue ceiling currently in 
place, these underwriting subsidiaries typically are the principal vehicles of the 
affiliated banks and BHCs for underwriting and dealing in eligible securities942. The 
greater the revenue derived from eligible securities activities, the greater the amount 
of revenue that can be derived from ineligible securities activities. A Canadian 
chartered bank or a Canadian-controlled registered BHC which already engages to a 
significant extent in underwriting and dealing in Canadian bonds of the types which 
have become eligible securities as a result of the FTA, and which seeks to expand its 
securities activities in the U.S., could use its activities in Canadian bonds which are 
eligible securities as the base for supporting ineligible securities activities. Moreover, 
the securities affiliates of U.S. BHCs may be expected to have greater interest in 
underwriting and dealing in these kinds of Canadian bonds because of the benefits for 
their ineligible securities business.
At about the time the FTA was implemented, the Canadian bank subsidiaries saw the 
10% limit as constituting an important restriction. In that regard, the U.S. position was 
difficult to understand in view of the fact that: (i) most U.S. brokers were not faced
However, note that "[o]ne reason why calls for repeal of [the GSA] have recently 
become louder is that the [FRB]’s habit of granting banks ad hoc [Section 20] 
exemptions was seen as a poor way of making public policy." "Trading Places" A 
Survey of Wall Street The Economist (15 April 1995) 26 at 28.
"The chief source of revenue attributable to eligible securities activities [...] is 
government securities activities. Activities with respect to these securities are generally 
intensely competitive and have low profit margins. [As a result,] §20 [apliates that are 
part of a foreign bank organization are particularly disadvantaged in expanding eligible 
securities activities, and thus ineligible revenues, since activities in U.S. government 
securities [...] do not form as relatively large or as natural an asset base for foreign 
banks as they to do for U.S. banking organizations [...]". GREENE [et al.], Vol. 2, 
supra, note 47 at 730-731.
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with such restrictions (not being owned by banks); and (ii) the U.S. and Canadian 
securities regulators were near an agreement on the MJDS. Considering that, under 
the MJDS, a company wanting to sell a stock or debenture issue in both countries 
would have to prepare only one set of regulatory documents (in its own country), the 
Canadian bank subsidiaries saw this new convenience as an "inconvenience" to 
them943. Hence, its was argued that the MJDS would encourage Canadian 
corporations to attempt more cross-border offering, tapping the big U.S. market 
without the extra cost of dual filings. Under the 10% rule, a bank-backed broker might 
find itself unable to bid for the U.S. slice of such an issue. It might thus lose the whole 
deal, and the client, to a U.S.-based rival or one of the few Canadian brokers not 
linked to a bank. That is why certain Canadian banks made a novel sort of a plea to 
the FRB on behalf of their securities arms.
In a new set of applications944, the banks said their subsidiaries deserved a special 
"Canadian-only" break. They wanted to be allowed to handle any volume of Canadian 
corporate securities in the U.S. without worrying about the 10% limit. As they saw it, 
this would at least give them a fair shot at winning business from their "natural" 
clientele (i.e. Canadian corporations) and would partly offset what they regarded as an 
imbalance in the U.S. policy945. In the end, the Canadian requests remained 
unanswered by the FRB, probably considering them to be premature and 
inappropriate.
At the time NAFTA was negotiated, The Canadian Department of Finance clearly 
indicated that Canada was pressing for the right of Canadian bank-owned securities 
dealers to compete for U.S. corporate public financing946. It is plausible that the 
inflexibility of the U.S. to continue to ease these restrictions may have created an 
insecure climate for the negotiation of Chapter Fourteen with respect to cross-border
J. SAUNDERS, "Banks Call for Removal of U.S. Barriers" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (20 October 1990) B5.
(1990) Fed. Res. Bull. 3240.
As the RBC’s filing put it: ”[t]he 10[%] revenue limitation is a virtually perfect example 
of a regulatory constraint that is even-handed in concept but operates in practice to 
deny equality of competitive opportunity".
"Canada Makes Gain in NAFTA: Financial Sector has Mexican Entry" The [ Toronto]  
Globe and Mail (26 June 1992) B1 at B2. "Greater Disclosure sought by Exchanges: 
Global Training on the Increase" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 June 1992) 4.
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activities of securities firms. However, a recent initiative has been undertaken by 
twenty U.S. banks and ten foreign institutions to pressure the FRB for permission to 
expand their securities-related businesses may benefit the Canadians947. In 
essence, the banks want to see a raise in the revenue cap (from the present 10% to 
25%) of the total revenues a BHC subsidiary may derive from ineligible securities 
underwriting and dealing activities. Although the FRB has yet to respond to the 
request of raising the revenue cap to 25%, it has recently suggested changes in the 
way the 10% cap is calculated948.
The most recent initiative undertaken by some Canadian banks to increase their 
amount of corporate underwriting and other private-sector investment banking 
business in the U.S. has been to apply for a licence to act as primary dealers949. 
There are currently 38 primary dealers in the U.S. and only B of M (through its 
Chicago-based subsidiary Harris Bankcorp Inc.) is Canadian950. By being able to 
underwrite U.S. treasuries, Canadian banks could more easily develop revenues from 
"eligible activities".
Since the middle of 1991, the CSA has been monitoring the effects of the MJDS on 
the Canadian dealer community951. Many months after the review date of the MJDS, 
there has not been a demonstration of any material adverse effect on the Canadian 
dealer community which would justify the CSA and the SEC to commence rule- 
making proceedings to alleviate such adverse effects. Nevertheless, under NAFTA, 
these securities firms may wish to point out that they do not enjoy ECO with securities 
firms owned by major U.S. banks due to the relatively limited extent of the eligible 
underwriting activity in the U.S. by the Canadian-owned firms. Thus, NAFTA leaves
947 "U.S. Lenders Seek More Securities Business" The [ Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 July 
1994).
948 Instead of using total revenues as a base, the FRB has proposed using total assets or 
sales volume as a base. See (1994) 59 Fed. Reg. 747.
949 J. PARTRIDGE, "CIBC Wants to Underwrite U.S. Treasuries" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (12 July 1995) B2.
950 Ibid
951 According to the final text of the MJDS, as it was implemented in 1991, Canada and 
the U.S. agreed that "[t]he CSA will monitor the effect of the MJDS and obtain input 
from Canadian dealers and otherwise monitor the dealer community." SEC Release 
N° 33-6902 at 30049-30050. Although specifically mandated in the implementation of 
the MJDS, it is unclear if the CSA has thoroughly reviewed the system to measure its 
impact on Canadian-owned dealers. JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 29 & 30.
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unclear the question of the GSA’s compliance with a broad principle of de facto 
national treatment. At one point during NAFTA negotiations, cooperation between the 
SEC and the CSA was moving in the direction of U.S. recognition of Canadian broker- 
dealer requirements. However, this all changed with Canadian concerns about the 
lack of any Canadian Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(hereinafter NRSROs), the most important ones being the Canadian Bond Rating 
Service (hereinafter CBRS) and the Dominion Bond Rating Service (hereinafter 
DBRS).
Hence when the MJDS was implemented, the CSA determined that for a period of 
one year, Canadian issuers would be required to have their debt and preferred 
securities rated by one of the Canadian rating organizations prior to an offering of 
their securities being made using Form F-9952 adopted by the SEC under the 
MJDS953. This requirement was adopted because Canadian bond rating agencies 
were not recognized as NRSROs by the SEC and, therefore, securities of Canadian 
issuers would need to be rated by one of the U.S. rating organizations if such 
securities were offered in the U.S. using Form F-9954. The expiry date for this 
requirement was extended until November 30, 1993 because the Canadian bond 
rating organizations had not yet been recognized as NRSROs, although they actively 
pursued recognition with the SEC955. This recognition finally occurred in late
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7032 (1 July 1991). MJDS, General 
Instructions I.B., Instruction 2. Note that the U.S. MJDS introduced Securities Act 
Registration Form F-7, F-8 and F-10 available to qualified Canadian private issuers. 
"Form F-9 is limited to investment grade debt securities or preferred stock offered for 
cash or in connection with an exchange offer by a Canadian private issuer or crown 
corporation that has been subject to the continuous disclosure requirements of any 
Canadian securities commission or equivalent regulatory authority for thirty six 
consecutive months [...] and is currently in compliance with such reporting 
requirements [MJDS, General Instruction I .A - I.B.]. The investment grade refers to the 
four highest grades accorded by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization. [MJDS, General Instruction I.A.]." H.S. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WOLFF,
The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System and Other Cross-border Offerings, (1992) 20 
Denv. J. Int’l L. & PoPy 551 at 557.
C. JORDAN, "Benefits of Cross-border Security Law" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(9 September 1991) 6. Note that the SEC is presently considering dropping the 
NRSRO tag entirely, thus creating a free market in ratings. "Rating the Rating 
Agencies" The Economist (15 July 1995) 53 at 54. "Will the Agencies Be SEC 
Puppets" Euromoney (November 1994) 26.
Section 7 of the Canadian MJDS as modified by National Policy Statement N° 45 - 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (NPS N° 45) Canadian Rating Organizations, 
(1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 2819; Instruction generate n° C-45, Decision N° 93-C-0203,
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On another front, the MJDS forces Canadian dealers to adapt to a series of new rules 
and affects the habits of their top executives. Not surprisingly, the greatest impact of 
the MJDS has been on the Canadian domestic securities regime. In essence, the 
"Canadianization" of U.S. domestic rules implemented by the MJDS has been 
intended to ease the regulatory burden imposed by duplication. Apart from the 
introduction of a national shelf prospectus, pressures of convergence between the 
Canadian and U.S. systems have not diminished since the introduction of the MJDS. 
The system has led to a certain harmonization of both prospectus disclosure and 
continuous disclosure. Certain changes to U.S. short form prospectus eligibility 
requirements has resulted in changes to the MJDS and the domestic Canadian 
prompt offering prospectus (POP) system957. In addition, the MJDS introduced into 
Canada a furious debate958 over disclosure on executive pay959. Until the year the 
MJDS came into effect, several Canadian-based companies had to disclose individual 
executive salaries because their shares traded in the U.S. and they were bound by 
the regulation of the SEC. In 1991, the SEC gave Canadian companies the choice of 
following its regulations or those of their home jurisdiction. Many Canadian companies 
chose to follow Canadian rules, which required less disclosure. However, Canadian 
shareholders of public corporations wanted to see the installation of a regime similar
(1993) 24:27 B.C.V.M.Q. 4.
Consequently, the requirement that debt and preferred securities offered by a 
Canadian issuer using the U.S. MJDS Form F-9 receive a rating by CBRS and DBRS 
was deleted. One other important amendment to the Canadian MJDS consisted in 
reducing the reporting history requirement from 36 months to 12 months for debt and 
equity offerings. With these changes, the Canadian MJDS conformed to that of the 
U.S. Modification de I’Instruction generate n° C-45-R4gime d’information multinational 
(Amendment of National Policy Statement N° 45 — Multijurisdictional Disclosure 
System), Decision N° 93-C-0399, (1993) 24:47 B.C.V.M.Q. 9.
JORDAN, supra, note 441 at 31.
H.D. WHYTE, "Cross-border Plan Hides Pay of Executives" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (3-5 November 1990) 1.
For a history of this debate, see Notice — Remarks of Edward J. Waitzer, Chairman of 
the OSC at Executive Compensation Disclosure Insight Conference, Toronto: "Who’s 
Afraid of Pay Disclosure?", (1994) 17 O.S.C.B. 490 at 490. M.R. COHEN & R.B. 
PAVALOW, "Disclosure of Executive Compensation" Canadian Financial Sen/ices 
Alert (January 1994) 45.
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to the one existing in the U.S.960 in order to evaluate the compensation given to 
each top executive and be able to judge the truth of a company’s claim when it said it 
was reducing executive compensation because of declining performance961. For 
their part, executives opposed fuller disclosure on the grounds of infringement on 
privacy962.
In the latter part of 1993, the government of Ontario, whose securities law sets the 
standard generally followed in the rest of the country, decided to move forward and 
adopted an OSC proposal963 which was very much like the U.S. model.964
"The [MJDS] [...] eliminates lot of paperwork [...]. But loss of the salary disclosure 
feature for large Canadian companies subject to SEC filing is regrettable. The situation 
could easily be remedied if Canadian regulators imposed a more complete disclosure 
requirement on Canadian companies. Why do they not see the shareholder interest in 
such disclosure?" EDITORIAL, "Too Much Secrecy on Top Salaries" The Financial 
Post [of Toronto] (6 November 1990) 14.
The debate over compensation disclosure has been connected with the one over 
corporate performance or compensation. See generally, "A Survey of Corporate 
Governance" The Economist (29 January 1994). For a Canadian perspective of the 
debate, see INSIGHT CONFERENCE, Executive Compensation Disclosure (Toronto, 
Ont.: Insight, 1994). Notice — Edward J. Waitzer, ”What’s Right About Corporate 
Governance?”, (1993) 16 O.S.C.B. 5575 at 5576. E. HEINRICH, "Regulator Warns 
Boards" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (14 September 1993) 5. T. CORCORAN, "Fad 
or Not, Corporate Governance is Hot" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 August 1993) 
B2.
For an opinion against disclosure, see J.D. McNEIL, "Why Make Executives Disclose 
Their Salaries?" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 October 1993) A21.
Press Release — Ontario Moves to Individual Disclosure on Executive Pay, (1993) 16 
O.S.C.B. 5126. See also Notice — Disclosure of Executive Compensation, (1993) 16 
O.S.C.B. 5886. J. FERRABEE, "Disclosure Opens Debate On Top Executive’s 
Salaries" The [Montreal] Gazette (18 December 1993) C1. T. VAN ALPHEN, "Veil 
Lifted On Top Bosses’ Pay" The Toronto Star (15 October 1993) E1. J. RUSK, "CEOs 
Required to Reveal Salaries" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (15 October 1993) B1. B. 
POWELL, "Ontario Executives Will Have to Reveal Salaries Under New Rules" The 
[Montreal] Gazette (15 October 1993) B4. P. WALD IE, "Pay Disclosure Called 
Dangerous" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (15 October 1993) 3. D. KELLY, "Ontario 
Lifts Lid on Executive Pay" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (15 October 1993) 1. B. 
MOONY, "Des compagnies canadiennes ne divulguent plus la remuneration de leurs 
dirigeants" Les Affaires [of Montreal] (17 April 1993) 2. M. GIBB-CLARK, "Investors 
Seek More Disclosure of Executive Pay" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 March
1993) B5. Surprisingly, Quebec did not follow in the footsteps of Ontario. 
"Remuneration of senior executive officers is a legitimate concern for corporation’s 
shareholders. [...] The scope of this shareholders’ right, however, must take into 
account the situation of senior officers of business in Quebec, the vast majority of 
which are small or medium-sized business." QUEBEC, Ministry of Finance, 
Quinquennial Report on the Implementation of the Securities Act (Quebec, Que.: 
Ministry of Finance, 1993) at 33. K. DOUGHERTY, "Ontario Urged to Rethink 
Disclosure" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (22 December 1993) 15. J. HEINRICH,
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Consequently, executives of major Canadian corporations (like financial institutions) 
found themselves complying indiscreet compensation disclosure rules.
In a nutshell, it is fair to say that with the FTA and NAFTA, the Canadian securities 
industry had a golden opportunity to obtain a special treatment with respect to the 
GSA. However, despite the fact that Canada did not fully benefit from this chance, the 
GSA (which seemed doomed in the mid-1980s) does appear to be on its way to 
crumble soon. Although certain members of Congress, mindful of the collapse of the 
savings and loan industry and the near collapse of the banking industry, are fearful of 
exposing government-insured banks to the riskier business of securities underwriting 
and trading, new pressures are being exerted on Congress to have the GSA 
abolished within a few years (if not months)965. Still Canadian dealers, by continuing 
to pressure the U.S., could force changes in areas beyond the scope of the GSA. For 
instance, in view of the MJDS, Canadian dealers ought to convince the Americans 
that they could sell Canadian securities in the "secondary" market to U.S. registrants 
without having to become full-fledge U.S. registrants or employ a U.S. "provider1'. 
Moreover, the 10% underwriting restriction could become more flexible.
However, the Canadian crusade promises to be long and difficult. Negotiations over 
access by U.S. firms to video screen systems of Canadian inter-dealer bond
"Salaries Should Be Secret: Robic" The [Montreal] Gazette (22 December 1993) D1. 
For reactions of Quebec’s stance, see J. HEINRICH & L. WARWICK, "Quebec’s 
Disclosure Position Could Be Harmful" The [Montreal] Gazette (24 December 1993). 
However, the newly-elected Quebec government has indicated that it would favour a 
system like that of the U.S. V. BEAUREGARD, "Salaire des cadres: Campeau veut la 
transparence" La Presse [of Montreal] (29 October 1994) C1. For a comment of these 
rules, see R.J. DANIELS, Compensation, Accountability, and Disclosure: An 
Assessment of the Revisions to the Securities Act Regulations Governing Executive 
Compensation, (1994) 2:1 Corporate Financing 3.
H.D. WHYTE, "New Rules Mirror More Detailed U.S. Regulations" The Financial Post 
[of Toronto] (15 October 1993) 3. However, in the case of Ontario, publicly traded 
companies only have to disclose the salaries of their CEO and their four other highest 
paid executives.
See, e.g., "Break Glass-SteagalP The Economist (1 July 1995) 15. "A Wall Not Yet 
Shattered" The Economist (24 June 1995) 66. "America’s Latest Financial Fling" The 
Economist (24 June 1995) 65. "The Walls Come Down" The Banker (June 1995) 22. 
R. WATERS "Big U.S. Banks Eye Wall Street Brokers as Deregulation Nears" The 
Financial Post [of Toronto] (4 May 1995) 5. "Breaking Glass-Steagall” The Economist 
(4 March 1995) 77. K. BRADSHER, "White House Is Joining in Efforts to Loosen the 
Limits on Banking" The New York Times (27 February 1995) A1. "Banking on Change" 
The Economist (19 November 1994) 87.
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brokerages are a case in point. The screens set a market by displaying anonymous 
bid and ask prices for government bonds. Many years ago, the bond screens were 
penetrated by U.S. dealers who obtained a free and unregulated ride into Canada’s 
insider market for bonds. In 1992, after more than two years of heated disputes, a 
compromise was struck966. The U.S. dealers would retain their access to the bond 
screen — in exchange they would have to pay a fee to the IDA and the Canadian 
Investor Protection Fund (hereinafter CIPF). In the end, this deal may be viewed as 
unfair because Canadian dealers do not have easy access to the U.S. bond market. 
However, Canadians know (perhaps more than anyone) that the Americans are tough 
bargainers when comes the time to negotiate matters relating to securities regulation. 
Nevertheless, there are cases when the Americans must adapt themselves to the 
current situation in Canada. For instance, the huge Canadian debt is forcing 
international primary dealers (including the U.S. ones) to change certain ways in 
which they to business.
3. The Evolutionary Presence of American Dealers in Canada
For many years, several major U.S. and other foreign securities firms have been 
expanding or opening branch offices in Toronto or Montreal. Ever since the 
deregulation of Canada’s securities industry, the presence of these firms has been 
constant967. At the early stage of the reform, Canadian brokers feared that 
American, European and Japanese securities houses would overrun Canadian capital 
markets once they became deregulated968. At one point, the OSFI became
D. KELLY, "IDA Makes Regulatory Deal With U.S. Firms" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (7 February 1992) 4. "IDA, U.S. Brokers Close to an Agreement" The 
[ Toronto] Globe and Mail (30 November 1991) B6. Earlier, the IDA dropped its 
demands that U.S. firms be required to open subsidiary offices in Canada and become 
members of the IDA.
For a brief overview of the many foreign dealers operating in Canada, see, e.g., 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 224 at 17-18. A. 
HUSDAL ed., The Guide to the Canadian Financial Servbes Industry, 1995 (Toronto, 
Ont.: Globe Information Services, 1995) 3-6.
"U.S. Domination Called Threat to Financial Firms" The Toronto Star (22 November 
1989) F1. M. MITTELSTAEDT, "Foreign Brokers Plan Canadian Presence" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 April 1989) B4. J.-P. DIiCARIE, "Les etrangers viendront, 
viendront pas?" Le Journal de Quebec (21 February 1989) 22. J.-P. DiiCARIE, "Les 
firmes de courtage americaines courtisent le marchS francophone" Le Journal de 
Quebec (20 February 1989) 21.
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concerned that a certain number of troubled Canadian financial institutions could 
become takeover targets for U.S. concerns969. That fear has since subsided970. 
The big brokers now have even bigger Canadian banks behind them, while others 
have decided to forge ties with foreign banks. Hence, most Canadian brokers have 
recognized their own strategic vulnerability, which was due to their weak capitalization 
and lack of size. Their response has been to seek mergers with the much larger and, 
generally, more internationalized commercial banks. Such linkages improve the 
capability of the dealers to participate in the evolving global markets, and to compete 
against foreign brokers in the domestic market. Nevertheless, what the Americans 
have going for them in the equation is something most Canadian ones no longer 
have: independence. Although the Canadians may feel better placed financially 
because of the backing of their owners, it must be underlined that universal banks 
(involved in every financial service possible) do not necessarily stimulate competition 
or creativity. Still, the Canadian bank-broker firms have now become leaner, meaner 
and a lot hungrier.
The Canadian securities industry has evolved to become an oligopoly: the large
"Regulator Worries About U.S. Buying Financial Firms" The [Montreal] Gazette (11 
May 1989) H5. "Financial Institutions "Vulnerable" to U.S. Bids" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (11 May 1989) 5.
For example, this was certainly the case when, at one time, a big U.S. firm closed its 
Canadian retail operations. A. SHORTELL, "Global Brokerage Never Made Sense" 
The Financial Times of Canada (3 December 1990) 6. B. CRITCHLEY, "Merrill Lynch 
Canada Tumbles From Top to Status of Bit Player" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (4 
January 1990) 1. A. WILLIS, "Sale Seen As Sign of Tough Competition Among 
Brokers" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (4 January 1990) 4. M. MITTELSTAEDT, 
"Securities Firms Reorganize for Tough Times" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4 
January 1990) B1. More recently, other foreign firms abandoned the idea of expanding 
into Canada. See, e.g., D. SLOCUM, "Bank of America Sells Burns Stake: Bank of 
Montreal Paying $103.7 Million for 25.7% of Canadian Brokerage" The [Toronto] 
Globe and Mail (19 July 1994) B10. G. IP, "BankAmerica Cuts Bums Fry Stake" The 
Financial Post [of Toronto] (27 January 1994)3. D. SLOCUM, "U.S. Firms Sells 
Midland Stake" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 May 1994) B1. Still, Canadian- 
owned firms ought to be concerned with the most recent move undertaken by 
Goldman Sachs Canada Ltd. to become the only U.S.-owned investment house to do 
equity trading in Canada. J. McFARLAND, "Goldman Sachs to Launch Equity Trading 
in Canada" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (Mi January 1995) 3. Moreover, some very 
relaxed rules put in place recently by the OSC may have something to do with further 
involvements by foreign brokers. K. HOWLETT, "OSC Removes Residence Rules for 
Brokers" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 September 1995) B1. J. McFARLAND, 
"OSC Opens Door to U.S.-based Brokers with Change in Residency Requirements" 
The Financial Post [of Toronto] (2 September 1995) 13.
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houses dominate the Canadian market, and a handful of small boutiques handle the 
few remaining leftovers. For their part, foreign dealers fill the vacuum in between971. 
The foreign firms are generally well capitalized and have highly internationalized 
operations. Many firms are financial innovators, with such innovation providing their 
competitive advantage. They draw on a large pool of experience in financial product 
technology. However, Canadian domestic markets are viewed as secondary targets 
because most corporate Canadian firms are not considered to be very big. Thus, the 
focus of foreign investment dealers has generally been non-corporate mandates972. 
Essentially, Canada has become very attractive for non-Canadian firms because of 
the size of the soaring federal and provincial deficits973.
In Canada, current account deficits and corresponding growth of foreign debt are a 
major source of concern974. At the end of 1994, half of Canada’s external liabilities 
was in the form of portfolio investment (mostly bonds)975. Foreign portfolio 
investment in Canadian bonds is not a new phenomenon. Its rapid growth can be 
traced back more than 40 years976. Now, holdings by foreigners are gigantic. By the 
end of 1994, non-residents held Cdn $301 billion of Canadian bonds (meaning more 
than 33% of all bonds outstanding)977 including Cdn $235.1 billion in government 
bonds alone978.
N. BRADBURY, "Playing Lean and Mean in Canada" Euromoney (November 1993) 
92.
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 224 at 17.
J. McFARLAND, "U.S. Brokers Make Move Back Into Canada" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (27 June 1995) 16. S. DE SANTIS "Canadian Brokers Bolster for Wave of 
U.S. Competitors" The Wall Street Journal [of New York] (4 April 1995) B4. J. 
WILLOGHBY, "U.S. Investment Banks Go North In Race For Canadian Business" 
Investment Dealers Digest (13 March 1995) 5. K. HOWLETT, "Foreign Invasion of Bay 
Street Continues" The [ Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 March 1995) B1. J. McFARLAND, 
"U.S. Dealers Invading" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (17 January 1995) 1. J. 
McNISH, "U.S. Brokers Invading Canada". The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (22 July
1994) B1.
On the Canadian deficits and debt owed to foreigners, see supra, note 591 at 460. 
The other half comprised of one quarter in the form of direct investment and the other 
quarter of foreign capital was widely spread in Canadian financial markets. Statistics 
Canada, Catalogue N° 67-202 (1994), Table 1 at 54.
Statistics Canada, Catalogue N° 67-202 (1926 to 1992), Table 48 at 133.
Statistics Canada, Catalogue N° 67-202 at 20.
Statistics Canada, Catalogue N° 67-002, Canada’s International Transactions in 
Securities, 1995, Table 19 (Non-resident Holdings of Canadian Bonds by Sector) at 
40.
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On the domestic level, Canadian dealers are generally chosen to lead a debt 
issue979. However, because of the magnitude of the debt, Canadian governments 
wishing to tap the international markets have generally preferred to use foreign firms 
(which can do a faster job due to the specific expertise they possess). Over the past 
few years, most of that debt was sold by U.S. dealers. Traditionally, they have sold 
Canadian governments debt from their trading desks in New York980. Now, U.S. 
dealers are expanding into Canada so as to obtain a larger share of commissions 
earned by selling the securities to foreign investors. Increased competition and some 
political pressure have caused U.S. dealers to set up shop in Canada981. As U.S. 
dealers earn bigger commissions from the rising tide of government debt sales 
outside Canada, Canadian governments have asked their U.S. underwriters to 
increase their Canadian operations if they wanted to keep their business982. Thus, 
only brokers with Canadian offices can qualify as primary underwriters of Bank of 
Canada debt issues983.
Having said this, the Canadian mutual fund industry is also reacting to the changes
For example, under the rules laid down by the province of Ontario, only six chosen 
dealers are allowed to put up a proposal and lead a financing in the domestic markets. 
B. CRITCHLEY, “Richardson Greenshields’ Chance to Lead" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (9 August 1994) 5. Note that in this case, Canadians ought to remember the 
obvious reciprocity considerations. “If the authorities choose to exclude particular 
foreign [securities] firms from operating in their domestic securities markets, then their 
domestic firms may be excluded from the foreign market concerned. Thus [, at one 
time,] Canadian (i.e. Ontario) securities firms [were not] allowed to manage an issue of 
securities in London because British-controlled subsidiaries in Canada [were not] 
allowed to lead an underwriting in Toronto". R.C. de GREY, The Service Agenda 
(Halifax, N.S.: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990) at 110.
For a brief historical account, see, e.g., B. CRITCHLEY & B. BAXTER "Merrill Trims 
Duties of Canadian Subsidiary" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (7 February 1989) 48. 
M. INGRAM, "Salomon Sets up Bond Trading Office" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail 
(19 June 1994) B2. According to the head of Salomon Brothers Inc.’s Canadian Unit: 
"[...] if you look at the growth since 1989 in provincial and federal debt, "it just made 
sense" to come to Canada".
"Morgan Stanley triple sa presence au Canada" Les Affaires [of Montreal] (18 March
1995) 53. J. FERRABEE, "Morgan Stanley Reopens Office Here to Expand Its Bond 
Business" The [Montreal] Gazette (11 March 1995) G4. M. INGRAM, "Morgan Stanley 
Expanding in Canada" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (5 October 1994) B5. V. 
BEAUREGARD, "Le courtier new-yorkais Morgan Stanley prevoit s’installer a 
Montreal" La Presse [of Montreal] (21 July 1994) A1.
"To be registered [with the Bank of Canada to underwrite Canadian government bonds 
and Treasury bills] [...], foreign firms must have an active presence in the domestic 
securities markets." ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Canada), supra, note 
224 at 14.
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brought about by North American free trade. With the U.S. firms being fiercely active 
during the post free trade era, Canadians are rapidly changing their approach to the 
"game".
CHAPTER II: The Changing Face of the Mutual Fund Industry
The investment world keeps changing as many American mutual fund giants are 
rapidly expanding their operations in the U.S. and abroad. Many portfolio managers 
running mutual funds or pension funds are abandoning their low inflation economies 
and financing the more profitable efforts of those in poorer countries (who will furnish 
the rich countries with cheap goods)904. In essence, there is currently a massive 
redistribution of wealth985. Over the past decade, FDIs have increased drastically in 
middle-income and poor nations. Portfolio investments have also grown rapidly. 
Fuelling this phenomenon are mutual funds and American Depository Receipts 
(hereinafter ADRs)986.
Its been said that North American free trade in mutual funds (and the benefits that 
could result for Canadians) would take years (if ever) to happen987. Many reasons 
can explain this delay. In order to play by Canadian rules, U.S. companies had to 
establish subsidiaries (meaning hire employees and invest capital). Still, in the early 
1980s, many American firms attempted to expand into Canada. However, most
Because their money is more fluid, big U.S. mutual funds are showing increasing clout 
in developing countries (particularly Latin America). Essentially, they are trying to 
pressure governments to adopt a series of policies that will maximize their returns. G. 
TERRIES & T.T. VOGEL Jr., "The Long Arm of the Funds" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (17 June 1994) B1.
On the recent Canadian popularity of Latin American funds, see, e.g., R. LUKKO, 
"Why the New Emerging Funds Are So Hot" The Financial Times of Canada (22 
October 1994) 11. J. CHEVREAU, "Latin American Funds Buoy Summer Mutual Fund 
Turnaround" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (17 September 1994) 24.
ADRs are tradable stocks from developing countries which do not have to meet tough 
listing rules. ADRs pay dividends in U.S. dollars and are called receipts because they 
are guaranteed by U.S. banks which have receipts to equities held in trust abroad for 
the bank. Over the past few years, Mexico has raised a lot of capital through ADRs 
traded primarily on the NYSE. Several major Mexican brokerage houses now have 
operations in New York, primarily to facilitate such trading activity. WEINERT & 
SINCLAIR, supra, note 735 at 8.
A. CORELLI, "U.S. Firms Eye Canada" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 April 1994) 
C10.
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abandoned their quest at the time of the recession when the Canadian industry was 
experiencing far less growth. Other factors explaining the differences between U.S. 
and Canadian securities rules and tax laws as well as the size of the Canadian 
market (which is too small to bother — especially if all documentation must be 
translated into French988 and approved by ten provincial regulators). However, a 
recent wave of expansion is taking place, perhaps because of the expansion of free 
trade. When NAFTA was being negotiated, the U.S. mutual fund industry association, 
the Investment Company Institute (hereinafter ICI), put pressure on the Investment 
Funds Institute of Canada (hereinafter IFIC)989 to have free trade in the mutual 
funds arena990.
While U.S. firms may see Canada as a country that holds only one-twentieth of what 
the Americans have invested in funds, others project that the Canadian market could 
triple in size (to Cdn $ 400 billion) by the year 2000991. For that reason, many U.S. 
mutual fund firms are increasingly looking to move to Canada and establish Canadian 
operations or form joint-ventures with already established financial institution^, 
independent fund firms or broker-dealers. For their part, Canadian firms (which are 
much smaller in size than their American counterparts) are slowly prospecting the 
U.S. market992.
In mid-1994, the OSC started a review of the regulation of mutual funds on the basis 
that the industry expanded by such proportions that it has outgrown the existing 
regulatory framework993. In essence, mutual fund regulation is rooted in provincial 
securities acts which originally embodied the laws to govern the issue of, and trading 
in securities other than mutual funds. Over the years, many accommodations have
S. 40.1, QSA, supra, note 356.
The IFIC represents mutual fund managers, banks, trust companies, life insurance 
companies, brokers, distributors and others. It is not a SRO. However, some provincial 
securities regulators are pushing the IFIC to assume SRO status. A. CORELLI, "Self­
regulation Urged for IFIC" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (15 December 1994) C10.
L. GROGAN-GREEN, "U.S. Funds Eye Access to Canada" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (22 February 1993) 17.
R. LUUKKO, "U.S. Funds March North" The Financial Times of Canada (18 June
1994) 1.
Ibid.
K. DOUGLAS, "The Timing Is Right for a Mutual Fund Industry Review by the OSC" 
The Financial Post [of Toronto] (21 May 1994) M2.
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been made to existing securities and income tax regulation in order to add laws and 
policy statements. The result has been a regulatory regime for mutual funds within a 
system designed to regulate other kinds of securities. With substantial changes on the 
horizon, the provincial governments want to ensure that when stock markets fall 
again, the many new and unsophisticated investors will be adequately prepared and 
made aware of the risks. At the same time, as preparing for the reform, Canada has 
had to deal with a strong American lobby wishing to ease access to the protected 
Canadian market.
At the end of 1993, cross-border marketing of mutual funds was addressed by the 
IFIC at the request of its U.S. counterpart, the ICI. They began to examine the 
possibility of permitting the sale of U.S. funds and vice-versa. At the same time, the 
IFIC prudently advised both levels of government that significant impediments to 
interprovincial transactions needed resolving before the border be opened up to the 
Americans994. The initial idea of cross-border marketing developed into a more 
concrete initiative designed to allow foreign companies to become more prominent in 
Canada by waiving residency requirements for salespeople. U.S.-based Goldman 
Sachs & Co. filed such a proposal with the OSC995. The IFIC and the IDA opposed 
the idea arguing that the abolishment of compulsory requirements imposed upon 
foreign firms to establish offices and employee presence in Canada would strangle 
the Canadian industry by favouring the arrival on the market of too many giant U.S. 
funds. Moreover, the Canadian players (most of them being set up as trusts) stressed 
the fact that they did not have such access (yet) to the U.S. market without having to 
change their structure to a corporation. According to the IDA, "to go ahead with this 
proposal unilaterally [would mean] to give away one’s bargaining chips before the 
negotiations begin996." Despite these apprehensions, Ontario reacted rapidly. Within 
months of the proposal by Goldman Sachs & Co., the OSC agreed to allow non­
resident portfolio managers without offices or staff to do business in the province of
M. McHUGH, "Funds Industry Has Message For Liberals" The Financial Post of 
[Toronto] (2 November 1993) 22.
M. URLOCKER, "Volatility and Regulation: Is the Party Over?" The Financial Post [of 
Toronto] (21 May 1994) M1.
Ibid However, this observation appears to have been incorrect. E. ROSEMAN, "OSC 
Opens Doors to U.S. Funds" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (1 September 1994) B1 at 
B2.
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Ontario, if they complied with certain basic requirements (such as proficiency, capital, 
financial reporting, business practices and record-keeping). Despite the fact that the 
decision did not prevent investors from having to buy the funds through the same 
channels (i.e. independent brokers and dealers, marketers located in Canada or 
through banks or trusts), the IFIC vigorously denounced Ontario’s move to allow this 
U.S. intrusion in the Canadian market997.
Note however that the OSC impose stringent conditions on foreign advisers998. They 
have to show the OSC they understand how the investment returns of their Canadian 
customers are affected by their various tax laws. Also, they have to name a local 
agent who could be served with lawsuits, agree to abide by the rulings of Ontario 
regulators and courts, and disclose in their prospectus that they are non-resident. 
Also, the OSC reserves the right to impose additional terms and conditions on a case- 
by-case basis. Although the new OSC rules have eliminated the current formal 
requirements for the IFIC exams, foreign portfolio managers still have a fiduciary 
responsibility to consider the impact of Canadian laws. Although the newly arrived 
U.S. funds have shaken up the Canadian industry, their presence has given Canadian 
investors more choices and price breaks on management fees (not from U.S. firms) 
but from Canadian funds wishing to retain their clients999. Also, it is likely to bring 
about a major consolidation of the Canadian industry, resulting in fewer players and 
larger funds1000. For the time being however U.S. mutual funds seem to give little
Staff Notice of Change in Administrative Policy Regarding Residency Requirements for 
Certain Non-Resident Salespersons and Supervisors, (1995) 18 O.S.C.B. 3905. The 
IFIC believed this decision raised many problems, like: (i) "[iInvestors who get bad 
advice will have to pursue a non-resident adviser in U.S. court"; (ii) the OSC’s decision 
to act without consulting the other provinces may lead to a "patchwork response to 
this important issue"; and (iii) "since the OSC did not define non-resident [...] there 
could be and influx of investment adviser from countries that are not as well regulated 
as Canada and the United States." ROSEMAN, supra, note 996 at B2. Moreover, it 
felt that every portfolio managers should have a clear understanding of Canadian 
securities rules and tax laws. J. McFARLAND, "OSC Okays Non-Resident Advisers 
and Mergers" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (1 September 1994) 6.
R. LUUKKO, "The OSC Welcomes Foreign Funds — Who Will Win and Lose" The 
Financial Times of Canada (3 September 1994) 5.
R. LUUKKO, "The Next Frontier: Free Trade in Funds" The Financial Times of Canada 
(8 June 1994) 7.
A. CORELLI, "Mutual Fund Boom Reshapes Industry" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail 
(26 July 1994) B21.
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priority to an invasion of Canada1001.
Still, NAFTA is indirectly responsible for cross-border traffic becoming two-way, as 
Canadian firms intending to sell funds look to the south. At the end of 1994, some 
Canadian banks jumped on the band-wagon of Latin American funds1002. The first 
to do so joined forces with a Mexican bank to set up a mutual fund to invest in 
NAFTA-oriented companies in Canada, the U.S. and Mexico1003. This 
announcement coincided with news that top Canadian banks decided to make use for 
the first time of a newly granted right to finance their own activities on the NYSE in 
order to execute the strategies that will allow them to prepare for the post free trade 
era.
CHAPTER III: Preparing for the Future: Listings on the U.S.
Exchanges
At a time when the North American market for financial services is undergoing a far- 
reaching process of consolidation, restructuring and regulatory change, some 
Canadian banks are changing their strategy in order to compete successfully with 
U.S. banks in either Canada, the U.S. or Mexico.
E. ROSEMAN, "Canada Low on U.S. Mutual Fund’s List" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (2 September 1994) B3.
Since the early 1990s, Canadian banks have acted as active participants in the mutual 
fund business. T. DELANEY, "Banks Push Mutual Funds" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (17 September 1992) C5. D. SLOCUM, "Banks Make Big Waves in Mutual Fund 
Industry" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (25 July 1992) B5. E. ROSEMAN, "Big 
Financial Houses Become Major Forces" The [ Toronto]  Globe and Mail (19 December 
1991) C1. M. GIRARD, "Les banques de plus en plus presentes dans les fonds 
mutuels" La Presse [of Montreal] (25 September 1991) C1. H.D. WHYTE, "A Welcome 
Addition to Mutual-fund Arena" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (19 November 1990) 
A3. G. TOOMEY, "Peddling a Piece of the Market" The [Montreal] Gazette (4 
November 1989) G1.
W. ACWORTH, "Bank of Montreal Launches NAFTA Fund" International Banking 
Regulator (7 November 1994) 4. B. MOONEY, "La Banque de Montreal lance un 
fonds ALizNA" Les Affaires [of Montreal] (8 October 1994) 53. D. GOOLD, "New Fund 
Hedges Bet on Mexico" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (6 October 1994) B11. J. 
McFARLAND, "B of M, Mexico Join to Aid NAFTA" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (28 
September 1994) 3.
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The Bank of Montreal1004, RBC1005, CIBC1006 and TD Bank1007, for instance, 
are all trying to offer a wide range of services across the borders1008. In essence, 
this approach is designed to react against a possible attack by American 
"superbanks"1009. Despite the current Canadian federal regulations that prohibit any 
investor to hold more than 10% of a bank’s total shares1010, the effect of NAFTA 
and a trend towards deregulation suggest that the protection may not last forever. 
Moreover, although the traditional U.S. banking industry has been extremely 
fragmented and hamstrung by a number of state and federal regulations, the last few 
years have seen the emergence of a new set of powerful and territorially expansive 
banks. Thus, from a Canadian standpoint, the strategy is to have banks perform well 
enough and be big enough to prevent any future takeover bids by U.S superbanks.
R. BLACKWELL, "B of M Establishes Merchant Banking Unit" The Financial Post [of 
TorontoJ (9 December 1995) 4. K. HOWLETT, "Nesbitt Burns to Open U.S. Bank" The 
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (9 December 1995) B7. J. HEINRICH, "Bank of Montreal 
Plans to Expand in the United States" The [Montreal] Gazette (18 January 1994) D6.
B. MILNER, "Royal Bank has Quiet Debut on Big Board in New York" The [Toronto] 
Globe and Mail (17 October 1995) B7. R. BLACKWELL, "Royal Bank Eyes NYSE 
Listing" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (7 September 1995) 5. S. GITTINS, "Royal 
Bank Will Become North American Giant" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (19 March
1993) 1.
C. CLARK, "CIBC Buys Junk-bond Firm in U.S." The [Montreal] Gazette (2 August 
1995) E3. Y. KANTROW, "With Purchase of Argosy Group, CIBC is Suddenly a Junk 
Player" Investment Dealers Digest (24 April 1995) 10. J. PARTRIDGE, "CIBC Poised 
to Buy N.Y. Junk Bond Dealer" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (18 April 1995) B1. J. 
PARTRIDGE, "CIBC Puts Price on Growth Strategy: U.S. Thrust to Cost $500-Million 
Over Next Few Years" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (15 November 1994) B6.
"TD Gets Note to Initiate U.S. Securities Operation" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 
August 1995) B3. R. BLACKWELL, "TD Gets Green Light to Expand New York 
Securities Unit" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (12 August 1995) 4.
However, keep in mind that "[t]he Big Six maintain large London offices and have 
substantial Eurodollar, foreign currency and derivatives trading operations. Although 
the emphasis of their business has moved to North America, the banks still maintain 
an extensive network of overseas branches, with particular emphasis of the 
Caribbean, Europe and Far East." ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO 
(Canada), supra, note 224 at 16.
On the continuous growth of U.S. banks, see, e.g., "Banks Break the Mould: The 
Consolidation of U.S. Banks Is Unstoppable" The Banker (June 1994) 37. Back in 
1991, there were rumours to the effect that some Canadian banks might be eyed by 
U.S. banking institutions. T. CORCORAN, "Are Our Banks in a Growth Straitjacket?" 
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (24 July 1991) B2. J. McNISH, "Big U.S. Banks 
Contemplate Marriages of Convenience" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (2 February
1991) B1. H.D. WHYTE, "Canada’s Banks Deny Merger Talks With U.S. Counterparts" 
The Financial Post [of Toronto] (1 February 1991) 28.
Some foreign banks are also taking the same approach. "They look upon North 
America as one region." B. CRITCHLEY, "More Banks Eye Regionalization." The 
Financial Post [of Toronto] (21 July 1995) 5.
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Because Canadian banks can expect to face much more intense competition from 
American banks in Canada, some have chosen to become full-service, continent-wide 
North American banks instead of waiting to find themselves as branch-plant 
operations1011. Their expansion has and will revolve around the formation of 
gradual U.S. (and eventually Mexican) operations designed to serve the small- 
business market and the ever growing number of Canadian snowbirds1012 and 
pensioners in those markets. Also, most of the banks’ wholly-owned securities 
brokerage firms will be able to work better in North American and perhaps make 
acquisitions1013.
In order to finance their expansion, Canadian banks are making use for the first time 
of a newly granted right to finance their own operations on the NYSE. Until more 
recently, no Canadian bank had even been listed on the NYSE, nor had any 
Canadian bank ever become a reporting issuer under the Exchange Act of 
19341014. The re-classification of U.S. shareholders as "Canadian" for purposes of 
ownership restrictions of Canadian banks removed a great barrier against Canadian 
banks listing on the NYSE1015. At the end of 1994, the Bank of Montreal became 
the first of a series of Canadian banks that are (in fact or considering) listing in the 
U.S.1016 As a result, the bank’s U.S ownership started heading towards the 50%
1011 Ibid
1012 "Snowbirds" is the name given to Canadian residents who flee come winter for a 
warmer climate. Once abroad, many will buy U.S. mutual funds. E. ROSEMAN, 
"Investors Foot the Bill for Sales Incentives" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7 
September 1994) B13.
1013 L. CLOUTIER, "Objectif USA: les banques canadiennes convoitent le voisin et 
envisagent plusieurs acquisitions" La Presse [of Montreal] (15 July 1995) E1. One 
major Canadian securities firm owned by a bank has reacted to seeing its "best 
Canadian clients [...] financing more easily and at better prices in New York." It plans 
to obtain a share of the underwriting revenues from Canadian provinces and seeks to 
develop specialized investment and banking niches to serve Canadian and U.S. 
corporate borrowers. J. McNISH, "CIBC Takes On New York" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (1 July 1994) B1.
1014 DEARDEN & PALMETEER, eds, supra, note 137 at 27,203 para. 38-705.
1015 See supra, note 617.
1016 M. TISON, "La Banque de Montreal se voit une banque «nord-americaine»" La Presse
[of Montreal] (28 October 1994) C2. The base for the Bank of Montreal’s U.S. 
expansion is its subsidiary Harris Bankcorp Inc. of Chicago (purchased in 1984). 
Harris recently expanded when it merged with Suburban Bancorp Inc. As a result, it 
became one of the largest financial institutions in the Chicago area. J. PARTRIDGE, 
"B of M to Register for U.S. Stock Listing" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 April
1994) B1. R. BLACKWELL, "B of M Set for Listing in the U.S. After Deal" The
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objective aimed at helping it generate half its net income from the U.S. by the start of 
the next century1017.
However, because the trading of bank stocks has traditionally represented an 
important portion of the total volume of Canadian Stock exchanges, the decision by 
the Canadian federal government to change laws that barred Canadian banks from 
listing their shares for trading on the U.S. exchanges might have dire consequences 
for the securities industry in certain regional financial centres of Canada. A 1992 
report prepared by the ME1018 stressed the fact that Its long-term survival might be 
threatened if banks (which represent almost 10% of the total volume of the trading of 
shares on the ME) all list in the U.S.1019. At the present time, more and more 
trading of stocks of major Canadian-based multinationals occurs in the U.S. with the 
rest of it being done on the TSE1020. The same situation could happen with bank 
stocks. As a result, the report suggests the Montreal market might become an empty 
shell at the decision-making level in the securities brokerage industry. Moreover, note 
that this phenomenon combined with NAFTA could have an impact on the equity
Financial Post [of Toronto] (19 April 1994) 21. "Bank of Montreal to Buy Chicago’s 
Suburban Bancorp" The [Montreal] Gazette (16 April 1994) G3.
R. BLACKWELL, "B of M Sees 50% U.S. Ownership" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(28 October 1994) 1. Note that the bank’s target was revealed in the early days of 
1990. R. GIBBENS, "Bank of Montreal Aims to Double U.S. Income" The Financial 
Post [of Toronto] (16 January 1990) 7.
BOURSE DE MONTREAL, La Bourse de Montreal et la reforme des institutions 
financieres (Montreal, Que.: Bourse de Montreal, May 1992).
A. MclNTOSH, "U.S. Trading of Bank Shares Could Damage ME" The [Montreal] 
Gazette (29 September 1994) D1.
P. DURIVAGE, "Les grandes societes canadiennes se tournent de plus en plus vers 
les bourses yankees" La Presse [of Montreal] (27 May 1994) C1. E. REGULY, 
"Canadian Firms Flock to American Stock Exchange" The Financial Post [of Toronto] 
(17 November 1993) 13. D. KELLY, "U.S. Exchange Woos Canadians" The Financial 
Post [of Toronto] (8 November 1991) 11. Recently, the president of the ME suggested 
that Canada’s four stock exchanges would have to get more cooperative if they want 
to avoid losing more business to huge capital markets in the U.S. A. MclNTOSH, "Do 
We Need a National Stock Exchange?" The [Montreal] Gazette (3 May 1995) E3. K. 
LEGER, "ME Seeks Truce in Exchange Turf Wars" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (19 
April 1995) 34. C. TURCOTTE, "Montreal souhaite une plus grande synergie boursiere 
avec Toronto, Calgary et Vancouver* Le Devoir [of Montreal] (11 April 1995) B2. A. 
MclNTOSH, "Stop the Infighting" The [Montreal] Gazette (11 April 1995) C1. These 
comments came at a time when the giant U.S. NASDAQ stock market expressed a 
desire to install its stock-trading computer terminals in Montreal. K. LEGER, "Nasdaq 
Proposal Irks Canadians" The Financial Post [of Toronto] (15 April 1995) 12. A. 
MclNTOSH, "QSC Chief Worried About Nasdaq’s Scheme" The [Montreal] Gazette (15 
April 1995) C4.
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values of Canadian banks1021.
TITLE II: CANADIAN DEALERS IN MEXICO
Financing has been, and continues to be a significant barrier to establishing, 
expanding, or modernizing an enterprise in Mexico. Major strides have been taken, 
however, to increase available financial services and to extend them outside Mexico’s 
main commercial centres. With privatization of banks and the formation of financial 
investment groups, Mexico’s financial sen/ices sector is being transformed1022. The 
advent of open trade policies and NAFTA has created opportunities for foreign banks 
and securities firms to enter Mexico by acquiring an interest in a Mexican institution or 
by establishing representative offices1023. Regional banks are being promoted, and
In 1989, it was determined that the FTA combined with a major anticipated shift in the 
nature of Canada’s banking regulations eroded the competitive position of Canadian 
banks and affected their daily stock market prices. L. BIERMAN, D.R. FRASER & A. 
ADKISSON, Effects of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement on the Equity 
Values of U.S. and Canadian Banks, (1989) 10 Nw. J. of Int’l L. & Bus. 268. Note that 
the phenomenon appears to be widespread. "[Fifteen years ago], if the Dow Jones 
[index] went up or down, Canadian markets marched virtually in lock step. Then a 
curious thing occurred. Most noticeably since 1987 (ironically, about the time of the 
[FTA]), the harmony of U.S. and Canadian equity markets began to dissipate. [...] A 
recent U.S. study shows that despite greater economic integration, the correlation 
between Canadian and U.S. equity markets declined to 60[%] in 1993 from 80[%] in 
1975". D. BEST, "A Cross-border Case for Canadian Stocks" The [Toronto] Globe and 
Mail (1 April 1995) B18.
J. COBAIN, "Opening Doors to Mexico" United States Banker (January 1995) 64. 
"Latin Notes: Banking the Mexico Way" The Banker (January 1995) 33. "Mexico Fires 
the Starting Gun" The Banker (December 1994) 58. T. GOLDEN, "In Opening Its 
Finance, Mexico Bets Long Term" The New York Times (19 October 1994) D2. T. 
GOLDEN, "Markets Opened By Mexico" The New York Times (18 October 1994) D1. 
"Revolution in Motion" The Banker (August 1994) 31. The reform of Mexico’s financial 
system is a three-stage process. First, the government has privatized the 18 financial 
institutions which it controlled. Second, new banks are gradually being authorized to 
do business. Third, "internationalization" of the system is the final step envisioned. 
"NAFTA Spurs Additional Reforms to Mexican Banking System" CCH NAFTA WATCH 
(29 April 1994) 5.
D. CLARKE, "Magnetic South America" Canadian Banker (May/June 1995) 19. 
Recently, new provisions for the establishment of representative offices of foreign 
securities firms were established. "Mexico Issues Rules for Foreign Brokerages" CCH 
NAFTA WATCH (28 July 1994) 6. "[I]t is appropriate to mention that within the 
[Mexican] Ministry of Finance, a new bureau [was] created with two main purposes, 
first to assist in the preparation of specific regulations to accomplish the NAFTA’s 
requirements and, second, to monitor the establishment of foreign [financial sen/ice 
providers] in Mexico and [their] representatives offices". MITCHELL, supra, note 685 at 
7.
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the government has allowed several private conglomerates with multiple commercial 
interests to buy into financial institutions. This is all the more true since the beginning 
of the Mexican economic crisis1024. However, while the government is closely 
regulating this industry during the conversion, controversy over reforms is high and 
many programs have yet to be implemented. The goals of regulators involve the hope 
that a foreign presence will strengthen the whole national system by providing 
expertise, technology, capital and healthy competition1025. However, the limitations 
placed on foreign financial operations and the relatively small market share allotted to 
them under NAFTA suggest that neither side is likely to be fully satisfied with the 
results for some time1026.
The Mexican financial system at large does have pockets of sophistication and 
dynamism. However, it is generally acknowledged to be underdeveloped, inefficient, 
and lacking in technology, trained personnel or adequate exposure to international 
operating standards1027. Today, Mexico is underbanked, underbranched, 
undermortgaged, underinsured, and lacking in corporate financial and securities 
services1028. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Mexico has improved radically during
With the recession resulting from the recent economic crisis, many Mexican banks 
have had to cope with high interest rates and bad debts. Consequently, Mexicans 
hope to solve their financial problems by offering foreign banks an option to them to 
swap their debt for equity in Mexican banks. "An Urgent Case of Disrepair” The 
Economist (1 July 1995) 69.
One example of the modernization of the Mexican financial system relates to the 
possibility of creating a cross-border transfer system among Mexican, Canadian and 
U.S. banks. "Bank of Mexico Studies Cross-border Transfers" CCH NAFTA WATCH 
(29 April 1994) 5.
W.S. HARAF, "NAFTA Opens Doors to Mexican Markets for U.S. Banks" Bank 
Management (January/February 1994) 26 at 30. R.L. THOMAS, "NAFTA Changes the 
Game: A U.S. Perspective" Bank Management (May/June 1994) 55.
CHAPUT, supra, note 888 at 15. L. RODRIGUEZ, "Financing to Secure the Future" 
Business Mexico (September 1994) 6.
W.R. WHITE, The Implication of the FTA and NAFTA for Canada and Mexico, 
Technical Report N° 70 (Ottawa, Ont.: Bank of Canada, 1994) at 16. SAUVIz & 
GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 14. In early 1994, it was estimated 
that more than 94% of Mexico’s non-urban population did not have access to financial 
services. "NAFTA Spurs Additional Reforms to Mexican Banking System" CCH NAFTA 
WATCH (30 March 1994) 6. However, note that while Mexico may be underbranched, 
and while "[...] rising incomes [...] are expected to increase the demand for [financial] 
sen/ices by Mexicans, most of whom live outside the major cities and currently have 
no banking relationship at all", Mexican firms have well-established positions in the 
retail market, which Canadian and U.S.-owned institutions may have difficulty 
achieving. C. MANSELL CARTENS, "The Social and Economic Impact of the Mexican 
Bank Reprivatization" Journal of Bank Research (January 1993) 4 at 9. Still, the CBA
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the past several years and that it is virtually certain to improve to an even greater 
degree, and at even faster pace, in the future (and that, despite the recent pesos 
crisis)1029.
As previously mentioned, Canadian and U.S. financial institutions wishing to do 
business in Mexico have been greatly advantaged by NAFTA1030. The provisions on 
financial services opens the sector to foreign investment, reversing decades-old 
restrictions. Prior to NAFTA, no more than 30% of the equity in banks and securities 
firms could be held by foreigners. Now, by being able to establish grupos financieros, 
foreign firms have unprecedented access to the Mexican market1031.
With the liberalization of trade in North America, Canadian and American MNCs 
increasingly want their domestic financial institutions to serve all their needs in all 
three markets as a one-stop shop. In order to comply with this desire of their 
corporate clients, North American banks and securities firms are expanding (or 
planning expansions) into all three countries1032.
In view of the fact that it has the least developed financial services sector of the 
signatory Parties, NAFTA’s foreseeable impact on capital markets and retail financial 
services within Mexico is greatly significant. Since the Brady Plan was put into place 
in 19891033, Mexico has attracted large inflows of portfolio investment. Another
believes that n[t]here are many opportunities for Canadian banks in Mexico in areas 
where Mexican consumers are under-served." GAFFORD, supra, note 701 at 58. 
"Down But Not Out" The Banker (March 1995) 41.
I.J. MATTHEWS, "Competition Is All" Canadian Banker (January/February 1993) 18 at 
18. Still, despite the fact that NAFTA helped to bring closer all three countries, the 
same basic considerations need to be addressed by a Canadian or U.S. financial 
institution seeking to conduct business in Mexico, i.e. (i) tax considerations; (ii) foreign 
currency fluctuations; (iii) cultural differences; (iv) political risks; and (v) language 
differences. P. LEE, "NAFTA and Mexico: Commercial Finance Opportunity" Secured 
Lender (November/December 1994) 104 at 106.
See, supra, notes 701 to 711 and accompanying text.
L. IOANNOU, "Better Banking with NAFTA" International Business (January 1994) 40 
at 42. "Eight Key Banking Provisions of NAFTA" ABA Banking Journal (November 
1993) 56. However, note that given the opportunities in their home market, Mexican 
financial institutions are not focused on greatly expanding beyond their borders. A. 
KATTER, "The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Banking Industry" 
Journal of Commercial Lending (December 1992) 11 at 14.
See, supra, note 200.
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determining factor in the growth of Mexico’s capital markets has been the Mexican 
government’s privatization program1034. This initiative has enabled many large 
equity issues to be successfully placed abroad. While many investors have been lured 
to the Mexican market over the past few years by significant returns, the ratification of 
NAFTA has helped decrease the perceived risk of investing in Mexico. Because of the 
particular size and configuration of the Bolsa, international offerings are very popular.
Until now, the overwhelming share of securities traded in the Mexican Bolsa has been 
of government issue1035. Because of the thinning of the financial markets for non­
government borrowers, firms that could go abroad for funding already have. It has 
been common for Mexico’s great conglomerates to issue securities in the U.S., and it 
is not unusual for the government to do the same. As a result, Mexico imports a large 
amount of brokerage sen/ices from the NYSE through ADRs and the large flotations 
from PEMEX1036, some large banks and other large firms. The worldwide revolution 
in information processing that has increased the abilities of securities industry to tailor 
debt and equity issues to the special needs of particular borrowers is bound to 
continue affecting Mexican domestic financial markets1037.
Overall, Mexican firms may be increasingly able to offer services at a greater level 
than that which has up to now been restricted to bank lending. However, the same is 
true for Canadian and American securities firms that enter Mexican markets under 
NAFTA. Moreover, Canadian and U.S. firms already have experience and technology 
in areas that Mexican institutions are now gaining. Accordingly, this is the area of the 
Mexican financial market that may see the greatest foreign penetration. Another 
reason that most entries under NAFTA are likely to be in securities brokerage is the 
Agreement’s relatively favourable treatment of this industry1038. During the NAFTA
1034 R.P. McCOMB & W.C. GRUBEN, Preparation and Performance in the Mexican 
Market, (1994) 34 Q. Rev. of Econ. & Fin. 217 at 219.
1035 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Mexico), supra, note 802 at 39.
1036 "A World-Class Credit" Euromoney Supplement (January 1992) 10.
1037 I. WATERS, A Framework for the Optimum Structure of Financial Systems, Working 
Paper Series N* S-92-47 (New York, N.Y.: New York University Salomon Centre,
1992) at 20.
1038 For a recent overview of the activities of the various brokerage houses operating in 
Mexico, see, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FFO (Mexico), supra, note 802 
at 39-40.
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talks, Mexico sought to protect its financial services industry, which had recently 
undergone an extensive privatization and liberalization in its restructuring. Specifically, 
Mexico sought to restrict market access by limiting the right of entry of particular 
institutions and to establish a progressive liberalization of the system that would 
gradually ease the restrictions within the financial services sector. With the 
establishment of NAFTA, Mexico was partially successful. The relatively quick opening 
of securities services should facilitate early foreign penetration into that area.
Stimulated by the increased interest from international investors, U.S. and Mexican 
securities firms have already used these opportunities to expand their business. While 
U.S. firms managed to underwrite many debt and equity issues for Mexican clients, 
Mexican firms are gradually developing their U.S. business (which has led several of 
them to establish offices in New York)1039. Consequently, easier access to global 
capital markets by the Mexican companies has been very lucrative for both U.S. and 
Mexican firms which have closely cooperated in managing many new issues1040. 
For their part, the Canadian securities industry has not participated significantly in 
these developments and are, comparatively inactive in this area1041.
In view of the fact that many Mexican blue chip stocks are traded on the NYSE, 
certain U.S. firms feel they do not have a significant presence in Mexico. However, 
several others see a series of opportunities offered to them if they have their foot set 
on Mexican ground. Because NAFTA allows Canadian and U.S. firms to establish 
subsidiaries in Mexico on easier terms then ever before, the Mexican securities 
industry is bound to face a harsh competitive challenge from heavily capitalized firms 
with superior international distribution capabilities1042.
On the other hand, a certain detail may offer a useful perspective on the extent of
1039 In view of the growing number of Mexican and Canadian dealer subsidiaries that 
choose to establish offices in New York, it has been observed that "New York City and 
New York State should be the big beneficiaries of [NAFTA]". T. PRATT, "Street Firms 
Prepare to Reap Concrete Benefits from NAFTA" Investment Dealers Digest (22 
November 1993) 6.
1040 SAUVIz & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 16.
1041 Here, "[...] Canadian dealers are not competition for the big New York investment 
banks." JORDAN, supra, note 694 at 53.
1042 IOANNOU, supra, note 1032 at 41.
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competition that Canadian and U.S. financial institutions could face from Mexican 
entities. Although the Mexican bank nationalization that occurred in 1982 formally 
removed only bank directors and left other employees at their desks, many of these 
directors departed for securities firms, which took on a rising share of financial 
activities1043. Later, securities firms turned out to be the major purchasers of 
privatized banks1044. Since many securities industry executives were bankers 
before the nationalization, the recent financial deregulation has meant a reunification 
of financial products and personnel. Does this mean that Mexican securities firms 
have an information advantage that would make a Canadian or U.S. firm’s entry into 
the Mexican market a highly competitive event? It seems to suggest that, because of 
personnel movement out of banking and into the securities business (and then back 
to banking for some of them), the expertise appropriate to the joint provision of 
securities may be particularly significant in the Mexican financial system.
The Mexican financial system, although not too competitive at present, shows signs 
that very soon the institutions and markets will offer better financial services at 
significantly lower cost1045. But a number of questions remain. One concerns the 
role that banks will play relative to securities markets. The remaining statutory barriers 
to entry in Mexican banking indicate that banks will maintain a privileged position in 
the Mexican financial market for many years to come1046. But the erosion of 
banking in Canada and the U.S. caused in part by changes of the regulatory 
framework and technological advance in information processing and financial 
instruments has given securities markets an edge, as witnessed by the increase in 
securitization1047. If Canadian, U.S. and Mexican securities firms can offer their 
services more efficiently than banks, then one would expect the importance of banks 
to diminish. The favourable treatment of securities brokerage by NAFTA would be
1043 WEINERT & SINCLAIR, supra, note 735 at 3.
1044 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Country Profile: Mexico (1994-95) (London:
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995) at 23.
1045 SAUV£ & GONZALES-HERMOSILLO, supra, note 696 at 15.
1046 In early 1994, it was estimated that Mexico’s banks controlled 94% of all Mexican
financial sen/ices transactions. R.S. POTHIER, "Mexico’s Banking System is Key to 
NAFTA’s Success" CCH NAFTA WATCH (16 May 1994) 7.
1047 G.G. KAUFMAN, The Diminishing Role of Commercial Banking in the U.S. Economy, 
Working Paper N* WP-1991-11 (Chicago, III.: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1991) 
at 17.
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expected to promote such a competitive process. These considerations make 
projections of the future structure of the Mexican financial system extremely difficult.
In the end, it is unlikely that Canadian and U.S. firms will try to outmanoeuvre 
Mexicans by establishing large offices in order to equal their vast penetration of 
customers1048. In the field of retail services, it may be reasonably thought that many 
large Canadian and U.S. financial institutions are likely to be active. However, the 
Mexicans possess huge advantages due to their networks and name recognition. 
Moreover, they have a cultural advantage over the Canadians and the Americans in 
their home market1049.
Nevertheless, while large Mexican firms are likely to continue to thrive, the same 
cannot be said about a series of smaller firms1050. As may be expected, the 
increased competition in their own market will lead to an eventual consolidation in the 
Mexican financial sector1051. At that time, Canadian and U.S. securities firms could 
prove to be attractive for these firms seeking acquisitions, joint ventures or simply 
strategic alliances with stronger foreign firms1052. While the most powerful Canadian 
and U.S. institutions are choosing to develop their own business through wholly- 
owned subsidiaries, the option remains open for the smaller rivals. However, most 
Canadian or U.S. firms looking to penetrate the Mexican market are likely to opt for 
the formation of joint ventures. Here, financial institutions do not have the constraints 
of committing themselves for a strategic alliance or an acquisition. They can only 
choose to cooperate with marketing or processing a single product or service. In
IOANNOU, supra, note 1032 at 42.
For that reason, numerous foreign firms with plans to establish sale offices in Mexico 
have recruited several experienced Mexican executives to help in their quest to 
conquer Mexico. T.R. HAMER, "The Hunt for Local Talent- Business Mexico (June
1993) 4. D. CAREY, "Ascent of the Headhunter" Institutional Investor (May 1994) 86. 
The recent peso crisis most likely had the same devastating impact on certain 
securities firms as it had on some small and medium-sized Mexican banks. 
"Expensive Crutches" The Economist (8 April 1995) 66.
"Although it is too early to expect consolidation in the Mexican financial system, it 
should happen over time" "Banks Act to Boost Their Capital Bases" Euromoney 
Supplement (January 1994) 22 at 24. R. GONZALEZ, "New Competition in Financial 
Services" Business Mexico (April 1994) 4 at 5. J. RUSSELL, "Continental Banking: 
Integration of Financial Services Across the Border" Business Mexico (May 1992) 44. 
M. GARCIA BARRAGAN CORDOVA, "Mexican Banks Ready for New Competition"
CCH NAFTA WATCH (10 November 1994) 7.
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return, the Mexicans may get what they greatly need from Canadian and U.S. firms, 
namely make use of technology and management expertise. Here, opportunities for 
cooperation are extensive1053.
In this context, Canadian and U.S. financial institutions all have various experience 
and expertise to trade with their Mexican counterparts1054. Likewise, the U.S. firms 
can trade their knowledge of dealing with the Mexicans to the Canadians who have 
little experience themselves in that part of the world. For their part, Canada and 
Mexico both share similar regulatory frameworks, which have led to nationwide and 
universal banking systems. Also, both countries share the same fear of domination by 
the U.S. Consequently, these factors may lead to some forms of strategic alliances 
between the financial institutions of both Canada and Mexico1055. Nevertheless, a 
series of other factors may delay the arrival of some firms into the Mexican 
market1056.
Although interested in doing business in Mexico, many foreign securities firms are 
wary of a direct commitment for a variety of reasons. Despite the opportunity to 
participate in a major opening in a rapidly developing economy, these foreign firms 
worry that they could be treated as second class alien corporate citizens. Few are 
willing to accept a subordinate minority position from which they feel they would be 
unable to exercise adequate control. Others are worried that they would lose control 
over expensive technology and other information or be seen as a deep pockets 
source for special interest or otherwise speculative projects. They also worry that, as 
foreign partners, they could be restricted to doing marginal business. Thus, as an 
alternative to taking an official minority ownership position, many foreign institutions 
are considering project-specific joint ventures designed to enter particular areas of
R.S. SCZUDLO, "NAFTA: Opportunities Abound for U.S. and Canadian Financial 
Institutions" Bankers Magazine (July/August 1993) 28 at 32. CANADA, L’ALlzNA: 
Qu’en est-il au juste? (Ottawa, Ont.: Affaires ext6rieures et Commerce exterieur 
Canada, 1993) at 83.
On the methods of negotiations between Mexican and U.S. business people, see, e.g.,
B.W. HUSTED, Bargaining with the Gringos: An Exploratory Study of Negotiations 
Between Mexican and U.S. Firms, (1994) 36 Int’l Exec. 625.
E.P. NEUFELD, "NAFTA Changes the Game: A Canadian Perspective" Bank 
Management (May/June 1994) 55.
C. LODISE, "Pulling for U.S. Banks" Business Mexico (March 1995) 43.
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business on a stronger, more independent footing.
In a nutshell, NAFTA’s impact on corporate strategy of financial institutions has been 
important. However, the Mexican peso crisis has affected the pace of foreign 
investment1057. While the effect of the peso devaluation on the North American 
outlook has been limited, the impact on the Mexican economy has been 
devastating1058. Nevertheless, medium and long-term prospects remain very 
encouraging1059.
Yet, investments have not completely stopped. See, e.g., "It Doesn’t Have to Be 
American ..." Euromoney (April 1995) 45.
CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, North American Outlook: 1995-1996, a 
Research Report, Report N° 1100-95-RR (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 
1995) at 9-10. CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA, World Outlook: Global Economic 
Trends and Prospects (Ottawa, Ont.: Conference Board of Canada, 1995) at 3. 
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Country Report: Mexico (2nd quarter 1995) 
(London, Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995) at 4.
W. WILLITTS, Taking the Long View: Canadian Banks Keep Investing in Latin 
America" The [Montreal] Gazette (4 October 1995) F2. L. FICKENSCHER, "Pesos 
Crisis: Battening Down to Focus on Long Haul" The American Banker (7 February 
1995) 17. C. TORREN, "Opening of Mexico’s Financial System Won’t Bring Any 
Immediate Rewards" The Wall Street Journal [of New York] (24 October 1994) A10. 
Still, the immediate risks remain high. For example, Scotiabank took a massive hit on 
its stake in Grupo Financiero Inverlat SA. B. MORISSETTE, "Les banques mexicaines 
sont en difficulty Scotia radie 145 M$ d’actif" Les Affaires [of Montreal] (9 December
1995) 17. J. PARTRIDGE, "Mexico Rescues Banco Inverlat" The [ Toronto]  Globe and 
Mail (1 December 1995) B1. J. PARTRIDGE, "Scotiabank Undecided on Mexican 
Investment" The [ Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 June 1995) B7. "Scotiabank Invests in 
Mexico" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (29 August 1995) B5.
254
CONCLUSION
North American free trade has caused the Canadian securities industry to face a new 
reality. By placing the sector under the spotlight and under international scrutiny, the 
way business is conducted is changing. With respect to a unanimously accepted 
hemispheric system which would offer a total liberalization of the financial sector, any 
prospects for the immediate future appear remote. The point is not, however, to waste 
time ruminating over the immediate unlikelihood of the adoption of a series of uniform 
continental rules surrounding the industry but rather examine, as we have done 
throughout, possible alternatives on the national level, while continuing to pursue 
workable international solutions.
Most financial markets, regardless of how they are regulated, are national in 
scope1060. That is certainly true of banking activities and securities trading. 
Furthermore, financial markets extend beyond national boundaries. International 
harmonization cannot be achieved unless there is some form of harmonization within 
the country itself. This is particularly true in the case of Canada, since this calls for 
cooperation and harmonization, not only between various provincial jurisdictions but 
also between countries. Cooperative efforts, nationally and internationally, are needed 
because financial transactions do not respect barriers between the provinces or 
nations. However, in Canada there is a trade-off between uniformity and the principle 
of federalism1061. There are also some benefits from competition in regulation, 
whereby different authorities struggle against each other towards the most efficient 
regulatory framework. A diversity of regulatory authorities contributes to such 
competition but also leads to the fragmentation of the regulatory system. The 
differences in legal treatment would be of less concern if the regulatory authorities 
cooperated more effectively with one another.
For many years, Canadian securities authorities (i.e. securities commissions and other 
provincial securities authorities) have worked together to develop regulatory systems
ROSENBERG, supra, note 76 at 427.
"An uncompromising commitment to uniformity, however, may be contrary to one of 
the fundamental premises of federalism, namely, the ability of individual provinces to 
develop their own policies to address local needs and goals." ANISMAN, Ibid, at 81.
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that take the specific features of each region of the country into account, while 
seeking to harmonize rules as much as possible. In doing so, they have tried not only 
to increase market efficiency, but also the industry’s competitiveness, and to reduce 
costs. This collective interprovincial harmonization effort is largely recognized by 
international regulatory authorities. For instance, the OSC and QSC have signed 
many international agreements, particularly with the SEC. In this context and given 
the proximity of the U.S. market, Canada has used the MJDS to build this recognized 
level of comparability. As a result, there is currently a rapid level of harmonization 
between the two regulatory regimes.
The reform of the Canadian federal legislation regarding financial institutions resulted 
in a series of new pieces of legislation that became effective June 1, 1992. The 
federal legislator then granted federally-incorporated financial institutions the ability to 
directly offer investment counselling and portfolio management services according to 
terms and conditions prescribed by federal regulations. In the case of banks, these 
services were even included in the statutory definition of the "business of banking", 
with the federal legislator appropriating the power to regulate the conditions under 
which banks can provide such services1062. The federal regulatory system for the 
banking sector and the clear Indication of a federal intent to continue in that direction 
are of enormous concern to a certain number of provinces who consider this federal 
initiative an unjustifiable intrusion in a field of provincial jurisdiction. For them, such a 
regulatory system can only lead to a duplication of rules and supervision as well as 
higher administrative and financial costs for issuers, investors, and intermediaries.
Any analysis of the system requires that an evaluation be made of the 
competitiveness of institutions, the fairness with which they are treated by the 
regulatory system and the quality of supervision of the securities sector. In this 
context, how and in what way can a CANSEC (assuming it can exist under the 
Canadian Constitution) meet the specific needs of the provinces more efficiently than 
the current system? Some provinces (like Quebec) are worried they would lose 
control of important levers of their economic development. Opponents to the creation 
of a CANSEC fear the centralization of power would eliminate the benefits of diversity,
In particular, see ss. 409(2)c), 410(3) and 415 of the Bank Act of 1991 (as amended).
256
namely, innovation and regulation that takes the specific needs of the regions into 
account. Having said this, can provincial rules be reconciled with the federal 
government’s proposed regulatory exercise? Ideally, the two-fold regulatory system 
should make way for a single one. This approach would be the best way to dissipate 
any confusion and uncertainty in capital markets, not to mention the cost to the 
industry. However, as long as there exists a duplicate approach in this field of 
jurisdiction, both levels of government will need to coordinate their activities to achieve 
their respective objectives in the current process of harmonization of securities 
regulatory systems.
Given the growing internationalization of financial activities, differences in regulatory 
systems between countries assume greater importance. Because of the changes that 
are occurring elsewhere, Canada’s relative position is continually shifting. Whereas it 
used to be viewed as quite restrictive in its separation of financial functions, Canada 
is considered to be less so today, especially when compared with the U.S., which has 
been slow to revise its regulation of the banking and securities business. To some 
extent, at least, the regulatory structure in Canada is moving towards what is often 
regarded as the European norm, with banks increasingly becoming involved In the 
securities sector1063.
Because many securities firms are affiliated to banks, the federal government should 
not leave the task of regulating the industry to the provinces alone. The constitutional 
authority of the federal government on the subjects of interprovincial and international 
trade and commerce are in direct relation with its authority to legislate directly on 
matters pertaining to competition and solvency. Nevertheless, although Canadian 
federalism has the necessary flexibility (through intergovernmental negotiation and co­
operative agreements) to accommodate itself to the opportunities presented by global 
markets, the division of responsibilities within Canadian system creates a barrier 
which, over time, may emerge as a hinderance to the ability of the country to rapidly 
co-ordinate its action towards integration into the evolving world markets.
While the basic principles under NAFTA are working towards universal banking in 
North America, there are forces working in the other direction. WHITE, supra, note 
1028 at 18.
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As the barriers to the establishment of foreign securities firms in domestic markets 
continue to be lowered through NAFTA, a number of challenges remain for Canadian 
policymakers. While there are clear benefits to be drawn from the entry of foreign 
dealers, this could become problematic if it resulted in too great a dominance of the 
Canadian market. The competitiveness of Canadian firms must be preserved and 
enhanced, particularly while they are losing market share, but not at the cost of the 
stability of the financial system. As foreign dealers continue to penetrate domestic 
markets, the need for cooperation becomes even more urgent. Consequently, major 
steps ought to be taken in the relatively near future. In delaying action on these fronts, 
Canada is still running counter to world trends. It can no longer afford internal 
rivalries. In order to meet foreign competition (particularly in the context of the new 
North American business dynamic), Canadians must show a common front or risk 
being ignored by large MNCs, thus reducing the number of possible securities 
issues/transactions and FDIs in Canada. However, due to the political sensibility of 
this topic, this objective may only occur if the federal government follows a strategy of 
gradual intervention in this sector.
As for the means of arriving at harmonization and coordination outside Canada, 
international organizations (such as the WTO, the OECD and the IOSCO) have 
important roles to play. Moreover, the "spontaneous" harmonization 
phenomenon1064, which leads countries to change their legislation voluntarily by 
taking into account the legislation in force in other states, should not be 
disregarded1065. "Spontaneous" harmonization is not an international nor a regional 
phenomenon. The idea is to make the law of a certain state to evolve to levels almost 
identical to that of neighbouring judicial systems. For instance, Canada has adopted 
numerous national policies towards foreign intermediaries of securities services and 
international capital movements based on American models. In this context, 
compatibility is more important than harmonization per se. This development can be 
observed through the law and the jurisprudence. With respect to the law itself, it is 
expressed in different ways. One example may be the integration, in the national 
legislation, of a series of concepts proposed by an international organization. Another
See, supra, note 10.
F.C. COLLART DUTILLEUL, L’harmonisation intemationale du droit prive, (1993) 24 
R.G.D. 227 at 234.
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example may be the adoption of a double legislation: one to solve internal conflicts 
and the other for international relations. As to the jurisprudence, the role of the courts 
and arbitration tribunals along with their openness towards foreign laws must not be 
completely neglected. However, in view of what was discussed, three questions arise. 
Firstly, must harmonization of trade in securities services be sought on a regional 
(notably continental) level or on a global level? Secondly, must it be sought within 
public or private organizations? Thirdly, should it be a "codified" concept or a 
"Common Law" one?
In North America, the Canadian securities industry is bound by the rules of the FTA 
and NAFTA. These two treaties led to a lowering of barriers to trade in financial 
services and to the establishment of foreign financial institutions in North American 
domestic markets. With the FTA, the Canadian securities industry gained limited 
access to the huge American market. In return, Canada opened the door to a U.S. 
industry which fully benefited from the deregulation of the Canadian financial sector. 
As a result, a new ground for competition between firms from the U.S. and Canada 
started to develop on the eve of the signing of NAFTA. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement presented a new opportunity for Canadians to break open into the 
U.S. market and gain access to a newly liberalized Mexican playing field. In the end, 
the Americans refused to concede any significant ground to the Canadian securities 
industry and the Mexicans allowed only partial access to their appealing territorial 
market. In appearance, Canada does not appear to have been too well served by 
these bilateral and trilateral talks. However, in retrospect, should Canadians have 
stuck solely to multilateral trade negotiations? Surely not.
Concepts of regional and global harmonization are not incompatible. For instance, in 
North America, while the prime model for NAFTA is the FTA, it draws upon ideas 
elaborated in agreements themselves developed in the negotiations of the Uruguay 
Round. Still, disagreements occur between countries concerning the respective 
powers of regional and global organizations. Nevertheless, regional harmonization has 
its limits. For example, it is clear that problems related to securities fraud are of global 
concern. In view of that fact, both public (such as some organs of the United Nations, 
like the WTO) and private (such as the various stock exchanges and specific-industry 
groupings) organizations have a role to play in the quest for the development of rules
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for services relating to securities. Whether or not all concepts need to be codified is 
not of relevance. A common feature of harmonization measures is the loss of freedom 
of action on the part of participants. While harmonization does not involve an 
irrevocable surrender of legislative jurisdiction on the power to enact legislation, it 
involves constraint. Thus, legislators wishing to undertake actions in harmony with 
other legislators must ask themselves: to what extent will a new legislation or treaty 
create disharmony? Harmonization mechanisms must try to identify public demand for 
harmonization and to seek to fulfil that demand. If harmonization is approached in this 
way, the restrictions to freedom of action become less objectionable.
Many differences exist between countries with respect to securities regulation (i.e. 
prospectus requirements, accounting procedures, and clearing and settlement 
mechanisms) or regulation of securities-related services. The fact that different 
approaches exist in different countries may simply reflect the ways in which traditions 
have developed in these countries. Hence, it would be wrong to emphasize the 
superiority of one regulatory scheme over another. For instance, the renown of the 
U.S. and Canadian securities markets attests to the overall efficiency of the regulatory 
scheme as a mechanism of the promotion of investor confidence and the protection of 
investor interests. While harmonization of the U.S. and Canadian securities laws could 
be achieved with relative ease due to the fact that both countries follow similar high 
standards, it would most certainly prove to be more difficult with the involvement of 
other nations1066. For example, an eventual harmonization of the rules with certain 
countries of Central and South America would require compromises on the basic 
principle of full disclosure and fair dealing in the market. The achievement of a certain 
degree of international harmonization of the securities regulation may also only be 
wishful thinking for several years to come. Despite these differences, an agreed upon 
minimum standard would seem to be sufficient for the adequate protection of 
investors in an international market.
According to the recent "MarKet 2000" study produced by the SEC, securities 
regulators should concentrate on protecting investors, facilitating fair competition and
S.M. BECK, "The Recent Trends in the Securities Regulations" in L.S.U.C. Special 
Lectures, Securities Law in the Modem Financial Marketplace (Toronto, Ont.: Richard 
De Boo, 1989) 1 at 3.
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promoting full disclosure rather than imposing entry barriers1067. In this regard, 
harmonization and mutual recognition of foreign regulatory systems have become the 
newest difficulties (and necessities) for modern-day regulators. Over the past few 
years, IOSCO has been promoting harmonization and mutual recognition as the 
leading principle for the regulation of global markets. However, negotiations towards 
the removal of the structural impediments to competition between domestic and 
foreign intermediaries have their limits. Hence, while a detailed agenda can be drawn, 
this may be counter to a "market driven" harmonization. Because a well-functioning 
global securities environment depends on the regulatory provisions defining the 
permissible spheres of activities for foreign and domestic financial institutions, the 
reality of the marketplace confirms the necessity to develop a series of international 
rules specifically adapted to govern the trade of securities-related services. Hence, 
well-designed regulations might be very beneficial to an experienced Canadian 
securities industry.
In the end, it is important to measure the impact of the various aspects of North 
American cooperation on the ways the Canadian securities industry does business. 
Achieving cooperation is not an easy task. It requires agreement on common 
principles, guidelines, and methods of implementation. But differences in legal and 
institutional frameworks and in national objectives, dictated by significant differences 
between nations make such agreements more difficult1068. In North America, some 
progress has been achieved. Changes in domestic regulation (driven by the demands 
of a more global marketplace) have brought some convergence in regulatory 
frameworks. North of the 49th parallel, the Americanization of the Canadian Securities 
regulation and industry has not necessarily been a bad thing. This phenomenon has 
forced Canada to make hard regulatory choices by taking into account developments 
that occur south of the border. Also, it has favoured the introduction of a U.S.-style
On Market 2000, see, generally, Symposium: Market 2000, (1994) 29 J. of Corp. L. 
437ff. T. RUSSO & R. CHASE, Comment on the Long-waited Market 2000 Report, 
I.F.L. Rev. (April 1994) 9. J.M. DOYLE, “SEC Report Stresses Putting Investor First" 
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (28 January 1994) B8. A. RAGHAVAN, "Proposed Rules 
in Market 2000 Study Fall Short of Exchanges’ Suggestions" The Wall Street Journal 
[of New York] (28 January 1994) C1. For the impact of "Market 2000" on Canadian 
regulators, see, J. McFARLAND, "SEC Reform Plan Likely to be Canadian Model" The 
Financial Post [of Toronto] (28 January 1994) 5.
ROSENBERG, supra, note 76 at 177.
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regulation in Canada (with all its complexity and formalization). With the Canadians 
free-riding on the back of the Americans and recognizing compliance with this foreign 
regime, the Canadian securities industry has been kept on top of the "world game". 
However, the FTA and NAFTA appear not to have provoked — at least by themselves 
— the harmonization of laws governing the securities industry1069. The large 
increase in the number of foreign participants in the Canadian market, the growth of 
international activities of Canadian-controlled firms, and the proliferation of new 
financial instruments have all contributed to affect the manner in which the Canadian 
securities industry conducts its activities. In the U.S., free trade negotiations have 
allowed the Canadian securities industry to benefit from a series of adjustments and 
changes in the application of the GSA. The implementation of the MJDS has also 
partially served to gradually remove some of the traditional barriers between American 
banking and securities businesses. However, despite these efforts to harmonize the 
way of doing business in North America, many differences subsist. Still, to remain 
competitive in an ever changing financial and regulatory environment, Canadian firms 
are rapidly adapting themselves by consolidating and restructuring their activities in 
the U.S. In Mexico, recent transformations in the financial services sector combined 
with the implementation of NAFTA create a series of opportunities for the American 
and Canadian securities industries. However, the new rules made in the context of 
North American free trade are not serving all partners the same way1070. Even 
though all jurisdictions have been able to participate in continental harmonization 
efforts, the small less powerful jurisdictions (like Canada and Mexico) had, or were 
perceived as having, less ability to influence the form of harmonization proposals put 
forward by the more powerful jurisdiction, the U.S. Nevertheless, in the years ahead, 
the progressive harmonization of regulation occurring through international 
cooperative efforts among supervisors of the industry may be crowned, in a not so 
distant future, by the emergence of a higher uniformed series of rules which could be 
extended throughout the hemisphere. Although still far from enjoying all-around 
acceptance, discussions leading towards such a possibility testifies to its significance.
"With some exceptions, NAFTA does not address in any consistent way the subject of 
harmonization of internal regulations over service industries. A de facto tendency 
towards harmonization does exist, however." S. ZAMORA, The Americanization of 
Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, (1993) 
24 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 391 at 410.
CHAPUT, supra, note 888 at 6-7.
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Such aspirations would have been unthinkable only a couple decades ago. That it is 
thinkable today shows how far the conception of free trade in financial services has 
developed and will continue to develop. However, the U.S. is the maestro of this 
symphony of changes. Thus, to fully benefit from the advantages brought about by 
continental free trade, the Canadian securities industry may need to continue to adapt 
its ways and play the American concerto.
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